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ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 



NOAH K. DAVIS, A.M., Ph.D., LL.D. 

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia 



Tpiipovrai Trdvres oi avdpdjireioi v6p.oi i/irb ivbs rod 
6elov • KparieL yap toctovtov 6k6<tov idi\ei, Kal e£ap/c&c 
iracn icai irepiyheTcu. — Herakleitos 




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Copyright, 1900, 1907, 
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PEEFACE 



This treatise is intended for readers who feel the need of 
a simple, direct and comprehensive theory of morals. Also 
it is designed to serve as a handbook in institutions for 
higher education, where the subject of ethics is usually 
offered to hearers who, though already well advanced in a 
course of liberal studies, are presumed to have no acquain- 
tance with this branch of philosophy. My experience in 
teaching it has led me to give such pupils primarily a 
rounded scheme, postponing an examination of the various 
and often conflicting views of philosophical moralists. Ac- 
cordingly, in this elementary treatise, I have simply pre- 
sented my preferred theory, starting from a principle, 
proceeding logically in the development of a complete sys- 
tem, and indicating cursorily many practical applications. 

The preparation has been long and diligent. I have 
been in search of truth, glad to receive light from any source, 
and have now summed the results of my reading, thinking 
and teaching for many years in what is here offered to my 
fellow-teachers, hoping it may be suited to their wants, and 
aid them in imparting high ideals and shaping noble charac- 
ters. Naturally I am solicitous that my work should be 
well received and approved, but whatever judgment be fin- 
ally passed upon it, I shall have been conscious of sincere 
desire and earnest endeavor to reach and teach sound doc- 
trine. This task finished, I shall hardly undertake another, 
but rest in the hope that what is now done shall be found 



iv PREFACE 

well done, proving a step toward truth in philosophy, and 
a help toward righteousness in life. 

An apology is perhaps needed for overstepping bounds 
with so large a bundle of annotations ; which, since they are 
not at all essential to unfolding the theory, might have been 
omitted, and may be overlooked. This desultory collection 
of citations from authorities, of quotations from general lit- 
erature, of discussions on minor points, together with what- 
ever occurred to me as illustrative, constitutes in some 
measure a variorum, an anthology. I feel quite sure that 
the scholarly reader will be pleased to see the very words of 
eminent writers, that the earnest student will be glad to 
have side-lights and finger-posts on the way, and that neither 
will be offended if here and there he stumble on an enliven- 
ing trifle. 

Also I apologize for the marginal references to my other 
works, " The Theory of Thought," " Elements of Deductive 
Logic," " Elements of Inductive Logic," and " Elements of 
Psychology." As they together with this essay form a con- 
nected series, the reference from one to another avoids repe- 
tition of statement, yet preserves continuity of treatment. 

Acknowledgments are due to Professor Collins Denny of 

Vanderbilt University, once my pupil, now my peer. By 

his encouragement the work has been accomplished, by his 

critical revision emended, and by his thoughtful suggestions 

enriched. 

NOAH K. DAVIS 

University of Virginia 



CONTENTS 



PROLEGOMENA 

I. Psychological page 

§ 1. Prerequisite. Mind. Its powers 1 

§ 2. Practical reason or conscience. Moral judgment 3 

§ 3. Moral sentiments. Respect. Reverence 4 

§ 4. Approbation and disapprobation. Their mark 5 

§ 5. Desire. Distinguished from feeling. Distributed 5 

§ 6. The moral impulse. Its universality. Its supremacy ... 6 

§ 7. Volition. How related to cognition ; to desire 8 

§ 8. Analysis of volition. Two conditions. Three elements ... 10 

§ 9. Choice or election. Intention. Effort 10 

II. Philosophical 

§ 10. Free-will. The power of choice a reality 13 

§ 11. Intuitions of pure reason. Their reality. Conscience ... 16 

§ 12. Personality, imperfect and perfect. Immortality 18 

§ 13. The Deity, his existence. An argument for 20 

§ 14. Relations of individuals, spatial, temporal, causative .... 24 

§ 15. Teleological relations. The kingdom of ends 26 

§ 16. The spiritual and psycho-physical realms 29 

§ 17. Law, its formative elements. Its definition 30 

§ 18. Its kinds. Natural law. Moral law 32 



ETHICS. 

FIRST PART — OBLIGATION 

Introduction 

§ 19. Moral law a reality. Ethics denned 35 

§ 20. Two methods avoided 37 

§ 21. The method adopted in this treatise 38 

I. Rights 

§ 22. The claim. Contention for private ; for public 42 

§ 23. The task of ethics. A right, how to be treated 43 

v 



Vi CONTENTS 

PAGE 

§ 24. Conscious life a condition and determinant of 43 

§ 25. Desires the basis. The ethical principle 45 

§ 26. Kinds of rights, reduced to liberty 49 

II. Liberty 

§ 27. Freedom, the power of choosing, a postulate 51 

§ 28. Four constitutional limitations, and corollary 52 

§ 29. Freedom absolute. Liberty discriminated 54 

§ 30. Objective restrictions of liberty 56 

§ 31. Subjective restrictions. Persuasion. Menace 56 

§ 32. Warranted restrictions. Unavoidable. Avoidable .... 58 

III. Trespass 

§ 33. Personal relations determinative of rights 60 

§ 34. A right implies possible interference. A wrong 61 

§ 35. Modified statement of the moral principle 63 

§ 36. Trespass defined. Its wide sense. Limits liberty 64 

§ 37. Practical difficulties. Partial clearances 66 

§ 38. Property rights. Adjudication of 68 

§ 39. The trespass of forced intrusion, of vice, of discourtesy ... 69 

§ 40. Personal honor, its offense and defense 71 

§ 41. Indirect trespass, its parity. Sin is trespass 74 

IV. The Law 

§ 42. Its cognitive origin, and its formula 76 

§ 43. Conscience defined. Inerrant. Ineducable 77 

§ 44. Imperatives. The moral law categorical ........ 80 

§ 45. Supremacy of the law. Addressed to the will 82 

§ 46. The law objective in origin and character 84 

§ 47. Negative form. Deductions. Decalogue. Civil law .... 87 

§ 48. This form inadequate. Positive form . 91 

V. Sanctions 

§ 49. Consequences ratify and sanctify the law 95 

§ 50. Subjective sanctions. Moral sentiments 97 

§ 51. The natural impulse to reward and punish 99 

§ 52. The subjective objectified, and proportioned 100 

§ 53. Legalized forms of. Keduction to unity 102 

§ 54. Pain a penal ordinance. Not an evil 104 

VI. Right and Wrong 

§ 55. The meaning and extension of the terms 107 

§ 56. Their opposition. Determination of cases 109 

§ 57. Moral quality not outside of volition 112 



CONTENTS Vii 

PAGE 

§ 58. Moral quality a property of the intention 113 

§ 59. The immediate and the ulterior intention 115 

§ 60. Imputation of moral quality to other activities 117 

§ 61. The moral paradox 121 

VII. Justice 

§ 62. The positive demand of the moral law 123 

§ 63. Definitions. Injustice and trespass identified 124 

§ 64. Corrective and distributive justice 126 

§ 65. Legalized justice. Its basis. Its imperfection 127 

§ 66. Equity, its jural and its general sense 129 

§ 67. Mercy, social, judicial, divine, consists with justice .... 131 

VIII. Duty and Virtue 

§ 68. Duty, meaning of, positive form of 136 

§ 69. Right and duty. Corollaries. Other synonyms 137 

§ 70. Virtuous character, how formed. Virtue defined 139 

§ 71. The cardinal virtues, summed in justice 141 

§ 72. Vice is slavery ; virtue is not liberty 141 

IX. Selfishness 

§ 73. The conscious ego, and the represented ego 145 

§ 74. The so-called love of self, and duty to self 146 

§ 75. That there is any such duty denied 147 

§ 76. Citation and interpretation of examples 148 

§ 77. General characteristics of the doctrine 151 

§ 78. Argument in support of. First part 153 

§ 79. Second part. Conclusion 155 

X. Service 

§ 80. Extension of the notion of duty. Service obligatory .... 158 

§ 81. Illustrative cases. The law restated 159 

§ 82. The dignity of service. Ministry. Heroism 161 

§ 83. Distribution of benefits. Participation in. Modified altruism 164 

§ 84. The using and serving each other as means 165 

§ 85. Stewardship, in holding and using, In defending 166 

§ 86. The law of service objectively insufficient 169 

XI. Charity 

§ 87. Love obligatory. Definition and distinctions 172 

§ 88. Affection can be and is commanded 173 

§ 89. The variations and extension of the obligation 175 

§ 90. The law of loving service. The law of love 176 

§ 91. Progress in moral culture. Irregularity of 178 

§ 92. The law of love, the law of liberty 181 



viii CONTENTS 

XII. Welfare page 

§ 93. Pleasure not the sole content of welfare 183 

§ 94. Welfare defined. Its imperfect realization 186 

§ 95. Happiness its reflex. Special conditions 188 

§ 96. The summum bonum. Ancient doctrines of 192 

§ 97. Modern doctrines of. The adopted view 195 

XIII. Deity 

§ 98. His existence postulated. Schemes without God 197 

§ 99. His attributes. Anthropomorphic. The supernatural . . . 199 

§ 100. No other ground for complete ethical theory 202 

§ 101. Not the will, but the nature of God, ultimate 203 

§ 102. Solves obligation. Ours Godward. He to us-ward .... 205 



SECOND PART — ORGANIZATION 

Transition 

§ 103. A brief summary of the foregoing doctrine 209 

§ 104. Complex social relations now to be considered 211 

I. The Man 

§ 105. Is a duplex organism. His corporeal organization .... 213 

§ 106. His mental organization. Exemplified in desires 214 

§ 107. What, if alone ; or if in society, without affections .... 216 

§ 108. A solitary unreal. Man hardly without affections .... 219 

§ 109. Ethical elements discoverable in personal relations only . . 220 

II. The Family 

§ 110. Variety in obligations due to variety in relations 222 

§ 111. Natural order determines the family 223 

§ 112. The ideal family. Rarely realized 224 

§ 113. Its organic order to be upheld. Restored 225 

§ 114. Marriage. Five prerequisites considered 225 

§ 115. Its dissolution. Legal divorce ; limitation of 228 

§ 116. Unmarried members of society. Their disadvantage . . . 230 

§ 117. Family members, mutual influence and obligation of . . . 230 

§ 118. Individuality and personality of the family 232 

§ 119. Its extended life and obligations 233 

§ 120. Family property, its ownership and management 234 

§ 121. Testamentary disposition of. By consent 235 

III. The Community 

§ 122. A product of pressure. An organism 237 

§ 123. Obligation of intercourse. Seclusion condemned 239 



CONTENTS 



IX 



PAGE 

§ 124. The common law of social decorum 240 

§ 125. Truthfulness a condition. Deception 241 

§ 126. Promises. Contracts. Common honesty 243 

§ 127. Minor organisms subordinate to the whole 244 

§ 128. Division of labor. Its organic and moral effects 246 

§ 129. Capital and labor. Socialism. A preference 248 



TV. The State 

§ 130. Its purpose. Its content. Limits of this discussion , 

§ 131. Forms of government. Its three essential branches . 

§ 132. The State an organism. Its ethical character . . , 

§ 133. Its basis the family. Other organic members . . . 

§ 134. Its individuality and personality wherein manifest . 

§ 135. Diversity of obligations. Civic virtue, patriotism 

§ 136. Ground of punishment. Right and duty of defense . 

§ 137. The defense of its members and of itself against trespass 

§ 138. The right to punish is in this defense. Discipline 

§ 139. Of rebellion, and revolution ; and of defensive war . 

§ 140. The relations of States. A universal State .... 



250 
251 
254 
256 
259 
261 
263 
265 
266 
268 
269 



V. The Church 

§ 141. Religion, its definition and division 272 

§ 142. Subject, in all its forms, to ethical principles 274 

§ 143. The Christian Church, incorporating general ethics .... 277 

§ 144. Its rise and resistless progress 278 

§ 145. Elements of its power. Philosophy of its history 281 

§ 146. Its union with the State. Opposed functions 282 

§ 147. The Church Universal. Its ethical essence 286 



"Ocra icrrlv a\r)@f}, ocra crefivd, ocra SiKaia, 6<ra ayvd, o<ra 7rpo<r<f>t\f} } 
ocra ev<j>rjfxxi } el tls aperrj kolI et rts tiraivo<Sj Tavra A.oyi'£ecr0€. 



ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 



PEOLEGOMENA 

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL 

§ 1, Before undertaking an inquiry into the principles of 
Ethics and their chief consequences, it is needful to examine, 
in a special way, the constitution of the human mind. The 
whole doctrine of morals concerns intelligences that are 
sentient and free, and is derived from their nature and 
relations. A preliminary survey of this ground consists in 
a specific study of human nature, in order to a study of 
human relations. The former is a psychological inquiry, 
and to it we at once proceed. 

Mind is conscious substance. The consideration of sub- 
stance may be omitted, and mind regarded as merely a com- 
plement of conscious activities, the knowing and feeling, 
desiring and willing. These are modes of consciousness, 
the universal characteristic of mental activity. They are 
posited as generic powers of mind. Each is subdivided into 
certain specific powers. The faculty of knowing, or cog- 
nition, is subdivided into intuition, memory, imagination, 
and thought. The intuitive intelligence is empirical and 
pure. Empirical or sensuous intuition is perception. Pure 
or non-sensuous intuition is pure intellect or reason. Pure 
reason is speculative and practical. 

This distribution of mental powers, together with the ex- 
plication now before us of some of their specific functions, 



2 PROLEGOMENA 

is a logical treatment of facts of consciousness in accord with 
approved introspective psychology. 1 

Let it be observed that a power, in its most general sense, 
is simply a possibility of change. Possible mental changes, 
known by experience, are classified as powers of mind. 
These are called mental capacities and faculties, the one de- 
noting power to be changed, to receive by impression, the 

i An elaborate discussion of the mental powers, according to the fore- 
going distribution, may be seen in my Elements of Psychology. For a con- 
cise statement of the distribution itself, see idem, §§ 71-78. For its ground, 
see § 79. For power, see § 53. The "New Psychology" discards this classi- 
fication, and on various grounds proposes some other. Wundt, in his Human 
and Animal Psychology, § 1, p. 4, says: " Wolff is the originator of the so- 
called theory of mental faculties which has influenced psychology down to 
the present day. This theory, based upon a superficial classification of 
mental processes, was couched in terms of a number of general notions, — 
memory, imagination, sensibility, understanding, etc., — which it regarded 
as simple and fundamental forces of mind. It was left for Herbart, one of 
the acutest thinkers of our century, to give a convincing proof of the utter 
emptiness of this theory." Four pages beyond, however, Wundt speaks of 
"mind and the principal mental functions . . . sense, feeling, idea, and 
will," also of " our experience of sensations, feelings, and thoughts," and 
further on, p. 17, he says, "we are undoubtedly able to pass judgment." 
This is quite enough to bring us together ; for by powers, faculties, 
capacities, we mean precisely functions, neither more nor less, and as to 
their logical distribution, we shall gladly accept a new one so soon as it is 
settled and proved superior. Meantime we are persuaded that the names of 
the various faculties or functions, which have prevailed in science from the 
time of Socrates until now, and the distinctions, which are so embedded in 
all Aryan and Semitic languages that even their critics necessarily use them, 
are sufficient for our present purpose, readily understood, and not likely to 
pass away at the wave of a wand. 

A disciple of Wundt says: "Association of ideas, thinking, reasoning, 
. . . used to be considered as separate faculties of the soul, and as show- 
ing the mind doing different things. But this view is now completely 
given up . . . mind does only one thing . . . that one thing is combining." 
But this is simply a question of the logical reduction of functions to a sum- 
mum genus. If it be shown that they are all merely modes of combining 
rather than modes of consciousness, a new reduction to unity will have been 
attained, a scientific modification of the science. But such reduction to a 
genus does not erase the distinctions among species. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL 3 

other denoting power to change, to impart by expression. 
The further distribution, particularly of the cognitive facul- 
ties and capacities, is made, not with reference to differences 
discerned in the mental action and reaction, but with refer- 
ence to differences in the objects cognized. The mind re- 
sponds to the action upon it of objects greatly differing in 
kind, and its reactions are classified as different modes of 
knowing. The feelings, desires, and volitions correspond to 
the cognitions on which they are severally conditioned, and 
are classified accordingly. 

Thus the many variations in conscious activity are origi- 
nally determined objectively, and are merely various modes 
of consciousness. 1 

§ 2. Pure intuition is the immediate cognition by reason 
of a pure idea or necessary truth discerned on some empirical 
occasion, and abstracted. Such are the ideas of space and 
time, and the principles of contradiction and causation. 
These are speculative. Likewise, on the occasion of a per- 
sonal action, pure reason discerns that it has moral quality, 
that it is either right or wrong. This implies an abstract 
intuitive principle marking the distinction, which principle 
takes the form of an imperative, enjoining the right and for- 
bidding the wrong. In this practical form it is recognized 
as the moral law. We identify the practical reason with 
conscience, and define conscience as pure reason discerning 
moral law. 2 

Thought, or the logical faculty, makes inferences from the 
data of intuition. When it subsumes a special case, and 
concludes a class of actions, or a particular action, to be 
right or wrong, this is moral judgment. 3 A moral judgment, 

i See infra, § 106. 

2 The matter here simply stated is examined infra, § 43 sq. See also 
infra, §§ 58-60. 

8 Both intuitions and inferences are judgments ; see Elements of Psychol- 



4 PROLEGOMENA 

then, is a deduction from the moral principle or law, as an 
ultimate major premise, to precepts of less generality, and 
thence to particular cases of obligation. The ultimate major 
is purely intuitive ; the minor is usually empirical in charac- 
ter. The process is strictly logical, requiring only correct 
inference. It does not differ in its forms from the exercise 
of thought on other matter, as in Economics, and is dis- 
tinguished as a moral judgment solely with reference to its 
matter, which is ethical. 

§ 3. Feelings are correlative to cognitions; that is, they 
attend cognitions, coexist with them, and correspond to 
them. There are three classes : sensations, emotions, and 
sentiments. Sentiments are divided into sensuous and pure ; 
and pure sentiments are subdivided into intellectual and 
moral. Only the latter call for present consideration. 1 

The basis of all moral sentiment is the cognition of moral 
law by conscience. The vast, weighty and all-pervading 
feeling of moral obligation, or sentiment of duty, correlative 
to conscience, may be taken as generic, as implying the moral 
sentiments generally. 

Because of his relation to moral law, every person has 
moral worth or dignity. The sentiment which the contem- 
plation of this worth inspires is respect. Positive respect is 
felt for persons whose habitual conduct conforms to moral 
law ; disrespect for those who disregard it. A show of un- 
due disrespect excites indignation, reasserting worth. The 
consciousness of one's own dignity and observance of the 
law inspires self-respect, a sentiment quite distinct from 
pride and vanity, but consistent with humility or the senti- 
ment of subjection to the law. The opposite feeling, arising 

ogy, § 212. Throughout the present treatise, however, we shall use the 
unqualified term judgment, and the phrase moral judgment, in the specific 
sense of logical judgment or inference, as distinguished from intuition, 
i See Elements of Psychology, § 231, and § 254. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL 5 

in view of what one is and does in contrast with what he 
ought to be and do, is self-abasement or humiliation. 

Respect becomes reverence when a person's character and 
conduct are seen to be an embodiment of moral law. The 
omniscience and omnipotence of Deity excite our highest ad- 
miration and awe ; but only before the white heat of his 
holiness do we feel reverence, deepening into veneration and 
adoration. 

§ 4. Another class of moral sentiments relates more espe- 
cially to particular personal actions. When the agent is some 
other person, then, according to my judgment on his action, 
I experience a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, 
exciting a disposition to reward or punish him. When the 
agent is myself in conscious action, then, according to my 
judgment on my own act, I experience self-approbation or 
self-condemnation, self-reproach, shame, remorse, together 
with a sentiment of ill desert that sometimes prompts a 
self-surrender to justice. The latter sentiments, while com- 
patible with pride, are inconsistent with self-respect. 

The sentiments of approbation and disapprobation are 
marked as pleasant and painful. There is probably no feel- 
ing more pure, more delicate and delightful than self-appro- 
bation. Self-condemnation, on the contrary, is always painful, 
and when it deepens to remorse, becomes intolerable. Thus 
these sentiments are a natural reward and punishment for 
right and wrong doing. 1 

§ 5. Qesire is a conscious activity marked by a want imply- 
ing an impulse or tendency toward an object seemingly fitted 
to the want. This object is quite commonly called the ob- 
ject of desire, but strictly and properly it is an object of cog- 
nition. For, in order to desire, there must be a co-existing 
cognition of an object, which object being known and judged 
1 This point is considered infra, § 50. 



6 PROLEGOMENA 

\ 
suitable to the want comes to be desired. Thus desire is 
conditioned on cognition. 1 

A feeling correlative to the cognition is also a condition 
precedent to desire. Notwithstanding the intimacy of this 
relation, which has caused confusion, feelings and desires 
should be clearly set apart. The former are characterized by 
pleasure and pain; the latter by want, a state of unrest 
which must be distinguished from pain, implying an impulse 
leading to satisfaction which must be distinguished from 
pleasure. Certain feelings, pleasant or painful, excite desire, 
certain others attend it, certain others arise on its gratifica- 
tion ; but these should not be confused with the desire. For 
desire has its own distinctive mark, a want, this being absent 
from feeling. Also the notion that desires are states of pain, 
and their satisfaction pleasure, is contrary to the facts that 
the disquietude of desire is often attended by highly pleasura- 
ble feeling, as in the enjoyment of many kinds of pursuit, 
and that quite often a satisfaction earnestly sought is at- 
tended by painful feeling, as in the infliction of punishment. 

Desires are distributed as the appetites, which have a 
physical basis, and are typified by hunger; the appetences, 
which are purely psychical, as desire for continued life, for 
pleasure, property, knowledge, power; and the affections, 
also purely psychical, as love of kindred, friends, country, 
mankind, God. The appetites and appetences crave, or im- 
pel to take ; the affections bestow, or impel to give. There 
is also a series of opposites called aversions. 2 

§ 6. Desires often conflict ; that is, the gratification of 
some one is incompatible with the gratification of some other. 

1 This is a real condition, that is, a condition of realizing, or of the 
reality, and should be distinguished from the causal condition and the 
logical condition. It is conditio sine qua non or necessitas antecedentis, that 
which must he in order that the other may be. See my Elements of Deduc- 
tive Logic, § 110, for several senses in which the term condition is used. 

2 See the discussion in Elements of Psychology, § 255 sq. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL 7 

Conflict occurs between members of the same class, but more 
notably between members of different classes. In general 
there is opposition between the craving and the giving de- 
sires, between interest that seeks to gain for self, and love 
which seeks to give out from one's own resources what may 
benefit another. Hence there appears a need for some con- 
trolling principle. It is found in the impulse to duty, the 
desire to do right, which by its nature is fitted to subordinate 
and regulate all other desires. 

That this moral impulse is hi every human mind becomes 
evident on the following considerations : First, the origin of 
any impulse to right action is unaccountable, if not native. 1 
If native, though often too weak to be effective, it is uni- 
versal. Secondly, consciousness testifies that there is ever an 
impulse to do right rather than wrong, even when contrary 
desires prevail. Thirdly," the moral law discerned by con- 
science is universal ; its authority is directed to the will of 
every person, commanding right action. But, since any exer- 
cise of will is conditioned on desire, the behest of moral law 
would be fruitless, were there not in everyone an impulse to 
obedience complementing conscience. 

Normally the relation of the moral impulse to the other 
desires is that of supremacy. This is evident from its direct 
connection with the supreme law, the moral law, from whose 
authority it derives its force. When impelled in diverse 
directions by the appetites, appetences and affections, the 
moral impulse urges us to the course indicated by moral 

1 The hypothesis of evolution, "The Natural History of Morals," is pro- 
posed to explain otherwise its origin. The moral impulse is supposed to he 
evolved from the natural inclination for pleasure and repugnance to pain, 
and thus conscience is selfish prudence, merely refined. But we ohserve 
that even in enlightened society highly cultured men often recognize as 
duties acts that are painfully repugnant, and as immoralities many that are 
highly pleasurahle. Surely a morality evolved from pleasure and pain 
would, on the contrary, condemn the severe virtues, and approve licentious 
enjoyments. See Darwin's Descent of Man, ch. 3; and infra, § 20, note. 



8 PR OLE G OMEN A 

judgment as in accord with moral law. Like conscience, this 
impulse is not concerned with the particular matter of ac- 
tions, but is simply regulative, impelling to compliance with 
the judgment. A will wholly good always yields to the 
moral impulse. That we so often disregard it shows that our 
will is not wholly good. That, nevertheless, we so often do 
right, is chiefly because subordinate desires frequently coin- 
cide with and reenforce the moral impulse. Moreover, the 
moral impulse incites us to observe the moral quality of par- 
ticular actions, and to search for it when not evident. The 
observation and search is effected by the intellect, and issues 
in a moral judgment. If the intellect were perfect, and the 
moral impulse had force conformable to its function, there 
would be no wrong doing. 1 

§ 7. Volition or will closes the circuit of the generic 
powers. It is the faculty or activity in whose exercise mind 
chooses between alternative actions conceived as possible, 
and strives accordingly to modify its own state merely, or to 
superinduce muscular movement. 

Volition, like cognition, relates to an object. The object 
of cognition is a fact, something to be known ; the object of 
volition is an act, something to be done, The normal aim 
of cognition is truth; the normal aim of volition is duty. 
Truth is the contingent property of a proposition ; we ex- 
amine it, and if found true, believe it. Duty is the contin- 
gent property of an action ; we examine it, and if found due, 
approve it. Logic states the laws of thought, and the sub- 
jective result of their observance is knowledge. Ethics 
states the laws of conduct, and the subjective result of their 
observance is virtue. 

Volition is inferior to cognition as dependent on it for 
intelligent guidance. A judgment is prerequisite to any 

1 See Elements of Psychology, § 264 sq: 



PSYCHOLOGICAL 9 

adjusted action ; a moral judgment, to any righteous action. 
Through this moral judgment a good will is furthermore 
dependent on conscience. 

Volition is superior to cognition as controlling it. Atten- 
tion is a concentration of the cognitive consciousness, and to 
effect this concentration is the sole function of will. All 
voluntary effort, even that which issues in muscular move- 
ment, resolves, in the last analysis, into a fixing of attention. 
By voluntary attention to this or that object the cognitive 
powers are directly, and through these all others are indi- 
rectly, governed. Voluntary attention is thus the sole yet 
sufficient means of self-control. We have no other, and we 
need no other, means of repressing, arousing, directing or 
combining our faculties, whether of cognition, feeling or 
desire. For instance, a complete withdrawal of cognition 
from a desired object, at once determines for the time a com- 
plete cessation of the desire. 

Volition and desire are psychological correlatives, mutually 
conditioning each other. Desires condition volition by fur- 
nishing occasion for choice and efficient causes of consequent 
effort. Obviously there can be no choice except between 
desired objects, and no effort except from impulse. Hence 
desires are properly motives, they move us to action. 1 On 
the other hand, desires are conditioned on volition. For 

1 A motive is properly that which causes motion. In our psychology the 
word expresses the prompting, impulsion, pressure, tendency, propensity or 
inclination of desire. These words are originally mechanical, and in their 
application to mind we must beware of a mechanical interpretation. The 
term motive is often, though less properly, applied to the reason that deter- 
mines the choice, also to the final cause, the inducement, the object desired, 
the end proposed. But " the deliberate preference by which we are moved 
to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the principle of 
action ; and desire and reason, which are for the sake of something, are the 
origin of deliberate preference." — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. vi, 
ch. 2. Accordingly, in the present treatise, we identify motive with the 
desire that prevails. 



10 PROLEGOMENA 

desire implies preference or choice, and its impulse implies 
pressure toward endeavor or effort. Clearly there can be no 
impulsion except in the presence of something impelled, 
which is the volition. 1 

§ 8. An analysis of an exercise of volition discovers five 
essential facts which seem to be ultimate, as follow : 

1. The idea of something to be done, or of an act in order 
to an end. The end, and therefore the means, is conceived 
by the agent to be desirable, and the action practicable. This 
is a product of cognition. 2 

2. An impulse urging to action. Connie ting impulses 
coexist. The one that prevails, with which the volition 
finally accords, is the motive. This is an exercise of desire. 

3. The preference of the conscious ego for one line of 
action rather than another, or for non-action. This is choice 
or election. 

4. The resolution of the choice into an intent to take a 
certain course, either instantly or in due time. This is inten- 
tion. 

5. An exertion or striving to effectuate the intention, con- 
straining, by means of attention, mental changes and muscu- 
lar movements. This is voluntary effort. 

The idea and the impulse are not elements, but are real 
conditions, of volition. Its elements are choice, intention and 
effort. 3 

§ 9. Choice or election is a phenomenon sui generis, oc- 
curring only within consciousness, and having no analogue 

1 See Elements of Psychology, § 257, and § 268 sq. "Appetite is the 
will's solicitor, and the will is appetite's controller ; what we covet according 
to the one, by the other we often reject." — Hooker, Eccles. Pol., bk. i. 

2 "Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and 
draw after it the acts of the will, this is certain, it does of necessity precede 
them, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports 
it to the will as amiable." — South, Sermon on Matthew, 10 : 37. 

3 See Elements of Psychology, § 272 sq. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL 11 

in the material universe. There are two special conditions 
precedent, corresponding to the general conditions of volition 
already cited. These are : 

1. Alternativity of possible actions, implying independ- 
ence of objective control or causation. 

2. A like plurality of impulses, counter-checking and re- 
straining each other until a judgment is rendered, and the 
choice made. 

Deliberative intelligence, aroused and influenced by the 
impelling desires, considers the alternatives, but does not 
causally determine the election. 1 That the election accord 
with the weightier judgment is normal, but not necessary. 
Good and weighty reasons are often rejected in favor of 
trifles ; as when one incurs danger to gratify curiosity. Thus 
choice is largely independent, both of the judgment which 
presumes to dictate it, and of the desires which impel it. Its 
conditions being fulfilled, it is free between the possible alter- 
natives. Indeed this is the essence of choice ; no freedom, 
no choice ; no choice, no freedom. We shall inquire pres- 
ently whether there be in reality such a thing as choice. 

Observe the distinction between choice making and choice 
made. When chooshig, one is vacillating under the influence 

1 Intelligence, but not choice, may be fairly likened to a balance, and 
reasons to the weights. Intellect deliberates (from de and librare, to weigh, 
from libra, a balance). It ponders the facts and the reasons with a view to 
choice and decision. — Elements of Psychology, § 273, note. Deliberate pref- 
erence, as well as desire, looks always forward in time. — Idem, § 255. 
"Nothing past is the object of deliberate preference; as no one deliberately 
prefers that Troy should have been destroyed ; for a man does not deliberate 
about what has happened, but about what is future and contingent. For 
what is past does not admit of being undone ; hence Agathon rightly says : 
1 Of this alone even God is deprived, the power of making things that are 
past never to have been.' "—Aristotle, Nick. Ethics, bk. vi, ch. 2, 6. 

"Noil tamen irritum, 
Quodcunque retro est, efficiet ; neque 
Diffinget infectumque reddet, 

Quod fugiens semel hora vexit." 

— Horace, Odes, lib. iii, car. xxix. 



12 PROLEGOMENA 

of opposed reasons and conflicting desires; when he has 
chosen, the question is resolved, his resolution is taken, he 
has decided what to do. This issue of choice is intention. 
It is static rather than dynamic ; a state of mind lying be- 
tween choice and effort, between election and fruition. Its 
duration is indefinite, varying from an imperceptible instant 
to any length of time awaiting opportunity. When this offers, 
the effort takes place, perhaps blindly, that is, without 
renewed or further deliberation, and the thing is done. 

Effort is the complete and final expression of the free per- 
sonality or ego. As choice issues in intention, so effort issues 
in attention, thereby inducing other mental modes, perhaps 
with muscular motions. In the effort the subjective voluntary 
action is complete, even though the intended consequents be 
imperfect or entirely null. 



PHILOSOPHICAL 13 



PEOLEGOMESA 

H. PHILOSOPHICAL 

§ 10. Besides the foregoing psychological doctrines there 
are a number of principles more strictly philosophical, which 
also are prerequisite to Ethics. 1 

1 There are various opinions as to the proper scope and definition of 
philosophy, due mostly to the fact that the word is taken, as is likewise the 
case with many other important terms, sometimes in a generic and sometimes 
in a specific sense. 

Taken generically it embraces as subordinate branches certain aprioric 
sciences, called the philosophic sciences, as logic, ethics, aesthetics, episte- 
mology, metaphysics. This last, metaphysics, which is often loosely re- 
garded as synonymous with philosophy, is more strictly the science of 
reality. It inquires into the real nature of both corporeal and mental 
objects, seeking to pass from the subjective to the objective, from thoughts 
to things. Lotze subdivides it into ontology, rational psychology, and 
cosmology. 

Other thinkers take the still wider view that philosophy " consists in the 
development of a comprehensive and consistent theory of the universe." 
— Kulpe, Int. to Phil., § 31, 3. Paulsen warmly pronounces "Philosophie 
der Inbegriff aller wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. ' ' — Einleitung in die Phi- 
losophie, S. 34. So also Penan: "Philosopher c'est connaitre l'universe. 
L' universe se compose de deux mondes, le monde physique et le monde 
moral, la nature et rhumanitC. L'e'tude de la nature et de l'humanite" est 
done toute la philosophie." — Fragments Philosophiques, p. 292. Likewise 
Wundt defines philosophy as "die allgemeine Wissenschaft, welche die 
durch die Einzelwissenschaften vermittelten allgemeinen Erkenntnisse zu 
einem widerspruchslosen System zu vereinigen hat." — System der Philo- 
sophie, S. 21. This accords with the saying of Spencer: "Knowledge of 
the lowest kind is ununified knowledge ; science is partially unified knowl- 
edge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge." Kant, discarding the 
narrower scholastic definitions, gives as a " world-definition " the following : 
"Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential 
ends of human reason." 

Taken specifically, as coordinate with the specific sciences named above, 



14 PROLEGOMENA 

Whether there be, truly and really, among the mental 
activities a choice between alternatives, is properly a metaphy- 
sical question concerning a reality. For this subjective 
freedom is not a fact of consciousness, and thus psycho- 
logical ; for consciousness is cognizant of positive facts only, 
and the conception of freedom is strictly negative, merely the 
absence of constraint. Moreover, an unconsciousness of con- 
straint does not prove its absence, for it may conceivably 
exist out of consciousness. Hence the reality of choice, of 
freedom in willing, is a debatable question of metaphysics. 

Some thinkers hold that the universal conviction of an 
ability to choose is a delusion which philosophy exposes ; that 
freedom is impossible in reality, since it is contrary to the 
strictly universal law that every change or event is caused ; 
and, indeed, that freedom is impossible even as a conception, 
for this would be contradictory to the same law, which is 
a necessary notion. 1 

Now, if the mental act called a choice be in every respect a 
change or event, then it must be allowed that it is caused, 
and so necessitated to be just what it becomes ; that there 
is no real choice, no possible alternative, no freedom. In 
other words, if the act be essentially a case of causation; then 
the doctrine of necessity, of bond-will, is true. 

But it seems reasonable to hold that the fact, as to its 
essence, is out of the category of causation. In so far as it 
is an act passing from indecision to decision, it is obviously 

"philosophy is the science of principles." — Ueberweg, Hist, of Phil, § 1. 
It is thus the investigation and systematic exposition of the fundamental and 
universal truths that underlie all the sciences, "the investigation of the pre- 
suppositions of science."— Kulpe, Int. to Phil, § 31, 4. It is evident that 
all sciences have their common root in philosophy so restricted; for all 
speak of conditions, axioms, laws, forces, possibilities, realities, etc., which 
they cannot undertake to establish or explain as applied in diverse senses to 
diverse spheres, and therefore are relegated for scientific exposition to phi- 
losophy thus specialized. 

i See mv Elements of Inductive Logic, § 18. 



PHIL OS OPHICAL 1 5 

subject to causal constraint; for the mere presentation to 
the will of opposed alternatives, each conceived to be possi- 
ble, as to go or stay, is a cause that necessitates the willing 
of one ; I must choose, as we say. 1 But in so far as the 
fact is merely a preference of this to that, which is its es- 
sence, it does not appear to be a case of causation ; for mere 
preference does not imply a change ; it is not from that to 
this, but only is it this rather than that. Circumstances de- 
termine that I shall take a step, but not at all which step 
shall be taken. As the essence of choice, and that which 
distinguishes it from all other mental facts, indeed from all 
things else, is simply the taking of one rather than the 
other of two possible alternatives, and as this does not imply 
causation, choice may, for aught that appears, be real, free- 
dom a reality. Moreover, causal constraint being absent, 
and no other being conceivable, we may conclude further 
that choice, freedom in willing, is a reality. 2 

It is evident that freedom in willing is a condition of all 
ethical doctrine, a postulate of Ethics. It is conditio sine 

1 As of two contradictories one must be true, and it remains to decide 
which ; so of two alternatives one must be taken, and it remains to de- 
cide which. 

2 See the discussion in Elements of Psychology, § 276 sq. The absence of 
causal constraint, and our inability to conceive any other, does not imply 
the absence of any determining influence whatever, which absence would 
allow mere caprice, morally worthless casualty. Determination is of two 
kinds, causal determination which implies necessity, and rational determina- 
tion which consists with freedom. Choice is rationally determined, that is, 
it accords with some antecedent conditioning reason, good or bad. " Delib- 
erate preference does not exist without intellect (8idvoia) and reason (»/o0s)." 
— Aristotle, Nich. fflh., bk. vi, ch. 2. Desires also condition choice, but 
do not causally determine it. The saying that the choice always follows the 
stronger motive, which claims to settle the whole question, is an unwar- 
ranted assumption that the desire acts causally on the choice, which begs 
the whole question. Desire causes, not the choice, but the effort. Kant 
thus defines desire : " The faculty of desire is the being's faculty of becom- 
ing by means of its ideas the cause of the actual existence of the objects of 
those ideas." — Critique of Practical Beason, preface, note. 



1 6 PROLEGOMENA 

qua non ; if freedom is, duty may be ; but if freedom is not, 
duty is not. 1 The responsible must be free. This, for 
those holding moral responsibility to be real, is of itself a 
clear demonstration that freedom, that choice, is real. 

There is freedom, then, in the fact of choice. It is not 
to be found elsewhere. All spontaneous and involuntary 
changes are effects determined by one's constitution and 
environment. Every voluntary change is an effect deter- 
mined, directly or indirectly, by the will. Within the will, 
the effort is causally and directly determined by that ante- 
cedent desire to which preference is yielded, the motive. 
The intention is merely choice as a fact, as made. Only in 
choosing is there freedom from causation. 2 

§ 11. In the precedent psychological sketch it is assumed 
that the human mind has a faculty of pure intellectual intu- 
ition, the pure reason. 3 The reality of this faculty is like- 
wise a metaphysical theme, one which has been much 
discussed by philosophic thinkers. Only a brief explanation 

1 Says Kant : " While freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, the 
moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. Were there no freedom it 
would be impossible to trace the moral law in ourselves at all." — Critique of 
Practical Reason, preface, note. Says Bishop Martensen : "Only in the 
domain of freedom is morality possible. ' ' — Christian Ethics, p. 3. 

2 Says Kant : " Will is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, 
in so far as they are possessed of reason ; and freedom is such a property of 
that causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign 
determining causes." See Elements of Psychology, §§ 257 n, 272 n, 275 n. 

3 See supra, § 2 ; also Elements of Psychology, § 113 sq., and § 124 sg. 
The faculty of pure reason, by which the mind cognizes necessary and 
universal ideas and principles, is in Greek termed vovs and in German 
Vernunft ; that which cognizes contingent matter, didvoia and Verstand. 
Aristotle thus defines the former : '0 vovs io-rl irepl rds dpxds rdv votjtwv icai 
tQ>v 6vtwv • i} fikv yap eTrio~T7)HT) tQ)v fier dirodei^eo^s 6vtwv icrlv al 5' dpxat dvairb- 
8eiKT0L. — Magna Moralia, i, 35. Kant, the highest modern authority in this 
matter, defines thus : ' ' Pure reason (Vernunft) is the faculty which contains 
the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori." — Critique of Pure 
Reason, Int. , § vii. 



PHILOSOPHICAL 17 

of the view adopted in the present treatise is practicable in 
this connection. 

We hold that mind is constituted with power to know 
both itself and things other than itself, the conditions of 
their existence, and their relations to each other. This cog- 
nitive constitution is fitted, not only for the empirical, but 
also for the pure intuition of objective reality. Conscious- 
ness, in the presence of some adventitious, empirical matter 
perceived by sense, external or internal, has, beside and along 
with sense, an intellectual power to discern in the total fact 
an essential element, equally adventitious, but not at all 
sensuous. This is the power of pure reason. That element 
of the total which is not the object of sense, is the object of 
reason ; both elements are objective and real in the total 
thing known. 

A conscious experience, for example, of a succession of 
mental states given in self-perception, the internal sense, in- 
volves time, which is not an object of sense, but is discerned 
by pure intellect or reason, as a necessary and objectively 
existing condition of the succession. Upon the occasion of 
an experience of body, the empirical intuition implies and is 
conditioned on a pure intuition of space, a non-sensuous 
object occupied by and containing the body. An experience 
of a change, especially of one that is constrained by conscious 
effort, noting that the subsequent is not detached but grows 
immediately from its antecedent, is an empirical occasion 
for the purely intellectual discernment of causation as the 
necessary condition of change, of a reality, a force, existing in 
the relation of things that change. Now from the law of 
relativity, that every mode of consciousness subsists by virtue 
of an opposition, that every affirmation is also a negation, 1 it 
follows, that the idea of causation as constrained action, is 
necessarily supplemented by the negative correlative idea of 
i See Elements of Psychology, § 58. 



18 PROLEGOMENA 

freedom as unconstrained action. A conscious act, judged 
to be free, is, in the human mind, an occasion for an intuition 
of the pure idea of right or duty. Such action, not coming 
under the law of causation, is cognized as under a different 
law, the law of obligation. 

Thus time is a condition of event, space a condition of 
body, substance a condition of quality, non-contradiction a 
condition of thought, cause a condition of change, right a 
condition of obligation. Upon the metaphysical question 
whether these pure ideas correspond to objective realities, we 
observe simply, that they stand prior to things in the relation 
of condition to conditioned. They must be in order that 
things may be ; the former necessary, the latter contingent. 
If a thing be real, its condition must be real. 

We have already identified the intuition of duty in its 
mandatory form, that is, the moral law or law of obligation, 
with conscience. Even should the intuitive character of 
this discernment be rejected, still it would remain true that 
conscience, the discerning of moral law, is, like freedom, a 
necessary condition, and hence a postulate of Ethics. 

§ 12. It is here in place to inquire what is meant by a 
person. 1 We can readily conceive of beings intelligent and 
sentient, and having free-will, but not having conscience. 
In fact we thus judge of brutes. But beings destitute of 

1 A word borrowed from the theater where it still plays its part in 
dramatis persons, impersonation, etc. Its etymology is more curious than 
helpful. "Lat. persona, personare, to sound through; per, through, and 
sonare, to sound, from sonus, sound. The persona was first a mask used by 
an actor, then a personage, character, part played by an actor, a person. 
The large-mouthed masks worn by the actors were so called from the 
resonance of the voice sounding through them. ' ' — Ske at. Persona has come 
to mean the inner spiritual subsistence that sounds through the mask of ex- 
ternal individuality. It is not the collected fagot of those peculiar visible 
traits, which may distinguish but do not compose the man ; it is the unified 
sum of those common mental and moral characteristics which make him an 
answerable soul. 



PHILOSOPHICAL 19 

moral insight, and therefore not morally accountable, are not 
persons ; for moral insight or conscience is the differentiating 
essence of personality. Accordingly we define a person to be 
an intelligent and sentient being, having free-will, and moral 
insight. But, since consciousness is generic of the modes 
knowing and feeling, desiring and willing,' it will be sufficient 
to define a person as a being conscious of moral insight. 

In the knowledge of our shortcomings we recognize our- 
selves as imperfect persons, and as such subject to the law 
with its penalties, of which law we have moral insight. 
Hence the imperfect person, the human person, is a being 
conscious of obligation. 

The notion of an imperfect person is necessarily supple- 
mented by the correlative notion of a perfect person. This 
ideal person fulfills the requirements of the law by virtue of 
his nature, and therefore is superior to obligation, not under 
the law, which is for imperfect persons only. Now perfection 
is complete, consummate wholeness. Hence a perfect person 
is a being conscious of holiness. 

In the knowledge of the narrow limitation of our powers 
we recognize ourselves as finite beings. The notion of finite 
being is necessarily supplemented by the correlative notion 
of infinite being. This notion, combined with that of a per- 
fect person, constitutes the notion of Deity, a perfect and in- 
finite person, or a perfectly harmonious personality infinitated. 

The moral law demands of imperfect persons perfection. 
This then must be possible, else the law would be brutum 
fulmen. Now the real object of a will determinable by moral 
law, is its perfect accord with the law. This angelic per- 
fection is an ideal not attainable, says Kant, by human beings 
in this life. But, since it is required as practically necessary, 
it can be looked for only as the result of progress thereafter 
in infinitum. Hence, not only the present existence of per- 
sons, of imperfect persons, but also their immortality, as 



20 PROLEGOMENA 

inseparably connected with moral law, is a postulate of 
Ethics. 1 

§ 13. Whether there be an objectively real being corre- 
sponding to the notion of Deity, is yet another metaphysical 
thesis, to which attention is now directed ; for the reality of 
a superhuman person, the supreme maker, ruler and judge 
of the universe, is a doctrine essential in complete ethical 
theory. Hence, after a very brief consideration, we shall 
assume it as an additional postulate of Ethics. 

Logical proof of the existence of God has, in all ages, been 
earnestly sought by philosophic thinkers, but even yet it is 
hardly established as an unquestionable philosophical doctrine. 
/Various forms of the ontological, the teleological, and the 
^ cosmological arguments have been proposed, criticised, and 
replaced by other forms, without settled result. We cannot 
here examine this august theme adequately, but will venture 
to offer a suggestion. 2 

Let the cosmological argument be formulated, not a priori 
as is usual, but a posteriori, adhering strictly to the logical 

1 So Kant in Critique of Practical Reason ; the Dialectic, ch. iv. 

2 " How can one be calm when he is called on to prove the existence of 
God ? But let us reason gently, smothering our indignation." — Plato in the 
Laws, 888 a, Ste. The several forms of argument named are effectively- 
criticised by Kant, 'the all-destroyer,' in the Critique of Pure Reason; the 
Dialectic, bk. ii. ch. 3, § 3 sq., concluding in § 6 : "A Supreme Being is, 
therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere ideal, though a faultless one, a 
conception which perfects and crowns the system of human cognition, but the 
objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure 
speculative reason." Elsewhere he says : " Providence has not willed that 
those convictions . which are most necessary for our happiness should be at 
the mercy of subtile and finely-spun reasonings, but has delivered them 
directly to the natural, vulgar understanding. ... It is altogether necessary 
that we should be convinced of God's existence, but not so necessary that 
we should be able to demonstrate it." — In the Essay : Der einzig mogliche 
Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763. It is well 
worth noting that the Scriptures nowhere offer logical proof of the existence 
of God ; but, from the very outset (Genesis 1:1) throughout, it is assumed. 



PHILOSOPHICAL 21 

method for solving the problem : Given intermixed effects to 
find their cause. The method is one highly approved and 
very familiar in physical science. 1 

A scientific explanation of phenomena is found in their 
causes. Looking abroad on the world of nature, we behold 
a bewildering multitude, a vast complexus of objects and 
events. To explain these severally, science investigates their 
proximate or second causes. In explanation of the great 
total, the universe, let us posit hypothetically an adequate 
personal first cause. That this is a possible conception is 
evinced by the fact that it is the faith of millions of men. 

The personal cause in the hypothesis is a vera causa, that 
is, an agency known to be effective in other connections. 
Every person knows himself and his fellows to be efficient 
causes, originating causes, creators or builders of new things 
from material at hand. We shall claim only this for the 
posited first cause. 

The supposed adequacy of the personal first cause is an 
indefinite extension of such powers as are known to belong 
to ordinary persons. It becomes thereby a complete and suf- 
ficient explanation of the totality of the phenomena under 
consideration. So the geologist, in positing early cataclysmic 
causes, supposes these to be such forces as are now under ob- 
servation, and that they acted with vastly greater intensity. 

Thus the two prime conditions of a soundly scientific 
hypothesis are fulfilled in that we posit a vera causa, and 
one that explains all the facts. It is therein superior to 
Dalton's atomic hypothesis which does not posit a vera causa, 
to Darwin's development hypothesis which does not explain 
all the facts, 2 and to Huygen's luminiferous ether hypothesis 

1 See this method of investigation explicated and exemplified in Elements 
of Inductive Logic, § 82 sq.; see also § 97. 

2 See Professor Cown's admissions in his Evolution of To-day, p. 117 sq. ; 
and Mi ll 's System of Logic, 8th ed. p. 355 note. See infra, § 20. 



22 PROLEGOMENA 

which does neither; yet these are generally approved by 
scientists, and claimed as invaluable parts of the sum of 
positive knowledge. But our hypothesis, notwithstanding its 
excellence, remains an hypothesis, an unproved proposition, 
unless we can show also that no other hypothesis will explain 
the facts. 

Now a first cause is the only possible explanation ; for its 
sole alternative is an infinite regressus of causes, and this 
can make no pretense to be an explanation, for evidently it 
merely pushes explanation back, away, out of reach, in fact 
denies any explanation to be attainable, which is essentially 
the agnostic position. Therefore an explanation of the uni- 
verse must posit a first cause. By like process of proof, that 
no other hypothesis would explain the facts, Newton estab- 
lished the theory of gravitation. 

Furthermore, the first cause must be either personal or 
impersonal. The latter alternative is proposed to us in the 
unintelligent deity of the pantheist, its manifestations being 
unconsciously worked out by the inward necessities of its 
nature. This banishes freedom in willing from the universe. 
Moreover, how an unconscious, unintelligent being, which is 
not a person but merely a thing, could originate personal 
beings, beings consciously intelligent, is inexplicable ; which 
is to say, the impersonal hypothesis does not explain the 
facts. Therefore the tenable hypothesis of a personal first 
cause, no other hypothesis being tenable, having thus fulfilled 
the prime and the final conditions of strict logical proof, 
should be accepted as an established scientific theory. 1 

1 By the same logical process the existence of Neptune was proved, "before 
its revelation by the telescope. 

Lord Bacon says : "It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man's 
mind to atheism, hut depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to 
religion ; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, 
it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further •. but when it beholdeth 
the chain of them confederate, and linked together, it must needs fly to 
Providence and Deity." — Essay xvi. 



PHILOSOPHICAL 23 

An additional word may be said in reference to the moral 
element in personality. The moral law, the most important 
factor in a world of intelligences, is necessarily referred to 
the personal first cause as an expression of his will, which, 
further, is an expression of his nature. This law demands 
holiness. Therefore his nature must be holy. 1 

Now it is to be admitted that the foregoing argument, like 
the teleological argument, does not establish the infinity of 
the divine attributes. The power and wisdom are seen to be 
indefinitely great, but this falls short of infinite. Moreover, 
the bringing into being what was not, is unproved. The 
personal first cause herein concluded is, therefore, no more 
than the demiurge of the early Greek philosophers, an archi- 
tect, building with material at hand. But let it be observed 
that, while the passing from the indefinitely great to the 
infinite may have insufficient logical ground, still it is an 
easy step for faith. 2 Also be it observed that creation, in 
an absolute sense, is for philosophy an impossible concep- 
tion, since it is an attempt to think a relation of one term, 
which is absurd. 3 

We have touched briefly upon the great theses of philoso- 
phy, freedom, immortality, 4 and God. For while Psychology 
is merely a system of natural order, and Ethics a system of 

1 The unity of this First Cause may be inferred from the unity of the 
reciprocal relation existing between parts of the world, as portions of an 
integral edifice ; an inference which all our observation favors, and all prin- 
ciples of analogy support. 

2 See supra, § 12, fourth paragraph. 

8 Absolute creation means : Nothing becomes something. Herein is no 
subject, for nothing is — well, no thing, a pure and total negation. For like 
reason annihilation is an impossible conception. Physicists hold it im- 
possible that any particle of matter, or any pulse of energy, can cease to be. 
The Hegelian, however, setting aside the law of contradiction, also holding 
that nothing is a thing, and that becoming mediates nothing and something, 
presumes otherwise. 

4 Kant, Critique of Pure Eeason, Introduction, § 3, et al. 



24 PROLEGOMENA 

natural jurisprudence, Philosophy is properly a system of 
natural theology. Science, in its full comprehension, is 
knowledge of myself, of the world, and of God. This is its 
beginning, its mean, and its end. The problem of the ages 
is : Given self, to find God. 

§ 14. In preparation for an ethical doctrine founded on 
personal relations, it is needful to examine the philosophy of 
relations taken in a more general sense. 

Nature, under which term we here include all objective 
realities, presents only individual things, or individual groups 
of things, in certain relations. The things are real, and their 
relations are real. This statement assumes the doctrine of 
Natural Realism, as opposed to Idealism. 

An individual, as the form of the word indicates, is a thing 
or a group of things, indivisible in itself, while divisible from 
every other thing. This means that its parts are not kinds 
of the whole taken generically, but are new individuals, and 
that it is distinguishable, at least numerically, from every 
other thing. Moreover, an individual is, as to its mere exist- 
ence, independent of other things. 1 

The general, which is the logical opposite of the individual, 
has no objective existence. It is wholly subjective, a state 
of mind, a conception, a product of thought, or simply a 
thought. All common nouns, as stone, tree, man, are merely 
signs or expressions of thoughts. They have no general 
object corresponding to them hi nature, and their generality 
consists solely in being predicable of any one of a plurality 
of individual things. 

1 The Scholastics, following Porphyry, define an individual to be ens in- 
divisum in se, et divisum ab omni alio ; id cujus proprietates alteri simul con- 
venire non possunt. Also as ens per se subsistens. " Whatever occupies a 
distinct portion of space is an individual object of external intuition ; and 
whatever occupies a distinct moment of time, without extension in space, is 
an individual object of internal intuition* . . . The general notion as such 
is emancipated from all special relation to space or time." — Mansel, Meta- 
tics, pp. 37, 39. 



PHILOSOPHICAL 25 

While generalities have no objective reality, the particular 
relations of individual things are evidently not less real than 
the things themselves, though indeed they are not objects of 
sensuous but only of intellectual cognition. 1 These relations 
are reciprocal, and when thoroughly traced, each is seen to be 
illimitable. All things in the universe are mutually related. 
Plurality and unity interpenetrate and condition each other. 
Each is in all, and all in each. 

For let us consider that every particle of matter occupies 
and is contained in space. Each particle is related to every 
other as to its position, a geometrical relation, and as to its 
motion, a mechanical relation. Any change of position 
places it in a different and distinguishable relation. Relative 
rest and relative motion are the only kinds of rest and mo- 
tion known. These reciprocal spatial relations combine the 
plurality of things into the unity of a corporeal whole. 2 

Consider also temporal relations. Space is extension, hav- 
ing three dimensions ; time is protension, having but one 
dimension. Yet every event is related temporally to every 
other as precedent, simultaneous or subsequent. These rela- 
tions also are reciprocal, comparative and measurable. They 
combine the plurality of events into the unity of an histori- 
cal whole. 

Together with spatial and temporal relations are relations 
of causative interaction. Every particle of matter in the 
universe attracts every other. 3 All are in motion, and mutu- 

1 Some philosophers, in opposing the doctrine of the Absolute or Being 
without relation, emphasize the reality of relations, regarding them indeed 
as the very essence of all reality. So Lotze : " Sein heist in Beziehungen 
stehen, und das Wahrgenommenwerden ist selbst nur eine solche Beziehung 
neben andern." — Grundzilge der Metaphysik, § 10. 

2 World and universe are proper synonyms, the latter from Lat. ad unum 
versus, turned into one, equivalent to e pluribus unum. Aristotle defines 
Nature as the complex of objects having a material constitution and involved 
in necessary motion or change. — Physica, ii, 1 ; cf. Be Coelo, i, 1. 

3 Hence each material particle is the center of a sphere of force filling 



26 PROLEGOMENA 

ally determine each other's motion. A stone falls to the 
ground; the earth rises to meet it. The earth and moon 
enforce each other to revolve about their common center of 
gravity. Also, because of their motion and mutual attraction, 
the planets and the sun revolve about their common center 
of gravity, and thereby constitute the solar system a unitary 
system. This system as a whole revolves about some higher 
center of the stellar system, a larger whole. Thus again the 
corporeal universe is a unit, more closely bound into one by 
virtue of efficient causes. 1 Moreover, these causative inter- 
actions are continuous throughout time, bringing past, pres- 
ent and future into a more compact historical whole, binding 
them into a closer unity by interlinked chains of causes and 
effects. Thus throughout the universe of space and time, 
every individual body is causally related to every other. All 
act upon each, and each upon all. 

§ 15. The foregoing are primary conditions of yet another 
specific relation of the highest import, the relation of means 
and end. Its philosophic treatment is teleology, which 
views nature as a kingdom of ends. 2 We shall here consider 

space. Gravity, unlike energy, is not transmitted, nor transferred, nor 
transformed, and is not obstructed. It coexists with its substantial center. 

1 To the molar motions indicated are to be added molecular motions, 
including all vibratory and chemical action. 

2 The expression is borrowed from Kant, who says : " Teleology considers 
nature as a kingdom of ends. Ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as 
a kingdom of nature. In the first case, the kingdom of ends is a theoret- 
ical idea, adopted to explain what actually is. In the latter, it is a practical 
idea, adopted to bring about that which is not yet, but which can be realized 
by our conduct, provided it conforms to this idea." — Metaphysic of Morals, 
inR. and S. ed. of Kant's works, vol. viii, p. 66 note. 

"Leibnitz termed the world when viewed in relation to the rational 
beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each 
other, under the government of the Supreme Good, ' the kingdom of Grace, ' 
and distinguished it from the 'kingdom of Nature,' in which these rational 
beings live, under moral laws indeed, but expect no other consequences 



PHILOSOPHICAL 27 

the teleologic relation merely as an existing fact, the end as 
an effect, not as a design or final cause. 1 

In many individual groups of things the relation of means 
and end may be discerned, binding the components into an 
organic whole. Accordingly an organism is defined as a group 
in which all parts are mutually means and end. Each part 
is for every other ; also each is for the whole, and the whole 
for each ; all serving all. 2 An organ is a member of an organ- 
ized group, serving all other members as ends. Every con- 
stitutive part is an organ, an instrument, a means. It has 
certain special functions relating to the rest severally and as 
a whole ; and when it entirely ceases to perform its office, 
it ceases to be a member of the organism. 

It is not a fancy, nor a mere speculation, but a fact, recog- 
nized by philosophy and lying at the base of all science, that 
the universe is a kingdom of ends, an organism constituted of 
minor organisms. Space is for bodies, and bodies are for 
space. Time is for events, and events are for time. Space 
without body, or time without event, is unthinkable. Gravi- 
tation draws all bodies toward one center, and radiation 
disperses to all bodies the store of energy collected in that 
center. Every star, and every planet, and every satellite, has 
its peculiar office relative to the rest. The extinction of any 
one would necessitate a readjustment of the whole. Nature, 

from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in 
the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of 
grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves 
limit our participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happi- 
ness, is a practically necessary idea of pure reason. "— Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's trans., Bonn's ed. p. 492. 

i Final cause, the excitant and object of purpose, implying antecedent 
efficient cause, and inferring First Cause. On the Aristotelic division of 
causes into four several kinds, see Elements of Inductive Logic, § 14 note. 

2 The word all is ambiguous, meaning either all as an undistributed unity, 
or all as a distributed plurality ; as in Drink ye all of it. In the above 
formula, and elsewhere in this connection, both meanings are applicable. 



28 PROLEGOMENA 

the great world of all things, is an organized individual, a 
cosmos. 

The earth is a cosmic unity. In its series of periodically 
recurring changes, reproductive life is linked with the seasons, 
and active life with day and night. It is itself made up of 
relatively independent organisms. For example, every animal 
is an organism. Each of its members, even the least, is an 
organ serving the sustenance of all others, and receiving sus- 
tenance from all. The head is for its hair, and the hair for 
the head, and both for the trunk. Should any organ cease its 
functions, it suffers atrophy, or is cast off as excrementitious ; 
and when the chief organs cease their ministry, life ceases, 
and the integral whole disintegrates. A plant is an organic 
whole. The root is for the leaf, and the leaf for the root; 
and the other parts serve the leaf and root, else these could 
not perform their functions. All are reciprocally related as 
means and end. 1 As physiology thus resolves living bodies 
into organized organs, so chemistry teaches that all bodies 
consist of systems of molecules, and these ultimately of 
systems of atoms. 2 Every subordinate is a microcosm repeat- 
ing the macrocosm. 

1 Says von Baer, as quoted by Paulsen: "The animal kingdom cannot 
exist without the vegetable kingdom ; this again cannot arise before the 
stony crust of the earth has been disintegrated into loose soil by physical 
and chemical influences. We must further presuppose that this soil is 
watered by rains from time to time. The rain can fall only on condition 
that the water has previously been absorbed by the air, that it has been car- 
ried to a higher stratum and then condensed by a change of temperature. 
The water, again, cannot rise unless the earth is heated by the sun's rays. 
Hence the smallest blade of grass really calls into play the entire planetary 
system with all its arrangements and movements, and all the laws of 
nature." — Int. to Phil, p. 232. 

2 "Das Staiibchen, selbst der unfruchtbare Stein, 
Indem er sein Gesetz hat, muss er wirken 
Und thatig fiir das grosse Ganze sein." — Goethe. 

The relations seen in simple cohesion "indicate more than mere resem- 
blance, an inherent kindred. They indicate on the part of two globules of 
the same elementary body a predisposition perfectly reciprocal to cleave to 



PHILOSOPHICAL 29 

§ 16. In the kingdom of ends is included the spiritual 
realm. We conceive that it contains no isolated elements, 
that throughout its sphere there is organized interaction. 
Within the range of observation is the human mind, con- 
stituted by a complement of faculties whose activities are 
mutually conditioned, and cooperate to a common end. As 
in the corporeal so in the spiritual sphere, very many of the 
most important ends are attained only by means of a com- 
bination of energies. 1 

The universe as a total we conceive to be composed of the 
spiritual and the corporeal united in an interchange of 
functional activities. Many minor wholes are thus organically 
constituted. Each individual man is a double organism con- 
sisting of body and mind. He is also a member of wider 
combinations ; for none of us liveth to himself, and none 
dieth to himself. The family is an organic individual, its 
members being normally related for mutual service. Every 
individual community or organized society has a constitution, 
written or unwritten, whose essence is a definition of the offices 
of its members in their service of the common interest. The 
city, the state, the nation, has organic laws constituting it an 
individual, wherein its citizens are each for all and all for 
each. The human race is an organized individual, its members 
being bound into one by natural affinities, and related by 
teleological interaction. Moreover, the content of an individ- 

one another, to hold real relations. They indicate that no particle exists for 
itself, but that its nature points to relation with other particles. They indi- 
cate that though each particle thus exists for others, as well as for itself, it 
does not exist indifferently for all others of any sort, but for others of its 
own kind in the first degree, and then for others of different kinds in a 
second degree." — Wm. Arthur, in the Fernly lecture On the Difference 
between Physical and Moral Law, p. 49 ; London, 1883. 

1 Says Leibnitz : " Les iimes agissent selon les loix des causes finales par 
appe'titions, fins et moyens. Les corps agissent selon les causes efncientes 
ou des mouvements. Et les deux regnes, celui des causes efficientes et 
celui des causes finales, sont harmoniques entre eux." — Monadology, § 79. 



30 PBOLEGOMENA 

ual life cannot be described except relatively to the historical 
whole. The entire history of the age and of the entire past 
is contained in it, and its influence extends throughout the 
entire future. The kingdom of ends is the universe. Every- 
where there is reciprocity, a relation of mutual interdepen- 
dence and altruistic subservience, a universal ministry. All- 
serving all is the fundamental, thorough-going, uniform plan 
of the world. 

§ 17. Yet another philosopheme to be considered is the 
conception of law. It is probable that the notion originated 
historically in the expressed will of a superior in authority 
and power. But this meaning has become specific, the notion 
having been extended to include generically various uni- 
formities, though still retaining, perhaps in all of its appli- 
cations, a covert suggestion of authoritative imposition. We 
must look away from this origin for its essence. 

The ultimate ground of the notion is in the shock of simi- 
larity. 1 When two facts, either things or events, make a 
striking impression of similarity, one is regarded as a repeti- 
tion of the other ; that is, a phenomenon is said to be repeated 
when the mind of the observer receives impressions so very 
similar as to be indistinguishable except as to place or time. 
When several such impressions recur, the notion of repetition 
is expanded into the notion of order. This implies a corre- 
spondence, more or less constant, among the facts, which is 
referred either to their inherent nature or to their conformity 
with some rule, perhaps a mandate, an order, of a ruler. 
When the order of the facts, either existing or required, is 
undeviatingly constant, the notion of order is expanded into 
the notion of strict uniformity. 

It has already been pointed out that objective reality pre- 
sents only related individuals. Now among real things or 

1 See Elements of Psychology, § 59. 



PHIL OS OPHICAL 31 

events, we observe many cases of naturally existing repeti- 
tion, order, strict uniformity ; and, by interposing our force, 
we are able to induce uniformities that otherwise would not 
exist. These uniformities may be severally reduced to the 
form of a general conception, and the expression of this con- 
ception is a law. Thus a law is an expression of a strict 
uniformity, either of one observed to exist in nature, or of 
one required to be produced by will. These considerations 
enable us to make a formal statement of the essential mean- 
ing of this comprehensive and important term in its most 
general definition, thus : A law is a designation of a con- 
stant order of facts determined by the constitution of the 
things. 

Let it be remarked that the things are those from whose 
constant order the law arises, and to which it applies ; also 
that the constitution of a thing is an assemblage of inherent 
properties which, being constant causes, determine both the 
facts and their constant order or uniformity ; also that, since 
a plurality of individual things have similar constitutions, the 
uniformity is intellectively viewed as general, and is expressed 
in a general formula or law. Hence, furthermore, since a 
law is a form of intellective apprehension, a generality in 
itself and in its expression, it is entirely subjective, existing 
only in mind as a thought. Law has no real existence in the 
external world. Uniformities there are, but these are indi- 
vidual though similar facts. Their mental reduction, by 
virtue of their observed similarity, to a generality is a law, 
which being expressed in language attains thereby only a 
quasi-objectivity. The very common notion that law pre- 
vails objectively and reigns throughout the universe, is a 
rhetorical fiction. Laws are only mental representations, 
conceptions, intelligent interpretations of recognizable uni- 
formities. Hence a law, formulated and expressed, is merely 
and properly a designation, or that which marks out and 



32 PROLEGOMENA 

makes known in general terms a real uniformity, either ob- 
served or required. 1 

§ 18. Laws are primarily of two kinds, formal and mate- 
rial. Formal laws designate or express merely the forms of 
mental conception, and thus are intellectual abstractions dis- 
charged of all content. Such are the principles of mathe- 
matics and of logic. Material law has content ; it designates 
order in phenomena. 

Material law is likewise of two kinds, natural and moral. 
Natural law is a generalization of facts of coexistence, or of 
events of orderly succession, in inanimate things, and also in 
animate beings apart from their free will. It designates an 
established uniformity which has been found to exist in na- 
ture. Moral law is a mandate addressed to persons. It 
implies a possible alternative ; and the required order, deter- 
mined by the constitution of its subjects, is sanctioned and 
enforced by penalty. 

Natural law is simply indicative ; moral law imperative. 

1 See in Elements of Inductive Logic the chapter on "Natural Law," 
§§ 90-100. Montesquieu defines thus: "Laws in their most extended sig- 
nification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things." — 
L'Esprit des Lois, bk. i, ch. 1, opening sentence. It has been strikingly 
said : " A law is a human translation of the divine procedure." Perhaps it 
would be more permissible to say : A law is an interpretation of cosmic order. 
Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, defines law in its universal meaning. 
Also we have : "A law is a rule or method according to which phenomena 
or actions follow each other." — Black, Dictionary of Law, ad verb. But: 
"Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of 
action . . . prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound 
to obey." — Blackstone, Commentaries, Int., §2. Thus jurists usually 
limit the meaning to what we term moral law; as, "A law, properly so 
called, is a command which obliges a person or persons." — Austin, as 
quoted by Black. Again: "A law, in the literal and proper sense of the 
word, may be defined as a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent 
being by an intelligent being having power over him." — Austin, Jurispru- 
dence, § 2. Again: "Law in its most comprehensive sense is a rule of 
action for intelligent beings, and in its practical and more limited sense 
for men,"— Minor, Institutes, Int. § 2, p. 22. Under this limited mean- 



PHILOSOPHICAL 38 

The one is a uniformity established, having no alternative ; 
the other is a uniformity enjoined, having an alternative. 
The basis of natural law is causation ; the basis of moral 
law is obligation. In the one the facts come before the law ; 
in the other the facts come after the law. The one general- 
izes real facts that actually are ; the other designates ideal 
facts that ought to be ; the former inductively, the latter 
deductively. 

We conceive accordingly of the kingdom of ends, the 
macrocosm, as divided into two realms, the corporeal and the 
spiritual. Body, which is the substantive content of the 
former, is ever strictly subject to causation, and hence its 
sphere is characterized by necessity, and is the realm of nat- 
ural law. Mind, which is the substantive content of the 
latter, exercises self-determination ; and hence its sphere is 
characterized by freedom, and is the realm of moral law. 
These two spheres, the realm of physical facts and the realm 
of moral worths, intersect in the microcosm man, who, be- 
longing at once to both spheres, is thus the connecting link, 
the bond of the universe. 1 

Moral law, with which alone we are concerned in this 
treatise, is based upon a single essential principle, which 

ing some moralists and jurists distinguish Divine Law, or the revealed 
will of the Deity, and Natural Law, or the constitutional order of human na- 
ture, and Civil Law, or the enactments of the State. See infra, § 47, note. 
We include all these under the generic term Moral Law, to which is opposed 
Natural or Physical Law, in accord with more general usage. 

1 We venture, for the sake of greater clearness, a diagrammatic repre- 
sentation of the Kingdom of Ends distinguishing its two Realms : 

Corporeal Sphere "x^"^ Spiritual Sphere 

, Body / \ Mind 

Causality / \ Volition 
XT .. [Man] _. , 
Necessity I / Freedom 

Natural Law \ / Moral Law 

Realm of Physical Pacts JX^ Realm of Moral Worths 



34 PROLEGOMENA 

takes an imperative form, and in this form is recognized as 
an all-comprehending mandate, as the moral law. It has 
many subordinate branches or specific applications which 
apply to every phase of human conduct. Without offering 
a complete or strictly logical distribution, it will be sufficient 
just now to point out its most important subordinates. The 
Decalogue is so widely comprehensive that it is often spoken 
of as itself the moral law. ' All municipal laws, both com- 
mon and statute, of organized states, derive their authority 
solely from the supreme authority of the moral law. Mili- 
tary law in all of its details, has no other ground. The laws 
of all kinds of formally organized societies, such as churches, 
colleges, clubs, bands, etc., are likewise specializations of the 
moral law. All the tacit conventions and unwritten laws of 
social intercourse, including the internal regulations of the 
family, and even the petty forms of politeness and simple 
kindness, owe whatever claim they have on us to the one 
law, the moral law, whence they are derived. This catho- 
licity of the law throughout human affairs, applying to all 
human voluntary activity, to all conduct public and private 
of single persons or of communities, renders the inquiry, on 
which we are now about to enter, one of supreme impor- 
tance, and therefore of profoundest interest. 



ETHICS 



FIEST PAET- OBLIGATION 
INTRODUCTION 

§ 19. In looking on the world around and above us, we 
discover, amid an infinite variety of ceaseless changes, a cer- 
tain uniformity established, which, reduced to comprehensive 
expression, is termed the law of gravity. In looking on the 
world within us, we discover, amid its incessant changes, a 
certain uniformity enjoined, which, reduced to comprehen- 
sive expression, is termed the law of morality. The law of 
gravity represents something real, a fixed corporeal order, 
with which we have to do in every waking moment of active 
life, and to which we must constantly adjust the movements 
of our bodies. The law of morality also represents some- 
thing equally real, a required spiritual order, with which we 
constantly have to do, a universal mandate overruling all 
relations between man and man, to which must be adjusted 
every voluntary action and proposed line of conduct. The 
reality of moral law as an inflexible factor in human life, in- 
volved in the essential constitution of human nature, is a 
scientific truth, as undeniable as the law of gravitation, and 
one whose importance surpasses comparison. 

Science has been well defined to be a complement of cogni- 
tions, having, in point of form, the character of logical per- 
fection; in point of matter, the character of real truth. 1 
1 Hamilton, Logic, § 80. 
35 



36 OBLIGA TION 

More briefly, science is systematized knowledge. There are 
a number of sciences which may be distinguished as sciences 
of human nature, Ethics being the chief. Pre-supposing 
and involving more or less knowledge of the others, it as- 
sumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates principles 
and rules for the conduct of men individually and collec- 
tively. In view of its basis, Ethics is the science of rights ; 
in view of its system, Ethics is the science of obligation. 1 

i "Ethic, relating to custom. (Lat. from Gk.) Commonly used as 
ethics, sb. pi. ' I will never set politics against ethics ' ; Bacon (in Todd's 
Johnson). From Lat. ethicus, moral, ethic. From Gk. ydiKos, ethic, moral. 
From Gk. fjdos, custom, moral nature; cf. e0os, manner, custom. Cognate 
with Goth, sidus, custom, manner; with Ger. sitte, custom; with Skt. 
svadhd, self-will, strength. And cf. Lat. suetus, accustomed. The Skt. 
form is easily resolved into sva, one's own self (Lat. se = Gk. £'), and dhd, 
to set, place (= Gk. 0e);-so that Skt. svadhd (= Gk. '4-dos) is ' a placing of 
one's self,' hence self-assertion, self-will, habit." — Skeat. "Moral virtue 
results from habit, ijdos, whence also it has got its name, iiduc-q, which is only 
in a small degree altered from e'0os." — Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 1. 
Perhaps this was suggested by Plato : Kvpiwrarov ydp ow kixfyierai iracn t6tc 
irav fjdos did idos. — Laws, vii, 792 e. See also infra, § 21, note. 

Right, erect, correct, straight, upright, according with truth and duty. 
From A. S. riht, from Teut. base rehta, right ; from the base rak, root rag, 
to rule, direct; whence Lat. rectus (for regtus), right, pp. of regere, to rule. 
— Skeat. Used also substantively with a modified meaning. See infra, 
§ 34, note. For etymology of wrong, see infra, § 55, note. 

Obligation, from vb. to oblige = to bind to, to constrain ; from Fr. obliger, 
from Lat. obligare, to bind together, from ob, to, and ligare to bind. — Skeat. 
We shall use the word exclusively in its most usual sense of moral constraint, 
or bounden duty, as distinguished from causal constraint. 

Deontology;" the science of obligation ; from rb 8£ov, what is binding, 
p. of dec, impers. from dico (the Gr. correlate of Lat. obligo), to bind, and 
X670S, discourse. Bentham chose this word as the title of his system and 
treatise, using it, as he says, ' ' to represent, in the field of morals, the prin- 
ciple of utilitarianism, or that which is useful." Whewell objects, and says : 
"The term deontology expresses moral science, and expresses it well, pre- 
cisely because it signifies the science of duty and contains no reference to 
utility." Stewart tells us that "the ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue 
to be "E£is tov dtovros, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding, the 
oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the 
most unexceptionable." The term is, however, insolens verbum, having 
been superseded by the word ethics. 



INTRODUCTION 37 

§ 20. The hypothesis of evolution has been applied to the 
explanation of ethical phenomena. Evolution, as a doctrine, 
is concerned with sequence in the form of a series, without a 
beginning and without an end. It can neither ascertain the 
primal origin of the series, nor predict its ultimate issue. 
Only a small section of the series is accessible to observation, 
yet it is boldly projected into a prehistoric past, and upon 
this hypothetical history is founded an explanation of present 
phenomena. The speculation is captivating but hazardous. It 
inquires how morality has come to be, assuming an origin in 
some heterogeneous principle transmuted under the influence 
of environment. But we are rather concerned to know what 
morality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest 
in mankind of to-day and of history. Inquiry into its genesis 
and prehistoric development may well be postponed until at 
least we have a firm hold upon the thing itself. 1 

There are many moralists who educe their ethical systems 
from the Scriptures. No doubt the light of revelation has 
enabled the Christian philosopher to advance far beyond the 
conceptions of the heathen world; his higher height has 
given him a greatly enlarged horizon. But a science may 
not borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of 
its doctrines. More especially we should not confuse science 
and revelation. These are distinct though concordant means 
of knowledge, the one aspiring to attain truth by its own 



1 See supra, § 6, note ; and Elements of Inductive Logic, §§ 75, 85. 
Professor Huxley, in his Romanes Lecture, affirms that: "The practice 
of what we call goodness or virtue involves a course of conduct which, 
in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic 
struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self- 
restraint ; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it 
requires that the individual should not merely respect, but shall help his 
fellows ; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, 
as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladia- 
torial theory of existence." See infra, p. 41, note. 



38 OBLIGATION 

effort, the other condescending to impart from its abundant 
store. If Ethics is to take rank with the philosophical 
sciences, it must have a basis of its own, and build thereon 
its system. Therefore, in the progress of our proposed in- 
vestigation, we shall in no case cite Scripture as warrant or 
as proof, but only for illustration or verification. Still it will 
be encouraging to find the elaborated and the revealed doc- 
trines in accord, and mutually corroborative. 

§ 21. A brief sketch of the ground and the process adopted 
in the present treatise is now in order. 

The basis assumed is human nature. Man has an original, 
native constitution, which, however much it may be distorted, 
disordered and depraved by his perverted free wilfulness, is 
nevertheless traceable amid its ruins. There are certain fun- 
damental and essential features of humanity, which no pro- 
cess of suppression or violation can ever wholly efface. 
There are capacities and faculties whose organic functions in 
their mutual relations, and relatively to their environment, 
are clearly manifest, however enfeebled by misuse, or de- 
formed by abuse. The recognition of these features and 
powers, and a representation of their orderly functioning, is 
an ideal restoration of human nature to its normal condition, 
and to its fitting place in the life of the world. This rehabil- 
itated man we shall call the natural man, and propose to find 
in him, in the native ordering of his being, a safe and suffi- 
cient ground for determining his universal though intricately 
varied obligation. 1 

1 Professor Birks of Cambridge Univ., Eng., in his Lectures on Moral 
Science, defines happily thus : "Ethics is the Science of Ideal Humanity.' 1 
— Lecture ii. 

The phrase "the natural man" is used scripturally and theologically 
to mean the man in his present actually disordered state. To avoid confu- 
sion it should be understood that by the natural man we mean on the con- 



INTRODUCTION 39 

Referring to the foregoing definitions of Ethics, we observe 
that a right in one person is correlative to an obligation in 
some other person. A right and an obligation exist only as 
they coexist ; neither can be alone. But rights are logically 
prior ; they condition and originate their corresponding obli- 
gations. For a right, being founded in the nature of its 
possessor, determines that there be a corresponding obliga- 
tion ; whereas an obligation cannot be conceived to determine 
a right. Hence we shall take the notion of a right as our 

trary, here and throughout, not man as he is, but man as he should be, the 
normal man. So Butler, Sermon II, on Romans, 2 : 14. 

Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons, Whewell's Ed. p. xlii, 
in the passage beginning, " There are two ways," etc., presents an approved 
statement of the matter, substantially reproduced in the following : 

"The question concerning the basis of morals may be put in two 
different ways, subjectively or objectively. We may ask, What is there 
in man that constitutes him moral ? what do we mean by morality as an 
attribute of human nature ? Or, on the other hand, What ground is there 
for morality in the nature of things, in the order and frame of the universe 
around and above us ? The answer to the first question constitutes what is 
called psychological ethics ; the second belongs to metaphysical ethics. The 
former method, that commonly pursued by British philosophers, addresses 
itself to our daily usage and self -acquaintance ; the latter leads up to the 
first principles of knowledge, to those primary concepts and fundamental 
necessities of thought that lie behind our ordinary thinking and govern our 
mental operations unawares, and which form the subject matter of the 
highest and ultimate philosophy. We set out on the former line of inquiry, 
asking ourselves what are the facts concerning our ethical constitution, and 
how we are to interpret them. But we shall find that those facts point us 
beyond ourselves. The human consciousness is not self-sufficient nor self- 
explaining. The psychological question pushed far enough in any direction 
passes, beyond arrest, into the metaphysical. The soul cannot conceive of 

itself without some corresponding conception of the world and of God." 

Professor Findlay, of Headingly College, Leeds. See also infra, § 25, 
where the psychological inquiry begins. 

"The problem of Ethics is to set forth in general outlines the form of 
life for which human nature is predisposed. . . . This science is related to 
life as grammar is to language, aesthetics to art, dietetics to bodily life. It 
sketches the form of the possible and of the allowable, and these forms may 
be filled with different contents." — Paulsen, Int. to Phil., Appendix. 



40 OBLIGATION 

point of departure for a search into the philosophy of 
morals. 1 

As already indicated, the matter that constitutes the con- 
tent of Ethics is real truth. In order to become a science, 
its matter must be developed in logical form whose perfection 
is attained through clear, distinct, complete and consistent 
treatment. To approximate this ideal a methodical proce- 
dure is requisite. Beginning with observation, primarily of 
facts of consciousness gathered by introspection or furnished 
by testimony, and secondarily of the behavior of men in 
social relations, present and past, the intellect discovers in 
these phenomena the universally determinative notion of 
inherent rights, native and acquired, and therein discerns a 
formative principle, imperative in character, and constituting 
the common bond of obligation among men. This strictly 
universal and necessary principle is not inductively general- 
ized, but is intuitively discerned. From it deductions are 
then made to subordinate truths, until these, arranged in a 
logical system, shall extend throughout all lines of human 
activity, and comprehend all modes of human obligation. 
Ethics thus constituted is a deductive science. 2 

1 Moral, virtuous, excellent in conduct. From Fr. moral; from Lat. 
moralis, relating to conduct, from mor — , stem of mos, a manner, custom. 
Root uncertain. Derivatives, moral, sb., morals, sb. pi., moralize, "But 
what said Jaques ? Did he not moralize this spectacle ? " — As You Like 
It, ii, 1, 44; moralist; morality, "I had as lief have the foppery of free- 
dom as the morality of imprisonment." — Meas. for Meas., i, 2, 125 ; from 
Fr. moraliU. — Skeat. Moral science or the philosophy of morals is 
synonymous with ethics. Cicero says: "... quia pertinet ad mores, 
quod Ijdos illi vocant, nos earn partem philosophise, De moribus, appellare 
solemus ; sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare Moralem." — 
Defato, ch. i, 1. 

2 Theories of morals are primarily the authoritative or heteronomous 
and the autonomous. Heteronomy finds the origin and sanction of moral 
conduct in constraining precepts whose validity is derived from supreme 
authority, demanding submission and obedience without condition or ques- 
tion. It recognizes the Deity, the Church, or the State as lawgiver. The 



INTRODUCTION 41 

In this essay the First Part treats of the source and 
character of Obligation. Its view is confined to the moral 
bond subsisting in the simple relation of man to man in entire 
parity and reciprocity. The Second Part treats of the va- 
rieties of obligation arising from the varieties of relation due 
to the Organization of men into complex associations. 

theological and ecclesiastical view traces obligation to the revealed will of 
God as ultimate, maintaining that a course is good and right simply because 
he wills it, and that if he willed otherwise its morality would be otherwise 
(Crusius, Grotius, Descartes). The political view discerns ultimate authority 
in the enactments of the State (Hobbes, Kirchmann). 

Autonomy finds the origin and sanction of morality in spontaneous, 
original, independent cognitions and impulses. It subdivides into aprio- 
rism or nativism or intuitionism, and empiricism whose specialized form is 
evolutionism. The apriorist founds morality on an original, innate, intui- 
tive activity ; the empiricist refers it to experience, or to a gradual develop- 
ment. Among apriorists we reckon Cudworth, Clarke, Kant, Fichte, Lotze ; 
among empiricists, Spencer, Wundt. 

Empiricism in the special form of evolution, to which allusion has 
already been made in § 20., is widely approved in the philosophic ethics of 
to-day. Evidently it is an hypothesis of psychogenesis, of historical psy- 
chology. But we question " whether ethics really has any necessary interest 
in an historical and psychological inquiry into the origin of ethical judg- 
ments. A normative discipline, an art of volition and action, can gain 
nothing either for the validity or for the systematization of its norms and 
precepts from the proof of their gradual development under a variety of 
conditions and influences. . . . Evolutionism is an hypothesis, not a norm ; 
it gives an explanation of particular facts, but no precepts or laws by which 
to regulate our conduct ; and hence the antithesis of intuitionism and em- 
piricism is not of essential significance for Ethics." — Kulpe, Int. to Phil., 
§ 27, 9. Cf. F. Bretano, Torn Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntniss, 1889 ; and 
C. M. Williams, Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution, 1893. 

The view of the present treatise is heteronomous in that it finds the 
basis of morality in the order of nature taken in its widest sense ; autono- 
mous or nativist in that it attributes to man the ability to interpret con- 
stituent nature, and discern his obligation to conform to its order. But the 
basis and genesis of morality, unless merely a historical, is a philosophical 
and not an ethical thesis. The problem before us is : Given the simple idea 
or notion of a right ; to find all forms of obligation. 



42 OBLIGATION 



CHAPTER I 



EIGHTS 



§ 22. Every man conceives himself as having certain per- 
sonal rights which he esteems of great worth, and guards 
with jealous care. Throughout life he is chiefly occupied 
with enlarging, confirming and defending them. They are 
a sacred possession which he zealously maintains, and whose 
loss or diminution he regards as degrading his manhood. 
This is one of the most striking and significant facts in the 
historical and current activities of mankind. 

Thence arises much of the strife that continually agitates 
the world. Among barbaric peoples personal violence is 
commonly used to maintain or to recover what one claims 
to be his personal rights. Among civilized peoples courts 
of justice are established to determine the relative rights of 
contending parties, and an executive is empowered to enforce 
their decrees. Nearly all the litigation abounding in every 
nation throughout history is a contention for real or imagi- 
nary rights. 

While each individual man has his own private rights, 
there are many of which he is possessed in common with 
other persons. The maintenance and development of com- 
mon or public rights is committed to organized society, the 
tribe, the state, the nation. When the claims of one on 
another of these conflict or are questioned, diplomacy assumes 
to adjust the rights involved. This failing, recourse is had 
to war. Hence the innumerable battles that mark the tragic 
history of mankind. 



RIGHTS 43 

§ 23. Evidently the notion of a right, since it is the 
source of such intense particular and social activity, has 
deep root in human nature. Also it is evident that, through- 
out the contentions to which it gives rise, there is an appeal 
to some common principle or law of widest generality, appli- 
cable to an infinity of cases, and of the highest practical 
importance in the progressive life of humanity. But inas- 
much .as this universal and overbearing law is for the most 
part obscurely discerned and imperfectly formulated, it is 
inevitable that men should differ often and widely in its ap- 
plication to particular cases. It is the province of Ethics to 
search out and formulate the law, and to unfold its general 
bearing on the several classes of its subjects. 

To this end let us fix discriminatmg attention on the no- 
tion of a right. It is an abstract from personal relations, and 
catholic in them. Whenever and wherever two persons 
come into any mutually affective relation whatever, then and 
there come into being reciprocal rights, and consequent obli- 
gations. The abstracted notion of a right, being pure and 
simple, is as to itself incapable of analysis, and hence of 
formal definition. But we may examine its conditions, its 
correlatives, antitheses, and other implications, and thus clear 
the conception, and distinguish it by its invariable environ- 
ment and limitations. This analytical process will disclose 
fundamental and determining elements, fixing clearly the 
scope and bearing of the notion, and evolving the formative 
principle and the law involved in its essence. 

§ 24. Life is obviously a primary condition of any right. 
Only living beings have rights. The notion is incongruous 
to a stock or a stone. Among riving beings, those alone can 
be conceived as having rights that are endowed with a con- 
sciousness involving at least volition, its primary element, 
conjoined with some degree of sensibility. 1 A right, then, is 

1 The new Psychology considers will as the primary and constitutive 



44 OBLIGATION 

a logical property, a mark that belongs to this, and to no 
other class of beings. 1 

But conscious life is not merely a condition of rights, not 
merely what must be in order that rights may be. There is 
in its very nature that which determines that rights shall be. 
They are of its essence. Thus every conscious being neces- 
sarily has rights by virtue of its ultimate constitution. It is 
not necessary that every one so constituted should be aware 
of the fact, either in detail or in general, not even in the 
most obscure way. But the higher orders of conscious be- 
ings recognize relatively to themselves the existence of rights 

function of mind ; intelligence, as a secondary development. The leader 
of this view is Schopenhauer (Willen in der Natur, et al.) ; followed by 
Schneider (Der Theirische Wille, 1880), Wundt (System der Philosophic, 
1889, and Vorlesungen liber die Menschen und Thierseele, 2d ed., 1892), 
Paulsen (Einleitung in die Philosophic, 1893), and many others. It sees the 
will arising, without perception or intelligence, as a blind craving or in- 
stinctive impulse, and thereon and thereby a gradual development of intelli- 
gence as a means to gratification. Thus a jelly-fish, a polyp, an infusory, 
knows nothing of itself, or of external things ; a mere craving determines its 
vital activities. Gradually, in the progressive series of animal life, we see 
intelligence grafted on the will. To instinctive movements are added others 
guided by perception, and then by intelligent purpose involving deliberation 
and choice. Also every human being enters the world as a blind will with- 
out intellect. The nursling is all will ; its voluntary movements are blindly 
instinctive. When a craving is satisfied, a feeling of satisfaction arises, 
otherwise a feeling of discomfort. In pleasurable and painful feelings, the 
will becomes aware of itself, and of its relation to an environment. Out of 
feeling, knowledge is gradually evolved, and in the more mature child the 
will appears saturated with intelligence. In this survey, the will is seen to 
be the original and constant factor of the life of the soul. At the close of 
the series, we find it directed towards the same great ends as at the begin- 
ning, the preservation and evolution of individual life and of the species. 
Intelligence is the secondary and variable factor, which is gradually imparted 
to the will as an instrument. So the voluntaristic as distinguished from the 
intellectualistic Psychology. 

1 The rights of man extend, however, beyond his natural life. Our an- 
cestors still have rights, and posterity has rights, which the living are bound 
to respect. Yet life, past, present or to come, is a condition of this property. 
See infra, § 119. 



EIGHTS 45 

in the lower orders, though these be quite destitute of the 
notion. 1 

§ 25. Every man has, elemental in his conscious life, cer- 
tain powers of mind, and thence of body. These powers, 
faculties and capacities, belong to his nature, to his original 
constitution, and are essential in his make-up as a man, as a 
human being. They are, more specifically, conditions psycho- 
logically antecedent to the existence and apprehension of 
rights, and rights are the natural and necessary consequence 
of their existence. That is to say, powers and rights are 
natural, constitutional, original correlatives. 

These native powers are distributed as modes of knowing 
and feeling, desiring and willing. The members of the latter 
couple constitute more particularly the practical side of 
human nature, and are intimately concerned with the exist- 
ence and exercise of rights. Therefore on them especially 
we fix our present attention. 

A desire implies an impulse, excited by the want, urging 
the will to an activity, relative to other powers, such as 
seems likely to result in gratification. 2 Every one is actuated 
by desires which thus motive his conduct. These sources of 
activity are the determinants of his welfare, and his rights 
have in them their ultimate ground. Hence it is only as his 
desires, either actual or potential, are infringed that his rights 
are affected ; and to that for which he has not and cannot 
possibly have a desire, e. g., a villa in the moon, he has not 

1 The wide class of beings having conscious life includes the brute forms 
of animal life. That brutes have rights is beyond question, though they 
themselves have no knowledge of the fact. This is recognized by a merciful 
man ; he does not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn. Also it is 
recognized in many States by protective laws. See infra, § 68, note. Our 
proposed inquiry shall be limited, however, to beings of the highest order, 
and among these, more especially, to human beings. 

2 See supra, § 5. 



46 OBLIGA TION 

and can never possibly have a right. Normal desires, or such 
as have an instinctive rise, and are in accord with the gene- 
ral order of nature, impel toward the fulfillment of the appro- 
priate functions of the man in a world of persons and things. 
This consideration of its terms brings into clear view the 
truth of the principle : A man has a right to gratify his normal 
desires. 1 

Every volition or act of the will is immediately conditioned 
on desire ; that is to say, no exercise of the will can occur 
except by virtue of an antecedent desire which as a motive 
impels it to action. But notwithstanding this dependence, 
the will is to be regarded as central in the personality, since 
it has the function to control, modify, suppress or arouse the 

1 Principle, a beginning, a fundamental truth or law, a tenet, a settled 
rule of action. From Fr. principe, from Lat. principium, from princeps, 
chief. — Skeat. Cicero says: " Principio autem nulla est origo, nam ex 
principio oriuntur omnia ; ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest ; nee 
enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde." — Tusc. I)isp. bk. i, ch. 
23, § 54. Aristotle distinguishes seven different senses of the word apxv, a 
beginning or first principle, then adds : " Common to all first principles is 
the being the original from whence a thing either is, or is produced, or is 
known." — Metaphysics, bk. iv, ch. 1. The term dpx'n was introduced into 
philosophy by Anaximander. — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., § 13. 

A principle is also a designation of order ; a principle of nature is a 
designation of natural order, physical or psychical ; a moral principle is a 
principle of nature which, in view of possible alternatives, takes imperative 
form, enjoining one, forbidding the other. 

Normal, according to rule. A late word. From Lat. normalis, from 
norma, a carpenter's square, rule, pattern ; Gk. yvupi/xos, fem. yvoptprj, 
well-known ; cf . yv&p.wv, an index ; all from the root gna, to know. — Skeat. 
A thing is normal when strictly conformed to those principles of its con- 
stitution which make it what it is. See infra, § 35, second paragraph. 

Let it be here observed in anticipation of subsequent matter that a man's 
malevolent desires, as anger, envy, jealousy, misanthropy, are in general 
abnormal in kind, since they do not conform to the normal principles of the 
human constitution ; and that his benevolent desires or affections, which are 
normal in kind, may in general become abnormal in degree, either by in- 
anity or by excess, temporary or permanent, and need to be invigorated or 
restrained. 



BIGHTS 47 

activity of all other powers, including even its conditioning 
desires. Freedom consists in the possibility of this voluntary 
exercise of one's powers, and it is evident that without 
freedom their normal functions cannot be f ufilled, or that free- 
dom is necessary to the natural working and development of 
the entire personality in its existing relations. These con- 
siderations bring to light the truth of the principle : A man 
has a right to a free use of his native powers. 1 

The two statements are not to be taken as distinct princi- 
ples. Together they constitute the mutually dependent and 
complementary parts of the consistent whole : A man has a 
right to a free use of his native powers in the gratification of 
his normal desires. 

This principle is the basis of Ethics. It is axiomatic, self- 
evidently true, not needing or admitting any logical proof ; 
for the intuitive, synthetic d priori judgment involved in the 
pure notion of a right finds its immediate application to the 
desires and volitions. At first view it may appear thoroughly 
egoistic or selfish in character, but the outcome of a pa- 
tient and thorough scrutiny of its bearings will reverse 
this primary impression. Likewise its formal universality 
may seem to sanction unbounded license, but the close in- 
spection to which we shall submit it will discover very strin- 
gent limitations, not arbitrarily imposed, but arising from the 
matter of its constituent terms, and leading to a disclosure of 
our varied obligations. Thus there is no need to look be- 
yond the natural and original constitution of man, despite its 

I "Not only will all these [principles] be found in the enacted laws 
(vSfiois), but nature herself has marked them out in her unwritten laws 
(voftlfwis), and in the moral constitutions of men." — Demosthenes, De Cor- 
ona, § 275, Teubner. 

II Selbstverstandlich ist das urspriingliche Recht der Freiheit, d. h. des 
freien Gebrauchs seiner Krafte und der freien Wahl der Ziele, worauf sie 
gerichtet werden. In der Gesellschaft unterliegt dies Recht, wie jedes, 
Beschrankungen." — Lotze, Grundzuge der praktischen Philosophie, § 42. 



48 OBLIGATION 

weakness, perversion and distortion, to discern the prolific 
principle of morality. 1 

i See supra, § 21. "In Plato's Republic, as in Butler's Sermons, the 
human soul is represented as a system, a constitution, an organized whole 
in which the different elements have not merely their places side by side, 
but their places above and below each other, with their appointed offices • 
and virtue or moral Tightness consists in the due operation of this constitution 
the actual realization of the organized subordination. We may notice, too, 
that Plato, like Butler, is remarkable among moralists for the lucid and 
forcible manner in which he has singled out from men's springs of action the 
irascible element (his Gvfweid^s ; Butler's Resentment ;) and taught its true 
place and office in a moral scheme." — Whewell, Preface to Butler's 
Sermons, p. xxxiv. 

"The foundation of Aristotle's system of ethics is deeply laid in his 
psychological system. Upon the nature of the human soul the whole fabric 
is built up, and depends for its support. According to Aristotle, we are 
endowed with a moral sense, aX<xdr)<ns, a perception of moral beauty and ex- 
cellence, and with an acuteness on practical subjects, deivorrjs, which, when 
cultivated, is improved into <pp6vti<ns, prudence or moral wisdom." — Browne, 
Analytical Introduction to Nic. Eth. 

The doctrine of the Stoics is very similar. The supreme end of life is a 
life conformed to nature, dfxoXoyovfjL^vws ry fyixxei ffiv, the agreement of human 
conduct with the universal law of nature, of the human with the divine will. 
Zeno defines the ethical end to be harmony with one's own nature ; Cleanthes, 
with the nature of the universe ; Chrysippus, with our own nature and that 
of the universe together, our nature being but a part of universal nature. 
The formula of Chrysippus is : kclt 4p.ireipiav tQp <pi<rei avjj.fi.aivbvTO)v, or 
aKoXotidios rrj (pija-ei ftp ; that is : Live according to your experience of the 
course of nature. This anthropological conception of the principle of morals 
was adhered to by the later Stoics, as in the following dictum of Clement of 
Alexandria, one of the latest : tAos elvai to ffiv afcoXovdws rrj rod avdp&irov 
KOLTao-Kevrj ; that is : The end of man is to live agreeably to the natural con- 
stitution of man. — Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, § 55. 

" The moral law is not foreign to our nature ; it is not imposed upon us 
by a despot, as was the Continental Embargo at the beginning of this cen- 
tury, barring the approach to a thousand goods and pleasures. It is rather 
the law of our own being. Moral laws are natural laws. We may assign 
to them a transcendental. significance or not; they are, first of all and at all 
events, natural laws of human life in the sense of being the conditions of its 
health and welfare. According to the natural course of events, their trans- 
gression will bring upon nations as well as upon individuals misfortune and 
destruction, while their observance is accompanied by welfare and peace." 
— Paulsen. Int. to Phil, bk. i, ch. 1, § 3. 



RIGHTS 49 

§ 26, In view of their objects it is usual to name three 
kinds of rights : the right to life, the right to liberty, the 
right to property. 1 This division appears in the three funda- 
mental verbs : to be, to do, to have. But the species are not 
independent, for each involves the other two as complemen- 
tary correlatives. 

It follows that either two may be regarded as modified 
forms and be expressed in the terms of the third. Thus, for 
instance, life without some measure of liberty in the use of 
instrumentahties, could hardly claim the name. 

Also, life and liberty are commonly spoken of as forms of 
property; as when one says, my life, his liberty. Indeed 
rights in general are viewed as forms of property in the fa- 
miliar phrases, my rights, our rights, their rights. We cor- 
rectly say that every man has rights, he owns them, he is 
their proprietor. Some rights he may dispose of at will, others 
are inalienable except by forfeiture ; but, so long as they in- 
here in him, they are his possession, his own. The sense of 
proprietorship in rights is very strong, as seen in the tena- 
cious retention and persistent defense of them when men- 
aced. 2 

Likewise the several kinds of rights may be reduced to the 
right to liberty. Conscious life is an aggregate of active 
powers, and a power is a possibility of change. A right to 

1 ' ' All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain 
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they 
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity ; namely, the en- 
joyments of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." — Virginia Bill 
of Rights, § 1. 

2 Psychologically the notion mine comes before the notion me. — Lotze. 
Even behavior is etymologically a having. To behave is a mere compound 
of the verb to have with the Anglo-Saxon prefix be-, to surround, to shut up, 
to possess. So conduct is behavior ; from Lat. conductus, pp. of conducere, 
from con-, for cum, together, and ducere to lead ; to bring together, to col- 
lect. — Skeat. 



50 OBLIGATION 

life is a right to exercise these powers, a right to self-deter- 
mined change, which is liberty. Also property in external 
things means liberty to make use of them. To be dispos- 
sessed of any property is to be deprived of this liberty ; but 
the thing i& still one's own, and the right to its free use, 
though suspended, remains. Thus ownership in external 
things is a right to liberty. 

Of these reductions, the last, though least familiar, is most 
clearly real, and of widest and deepest import. Hence, 
while we cannot avoid using the language of possession, we 
shall adhere to the view that every right, in its last analysis, 
is a right to some phase of liberty, to the untrammeled exer- 
cise of ability. 1 Manifestly the cardinal element in the princi- 
ple already formulated is a right to liberty in this general 
sense, and on it our further consideration shall chiefly turn. 

1 ' ' Liberty and Right are synonymous ; since the liberty of acting ac- 
cording to one's will would be altogether illusory if it were not protected 
from obstruction. There is, however, this difference between the terms. 
In Liberty the prominent or leading idea is the absence of legal restraint, 
whilst the security or protection for the enjoyment of that liberty is the 
secondary idea. Eight, on the other hand, denotes the protection, and 
connotes the absence of restraint." — Austin, Jurisprudence, §445. 



LIBERTY 51 



CHAPTER II 



LIBEETY 



§ 27. Freedom means the absence of cansal restraint or 
constraint. It is a function purely negative, yet a special 
subjective property of volition. It is the power of choosing. 
Causative determination is incompatible with the existence 
of choice, for hi causation there is no alternative, whereas in 
choice an alternative is essential. The power of choosing 
is simply the ability to decide freely for one act or line of 
conduct rather than for its possible alternate. 

Whether or not there be in reality a power of choice is an 
old and difficult question in metaphysics. It has already 
been briefly considered, and the point made that the reality 
of choice is a necessary condition and hence a postulate of 
Ethics. Whoever is morally responsible must be free. Con- 
sequently we here assume that in all voluntary activity there 
is real freedom in measure sufficient for responsibility. 1 

1 See Supra, §§ 8-10. Aristotle teaches that "morality presupposes 
liberty. This exists whenever the will of the agent meets no obstacles, 
and he is able to deliberate intelligently. It is destroyed by ignorance or 
constraint." — Ueberweg, Hist Phil., § 50. The matter is specially treated 
in the Nicomachean Ethics, bk. iii, first five chapters. The principle of all 
moral action is irpoatpecns, i.e. what is commonly termed choice, or the delib- 
erately preferring one act or one course of action to any other on moral 
ground, under the direction of reason, vovs. It is this, he says, which de- 
termines the moral quality of an act, and distinguishes the habit of virtue. 
At the threshold of the investigation is the freedom of the human will, and 
on the establishing of this doctrine depends the whole question of human 
responsibility. See especially Grote's Aristotle, 2d Ed., 1880, ch. xiii, § 2. 



52 OBLIGATION 

§ 28. Certain limitations of freedom need now to be 
observed. Freedom lies in the power of choice, and in it 
alone. All other powers of mind are subject to causation, 
their activities being always definitely determined by causa- 
tive antecedents. That choice alone is free is a simple fact 
in human nature, and a very narrow constitutional limitation 
of our original and originating ability ; but it is the essential 
difference between a creator and the passive work of his 
hands. It renders possible not only moral obligation, but 
also an infinite variety of self-determined activities. 

A choice resolved is intention. The intention accords 
with that desire to which preference is given by choice. 1 
The elected desire, if it be for action, induces a voluntary 
effort whose end is the object desired. This effort consists 
solely in an act of attention. The fixing attention more or 
less intense on a chosen object is the total of possible volun- 
tary energy. We observe here a second very narrow consti- 
tutional limitation of human ability. Still this power of 
attention proves sufficient for the purposes of life, and for 
fulfilling the demand for moral action and conduct, since by 
means of it we are capable, directly or indirectly, of com- 
plete self-mastery. 2 

To the exercise of voluntary attention, since it is deter- 
mined by choice, freedom is attributed. This freedom, how- 
ever, is not absolute, but suffers restriction. That the exer- 

i An exercise of choice is commonly viewed as directly resolving the 
question : Shall I do this or that ? The view is narrow, but the fact is even 
narrower. An election is not primarily between two positive alternatives, 
but between one positive and its negative. Shall I do this or not ? Shall 
I act or refrain ? If the decision is to abstain, then, secondarily, the election 
may occur between the other positive alternative and its negative. Very 
often, in deliberation, the two positives seem to be weighed directly against 
each other, as in two scales of a balance ; but, on close analysis, it appears 
that there is but one scale, counterpoised by native inertia, in which scale 
proposed actions are weighed in quick succession. 

2 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 89, and 269 sq. 



LIBERTY 53 

cise involves effort, a nisus or striving, shows the presence 
of obstacles within the mind itself. Evidently there is some 
mental inertia to be overcome, which checks and limits the 
action ; otherwise there would be no occasion for effort, no 
point of application whereon to expend energy. Herein is a 
third limitation. 

Mental effort is a force or cause, free in that according to 
choice it may or may not be put into play, and in that, if put 
into play, its intensity may be varied. Now the mental may 
be transformed into physical energy, and issue in muscular 
action. This, too, is accomplished through attention. To 
move my arm, I must have an idea of the arm and of it as 
moving. Fixing my attention thereon, and willing the reali- 
zation, the arm moves accordingly. This is inexplicable. 
We know it only and simply from experience. But let it be 
observed that the direct control of the animal body lies ex- 
clusively in this power to contract, according to choice, the 
voluntary muscles, a limited class, thus producing motion of 
the limbs and some other organs, while very many vital 
activities, as pulsation and digestion, are beyond direct con- 
trol. Moreover, when the movable organs are at liberty, 
still the extent of their motion is very closely circumscribed. 
This discovers a fourth very narrow constitutional limitation 
of free action, restricting or confining it to the ability to con- 
tract a muscle, and so to move a member through a small 
space. Still it is much, very much, to possess and to have 
at command a free physical force, free in that it accords with 
choice, which force we may use at will, combining it with 
fixed natural causes, varying its direction and small inten- 
sity, so as to arrest or modify the operations of nature. 

It is a noteworthy corollary that this limitation to loco- 
motion extends to the body as a whole, and to all external 
things. These we move from place to place, but this is the 
total of our direct physical efficiency. The planter moves a 



54 OBLIGA TION 

spade and seed from one place to another ; the forces of na- 
ture do the rest, producing the crop. The smith moves his 
hammer up and down, the weaver throws his shuttle to and 
fro; the outcome is fabricated by virtue of the natural 
forces inherent in the materials. A knowledge of natural 
forces, and an intelligent, purposeful placing of things so as 
to take advantage of them, enable men to manage factories, 
to tunnel Alps, to navigate oceans, to wrap the earth with 
iron, and to cover its face with cities. But in all his infin- 
itely varied works, man has at command only the single free 
physical ability to place or displace things. 1 

§ 29. Freedom isolates each man from every other, setting 
him apart and alone in the universe. For this center of his 
personality is intangible, out of reach of any other being. 
By the gift of his image the Deity has made man to this 
extent independent of himself, putting it beyond his power 
to cause a human creature willingly to do otherwise than 
that creature may choose ; since therein would be a contra- 
diction. He may reason and persuade, command and 
threaten, but cannot causally coerce the man, for this de- 
stroys the essential conditions of personality ; the man in 
such case is not a man, not a moral being. Much less may 
a fellow-man causally determine his choice. One may de- 



1 Lord Bacon wrote: "Man, whilst operating, can only apply or with- 
draw natural bodies; nature, internally, performs the rest." — Novum Or- 
ganujn, bk. i, aph. 4. Mr. J. S. Mill, apparently unaware of Bacon's 
aphorism, makes the point and expands it, with many illustrations.— Politi- 
cal Economy, bk. i, ch. 1, § 2. 

" Son of immortal seed, high-destined man, 

Know thy dread gift, — a creature yet a cause ! 
Each mind is its own center, and it draws 
Home to itself, and moulds in its thought's span, 
All outward things, the vassals of its will, 
Aided by heaven, by earth unthwarted still." 



LIBERTY 55 

stroy another's life, but not otherwise his personality. The 
freedom of man, within constitutional limits, is absolute. 1 

Freedom and liberty are synonymous terms, denoting the 
absence of causal determination. They are commonly used 
interchangeably, but it will be convenient here to use them 
distinctively. Freedom signifies the absence of causal deter- 
mination antecedent to and effective of election and inten- 
tion. It is strictly subjective. Liberty signifies primarily 
the absence of preventive causes subsequent to intention, of 
obstacles, impediments or hindrances that interfere more or 
less effectively with its successful accomplishment. It im- 
plies the untrammeled exercise of voluntary effort in its 
normal function of carrying out the intention. It is objec- 
tive- in that it has reference primarily and especially to 
external difficulties. A prisoner is entirely free in preferring 
release to continued confinement; but not until the door 
opens is he at liberty. The term is also applied in this sense 
to purely physical facts ; as, an unscotched wheel is at lib- 
erty ; a spark on powder liberates energy. 2 

1 Says Epictetus, the philosophic f reedman : ' ' Put me in chains ! No, 
no ! You may put my leg in chains, but not even Zeus himself can fetter 
my will." 

" Je n'ai jamais cru, quant a moi, que la liberte" de Thomme consistat a 
faire ce qu'il veut, mais bien a ce qu'aucune puissance humaine ne lui fit 
faire ce qu'il ne veut pas." — Rousseau, Reveries oVun Promeneur Soli- 
taire. 

2 See Elements of Psychology, § 285. The distinction is rarely observed, 
and the neglect of it has in some instances led to erroneous doctrine. We 
remark that : 

Freedom is essential in personality ; Liberty, accidental ; 

Freedom is absolute ; Liberty, merely functional ; 

Freedom appertains to choice; Liberty, to effort, and beyond; 

Freedom implies free-will ; Liberty, merely free-agency ; 

Freedom is negative of any causality ; Liberty, of preventive causality ; 

Freedom contradicts necessity ; Liberty consists with necessity ; 

Freedom is subject to morality ; Liberty, to legality ; 

Freedom conditions proficiency ; Liberty, efficiency ; 

Freedom is a primary, Liberty a secondary condition of obligation. 



56 OBLIGATION 

§ 30. The exercise of liberty or free action, in the sense 
just indicated, often suffers restrictions that diminish it, even 
to annihilation. Neglecting impossibilities and impersonal 
difficulties, we shall consider only those restraints that arise 
from the conflict of other wills. 

One person may effectively interfere with the liberty of 
another by using his own muscular force, either directly or 
by setting obstacles to bar the way. The man thus assailed 
may be overpowered by stronger handling, and be fettered 01 
imprisoned. Also he may be beset and embarrassed in his 
taking or keeping possession of property, in producing and 
imparting. Also any withdrawing or withholding of means 
which he might use to attain a chosen end, is an interference 
with his liberty. Such external interferences may occur in 
an infinite variety of ways, and are cases of causal determina- 
tion. 

§ 31. There is, however, a secondary sense, even more im- 
portant and perhaps more frequent, of the use of the term 
liberty, in which it signifies the absence, not merely of causal 
restriction, but also of any inducement presented to one in- 
clining him otherwise than he, if unassailed, would be dis- 
posed. When influences that are not causes are brought to 
bear on a man pressing him to choose otherwise than he 
would, modifying and sometimes reversing his original and 
characteristic preferences, this is properly regarded as a 
restriction of his liberty. 

The process becomes clear upon a little consideration. 
The power of choice is obviously conditioned on cognition. 
There must be an idea of an action, and of its possible alter- 
nate. A judgment is rendered between these, and the choice 
accords with the weightier reason. Reasons are not causes. 
A man may be influenced in his choice by them without loss 
as to his personality, and indeed his every choice is subject 



LIBERTY 57 

to rational determination. The reasons for one alternative 
are more influential than those for the other, and he freely, of 
himself, chooses the former. It is not at all requisite that 
the prevailing reasons should be what might be called good 
reasons ; they may be very bad, poor, trifling, or even absurd 
reasons ; nevertheless they are the rational determinants with 
which the choice accords. 1 

Now, a man may not effect, but he may affect another's 
choice by presenting such reasons as shall operate through 
the desires to influence his course. This is done obviously 
by argument; also one obviously influences by persuasion 
the decisions and conduct of his fellows. Even greater in 
extent is the influence of instruction, as in the education of 
children. Indeed, in the whole process of education, we in- 
fluence powerfully the general disposition, character, and 
course through life of other persons, thus putting permanent 
restraints upon their liberty. So also in social and political 
relations, and in religion, restraining influences, or interfer- 
ences with liberty, are constantly exerted by the presentation 
of reasons. 

Another way of embarrassing the will, and so checking 
liberty, is by reason of threatened harm, as seen particularly 
in the penalties of the law. The police, the court and the 
penitentiary offer a constant reason for conformity to law. 
The footpad, who presents the alternative of your money or 
your life, thereby proposes a reason usually sufficient to de- 
termine in favor of yielding the purse. A plea of duress is 
allowed by the courts in discharge of engagement, or in miti- 
gation of penalty. Any menace inspiring apprehension in- 
terferes with liberty, changing the preferable direction of 

1 See supra, § 10, note. Reasons are causae efficientes cognoscendi, but 
are not at all causae, efficientes essendi. They should be clearly distinguished 
from the latter class, which is the usual meaning of the unqualified term cause. 
For the several kinds of causes see Elements of Inductive Logic, § 14, note. 



58 OBLIGATION 

action, or diminishing its range, without bringing to naught 
the possible alternative. The weightiest examples of such 
interference are to be found in political oppression, in reli- 
gious persecution, and still more generally in war. 1 

§ 32. An important distinction now to be made is between 
those interferences, both external and internal, that are war- 
ranted and those that are unwarranted. 

The state warrants its officers in the arrest and imprison- 
ment, and even in the execution of offenders against its laws. 
It warrants the seizure of goods to satisfy judgments, the 
confiscation of private property for public weal, the levying 
of taxes for its own support, the conscription of citizens for 
military service, the bondage of a class as serfs or slaves. 
Also by stringent enactments it regulates industry in produc- 
tion and trade, restricts marriage and divorce, inheritance 
and bequest, and provides compulsory education. These and 
many other restraints on the original liberties of its subjects 
it imposes, and enforces, if need be, with a strong arm. 
Aside from those enjoined by the state, there are many for- 
mal restraints in the common intercourse of men which are 
warranted by social relations. To these may be added re- 
straints within the family circle, especially those arising from 
the exercise of parental authority. 

The foregoing restrictions of liberty are unavoidable. One 
may approve of and willingly comply with them, but his con- 
sent is not asked ; he can neither refuse to accept them, nor 
escape by renouncing them. But there are also many avoid- 
able restraints that exist by consent, as in contracts, promises, 
marriage, and membership in clubs, societies, institutions and 

1 The legal definition of duress is "the state of moral compulsion or 
necessity in which a person is induced, by unlawful restraint of his liberty 
or actual or threatened violence, to make a deed or contract or to fulfil one, 
or to commit a misdemeanor." See Elements of Psychology, § 273, note. 



LIBERTY 59 

churches, whose requisitions are warranted by being legiti- 
mate and voluntarily conceded. 

Very grave questions arise, and will be subsequently con- 
sidered, respecting the ground of the warrant or right to 
bind. It is sufficient here to observe that the occasion and 
extent of warranted interference is determined by the rela- 
tive rights of the parties. Granting the warrant in the vari- 
ous cases cited, it is evident that they represent a large and 
distinct class of restrictions in the range of personal liberty. 

It seems, then, that every man is surrounded by legitimate 
checks on action, having warrant in the rights of others to 
whom he is personally related. He cannot transgress a cer- 
tain circumscribed bound without infringing on their privi- 
leges, and he is debarred from doing so, as far as practicable, 
by their conflicting wills. Thus by the rights of others 
everyone's rights are limited. But within the limits thus set, 
any willful restraint upon one's liberty of action, either exter- 
nal or internal, being ex vi termini unwarranted, is a violation 
of his ultimate constitutional right to a free use of his powers 
in the gratification of his normal desires. On this class of 
interferences we proceed to bestow special consideration. 



60 OBLIGA TION 



CHAPTER III 

TRESPASS 

§ 33. Having considered certain conditions and limitations 
of rights, we are now prepared to examine more particularly 
the basis and origin of the notion, together with certain 
other conditions, correlates and implications that mark the 
limits of interference in liberty. 

The notion of a right, being pure and simple, is incapable 
of logical definition. Like all other pure notions it is imme- 
diately discerned upon an empirical occasion. The occasion 
for this intuition is the experience of a personal relation. It 
is a matter of common observation that we all stand in vari- 
ous and dissimilar relations to other sentient beings, as of 
man to man in reciprocal parity, of parent to child, of bene- 
factor to beneficiary, of ruler to subject, and many others. 
Now, so soon as a human mind apprehends a relation between 
two persons, whether the observer be one of the parties or 
not, upon that occasion it immediately discerns the concomi- 
tant existence of mutual rights. Their special character and 
extent is not immediately discerned, but only that they exist. 

The character and extent of the rights discerned are de- 
termined by the kind and intimacy of the relation between 
the parties. Whenever we undertake to pass moral judg- 
ment on any action, we examine and reflect upon the rela- 
tion sustained by the persons concerned, and make this the 
basis of the judgment, approving or disapproving, mildly or 
strongly, as the case may be. We judge that a benefactor 
has a right to the gratitude of his rightful beneficiary ; that 



TRESPASS 61 

a subject has a right to the forbearance of his rightful ruler, 
who, in violating that right, becomes a tyrant. Thus rights 
Vary with relations. Those of parent in child are different 
from those of child in parent ; those of benefactor in recipi. 
ent, from those of recipient in benefactor; and both differ 
from those lying in elder and younger brothers, and in master 
and servant. But in all such relations, however they may 
otherwise differ from each other, we see the existence of 
mutual rights, whose character and extent are determinable 
only by, and ascertainable only from, the nature of the rela- 
tion. It is therefore held as an ethical principle that rights 
are conditioned on personal relations, discerned in personal 
relations, and determined by personal relations. 

In attempting to unfold the ethical theory grounded on 
personal relations, we shall confine our attention primarily 
and for the most part to the simple and indifferent relation 
of man to man, in entire equipoise and reciprocity. 

§ 34. A slight attention to the notion of a right discovers 
that it is conditioned on a social relation. A solitary man, 
one absolved from all fellowship, however entire his liberty, 
however abundant the means of gratifying many desires, has 
not, strictly speaking, any rights. 1 Now a right, since it 
exists only by virtue of a personal relation, near or remote, 
implies a liability of conflict between wills ; at the least, the 
conceivable possibility of an interference in one's liberty by 
some other person. For example, a right to go involves the 
notion of possibly being hindered or opposed, not by the 

1 "To speak of natural rights as belonging to the isolated person (Einzel- 
person) is in itself false. By nature man has merely physical and spiritual 
capacities, and the possibility of exercising them ; but he has a right to the 
last only in society. ... A right can only be called natural, in so far as it 
is not gained through special title, but in so far as it is enough to be a man 
among men in order to know that others are obligated to respect it." — 
Lotze, Grundzuge der praktischen Philosophie, § 32. 



62 OBLIGATION 

physical difficulties of the way, but by the counteracting will 
of some other person, which coming into play, the right to 
go is orally claimed, and perhaps violently exercised. Any 
right whatever that any man or people or nation may have, 
is held in view of a conceivable hindrance or obstruction on 
the part of others. 

Let it be next observed that not every interference in one's 
liberty is an interference in his right. Warranted interfer- 
ence does not violate any right, but only unwarranted inter- 
ference. The notion of a right implies that any intelligent 
interference with its free exercise is unwarranted, which in- 
terference is a wrong. Now a right and a wrong are logical 
antithetical correlatives. The notion of the one necessarily 
carries with it the notion of the other, like as the notions of 
straight and bent, of order and disorder. A wrong, how- 
ever, is conditioned on a right ; that is, a right must be in 
order that a wrong may be. Whenever, then, a person 
knowingly and willingly interferes in my right, checking or 
preventing or making vain my effort to realize it, thereby 
restraining the free course of my powers in seeking to gratify 
my normal desires, he does me a wrong. Thus a wrong is a 
violation of a right, and it again appears that a right can 
exist only in view of its conceivable violation, a possible 
wrong. 1 

1 "Eight (Lat. jus) as a substantive, a right or rights, denotes a claim 
of one person against the infringement of others, or a possession which can 
be defended against aggression. It is illustrated in such phrases as the right 
to life, the right to vote, human rights, etc., and essentially means that force 
may be legitimately used in the defense of it, though there may not always 
be an obligation to do so." — Htslop, Elements of Ethics, ch. iii, § 3. 

A helpful distinction, taken by the Civilians writing subsequently to the 
revival of Roman Law, is between jus in rem, a right which avails against 
persons generally, and jus in personam, a right which avails only against 
particular persons. 

One instance of the former kind is ownership or property, which is "the 
right to use or deal with some given subject, in a manner, or to an extent, 



TRESPASS 63 

§ 35. The principle that every man has a right to the free 
use of his powers in gratifying his normal desires, 1 may be 
stated thus : Every man has a right to the free use of his 
powers in so far as he does not interfere in the rights of any 
other ; that is, does not violate the right of another, or does 
no one a wrong. We have just seen that the right of either 
party exists only in view of its conceivable violation by the 
other. The modified expression of the principle brings out 
the point that rights in different parties limit each other; 
or that each of two parties has a sphere of rights which 
touches but does not intersect the sphere of the other. 2 

The necessary and universal limitation expressed in the 
foregoing modified statement of the principle, is merely a 

which, though not unlimited, is indefinite." Another is jus servitutis, which 
is "the right to use or deal with, in a given or definite manner, a subject 
owned by another ; " as, a right of way over another's land ; a right, against 
any third party, of a husband relative to his wife, of a parent to his child, 
of an officer to his subordinate, e.g. a soldier, of a master to his slave, ser- 
vant, or apprentice, and vice versa. A third is the right styled a monopoly, 
which is jus in rem though having no subject, that is, no specific person or 
thing over or to which the right exists, or in which it inheres. Of this sort 
is the exclusive right to a trade mark, and a man's right to his reputation or 
good name. Jura in res are all prohibitive, obligating persons generally to 
forbear or abstain from interference. 

Instances of jus in personam are, a right arising from a contract or agree- 
ment or a simple promise, and a right of legal action, with all other rights 
founded upon injuries. Jura in personas are either prohibitive or requisitive. 
See Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, § 510 sq., and § 1041 sq. 

1 See supra, § 25. 

2 Fichte, in his Theory of Eights, holds that : ' ' Since no one with free- 
dom passes beyond his sphere, and each one therefore limits himself, they 
recognize each other as rational and free. This relation of a reciprocity 
acting through intelligence and freedom between rational beings, according 
to which each one has his freedom limited by the conception of the possibil- 
ity of the other's freedom, under the condition that this other limits his own 
freedom also through that of the first, is called a relation of rights. The 
supreme maxim of a theory of rights is therefore this : Limit thy freedom 
through the conception of the freedom of every other person with whom 
thou canst be connected."— Schwegler, Hist. Phil, § 41. 



64 OBLIGA TION 

partial explication of what is implied in the qualifying term 
normal occurring in the prior statement. Normal desires are 
those that strictly conform to the natural and original con- 
stitution of man, harmonize with his other powers, and 
accord with his relations to his fellows and to his general 
environment. Those are abnormal which have not this con- 
gruity. Normal desires, as acquisitiveness, are limited to 
such gratification as may be attained without interference in 
the rights of others. Abnormal desires, as covetousness, 
impel to action in disregard of the rights of others. It 
appears, then, that the latter statement of the moral princi- 
ple modifies the former, not in content, but in expanded 
expression only. 

§ 36. In the further treatment of this matter it will be 
convenient to use the word trespass, with some latitude of 
meaning, yet quite definitely. A wrong is any violation of a 
right ; so is a trespass. The terms have identical extension, 
indeed are strictly synonymous. We have found that liberty 
is necessary to the exercise and realization of a right, and 
that a violation of a right is an interference in liberty. Also 
we have found that a warranted interference in liberty is not 
a violation of any right, not a wrong, not a trespass. It re- 
mains, then, that a trespass is an unwarranted interference in 
liberty. 1 

1 Trespass, a passing over a boundary, a crime, sin, offense, injury ; from 
Old French trespas, a decease, departure out of this world. The literal 
sense is a step beyond or across, so that it has direct reference to the modern 
use of trespass in the sense of intrusion on another man's land. From Lat. 
trans, across, and passus, a step. Cf. transgression, violation of law ; from 
Fr. transgression, from Lat. transgressus, pp. of transgredi, to step over, pass 
over, from trans, across, and gradi, to step, walk. — Skeat. 

In the Pater Noster we have : And forgive us our debts (<50etXi^«tTa), as 
we have also forgiven our debtors (60eiX<?rcus.) — Matthew, 6 : 12. In Luke, 
11:4: And forgive us our sins (afiaprias) ; for we ourselves also forgive 
every one that is indebted (dfatKovri) to us. The comment in Matthew, 6:14, 



TRESPASS 65 

In legal definition a trespass is an unlawful act committed 
with force and violence, vi et armis, on the person, property, 
or relative rights of another. This narrow, technical state- 
ment is intended to designate those forms of trespass which 
are forbidden by civil law, and have a remedy or a penalty 
therein provided. But in common, free and correct usage 
the term includes many forms of offense of which civil law 
takes no cognizance, indeed any and every act that injures or 
annoys another, that violates any rule of rectitude or bond of 
obligation, and we here adopt this comprehensive meaning. 1 

is : For if ye forgive men their trespasses (Trapa.irTufj.aTa, from irapairiTTTia, to 
fall beside or aside, to mistake, err), etc. It is evident that the several terms 
are used synonymously and interchangeably in a widely comprehensive 



1 The contrast of the juridical and ethical definitions of trespass gives 
occasion to note the usual legal distinction between perfect and imperfect 
rights. Perfect or determinate rights, duties, obligations, officio, juris, are 
those recognized and enforced by civil law. Imperfect or indeterminate 
rights, duties, obligations, officio, virtutis, are those not recognized and 
enforced by civil law. The former, which we shall call jural rights, are the 
sole subject of Jurisprudence ; the latter are customary and conventional, 
and being equally intrinsic, are included in the more comprehensive science 
of Ethics. The distinction is practically important as marking the existing 
limits of authorized jurisdiction ; but it is accidental, not essential, and 
hence of little or no theoretical value. 

The phrase perfect right indicates merely that an existing right has been 
recognized, denned, and made the subject of judicial decision or perhaps of 
statutory enactment. It is thereby perfected in the sense of being established 
and protected ; and it has gained weight, since to the original merely human 
right is added the right of a legal subject or citizen. But it should not be 
understood that an imperfect right, one lacking this authorization, is in itself 
defective. Imperfect rights are often of greater weight and sanctity than 
many perfect or jural rights ; e.g., those intimate within the family circle, 
and many others likewise non-jural or merely customary. Hence the no- 
menclature is misleading and unfortunate. There is in fact a vast variety of 
untold rights which civil law cannot protect and therefore does not recognize. 
In the common intercourse of men, their personal relations are so manifold 
and intricate, so various and variable, that specific definition of rights and 
trespass is impossible, except in a comparatively few marked cases passing 
from latent to patent. Very much is necessarily left to the voluntary respect 



66 OBLIGATION 

Our wide definition gives occasion for another verbal 
variation in the statement of the moral principle, thus: A 
man has a right to the free use of his powers, provided he 
commit no trespass. On further examination we shall find 
that this provision sets very narrow bounds to rightful lib- 
erty ; indeed that there is no proper liberty that does not 
conform to the limits and consist with the bonds of morality. 

§ 37. The limit which moral principle puts to the gratifi- 
cation of desire, that it must not involve a trespass on the 
right of any one else, gives rise to many and grave practical 
difficulties. The line between me and my neighbor which 
neither should overstep, is often invisible and intangible. 
To settle it requires, in a numberless variety of cases, very 
thoughtful and careful consideration in which a respect for 
personal right must dominate the greed of personal interest. 
In the intricate, pressing, and ever-changing relations of men 
in society, it is almost impossible to guard and keep intact 
one's own rights, and to avoid a transgression of the bounds 
set by the rights of others. Contentions inevitably abound. 
Thence arise vast and costly systems of judicature among all 
civilized peoples, systems that become more and more intri- 
cate as civilization progresses, involving numerous courts of 
authoritative decision, whose business is little else than to 
mark the bounds of rights, and to enforce the law of trespass 
in its infinitely varied applications. 

The practical difficulties attending questions that concern 
trespass on rights, may be lessened, especially as to our pri- 

f or rights, and for the universal unwritten law forbidding infringement on 
them, which law prevails in all communities of moderate moral culture. 
This has developed the English Common Law, whose excellence Aristotle 
anticipates, saying : ' ' Customary laws have more weight, and relate to more 
important matters, than written laws ; and a man may be a safer ruler than 
the written law, but not safer than the customary law. ' ' — Politico,, bk. iii, 
ch. 3, § 17, Jowett's trans. Cf. Calderwood, Hand-book of Moral Philosophy \ 
Pt. I, ch. 5, § 5 sq. (ed. 1872). 



TRESPASS 67 

vate conduct, by clearing the conception in certain respects. 
To this end the following observations will be helpful. 

Conflicting claims are seen on every hand, but rights 
never conflict. They touch each other, but never overlap. 
They limit by excluding each other, and indeed have no 
other limitation. The same right cannot pertain to different 
persons ; and different rights, however similar, are always 
consistent. Wherever there is contention, there is trespass ; 
somebody is doing a wrong ; somebody is interfering in the 
rightful liberty of some one else. Even rights that are 
shared, and so-called common rights, do not and cannot con- 
flict, but are entirely consistent in their exercise. Everybody 
has a right to drive on a public road, but not so as to inter- 
fere in the like liberty of any other. 1 

Original rights are inalienable in the sense that one cannot 
be unwillingly deprived of them, except by the extinction of 
the objects in which the rights inhere, thus rendering their 
exercise impossible, which is extreme trespass, as in murder, 
arson, and the like. One may be dispossessed of property, 
and otherwise violently limited in liberty, but the right re- 
mains whole, complete, intact so long as its object continues 
to exist. Derived rights or such as have been conferred by 
parental, civil, or other authority, may in many cases be 
withdrawn by resumption of the grant, by confiscation, or by 
exercise of eminent domain. 

Rights in general may be alienated by the possessor him- 
self transferring or forfeiting them. Property rights may be 
transferred by exchange, gift or bequest. Property may be 
alienated also by misdemeanor, the court imposing fines. 

1 It is quite commonly supposed that a person often has a right to do 
either of two things as he may happen or please to choose. But on a close 
analysis, as we shall hereinafter see, it appears that in every case the right 
is limited to one of the two alternative actions, the other being, directly or 
remotely, a greater or less trespass on some related person. Contrary or 
opposed rights cannot coexist either for the same or for different persons. 



68 OBLIGATION 

Liberty of person may be forfeited by crime and the c rimin al 
imprisoned, or all liberty with life extinguished on the gal- 
lows. Being warranted, therein is no trespass. 

§ 38. For more specific illustrations of rights in their sub- 
jection to trespass, we shall now briefly consider the ground 
of property and its patent liability to trespass. Property 
rights are found, in the last analysis, to consist in the origi- 
nal right of every man to the free exercise of his powers in 
the gratification of his normal desires. An infringement on 
them is an interference in this liberty, and so is a trespass. 1 

Much the larger part of any man's activity consists in 
appropriating, transforming, and using external objects. 
Natural objects, as land, fruits, ores, to which no one has an 
earlier claim, are withdrawn from the disposal of every other 
person, simply by the taking possession of them. For this 
act of taking possession, inasmuch as it does not involve a 
trespass on any one, is an original right, looking toward the 
gratification of normal desires. Things thus become private 
property, and any hindrance on the part of others to the 
taking possession is a trespass. Moreover, the proprietor 
must be left at liberty to transform his property, by his labor 
and skill, as he wills ; the products arising therefrom being 
likewise his own, to be used freely in further production, or 
otherwise consumed. We shall find hereafter that all prop- 
erty is held in trust, to be used usuriously and consumed 
profitably, else the owner himself becomes a trespasser. 

Many perplexing questions arise in the adjudication of 

1 "Freiheit bedeutet nur die allgemeine Moglichkeit des Gebrauchs 
unserer Fahigkeiten. Aber auch von jeder einzelnen Handlung gilt, dass sie 
ursprunglich respectirt werden muss, so lange nicht besondere Motive des 
Gegentheils vorhanden sind, und dass es daher sittlich unrecht ist, sowohl sie 
zu hindern, als auch sich so zu benehmen, als ware sie uberhaupt gar nicht 
geschehen. Hieraus folgen zuerst eine Menge kleiner Regelen der guten 
Lebensart, die wir iibergehen, dann aber der Ursprung unserer Begriffe 
vom Eigenthum." — Lotze, Grundziige der praktischen Philosophies § 43. 



TRESPASS 69 

property. It may be that an original appropriation is exces- 
sive, more than a fair share, and so a trespass beyond bound, 
but this is very difficult to determine. Moreover, it con- 
stantly happens that there are long pauses in the useful ac- 
tivity of the proprietor of certain material, because of the 
greater or less complexity of his plans, or from lack of con- 
tinuous energy ; still it is evident that during such indefinite 
pause, his right of property must be respected, and the 
material thus reserved be left unmolested for his future use. 
But if, within a time sufficiently great for the ordering of 
all circumstances, he give no sign of making that use, the 
right of property lapses ; though it is needful that the inva- 
lidity of the claim be determined and decreed under special 
legal enactment. Finally, it is evident that, while possession 
is proof presumptive of ownership, material may pass from 
the possession of the rightful owner without loss or surrender 
of the ownership; and therefore, while the presumptive 
right of the possessor is to be recognized, it should be super- 
seded by ownership established in action of trover. 1 

§ 39. Setting aside felonies or high crimes, such as murder 
which utterly destroys all rights and liberty, and robbery 
which lessens the means of their exercise, the most familiar 
form of trespass is that kind of injury which is done to a 
man's land or house by intruding into it against his will. It 
is an old legal maxim that every man's house is his castle, 
and he is entitled to treat as an enemy any one who attempts 
to enter it without his consent. As to land, the owner is 
not bound to fence it, and whether inclosed or not, a neigh- 
bor is not at liberty to enter on it himself, or to permit his 
cattle so to do. For in all such cases the liberty of the 
owner in the use of his house or field is at least liable to 
infringement, is jeoparded, which is trespass, 
i See infra, § 120. 



70 OBLIGATION 

It is perhaps not quite so clear that vice is trespass, yet 
sufficiently clear. Gambling is a transfer of property deter- 
mined by an event whose occurrence is believed by all parties 
to the transfer to be due to chance. 1 Therein is a misuse of 
means, a transfer, without equivalent, of property held in 
trust for beneficial ends. This alone makes gambling or bet- 
ting wrong, even in its lightest forms, when there is no un- 
fairness and when the stake is small. Any disregard of the 
claim of others on a productive use of one's means, restricts 
their privileges, and thus is a trespass. Intemperance, the 
excessive indulgence of an appetite or of any desire, is an 
abuse, a weakening, a degradation of powers, to whose fully 
efficient service others have a rightful claim, and hence it is 
an overstepping the bounds of liberty, a transgression, an 
infringement on the privilege of other persons, a trespass. 
The vice of lying, the hearer having a right to the truth, is 
clearly, even when no further injury appears, a checking or 
perverting of the hearer's privilege. Slander is of like char- 
acter, doubling the trespass in the injury to both hearer and 
subject, and in its grosser forms is a misdemeanor, liable to 
legal action for damages. Much more might be said on the 
ethics of vice, but it is sufficient here to point out that it is 
essentially trespass. 

A great many actions of trifling consequence, and hence 
usually overlooked, have nevertheless essentially the nature 
of trespass. They differ from crime and vice in degree 
rather than in kind, all having the specific mark of unwar- 
ranted interference in liberty. When I have a right to go 
first, and another, who knows or might know this, steps in 
before me, my right is violated. Even if the attempt is 
thwarted by my stepping more quickly, still the integrity of 
my right, the entirety of my liberty, has suffered. One who 
walks through my garden without leave, or enters my door 
1 See infra, § 40, note ; and § 85, note. 



TRESPASS 71 

unbidden, violates my right to be private. One who, with- 
out warrant of good reason, intrudes on my conversation 
with some one else, or interrupts my words to himself, breaks 
in upon my right of free speech. When we occupy the time 
or attention of another otherwise than he would, as by send- 
ing a letter or making a visit, we apologize by stating reasons 
that occasion and warrant the call. Any intrusion or inter- 
meddling with what does not concern one, is a trespass. 
When I am in haste, and some one needlessly detains me, it 
is a trespass. Pressing the unwilling for a loan or donation, 
or for an endorsement of any sort, is an embarrassment, a tres- 
pass. Thus in the passing relations of men there are a multi- 
tude of ways in which one may hinder the preferred action 
of another, or turn its direction, thereby, lightly perhaps, yet 
essentially, committing a trespass. The conventional unwrit- 
ten laws of mutual courtesy in social intercourse are regulative 
of private conduct and protective of private personal rights 
from personal trespass. Politeness is morality in trifles. 

§ 40. The foregoing mention of slander suggests a class of 
offenses touching personal dignity that calls for special con- 
sideration. 1 An impolite act or word to a person worthy of 
respect is a wrong, inasmuch as it unwarrantably interferes 
in his liberty. In order that one may use his powers freely 
a certain equanimity is necessary, a mental equilibrium. 
This is disturbed by even a slight affront, and he is embar- 
rassed, his liberty of action is checked. Every upright man 
cherishes a certain measure of self-respect, and claims a cor- 
responding degree of respect from his fellows, a respect pro- 

1 "In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity. 
Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent ; 
whatever on the other hand is above all value and therefore admits of no 
equivalent, has a dignity. Whatever has reference to the general inclinations 
and wants of mankind has a market value ; whatever, without presupposing 
a want, corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the mere 
purposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value ; but that which con- 



72 OBLIGATION 

portionate to his estimate of his own dignity or moral worth. 
These constitute his personal honor. It is very precious and 
very sensitive, for no one can fulfill high aims in life unless 
he preserve a calm equipoise of his faculties, and the obser- 
vant deference of his associates. 

If an affront be grave, such as giving the lie or other 
verbal insult, or striking a blow even without physical harm, 
it overthrows for an indefinite time the serene composure, if 
not the entire self-command, requisite to the unbiased exer- 
cise of one's faculties. Such indignity is intolerable. No 
doubt the resentment which arises instinctively often becomes 
excessive, putting into violent commotion the whole being, 
turning it completely away from preferred conduct, and in- 
ducing extreme acts, even such as involve the sacrifice of 
one's life. And indeed in many cases death is better than 
dishonor; for while death is the loss of all rights, dishonor 
may fix fetters and settle a slavery that is worse than all loss. 

As a man himself defends his life, so he would himself 
defend his honor, his most precious possession, essential to a 
free life. The anger or resentment that naturally follows 
indignation is instinctive impulse to self-defense. It is 
normal, and therefore rightful in rational furtherance. 1 Too 
much cannot be said in favor of the sacred right and obliga- 

stitutes the condition under which alone anything can he an end in itself, 
this has not merely a relative worth, which is value, but an intrinsic worth* 
which is dignity. . . . Skill and diligence in labor have a market value ; 
wit, lively imagination, and humor have a fancy value ; fidelity to promises 
and benevolence from principle have an intrinsic worth. . . . The worth of 
this disposition is dignity, rising infinitely above all value, with which it can- 
not for a moment be brought into comparison or competition without violat- 
ing its sanctity." — Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 64, R and S. 

1 " It is not natural but moral evil ; it is not suffering, but injury, which 
raises that anger or resentment, which is of any continuance. The natural 
object of it is not one, who appears to the suffering person to have been only 
the innocent occasion of his pain or loss, but one who has been in a moral 
sense injurious either to ourselves or others." — Butler, On Resentment, 
Sermon, viii. 



TRESPASS 73 

tion to defend one's rights, and especially one's personal 
honor. With the savage this passes over into malice and 
revenge, a trespass retaliated by a trespass. Bnt two wrongs 
do not make right; this does not restore the prior state. 
Among civilized peoples the savagery lingers, particularly in 
the restricted form of dueling, for men are rarely willing to 
submit a question touching personal honor to a civil court 
or to a court of honor. 1 One's honor is a thing too sacred 
to be weighed in the scales, there is no possible counterpoise. 
It is to be personally defended, and in opinions which have 
prevailed, personally avenged. 2 But higher moral culture 
brings its subject to see that he is limited to defense, and to 
that mode of defense which will best prevent the trespass, 
or its repetition, or its imitation. Other remedy is rarely 
possible. It is hard to be angry, and sin not, yet such is the 
moral ideal. 3 

1 In the proposed Arbitration Treaty between England and the United 
States, 1897, it was expressly reserved that differences involving the national 
honor of either party should not be adjudicated by the court of arbitration. 
See infra, § 85. 

2 The duello, a relic of barbarism, has its folly on its face. It proposes 
to defend honor by adding dishonor, and proves nothing but savage audacity. 
Dueling is a double crime, compounded of murder and suicide. Being an 
intent to kill with malice prepense, it is murder. Being a willful offering of 
one's life, it is suicide. That both parties consent is null, for neither has a 
right to offer his life. The crime is doubled again in the two parties to it. 
Trespass and the violation of trust can no further go. 

Let it be added here that the vice of gambling is analogous. What duel- 
ing is to murder and suicide, that gambling is to theft and waste. It too 
is doubly doubled. The mutual consent, having no ground in right, is 
null. It is a transfer of property without title, an all around violation of 
trusts. See infra, § 85, note. 

3 "Retribution is agreeable to conscience ; that is to say, the returning 
of a corresponding measure of reward or of punishment to a will which has 
occasioned a definite measure of weal or woe. It is to be observed, however, 
that while we can very easily deduce from the foregoing the moral obligation 
of gratitude, we cannot, on the contrary, by any means so immediately 
deduce our right to execute the punishment." 

"Antiquity saw in the person merely a product of nature whose intel- 



74 OBLIGATION 

§ 41. The various kinds of offense to which we have re- 
ferred are mostly modes of direct trespass, wherein an imme- 
diate action unwarrantably checks liberty. Let it be now 
observed and hereafter kept in mind that trespass is very 
often indirect, by mediate action or by inaction. Indirect 
trespass by inaction calls for special remark and emphasis, 
since the term is commonly used only in the positive sense 
of direct action. 

Neglecting to pay a money debt when due is clearly an 
unwarranted interference in the liberty of the creditor ; for 
he might use the money to gratify a normal desire, but is 
restrained and more or less embarrassed by the non-payment. 

In general, any withholding, unless by free consent, of 
what it is one's right to possess is plainly akin to theft, and 
as truly a trespass. A promise of every rightful kind is 
to be kept, because it may have become a factor with the 
promisee in ordering his life, and he may be embarrassed by 
the disappointment of his confidence. A breach of promise 
doing serious injury is a recognized form of trespass, action- 
able at law. Lack of gratitude to a benefactor, omitting a 
meed of praise, failing to show the worthy such outward 
marks of respect as are conventional, neglecting to pay or to 
acknowledge any polite attention, these and the like are em- 
barrassing, and hence modes of trespassing. If I am using 
my right of way, it is all one whether somebody else steps in 

ligible aim must be to unfold itself as beautifully and happily as possible. 
Christian culture, which conceives of man as having a calling and a task 
allotted to him on earth by God, naturally finds in this the reason for re- 
garding as wanton wickedness every willful abbreviation of such testing thus 
imposed upon him. Accordingly our conceptions of personal honor are dif- 
ferent from those of antiquity. But although we still believe so much to be 
due to our honor, the significance of our belief nevertheless is tha.t such ob- 
ligations are owing not to us as definite individual persons, but to that con- 
ception of personality in general which has a living expression in us also, 
and to its worth in the connected system of the ordering of the world." — 
Lotze, Practical Philosophy, § 13, and § 33. 



TEE SP ASS 75 

the way, or does not step out. In either case he is equally 
in my way. The act committed in the one case and omitted 
in the other, is in each a trespass, a restraint of my liberty, 
and hence the cases are morally identical. 

The notion widely prevails that an indirect trespass, espe- 
cially one omitting to fulfill an obligation, is less offensive 
than a direct trespass committing a deed violative of an obli- 
gation. This is a popular error. In either case, if inten- 
tional, there is a complete breach of obligation, a wrong, a 
trespass. Forgetfulness is more likely to have occurred in 
the former than in the latter case, but forgetfulness, though 
it may palliate, does not wholly excuse an offense. If the 
degree of offense be measured by the gravity of its conse- 
quences, even this will not favor a fault ; for it is evident 
that very often a neglect of obligation may be as serious as 
any direct violation. A sentinel who fails to give alarm and 
thus to prevent surprise, is responsible for the disastrous 
consequences, and is condemned to capital punishment. A 
moral distinction between actions omitted and those com- 
mitted is superficial and unessential. 1 

Sin is transgression of the law of God, disobedience to 
the divine command. We shall hereafter show that any tres- 
pass of man on man is trespass on God, violating his will, 
thwarting his purposes, checking the free course of his de- 
signs. There is also indirect trespass on him in neglecting 
his personal dues, and direct trespass in counteracting his 
ways. All disaccord with him, whether by action or by inac- 
tion, whether by sin of commission or by sin of omission, is 
an unwarranted interference in the divine furtherance of the 
world. Thus it comes to light that all trespass is sin, and 
all sin is trespass. 

1 See Ezekiel, 33 : 6-8. Cf. Matthew, 21 : 28-31. 



76 OBLIGATION 



CHAPTER IV 

THE LAW 

§ 42. Let intellective attention be again fixed on the 
primary notion of a right. Pure reason immediately dis- 
cerns that a violation of a right, knowingly and willingly 
committed, is a breach of normal order, a violation of law. 
Also it discerns that this law, being violable, is not, like nat- 
ural law, the designation of a constant order of facts that 
have no alternates ; but the designation of an order of facts 
that ought to be constant, an order which, though violable, 
should be inviolate and universal. 

Moreover, pure reason discerns the very important and 
special characteristic of this law, that it is obligatory on the 
potential transgressor. It is addressed to his will, laying 
upon it a binding obligation, obliging him to conform his 
actions to its behests. Accordingly it is recognized as an 
imperative, a command, an order enjoining order on those 
capable of disorder. 1 

The order herein designated and demanded is a constantly 
observant respect for the rights of others, forbidding any un- 
warranted interference in liberty, forbidding trespass. Its 
formula is : Thou shalt not trespass. This widely yet defi- 
nitely interpreted is the completely comprehensive Moral 
Law, binding all imperfect persons without exception, and at 
all times, in all places, under all circumstances. Thus it is 
both catholic and strictly universal. 

The moral law is independent of experience, except that 

1 See supra, §§ 17, 18. 



THE LAW 77 

experience must furnish the occasion for its discernment by 
pure intellect. It is not deduced from some higher law; 
there is none higher. It does not logically follow from the 
principle of liberty to gratify desire, but implies or is implied 
in that principle, and a mere unfolding of the essential con- 
tent of either is all that is requisite for a clear apprehension 
of its truth. 1 Indeed the principle and the law are but 
varied forms of essentially the same necessary truth. As a 
principle, it is an immediate intuition of pure intellect, hav- 
ing the light of truth in itself. As a law, its universally 
binding authority lies in its intuitively imperative truth. 

§ 43. The intuitive cognition of this fundamental, catholic, 
and universal law, is the sole function of the pure practical 
reason or conscience. Conscience is pure reason discerning 
moral law. 2 This faculty has the moral law for its exclusive 
object, and its exercise is the primary, original, antecedent 
condition of any moral activity whatever, without which lib- 
erty has no moral restraint, and volition no moral character. 3 

In thus identifying conscience with the pure practical rea- 
son, we give to the term a clear and sharp definition, fitting 
it for scientific use by distinguishing it from those other fao 

1 On the distinction between implication and inference, see The Theory 
of Thought, p. 103 ; and Elements of Deductive Logic, § 78. 

2 See supra, § 2, and § 11. Also Elements of Psychology, § 267. 

8 Conscience, consciousness of good or bad. From Fr., from Lat. con- 
scientia, from con-, for cum, together with, and scientia, knowledge, from 
scienti-, stem of pres. part, of scire, to know, orig. to discern. — Skeat. 

Consciousness, conscia sibi, and Conscience, conscia obligationis, have the 
same etymology. For three centuries our language has had the separate 
terms, like the German Bewusstsein and Gewissen, both being contained in 
the Old English inwit, in the French conscience, in the Latin conscientia, and 
in the Greek <TvveL5r)<Tls, from aw and Ldeiv, to see together. The Modern 
English and the German discrimination is an aid to clear expression, but the 
indiscriminate oneness in other languages is significant. It indicates that 
conscience is a special functioning of consciousness ; that we have no proper 
consciousness of conduct except in terms of conscience. 



78 OBLIGATION 

ulties which, subordinately and occasionally, are concerned 
with moral matter, and whose exercise on such matter is 
quite commonly and confusedly spoken of as the exercise of 
conscience. Except the pure practical reason, there is no 
original, distinct, special moral faculty in the human mind. 1 

1 Conscience in popular usage signifies any or all exercise of mind con- 
cerning the morality of action. The moral judgments are attributed to 
it, also the moral sentiments, and the moral impulse; as in the familiar 
phrases, a scrupulous or an inconsiderate conscience, a tender or hardened, 
an approving or upbraiding conscience, a restraining or constraining con- 
science. In such indefinite sense no scientific use can be made of the term. 
Moralists find a limiting definition necessary, but they do not altogether 
agree as to its comprehension. Many definitions include the moral judgment 
or decision respecting cases ; some include also the moral sentiments (§§ 2, 
3). It is not a disagreement in doctrine, but merely as to the extent of the 
meaning of a term in the exposition of doctrine. We gather for comparison 
a few definitions by recognized authorities, as follow : 

"By conscience, or the moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we 
discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain 
affections in respect to this quality." — Wayland, Moral Science, bk. i, ch. 
2, §1. 

" Conscience is the mental faculty or feeling which recognizes and reveals 
the distinction between right and wrong." — McCosh, Divine Government, 
bk. iii, ch. 1, § 4. 

"A perception of the right, together with a feeling of approbation or 
disapprobation." — Cook, Conscience, Lee. i. 

"Conscience is that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to 
each individual for the guidance of his conduct." — Calderwood, Hand- 
book of Moral Philosophy, Pt. I., div. i, ch. 4, § 1 (ed. 1872). 

"Nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude 
or pravity of our own actions." — Locke, Essay, bk. i, ch. 3, § 8. 

"The principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, 
temper, and actions, is conscience ; for this is the strict sense of the word, 
though it is sometimes used so as to take in more." — Butler, Sermon i. 
"That principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our 
heart, temper, and actions. . . . You cannot form a notion of this faculty, 
conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency." — 
Idem, Sermon ii. 

"Conscience is man's practical reason, which holds before him his law 
of duty in every case, so as either to acquit or condemn him." — Kant, 
Tugendlehre, p. 205. "The consciousness of an inner tribunal in man, 
before which his thoughts accuse or else excuse one another, is conscience." 



THE LAW 79 

Let it be remarked that conscience, as herein defined, can- 
not err. The criterion of a pure intuition is its necessity and 
universality. Conscience in its intuitive discernment discov- 
ers what is necessarily and universally true, and this discern- 
ment, being intuitive, is infallible. It is not, however, itself 
a complete guide of conduct. It must be supplemented by 
the logical function of intelligence, by thought, deducing 
minor rules or the moral quality of particular actions. 
Thought may err, is peculiarly liable to error. 1 Herein is 
the explanation of the great diversity of moral judgments 
among men. The data of pure reason are the same in all 
human minds ; but the judgments formed in the application 
of these data often greatly differ, because of illogical think- 
ing. The liability to error is greatly increased by a common 
acceptance of traditional moral standards, expressed in ready- 
made rules, which, if not themselves erroneous, are often im- 
perfectly comprehended and applied to cases beyond their 
scope. Thus certain individuals, or large classes of men, or 
nations, are said to have high or low standards of morality 



— Idem, p. 293. "Conscience must be conceived as a subjective principle 
which declares our responsibility to God for our actions." — Idem, p. 295. 

"Conscience is that act of the mind by which we apply to a particular 
case, to an action to be performed or already performed, the general rules 
prescribed by moral law." — Janet, Elements of Morals, § 10. 

" There must be a voice of conscience which gives direction in particular 
cases concerning the praise-worthiness or blame-worthiness of an action pre- 
sented before it." — Lotze, Practical Philosophy, § 3. 

1 ' Die ganze Seite unseres Wesens, wodurch wir uns urteilend zu uns selbst 
als wollenden oder handelnden Wesen verhalten, heisst Gewissen." — Paul- 
sen, Einleitung in die Philosophie, Anhang. 

1 See Elements of Psychology, § 219. "Eight reason," Hobbes calls 
"true, that is, concluding from true principles rightly framed, because that 
the whole breach of the Laws of Nature [the Moral Law, see supra, § 18, 
note] consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly, of those men who do 
not see those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others." — Be 
Cive, vol. ii, p. 16, note. On the diversities of moral judgment, see Lecky, 
History of European Morals, vol. 1, p. 93 sq., Am. ed., 1870. 



80 OBLIGATION 

according to the degree of approach and logical conformity 
of these standards to the intuition of pure reason. 

The moral intuition, like all others, may be cleared by dis- 
criminating attention to its occasions, abstracting from the 
empirical elements, and fixing upon the pure ; and further, 
by distinguishing those abstract notions with which it is lia- 
ble to be confused, as, for example, utility. In this manner 
only is conscience capable of improvement, of education. 
The accuracy and acumen of the logical faculty, by which 
the moral quality of an action is inferred, may be greatly im- 
proved by intelligent exercise, and thus furnish means for 
the refinement of moral character. The moral sentiments 
may be intensified and the moral impulse strengthened by 
indulgent activity, and the will may become more and more 
submissive to its law by habitual observance. Conscience, 
in its loose general meaning, has these several sources of cul- 
ture ; but in the narrow scientific sense here adopted, it is 
capable only of clearance. 1 

§ 44. Turning from the faculty by which the law is cog- 
nized to the law itself, we observe that this imperative truth 
is categorical. 

There are two classes of hypothetical imperatives, each 

1 "Beings like ourselves, in a world like this, compounded of a soul and 
sense, wrought upon by wild, struggling forces within and without, require 
for tolerable existence, some ideal scheme of life, some law lodged in the 
understanding and informing the will. Otherwise we are lost at the outset, 
and bound for shipwreck as certainly as any vessel sailing into wintry seas 
without chart or compass, rudder or pilot. Morality is the chart, drafted 
by religion ; rectitude is the compass ; duty, the rudder ; and conscience, 
the steersman at the helm. Only, in this case, pilot and rudder are not 
things separate from the vessel ; it is the ship of life herself, thrilling with 
intelligence and purpose in every part, that bends her forces to the direction 
of her course, and wins her perilous way through reefs and quicksands, 
against buffeting storm and treacherous current, till she reaches the far 
haven where she would be." — Professor Findlay. 



THE LAW 81 

implying the practical necessity of a means to an end. 1 The 
condition in the first of these classes is problematical, being, 
though constant, not universal, but merely possible. Exam- 
ples are found in the technical rules of art. If one would 
build a house, he must gather materials, employ skilled labor, 
etc. The condition in the second class is assertorial, being 
actual, constant and universal. Examples are found in the 
dictates of prudence. If one would be healthy, he must be 
temperate. More generally: If one would be happy, he 
must, etc. These rules and dictates command conditionally. 
There is no necessity that any one should observe them, ex- 
cept in case of his willing the antecedent, which, however, 
in the second class, every one actually does. 2 

But the moral law is a categorical imperative, command- 
ing unconditionally. It is simply, Thou shalt, or Thou shalt 
not. There is no hypothetical antecedent expressive of a 
definite end to be attained. Moreover, its behest is in disre- 
gard of any special consequences, except in so far as these 
may enlighten the obligation. Tradition and custom may 
likewise illustrate its application, but they neither add to nor 
take from its authoritative hoc age. Its authority is in its 
irrefragable and universal truth, and its truth is in the essen- 



* Several distinct kinds of necessity, commonly expressed by must, should 
be noted. These are as follow : 

1. Philosophical ; intellective, having no possible or conceivable opposite ; 
e.g., pure ideas and axioms. 

2. Psychical and physical ; causative, having no possible, yet a conceiv- 
able, opposite; e.g., a percept, a falling stone. 

3. Moral; volitive, having both conceivable and possible opposite ; e.g., 
obliged to keep a promise. 

4. Practical ; tentative, having problematic opposite ; requisite as means 
to an end; e.g., suitable tools. 

5. Logical; probative, having sophistic opposite; requisite in order to 
truth; e.g., the syllogism. 

Cf. Elements of Psychology, § 119; and Calderwood, Hand-book, p. 91. 
2 See infra, § 95, note. 



82 OBLIGATION 

tial and ultimate nature of the facts. It demands an uncon- 
ditional and immediate obedience as a moral necessity, always 
and everywhere, amid any and every combination of circum- 
stances ; a blind obedience, if in the dark ; an intelligent 
obedience, if there be light; but always an uncompromising, 
unswerving obedience. 1 

§ 45. The law is sovereign, subjecting all personal powers. 2 
Each faculty operates according to its own constitutional 

1 The foregoing distribution is from Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten, S. 38 sg., R. and S. It may be presented as follows : 

Imperatives, addressed to Will, are : 

I. Hypothetical, implying practical necessity, good as a means. 

A. Problematical, possible, constant but not universal. 
Rules of art or skill ; 

Technics, Economics, Rhetoric, etc. 

B. Assertorial, actual, constant and universal. 
Dictates or counsels of prudence ; 
Pursuit of happiness. 

II. Categorical, implying moral necessity, good in itself. 

Unconditioned and no ulterior end, constant and universal. 
Commands or laws of morality. 

2 It is commonly conceded that Butler, in his sermons Upon Human 
Nature, established the supremacy of conscience. He argues from the com- 
plex constitution of the soul, and the combination in it of higher and lower 
faculties, with their various and conflicting aims, that the control of a supe- 
rior internal principle is indispensable. The title prefixed by Gladstone to 
§ 19 reads : " Conscience de jure claims universal rule, if we follow the law of 
our nature." In this section occurs Butler's famous saying of conscience : 
" Had it strength, as it has right ; had it power, as it has manifest authority, 
it would absolutely govern the world. ' ' 

All this is quite as true now as it was a century and a half ago ; but even 
by Butler's own definition of conscience (given supra, § 43, note), as a 
principle that surveys and approves or disapproves, the argument seems to 
apply not so directly to conscience as to the law which conscience discerns, 
or rather to the authority of which the law is merely the expression. It is 
not conscience, but the law, that is supreme, and a good will obeys, not 
conscience, but the lawful authority which it recognizes. 

' ' The authority of conscience is not found in any predominating force be- 
longing to it as a faculty, but altogether in the character of the truth which 
it discovers. The authority is not found in the nature of the faculty itself. 



THE LAW 83 

function, but it is not competent for its own guidance. All 
others are dependent on intelligence as a guide, and for the 
full and correct performance of this specific guiding function, 
intelligence is dependent on conscience discerning the law of 
conduct. All human activities, whether they issue in exter- 
nal expression or not, are thus subjected ultimately to the 
moral law. 1 

It is the peculiar, the exclusive function of the will to con- 
trol all other powers, to bring them into normal and harmo- 
nious exercise. The sovereign law is therefore addressed to 
the will, the executive. It commands choice to conform to 
its behest. It demands the regulation of all inner activity, 
and thus the regulation of all outward action. It is the 
essential informing element in all mandates and minor rules 
of conduct ; the hypothetical imperatives, described above as 
logically coordinate, being ethically subordinate, subject to 
its regulation. Even conscience itself is subject to its au- 
thority ; the law, dimly seen, demanding the voluntary atten- 
tion requisite to its being clearly seen in the fullness of its 
meaning, lest it be ignorantly violated. 2 

The faculty is a power of sight, such as makes perception of self-evident 
truth possible to man, and contributes nothing to the truth which is perceived. 
To the truth itself belongs inherent authority, by which is meant absolute 
right of command, not force to constrain." — Caldekwood, Hand-book of 
Moral Philosophy, Pt. I, div. i, ch. 4, § 5, (ed. 1872). 

1 "Besides subordinate rules, there must be a supreme rule of human 
action ; for the succession of means and ends, with the corresponding series 
of subordinate and supreme rules, must somewhere terminate ; and only that 
which is conformable to the supreme rule is absolutely right." — Whewell, 
Elements of Morality. 

2 " Practical reason shows us that the vocation and dignity of man is not 
ultimately rooted in knowledge, but in the volitional side of his nature. 
Here also lie the deepest roots of our being ; in conscience, in the conscious- 
ness of the moral law, we become aware of our real essence. We possess 
the immediate certainty that the real essence of our being is grounded on 
reality itself, that we belong, not to nature as it appears to the senses and 
the understanding, but to absolute reality itself, and therefore come to be- 



84 OBLIGATION 

This claim of supremacy, demanding the unconditional 
subjection of the entire will, is more or less clearly recog- 
nized by every one. I see that it is law for me ; I cannot 
ignore or reject its claim. Yet a will often disregards or 
rebels against this authority ; and only when completely sub- 
missive and perfectly accordant can a will be pronounced 
wholly good. And "nothing can possibly be conceived in 
the world, or even out of it, which can be called good with- 
out qualification except a good will." * 

§ 46. It has already been indicated that rights are grounded 
on personal relations, and that a discernment of the existence 
of rights takes place on an empirical occasion, on an obser- 
vation of such relation in actual life, whether the observer be 
a party or not. 2 Now it is evident that personal relations 

lieve in the absolute teleological order of things, in a moral world-order, of 
which the natural order is but an external reflection. . . . Hence I believe 
that the world is the revelation of an all-wise and all-good God, even though 
mine eyes fail to see him, and my understanding comprehend him not." — 
Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, closing sentences ; Thilly's translation. 

1 Opening sentence of Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik derSitten; 
which statement seems to have been fairly anticipated by Epictetus, who 
said : "Apart from will there is nothing either good or bad." See Ency. 
Brit., vol. viii, p. 472. Subsequently Kant adds : " Ein guter Wille ist 
das Einzige, was an und fur sich gut ist, er hat absoluten Wert, ganz un- 
abhangig von dem, was er in der Welt ausrichtet und durchsetst." On this 
doctrine Janet remarks : "La bonne volonte" est bonne par elle-meme, et il 
n'est point necessaire d'attendre les resultats pour la juger telle. La bonne 
volonte" est done le seul bien veritablement absolu. Or, si nous analysons 
l'id£e de la bonne volonte", qu'y trouvons nous ? rien autre chose, selon 
Kant, que la volonte" de f aire son devoir ; et faire son devoir, ce n'est pas 
seulement agir conforme'ment au devoir, e'est agir par devoir ; une conformity 
exterieure avec la loi du devoir n'a qu'une valeur legale, et ne prend de 
valeur morale que si elle est interieurement accompagn^e de la volonte" de 
faire son devoir ; la moralite" ne consiste done que dans cette volonte" meme." 
Subsequently he objects : " C'est confondre ici l'objectif et le subjectif. 
C'est faire sans le vouloir de l'6"tat de conscience du sujet le principe absolu 
de la moralite"." — La Morale, ch. 2. 

2 See supra, § 33, and § 42. 



THE LAW 85 

are strictly objective, and rights objectively determined ; hence 
it follows that the moral law, being essentially implied in 
really existent rights, is objective in origin and character. 
It is true that human rights are more remotely grounded in 
human nature, 1 and men are spoken of as doing by nature 
the things of the law, as being a law unto themselves, as 
having the law written in their hearts. But this does not 
make the law in any measure or sense subjective. For man 
has a fixed, native constitution of both body and mind ; he 
cannot make one hair of his head white or black, nor can he 
add to or take from his natural faculties, one of which is con- 
science, the eye reading the law written for him in his heart. 
This constitution, being independent of his subjective states, 
is as truly objective as is the solar system, and it is this 
objective constitution, acting in conformity with the existing 
constitution of nature at large, that is determinative of rights, 
of obligation, of the law. 

Thus the moral law is, as to its origin, objective in the 
constituent order of the world. It does not originate within 
me, but beyond me. It is not given by me, but to me. It 
comes to me from without ; it is adventitious. The law of 
causation, every event is caused, and the law of conduct, 
thou shalt not trespass, though the one be indicative, the 
other imperative, the one inviolable, the other violable, are 
alike in this, that each is independent of the mind apprehend- 
ing it. Conscience is not autonomous, nor is the will. ' The 
law, objectively determined, is read by conscience, interpreted 
by the judicial faculty, and executed, under the moral im- 
pulse, by the will. ^ 

The objective character of the moral law is indicated by 
its independence of circumstances and its disregard of conse- 
quences. Yet still more clearly is this character evidenced 
in its sameness for all classes and conditions of men. Were 
1 See supra, § 25, and notes. 



86 OBLIGATION 

its character subjective, or were it liable to any subjective 
modification, there might be as many variations of the law 
as there are minds of men. But, being one and the same for 
all individual minds, evidently it is not enacted by them, but 
enacted for them. Also, since it is not at all affected by 
what one may think about it, every sane man being accused 
or excused by his fellowmen in disregard of his peculiar no- 
tions, it is clear that a law thus common and unalterable by 
any subjective treatment has the essential character of an 
objective reality. 1 

1 " Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration 
and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them : the starry 
heavens above and the moral law within. I have not to search for them 
and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the 
transcendent region beyond my horizon ; I see them before me and connect 
them directly with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins 
from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my 
connexion therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and 
systems of systems, and moreover into limitless times of their periodic mo- 
tion, its beginning and continuance. The second begins from my invisible 
self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but 
which is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that 
I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary connexion, 
as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The former view of a 
countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it were my importance as an 
animal creature, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital 
power, one knows not how, must again give back the matter of which it was 
formed to the little planet it inhabits. The second on the contrary infinitely 
elevates my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral 
law reveals to me a life independent on animality and even on the whole 
sensible world, at least so far as may be inferred from the destination 
assigned to my existence by this law, a destination not restricted to con- 
ditions and limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite." — Kant, 
Critique of the Pure Practical Reason, Conclusion ; Abbott's translation. 
Cf. supra, § 45, note. 

Of this famous peroration Hamilton says : " I do not know a better ex- 
ample of the sublime." — Metaphysics, Lecture 46. It is an unconscious 
paraphrase of the nineteenth Psalm. The two productions strikingly con- 
trast the poet and the philosopher, the heart and the head, the ancient and 
the modern. 



THE LAW 87 

§ 47. The law, in the form we have given, is negative : 
Thou shalt not. In this form, taken strictly, it forbids a 
large class of actions without enjoining any. Unquestionably 
this is its primary and most palpable aspect comprehending 
our most obvious obligations, the one most clearly and fully 
recognized in actual life. As prohibitory, it strikes the most 
uncultured intellect, is patent to the grossest comprehension, 
and impresses itself on the humblest capacity, making its ap- 
pearance in the very awakening of the moral consciousness. 
This strictly negative or prohibitory aspect of the law is 
therefore worthy of specific consideration in this place, posi- 
tive forms being reserved for subsequent examination. 

From the law in its prohibitory form many deductions can 
be made to secondary laws, having less yet very wide gen- 
erality, and retaining the character of strict universality. 
For example: Trespass is forbidden; Murder is trespass; 
therefore Murder is forbidden. In this simple syllogism, the 
major premise is an indicative form of the law intuitively 
true; only the minor premise needs support, which the 
slightest reflection furnishes ; for the right to continue in 
life is the highest of rights, it being the condition of all 
others, and to kill unwarrantably, which is murder, is the 
greatest possible trespass, since it extinguishes all liberty, all 
possible enjoyment of any right. Maiming is likewise tres- 
pass, for it diminishes one's liberty to realize his rights ; and 
therefore it is forbidden. Cruelty is pain-giving trespass; 
a wrong, not simply because it gives pain, but because 
it thereby unwarrantably interferes in liberty; it there- 
fore is forbidden. Theft is trespass, a violation of the 
right of property preventing its free use; and therefore, 
Thou shalt not steal. These are very obvious yet typical 
cases. 

The Decalogue, which the foregoing suggests, is usually 
spoken of as the moral law. It is eminently, but not ulti- 



88 OBLIGATION 

mately. Its ten-fold statement lacks the unity requisite to a 
philosophic reduction. Yet it is easily seen that each of the 
ten laws is a simple deduction from the one ultimate law : 
Trespass not. This is the basis. Consequently they are 
throughout negative, simply prohibitory. Let us add the 
observations, that these prohibitions are, in general, progres- 
sive from higher to lower offenses, and that all are objective, 
forbidding outward acts, except the last which is subjective, 
entering the mind or soul, and forbidding unrighteous desires. 1 

1 On the points in the foregoing paragraph let it be remarked : 

1. Canon Earrar, in his Sermons on the Ten Commandments, inverts the 
true order by entitling them " A Voice from Sinai, or the Eternal Basis of 
the Moral Law. ' ' \ 

2. We are reminded of the Pythagorean Decad [circa 500 1 1 
b.c), wherein the scale of universal truth is symbolized by 111 
the series of numbers : ten, 5e/cds, being their sum, thus : 

3. The first commandment forbids confronting Jehovah 
with other gods in opposition, set up as rival objects of service and adora- 
tion. Evidently it would be a trespass upon his exclusive right. The 
second forbids degrading the spiritual nature of God by graven images, and 
also forbids idolatry ; for a worship through images inevitably becomes a 
worship of images. The third forbids perjury, a trespass on him in whose 
name an oath is taken, and to whom fulfillment is due. The fourth expressly 
claims the memorial Sabbath as his own ; its violation is a trespass on this 
reservation. The fifth enjoins honor of parents, whose dishonor would be a 
trespass, not only on them, but also on him through his natural and visible 
representatives. 

4. The fourth commandment is grammatically positive, but its appended 
interpretation is negative. The fifth is positive, if we construe to honor posi- 
tively, but it may mean only to respect, which is primarily negative. 

5. The progression in the first table, which concerns our relation to 
superiors, is from high treason against the divine King, down to disrespect 
for appointed human authority ; in the second, which concerns our relation 
to equals, it ic from murder, down to the subjective impulse to trespass, 
thus guarding the sacredness of personal life, of wedded life, of property, 
and of reputation. 

6. A correspondence between the two tables may be noted. The first 
commandment in each relates to the extinction of all rights ; the second in 
each, to their corruption, idolatry being often called adultery ; the third in 
each, to the violation of a property ; the fourth in each, to a reservation or 
claim ; the fifth in each, to a right disposition. 



THE LAW 89 

The Ten Words are inadequate. A man may keep them 
all from his youth up, and yet lack. They are directed 
solely against sins of commission. They prohibit certain 
prominent offenses, but posit no explicit obligation of benev- 
olence, no duty of love to God or neighbor. They were 
addressed originally to a people rude, uncultured, whose 
moral character was very imperfectly developed by its Egyp- 
tian experiences. They were for the time as much as could 
be borne. Had the law in its fullness been at once revealed, 
it probably would not have been understood, much less ap- 
preciated, accepted and practiced. In general, the Old Tes- 
tament morality is negative and prohibitory. 1 



7. To the second and to the third commandment is appended a menace ; 
to the fourth, a supporting reason, without which the violation would not, 
perhaps, appear so clearly a trespass ; to the fifth, a promise. The fifth of 
the first table makes an easy transition from the divine character of the 
first table to the human of the second. In neither is any mandate of love 
to God or to neighbor. But see Deuteronomy, 6:5; and Leviticus, 19 : 18. 

8. The naturalness of the Decalogue, its manifest Tightness, and its uni- 
versality, are well illustrated in the following heathen summary of the less 
obvious First Table. ' ' Socrates, conversing with Hippias, asks : 

Dost thou know, Hippias, any unwritten laws ? 

Those in every country, replied Hippias, that are held binding touching 
the same things. 

Canst thou say that men made them ? 

Why, how could all men come together when they do not speak the same 
language ? 

Then who do you suppose made those laws ? 

I think, Socrates, that gods gave those laws to men ; for with all men it 
is thought right first of all to reverence gods. 

Is it everywhere thought right to honor parents ? 

It is so indeed." — Xenophon, Memorabilia, bk. iv, ch. 4. 

1 Edersheim tells us that "the Rabbis divide the Law of Moses into 248 
affirmative, and 265 negative, commandments. ' ' But this includes the Cere- 
monial, as distinguished from the Moral Law. Our Lord's comment on the 
prayer he taught his disciples (Matthew 6 : 9-15), emphasizing trespasses, 
TrapairTibfMaTa, is an echo of Old Testament morality. It expands the point, 
and this point only, perhaps as the one least intelligible and acceptable. 
See supra, § 36, note. 



90 OBLIGATION 

Civil law, under which phrase we include all laws rec- 
ognized, enacted and enforced by an organized State, 1 is 
originally negative in its forms. Even after being greatly 
expanded, it is still very largely negative in expression and 
prohibitory in character. Especially is this true of the crim- 
inal code, which consists of a series of prohibitions of certain 
overt acts. As a science of human rights, civil law is occu- 
pied with classifying and defining the various rights of indi- 
viduals, of corporations, and of communities in general. As 
an art of social regulation, it provides for the adjudication of 
particular cases, and the enforcement of judicial decrees. 
Throughout it is a system of enactments deduced from the 
universal and exhaustive law of trespass, which enactments 
are used as major premises in further deduction ; the minor 
premises being the particular cases which the court is con- 
sidering. Hence it is evident that, in essence, there are not 
many laws ; there is only one law. 2 

1 Civil law, in a general sense, the law of a state, city, or country ; spe- 
cifically, the Roman law, the municipal law of the Roman empire, com- 
prised in the Institutes, Code, and Digest of Justinian and the Novel 
Constitutions. — Blackstone. We use the phrase in the generic sense 
only, which corresponds to Kent's definition of municipal law in general, 
as " a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the law-making power of a state. ' ' 

— Commentaries, vol. I, p. 447. This includes lex non scripta, or Common 
Law, and the lex scripta, or Statute Law. It is co-ordinate with Interna- 
tional Law, Constitutional Law, and Ecclesiastical or Canon Law. See 
supra, § 17, note. "The word civil has about twelve different meanings ; 
it is applied to all manner of objects which are perfectly disparate. As 
opposed to criminal, it means all law not criminal ; as opposed to ecclesias- 
tical, it means all law not ecclesiastical ; as opposed to military, it means 
all law not military ; and so on. Even jus privatum is sometimes also 
called jus civile.'''' — Austin, Jurisprudence, § 1030. 

2 Moralists have much to say about " The Moral Law," but few venture 
to formulate it, thus failing to answer the all important question : What is 
the moral law ? Some formulas that have been given will interest the reader. 

" A reasonable being ought to act reasonably. . . . Hence, Obey reason." 

— Hickok. 

"It is right for men to use their powers for their natural (or rational) 



THE LAW 91 

§ 48. The law in its primarily negative sense, forbidding 
certain actions and requiring none, tends to isolate men, to 
set them apart from each other, to sever their natural rela- 
tions. It says : Let your neighbor be, do not interfere in his 
liberty, do not step in his way or on his ground, respect his 
rights. 1 Accordingly, even among highly cultured people, 

ends. This is the intuition, the immediate recognition of Moral Law. . . . 
That principle which determines what is right, determines what is law for 
me. ' ' — Calder wood. 

" Respect the freedom of others." — Cousin. 

"Limit thy freedom through the conception of the freedom of every 
other person with whom thou canst he connected." — Fichte 

" Be a person, and respect others as persons." — Hegel. 

"Act at every instant with thy whole moral energy, endeavoring to do 
thy whole moral work." — Schleiermacher. 

' ' There is but one categorical imperative, namely this : Act on that 
maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become 
universal law." — Kant. See supra, § 44. 

Of Kant's famous categorical imperative be it noted that, like several of 
the other forms given above, it has, as he himself says, no content, it is a 
form only. We venture the criticism that a law of conduct should tell us 
what to forbear or to do ; it should have matter as well as form. Again, 
his imperative clearly has a tincture of the utility which he discards, in that 
it makes the consequences determine the right or wrong of actions ; for, 
why can I not will theft to be universal ? — because it would be ruinous. 
But, indeed, this imperative seems to be, not a law, but a rule by which to 
test conduct. I take a straight-edged rule or ruler, and laying it on my 
paper, draw a right line, or test one already drawn. Why is it known to 
be right ? Because it conforms to the rule. Now this rule is not the law of 
a straight line. Its law, in the Cartesian co-ordinate geometry, is the linear 
equation a x + b y = c, wherein a, b and c are fixed numbers, and x and y 
variables ; which is a very different thing from my wooden ruler. Likewise, 
a law of conduct, and a rule by which to guide or test conduct, are very dif- 
ferent things. Kant's empty imperative is not properly a law ; but it is a 
rule, by which we may know the moral quality of certain conduct by bring- 
ing to view its natural consequences, these not {causae, essendi) making, but 
merely (causae cognoscendi) showing, its quality. For a violation of moral 
law results in evil, and vice versa, and when the application of the law itself 
to a case is obscure, the patent consequences will enlighten us. See infra, 
§ 48, note. 

1 " The most original obligation of man in intercourse is that of leaving 
every other unmolested until that other has disclosed his purpose to enter 



92 OBLIGATION 

there are many who, while rigidly conforming their lives to 
the prohibitions of the law, apparently have no wider concep- 
tion of obligation, and know no difference between legality 
and morality. Indeed there are some who regard the laws of 
the State, with all their manifest imperfections and narrow 
inadequacy, as marking the bounds of obligation, and con- 
sider it right to claim or do whatever civil law does not 
forbid, all unforbidden actions being permissible and super- 
erogatory. 1 

A thorough analysis, however, of the conditions and impli- 
cations of trespass, such as we shall subsequently undertake, 
discovers that the limitation to prohibition is inadmissible, 
that it is far from exhausting the moral principle, — that there 
is a positive aspect of this formally negative imperative, that 
the injunction placed upon trespass by the universal moral 
law is both a prohibition and a requisition, forbidding to do 
this but equally requiring to do that, and embracing all par- 
ticular acts and general conduct. 2 The morality of the New 
Testament advances to this higher positive plane. It does 
not abrogate the earlier form of the law, but arises from it, de- 
mands active benevolence, and so exhausts the obligation of 

into some intercourse. No one therefore has any right to force unsolicited 
services upon another; although each one is at the same time bound to 
behave with good will toward the intentions of every other, as soon as they 
are made known to him." — Lotze, Practical Philosophy, § 41. 

1 The Greeks held that the State should provide by legislative enactments 
for the moral education of the people. Accordingly Aristotle says : ' ' What 
law does not command, it forbids." — Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 11, § 1. On 
this, Michelet remarks : ' ' The Greeks recognized the principle that it was the 
duty of their State to support the sanctions of virtue by legislative enact- 
ments; the moral education of the people formed part of the legislative 
system. Hence the rule which Aristotle stakes : Quce lex non jubet, veiat. 
The principles of our [the German] law, on the contrary, are derived 
from the Eoman law, which confines itself in all cases to forbidding wrongs 
done to society. Hence the rule with us is exactly the contrary : Quae lex 
non vetat, permitbiV — The Ethics of Aristotle, p. 195. 

2 See supra, § 41. 



THE LAW 93 

man to man. 1 The influence of this positive presentation of 
the law effectively counteracts the isolating tendency of the 

1 Thus ' ' The Royal Law, according to the scripture : Thou shalt love 
thy neighbor as thyself." — James, 2 : 8. Cf. the rule : "All things whatso- 
ever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them ; 
for this is the law and the prophets." — Matthew, 7 : 12. This contravenes 
the old Lex Talionis: Do unto others as they do unto you; and resounds in 
the Anglo-Saxon : Put yourself in his place. It has sometimes been mis- 
taken for the moral law, perhaps because of the addendum, which, however, 
doubtless means : By this ye may fulfill the law. For evidently it is a rule 
merely, a form without content, a guide or test of conduct. Even as a rule 
it is inadequate, for it does not provide for : 1st. Duties to self ; but in this 
we hold it correct; there are no duties to self (see infra, § 74, sq.). 2d. 
Benevolence ; one might say, I want no alms, and so am not bound to give 
alms. The usual gloss, "in like case," is supposed to correct this, but it 
does not correct the next point. 3d. Legal justice; by it a judge should 
always discharge the accused. The gloss, "if it be right, ' ' begs the whole 
matter.* We note also that the rule makes self-love the test and measure 
of obligation; but so too does the royal law; probably, however, not the 
ultimate test and absolute measure, yet setting a mark we may hardly reach. 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, it is rightly called "The Golden Rule" 
for its intrinsic worth and practical value are of the highest. As a rule easy 
of apprehension, if not of observance, in the vast majority of actual cases, 
none can exceed its simplicity, its clearness, its wisdom, its excellence. 
Kant's categorical imperative (supra, § 47, note), taken as a rule, is superior 
in philosophical comprehension, but vastly inferior in practical application. 
We accept the one as The Golden Rule of Philosophy, and the other as 
The Golden Rule of Christianity. 

In the Confucian analects, bk. xv, ch. 23, we find: "Tsze-kung asked 
saying: Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all 
one's life ? The Master replied : Is not reciprocity such a word ? What you 
do not want done to yourself do not do to others." Cf. bk. v, ch. 1. — 
From Samuel Cox, on Ecclesiastes, p. 315. Cf. Legge, Chinese Classics, 
vol. i. 

Isocrates (d. 338 b.c.) said: What you are angry at when inflicted on 
you by others, this do not do to others. 

Aristotle (d. 322 b.c), being asked how we should behave towards our 
friends, replied : As we should wish them to behave toward us. 

* Henry More, in Enchiridion Ethicum, gives the following revision: " The good 
which you prefer for yourself in given circumstances, you ought to prefer for another 
in the same circumstances, so far as it is possihle without injury to any third person." 
— Noema, 14, p. 29. 



94 OBLIGATION 

exclusively negative view, restores and strengthens the mu- 
tual relations of men, bringing them into fraternal fellow- 
ship, and uniting them by common and indissoluble bonds. 

Tobit said to his son : Do that to no man which thou hatest. — Apocrypha, 
v, 15. 

Hillel (d. 4 b.c.) said: Quod tibi ipsi odiosum est, proximo ne facias, 
nam hoc est tota lex. — The Talmud, as quoted by Wetstein. 

Philo Judeeus (d. cir. a.d. 45) said : One must not himself do what he 
hates to have done to him. 

Seneca (d. a.d. 65) says: We should give as we would wish to receive. 

The didaxti or Teaching of the Apostles (2d century), followed by the 
Apostolic Constitutions, vii, 2, says: All things whatsoever thou wouldst 
not have befall thee, thou, too, do not to another. 

These early forms are all negative, except that of Aristotle (about friends), 
of Jesus, and of Seneca. That the thought occurred to so many ancient 
sages indicates its natural origin. 



SANCTIONS 95 



CHAPTER V 

SANCTIONS 

§ 49. The human will originates actions in the sense that 
it elects one rather than another possibility, and does that 
instead of this. It is therefore rightly regarded as the first 
cause in a series of events whose subsequent members are its 
effects or consequences. As this mastery of the will is itself 
subject to the moral law, the causes and effects in the series 
are qualified as moral causes and effects. But let it be ob- 
served that causation in the mental or spiritual sphere is 
still causation, and in that sphere moral causes determine 
their effects as rigidly as, in the physical sphere, physical 
causes determine their effects. Moreover, such is the recip- 
rocal relation between the spiritual and material spheres 
that an activity in either may be the cause of an event in 
the other. 1 

When a voluntary act takes place, I have determined it 
shall be this rather than some other. Until then the deed 
is merely potential, I am master, I have to do with it. When 
it becomes actual, then no longer have I to do with it, but it 
has to do with me. I cease to be the actor, and become an 
observer, perhaps a sufferer. What is done can never be 
undone. There may be counteraction, readjustment, restitu- 
tion, compensation, but there is no restoration or erasure of 
the past. The act is unchangeable. It has passed from 
the domain of moral law and entered the realm of natural 
law, to become a first link in an irrefragable chain of causes 
1 See supra, § 10, note ; and § 18. 



yb OBLIGATION 

and effects involving my welfare, perhaps completely and 
inextricably. Often a word unspoken is a sword sheathed at 
my belt; spoken, it is a drawn sword in the hand of my 
enemy. 1 

Experience in such matter brings reflection, and with it 
the wider observation and induction that conformity of voli- 
tion to moral law is wholesome, non-conformity perilous, per- 
haps fatal. These good and evil effects constitute in general 
the sanctions of the moral law, they conserve its sanctity, 
ratifying and vindicating its authority, inducing obedience, 
that it may be unbroken, whole, holy, sacred in the eyes of 
its subjects. 2 

1 "Be the stern and sad truth spoken, that the breach which guilt has 

once made into the human soul, is never, in this mortal state, repaired." 

Hawthorne, Scarlet Letter, ch. 18. 

"Every word and act is a portion of the living, breathing past, that 
having once been is immortal in its every part and moment, incarnating as 
it does the very spirit of immortality, an utter incapacity to change. As 
the act was, as the word hath been spoken, so shall act and word be forever 
and forever." — Haggard, Jess, ch. 80. 

Cf. James, 3: 5-12; and Proverbs, 25: 11; also Homer, Iliad, bk. ii, 
455, and bk. xi, 155 ; also supra, § 9, note. 

2 "A sanction, in the proper sense of the term, means nothing more nor 
less than a penalty incurred by a violation of a law. If a man systemati- 
cally ' takes every pleasure as it flies,' he becomes liable to a physical sanc- 
tion, or, in other words, pain, disease, death. If he transgresses the known 
law of the land, he comes under the political sanctions of legal punishment. 
If he defies the ordinances of society, he pays the penalty for his eccen- 
tricity in the social sanction of ostracism. But are any of these moral 
sanctions, moral penalties incurred by an immoral agent ? Perhaps it will 
be enough to accept on this point the answer of Mill : ' The ultimate sanction 
of all morality is a subjective feeling in our minds.' " — Edinburgh Review 
for April, 1883, p. 236. See Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 41, 42. 

" The difference between sanction and obligation is simply this : Sanction 
is evil incurred, or to be incurred, by disobedience to command. Obligation 
is liability to that evil in event of disobedience. ... It is not infrequently 
said that sanctions operate on the will. ... It were more correct to say 
that sanctions operate on the desires. . . . The party obliged is averse from 
the conditional evil, ... he wishes or desires to avoid it, . . . in order to 
this, he must fulfil the obligation. We are told by Hobbes, in his Essay 



SANCTIONS 97 

§ 50. Mandatory law has necessarily penalty affixed. In- 
deed the notion of the one seems to imply the other as of its 
essence ; for the voice of command without power enforcing 
it would be mere brutum fulmen, vox et prceterea nihil. Ac- 
cordingly, in considering the moral order of the world, the 
order that ought to be, we find that any deviation carries 
with it penalty, or rather penalties, as its natural and neces- 
sary consequence. Let us now examine first those that are 
wholly subjective. 

Subordinate to reverence for the law revealed by conscience 
is the . sentiment of approbation or of disapprobation, correla- 
tive to the moral judgment approving or disapproving. These 
innate sentiments bear powerfully upon conduct, and thus 
constitute sanctions. Indeed they are the original, constitu- 
tional, and primary sanctions of the law. In the pleasure or 
pain, by which they are strongly marked, we discover native, 
subjective reward and punishment. 1 

The moral sentiments are so highly influential that their 
function is often exaggerated, and they are supposed to be 
sanctions in the sense of being a sure index and an authori- 
tative exponent of the true moral character of an act or of 
general conduct. Many a man of high culture will assert his 
rectitude in a certain case because he experiences the pleasing 

on Liberty and Necessity, that ' the habitual fear of punishment maketh men 
just, it frames and moulds their wills to justice.' The plain and simple 
truth is this ; that it tends to quench wishes which urge to breach of duty, 
or are adverse to that which is jussum or ordained."— Austin, Jurispru- 
dence, §§ 650, 655. 

1 See supra, § 4. " The intensity and ardor of these sentiments in the 
healthy mind, the singular delicacy, variety, and complexity of which they 
are susceptible, their long continuance and' power to color and temper our 
whole experience, the way in which they break out from unsuspected 
depths, and in their painful forms of remorse or indignation will sometimes 
by a sudden upheaval rend the entire fabric of a man's previous life, or 
change the current of a nation's history — this incomparable vividness and 
electric force of the moral feelings proves that the conscience, whose servants 



98 OBLIGATION 

sentiment of self-approbation, saying : My conscience sanc- 
tions my course. It is therefore important to remark that 
one's feelings in view of his actions do not, even in the most 
remote way, furnish any proof of their true moral character. 
This would invert the psychological order that posits moral 
sentiment as dependent on moral judgment. In reality the 
feeling of approbation or disapprobation attends a false moral 
judgment as readily and fully as it does a true one, having 
no power to discern the difference. Hence these sentiments 
do not at all confirm the judgment; but, on the contrary, 
their own justification is wholly dependent on the validity of 
the antecedent judgment ; and this depends ultimately on a 
clear discernment of the moral law by conscience. Accord- 
ingly we observe that even these sanctions, though original 
and innate, are liable, as are all other human sanctions, to 
distribute reward and punishment unduly, both in kind and 
degree. 

In the class of subjective sanctions must be included the 
silent approval or censure of one's fellows. We are largely 
dependent for our free welfare on even the private opinions 
of each other. No man can reasonably be indifferent to the 
judgment that others form of his conduct, and to the moral 
sentiments with which it inspires them. Every right-minded 



they are, is the sovereign factor of personality. These thunders and light- 
nings of the soul are wielded by that power which sits on the throne of our 
being. 1 ' — Prof. Findlay, Headingly College, Leeds. 

" He, that has light within his own clear breast, 
May sit in the centre, and enjoy bright day ; 
But he, that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts, 
Benighted walks under the mid-day sun, 
Himself is his own dungeon." 

— Comus, 1. 381 sq. 

Cf. Milton's Prose Works, i, 217. Also Proverbs, 4: 18, 19: — 
"The path of the righteous is as the light of dawn, 
That shineth more and more unto the perfect day ; 
But the way of the wicked is as darkness, 
They know not at what they stumble.'* 



SANCTIONS 99 

man feels this keenly, whether the judgment be just or un- 
just. He is elated and encouraged by silent commendation ; 
he is depressed and discouraged by condemnation. These 
also are potent sanctions ratifying the moral law, and uphold- 
ing its authority. 

§ 51. From the foregoing considerations it appears that 
the notion of violable law carries with it the notions of a gain 
of worth or dignity in its observance, and of a loss of worth 
or dignity in its violation ; also that the one implies the no- 
tion of merit or desert, of reward due, the other of demerit, 
of penalty due. Furthermore, an observation of meritorious 
conduct, especially if despite adverse temptation, excites an 
impulse to bestow reward; of culpable conduct, a disposi- 
tion to inflict punishment. These natural impulses have, 
no doubt, an instinctive origin and play, and so far are con- 
stitutional ; but they have also a distinctively rational exer- 
cise, and so far are susceptible of justification. 

In view of one's own conduct, an approving judgment 
of merit excites the instinctive impulse to reward well- 
doing, realized perhaps in some special self-indulgence; 
whereas a judgment of demerit incites an instinctive anticipa- 
tion of punishment, which sometimes is self-inflicted. Crim- 
inals not infrequently surrender themselves voluntarily to 
public justice, that they themselves may have the satisfaction 
of penance for their misdeeds. 1 Suicide following remorse 
has perhaps often the character of self-inflicted punishment. 

Recompense and retribution are reasonable. It is patent 
to common sense that the welfare of a community as a whole, 
and of its several members, is favored by the steady observ- 

l " I am sorry that such sorrow I procure ; 
And so deep sticks it in my penitent heart 
That I crave death more willingly than mercy ; 
'Tis my deserving, and I do entreat it." 

— Measure for Measure, Act v, sc. 1, 1. 479 sq. 



100 OBLIGATION 

ance of the law which requires each to respect the rights of 
all others ; and more especially is it evident that a wrong 
done, a trespass committed, is a breach of order affecting un- 
favorably, not merely the immediate sufferer, but mediately 
the welfare of all, even of those whose relation to him is 
remote. Therefore, when a breach is threatened, all agree 
that preventive restraints should be imposed ; and when a 
breach is actually made, that the offender should be punished 
in such manner and measure as will deter him from repeating 
the offense, and deter all observers from like misdeed. If 
the community be one of which I am a member, I am dis- 
posed and indeed bound to take part directly or indirectly in 
inflicting the deterrent penalty. On the other hand, if some 
one, who, from moral weakness or from lack of moral culture, 
is specially liable to temptation, conform manfully in a cer- 
tain action or in general conduct to the social order that 
ought to be, then there is a common judgment that he should 
be rewarded, and a prompting to bestow reward in such man- 
ner and measure as shall strengthen his good will, and induce 
observers in his class to practice like conduct. This seems 
to be a reasonable account and justification of the common 
disposition of men in their treatment of orderly and disor- 
derly persons. 

§ 52. The subjective sanctions in the minds of observers 
tend to become also objective in public opinion. The judg- 
ment and sentiment usually find expression in outspoken 
words of praise or blame, often in modes more forcible, as 
popular honors, or social ostracism. 

Reprobation of a wrongdoer is, in general, directly pro- 
portioned to his intelligence and culture. For it is evident, 
from the admitted supremacy of the moral law, that a knowl- 
edge of one's obligations, implying the possibility of fulfilling 
them, diminishes in so far the ground of apologetic defense. 



SANCTIONS 101 

Conversely, ignorance of facts and circumstances which go to 
determine the moral quality of conduct, is allowed to be a 
palliation of offense, followed by a mitigation of punishment ; 
yet is not allowed as complete excuse, for no human mind 
can be absolutely blind to its obligations. 1 

The sentiment and impulse prompting us to reward one 
who does well is, speaking generally, in inverse proportion to 
his intelligence and culture. A street gamin who .finds and 
restores my lost purse should have some portion of its con- 
tent bestowed on him, but I would not offer to reward a 
gentleman ; should I commit the blunder, he would be justly 
indignant. We heartily approve the good deeds of cultured 
persons, but express rewards are rarely proposed to them. 
Academic honors are offered to youth as a stimulus before 
the fact, but in mature life honors are indefinite, spontaneous, 
and come after the fact. Titles of nobility are usually 
granted as rewards only for some special and signal service. 
Neither these, nor honorable distinctions of any kind, nor 
any emoluments, are granted for mere conformity to law. 
In the civil code, while to each law is attached a penalty 
for its violation, to no law in any enlightened State is at- 
tached a reward for its observance. 2 

This last observation gives occasion to remark that while, 
as already stated, penalty is a necessary sanction, essential 
in the very notion of violable law, reward is only a contin- 
gent sanction, it may or may not be applied, it is not essen- 
tial. Moreover, in the progress of moral culture, not only 
does a promise of reward, but also the threat of punishment, 
gradually lose its influence. Many a man reaches the stage 
where these are, for himself, lost to view, and he fulfills his 

1 See Luke, 23 : 34 ; Hebrews, 5 : 2 ; i Timothy, 1 : 13 ; See also infra, 
§61. 

2 The occasional rewards offered for the detection of felons, having a pur- 
pose quite different, are not exceptions. 



102 OBLIGATION 

obligations without regard to either. This is a high, yet 
not the highest, degree of culture. 1 

§ 53. Another class of sanctions, originating in the fore- 
going, may be discriminated as distinctly objective, being 
embodied in formal ordinance, and having reference to overt 
misdeeds. They are the enactments of an organized State. 
No longer recognized as individual judgments, they super- 
sede the private opinion of the offender, the court and the 
executive, they have passed beyond the more or less sym- 
pathetic opinion of the public, and are objectified in a bind- 
ing penal code. 

Such, in general, is the character of all civil law. It 
cannot be too strongly or repeatedly emphasized that the 
whole science and practice of jurisprudence, in all its various 
branches, together with the vast and complex system of 
courts of judicature, having a prescribed and established 
form, manner and order for conducting suits and prosecu- 
tions, and having executive powers, has its ultimate basis 
and justification in the ethical principle of a personal right, 
and is merely an authoritative explication and application of 
the one moral law : Thou shalt not trespass. 2 

1 " Those writers who disparage the morality of the New Testament as 
employing an inferior class of motives because it appeals to fear of future 
punishment and to hope of reward in heaven, seem strangely incapable of 
appreciating the real scope and spirit of Christian morality. The true glory 
of Christianity as taught in the New Testament is the almost measureless 
range of its motives, ascending from the hope and fear which can reach the 
lowest degradation to which man can descend, up to the purest spirit of dis- 
interested love of which human beings are capable." — Robinson, Principles 
and Practice of Morality, p. 143, note. Cf. infra, § 91. 

2 Jurists quite commonly distinguish civil law from moral law, and legal 
obligation from moral obligation. This distinction has crept into common 
speech, conveying the erroneous impression that these are two coordinate 
kinds of law or obligation, having a different origin and a distinct essence, 
so as to be not only logically opposed, but sometimes, indeed often, in actual, 
practical opposition. Whereas in fact no obligation can possibly bind a 



SANCTIONS 103 

Very many kinds of enacted sanctions of law have been 
devised. There can be no doubt that in the early stages of 
organized society, the spirit of personal vengeance dominat- 
ing, the intent and form of legal punishment was largely 
retaliatory, a paying back blow for blow. 1 This barbarous, 
strict lex talionis is no longer in vogue. It has been ex- 
punged from the penal code of civilized States, excepting in 
case of life for life, which is justified on grounds other than 
vengeance. For it is evident that, if requital in kind, to 
satisfy the thirst for revenge, be the object of punitive 
measures, then it is the purpose of the State, as far as it 
can reach, to double the suffering of its members ; which is 
absurd. Whatever of vengeance is compatible with legal 
punishment, is reserved expressly for a tribunal higher than 
the State. 2 

Under a prior topic it was stated that rights may be re- 
duced to three, a right to life, a right to liberty, and a right 
to property. 3 In refined codes the penalties correspond, con- 
sisting exclusively in deprivation of life, or of liberty by 

human will that is not a moral obligation, and all jurisprudence or politics 
in general is strictly a subordinate branch of applied Ethics. Aristotle's 
Politics is a continuation of his Ethics. In concluding the latter treatise, he 
says : " Since all former writers have passed over without examination 
the subject of legislation, it would perhaps be better for us to examine it 
ourselves, and, in short, the whole subject of politics, in order that the 
philosophy of human nature, may, as far as in us lies, be completed." The 
transition is in the closing sentence : "Let us then make a commencement." 
— Nic. Eth. bk. x, ch. 9. 

1 See Exodus, 21 : 23-25 ; Leviticus, 24 : 17-21 ; Deuteronomy, 19 : 21 ; and 
cf. Matthew, 5 : 38, 39. Aristotle says : " Some people think that retaliation 
is absolutely just, as the Pythagoreans said ; for they defined justice simply 
as retaliation to another. But retaliation does not fit in with the idea either 
of distributive or of corrective justice ; and yet they would have that this is 
the meaning of the Rhadamanthian rule : ' If a man suffers what he has done, 
straightforward justice would take place ; ' for in many points it is at vari- 
ance." — Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 5, 1. See also Butler, On Presentment, Ser- 
mon, viii. 

2 See Deuteronomy, 32 : 35 ; and Romans, 12 : 19. 3 See supra, § 26. 



104 OBLIGATION 

imprisonment, or of property by fines, damages or confisca- 
tion. Flogging has been generally abolished. Restitution, 
or else compensation, is enforced when practicable, but is 
not punishment; hence damages are added. 1 Punishment, 
then, is practically the taking away of that the right to which 
has been forfeited by trespass, by a transgression of the bounds 
set by personal relations to personal liberty. Moreover it 
was pointed out that the three kinds of rights may be re- 
duced to one, the right to liberty in the gratification of nor- 
mal desires. Hence it appears that as all offenses are 
unwarranted interferences in liberty, so all legitimate pen- 
alties are warranted interferences in liberty. 2 

§ 54. Pain is the correlate of restrained or constrained 
energy. Each of our powers tends spontaneously, that is, 
of its own proper nature, without strain, to put forth a defi- 
nite quantity of free activity. If this amount be realized, 
there is pleasure ; if less, the energy being repressed, or if 
more, the energy being overwrought, there is pain. Thus 
all pleasure arises from the free natural play of our faculties ; 
all pain, from their restraint or constraint. The normal is 
pleasurable, the abnormal painful. 3 

1 See Exodus, 22 : 1 sq. ; and cf. Luke, 19 : 8. 

2 See supra, §§ 23, 27, 29. The ground on which the State is warranted 
in inflicting punishment, is examined infra, § 136 sq. The Constitution of 
the United States provides that no person shall " be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." — Amendments, Article v. Also 
that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." — Idem, Art. viii. " In San 
Francisco an ordinance was passed declaring that any male person confined 
in the county jail should have the hair of his head cut to within an inch of 
his scalp. To a Chinaman the loss of his queue was regarded not only as a 
disgrace, but as entailing suffering after death. This kind of punishment 
was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." — Coker, Goverrir 
ment of the United States, ch. xviii. 

3 See Psychology, § 228 ; also, Hamilton, Metaphysics, Lecture xlii sq. 
This doctrine of pleasure and pain originated with Aristotle ; see especially 
Nic. Eih., bk. x, ch. 4. 



SANCTIONS 105 

Naturally we have an inclination to pleasure, and an aver- 
sion to pain. A desire for pain, simply for its own sake, is 
a psychological impossibility. This constitutional aversion 
to pain impels one constantly away from abnormal extremes 
toward an intermediate normal condition, while the co-operat- 
ing constitutional inclination to pleasure constantly draws 
one, like a pendulum, toward the same golden mean of mod- 
eration and harmonious order. 

All trespass, being an interference in natural spontaneous 
liberty of action, gives pain. All legal penalty, for the same 
reason, is the infliction of pain ; rarely in like manner, but 
always, if adequate, graduated to correspond in measure with 
the degree of trespass, and limited to the pain of repression. 
More widely, all sanctions of the moral law, innate or enacted, 
natural or artificial, are essentially the same, depending for 
their efficacy on the same element ; all rewards are pleasures, 
all punishments pains. These are the natural attraction and 
repulsion in the spiritual sphere, tending to maintain a uni- 
versal equilibrium, and to restore it when disturbed. 1 

It was a mooted question among the ancients whether pain 
is an evil, and to-day it is still a question. When we con- 
sider its influence in the preservation of our powers of body 
and mind, averting the ruinous effects of excess on the one 
hand, and of inaction on the other; when we observe the 
working of the whip of pain in the world of sentient beings, 
tending constantly to harmonize their mutual interests, and 
adjust their actual relations to the moral order of the uni- 
verse in "a stream of tendency that makes for righteous- 
ness," it seems not merely unreasonable to account pain an 
evil, but that it should be reckoned essential to welfare, 

1 Pain, suffering, anguish ; from Er. peine, penalty, from Lat. poena, 
punishment, penalty, pain ; cognate with Gk. woivq, a ransom, generally re- 
quital, also vengeance, penalty. Boot uncertain, but perhaps, like Skt. pti, 
from Aryan root pu, to purify. Punish, to chasten, same origin. — Skeat. 



106 OBLIGATION 

reckoned, along with the highest good, essential in the well 
ordering of a world of free activity. 

This is the sanction by which the Divine Ruler of the Uni- 
verse upholds his government against trespass. We instincts 
ively revolt at the thought that the Deity is the author of 
sin, the source and sum of evil. But that he is the author 
of pain cannot be doubted, and is entirely accordant with 
the infinite benevolence that proposes and actively seeks to 
accomplish the highest welfare of humanity. 



RIGHT AND WRONG 107 



CHAPTER VI 

EIGHT AND WRONG 

§ 55. The substantive notions of a right and a wrong, used 
hitherto, need now to be supplemented by the corresponding 
qualifying notions of right and wrong. 

A right is accorded in law; right is according to law. 
Right lines are straight lines ; we draw them by means of a 
rule or ruler. So in the ethical sense, right actions are such 
as conform to rules of conduct, implying a ruler. More 
generally, they are those conforming to the moral law, any 
deviation from strict rectitude being wrong. 1 

1 The use of topical terms — such as right and wrong, justice, duty, 
ought, service, charity or love, good — is avoided in this treatise, until the 
term occurs in place, is defined and discussed. The term welfare is an ex- 
ception. For etymology of right, see § 19, note. Wrong = perverted ; 
from Anglo-Saxon wrang, pt. t. of wringan, to wring, twist, bend aside ; 
cognate with wry, and awry, this compounded of on and wry = on the twist. 
Cf. Lat. tortus from torquere. — Skeat. 

" Goodness in actions is like unto straightness ; wherefore that which is 
done well we term right. For, as the straight way is most acceptable to him 
that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey's end, so in 
action, that which doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire, 
must needs be fittest for our use." — Hooker, Eccles. Pol., bk. i, § 8. 

" What is rectitude or Tightness as the characteristic of an action ? Ac- 
cording to Price and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea, 
and cannot be explained. It might as well be asked, what is truth, as the 
characteristic of a proposition ? It is a capacity of our rational nature to see 
and acknowledge truth ; but we cannot define what truth is. We call it the 
conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things. But it may be doubted 
how far this explanation makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like 
manner, some explain rectitude by saying that it consists in a congruity be- 
tween an action and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we form of an 



108 OBLIGATION 

The terms a right and right are, in last analysis, coexten- 
sive. Whatever one has a right to do is right for him to do. 
This seems obvious. Yet it is commonly supposed that ex- 
ceptions often occur, and even moralists have taught that a 
man may have a right to do what is not right. A planter, it 
is said, has a right to destroy his crop, but it would not be 
right. 1 This paradox cannot be allowed. It arises perhaps 
from the false notion that one has a moral right to do what- 
ever is not forbidden by civil law, which is mere legality, not 
morality. The true limitations of rights are not found in 
civil law, nor in enactments of any sort, but in the nature 
and relations of men, which the most elaborate enactments 
fall far short of denning completely. A producer destroying 
a product of any value, an heir wasting his inheritance, an 
idler not exercising his ability, is wronging or trespassing on 
rights of others naturally vested in these things. In the 
proper ethical sense a right to do a wrong, or to do wrong, 
is absurd. 

Conversely, whatever is right for one to do he has a right 
to do ; any interference by any other is a trespass. For, if 

action, when it is, in every way, conformable to the relations of the agent 
and the circumstances in which he is placed. On contemplating such an 
action, we approve of it, and feel that if we were placed in such circum- 
stances, and in such relations, we should be under an obligation to perform 
it. Now the circumstances and relations in which man is placed arise from 
his nature, and from the nature of things in general ; and hence it has been 
said, that rectitude is founded in the nature and fitness of things ; that is, 
an action is right when it is fit or suitable to all the relations and circum- 
stances of the agent." — Fleming, Vocabulary, ad verb. 

1 " The adjective right has a much wider signification than the substantive 
right. Everything is right which is conformable to the supreme rule of 
human action ; but that only is a right which, being conformable to the 
supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence 
the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor 
man has no right to relief, but it is right he should have it. A rich man has 
a right to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be right." 
— Whewell, Elements of Morality, bk. i, § 84. Cf . supra, § 48. 



BIGHT AND WRONG 109 

it be not right, it is wrong, these being contradictories ; and 
in doing wrong one always inflicts a wrong, greater or less, 
near or remote, on some one affected by his act which, if not 
punishable, is at least censurable. Hence the terms are co- 
extensive. 

A moral right, or simply a right should be distinguished 
from a legal or jural right. 1 The one is generic, the other 
specific. The one is accorded in universal moral law, the 
other is accorded in imperfect and exceptional civil law. 
A right properly implies both exemption from legitimate 
interference in its exercise and an obligation to exercise 
it ; whereas a jural right implies immunity merely, not obli- 
gation. Hence the unqualified term leads to confusion. 
Sometimes indeed there is formal opposition between moral 
and legal rights, for occasionally unrighteous laws are enacted, 
technically conferring rights that are immoral, authorizing 
wrongs. A moral right to act is an obligation to act, which 
is synonymous with right action. 

§ 56. Right or wrong is the moral quality of a voluntary 
personal action. As propositions are always either true or 
false, so actions are always either right or wrong. A true 
proposition accords with axiomatic logical principle, and a 
right action accords with axiomatic moral principle. As one 
of two contradictory propositions must be false or logically 

1 " A party has a right when another or others are bound or obliged by 
the law to do or to forbear towards or in regard of him." — Austin, Lectures 
on Jurisprudence, § 576. A legal or jural right " signifies that which jurists 
denominate a faculty, which resides in a determinate party or parties by 
virtue of a given law, and avails against a party or parties other than the 
party or parties in whom it resides. ... It is manifest that right as signify- 
ing faculty, and right as signifying justice, are widely different though not 
unconnected terms. But nevertheless the terms are confounded by many 
of the writers who attempt a definition of right, and their attempts to deter- 
mine the meaning of that very perplexing expression are, therefore, mere 
jargon."— Idem, § 264, note. Cf. Mill, Logic, bk. v, ch. 7, § 1 (p. 569). 
Also cf. supra, § 36, note. 



110 OBLIGATION 

absurd, so one of two incompatible actions must be wrong or 
morally absurd. An action that is wrong is a moral self- 
contradiction, inconsistent with what may be known to be 
right or in accord with axiomatic law, and thus is a self- 
condemned absurdity. 1 

It has already been stated that on the empirical occasion 
of a voluntary personal action, we have an intuitive discern- 
ment by conscience of the existence in it of moral quality, 
we discern that it is either right or wrong. But whether 
the observed action, as striking a blow, be right or be wrong, 
is not at all intuitive, not at all discerned immediately by the 
pure practical reason or conscience. Which one of these 
two contrary qualities it has, conscience does not know ; it 
knows only that it must have one or the other. 2 

1 In the moral relation of one man to another, we distinguish the one as 
having a right and hence susceptible of a wrong, the other as doing right or 
wrong. Let p represent a patient having a certain right, and a an agent to 
whom this right relates. If a respects this right, by either acting or not 
acting as the case may require, then he does right, and the right of p is ad- 
justed ; but if a defaults, then he does wrong, and p suffers a wrong, a tres- 
pass. Thus a wrong is conditioned on and coexists with a right ; whereas 
the qualities right and wrong, being contradictories in form and contraries 
in fact, cannot co-exist in one and the same action. Right and wrong are 
marks of kinds of action ; while merit in the one kind, and demerit in the 
other, are marks of degree. See Elements of Deductive Logic, § 23, and § 125. 

In addition let it be noted that whatever accords with universal order is 
right ; and whatever disaccords with universal order is wrong. A special 
order when at variance with universal order is wrong, as in systematic vice 
or tyrannical rule ; and a special disorder when resolving into universal 
order is right, as in reformation or revolution. In general, however, dis- 
order is wrong ; or whatever is irregular is wrong. Moreover, whatever is 
right is reasonable, rational ; and whatever is wrong is unreasonable, irra- 
tional. A wrong is a blunder ; sin is folly ; what is wicked is stupid ; crime 
is craze ; intelligent prudence does right. Said a certain one : "I have often 
been called a scoundrel, but no one ever yet called me a fool." If he was a 
scoundrel, then he was a rank fool. Furthermore, nature is a system of 
universal order (§ 15) ; hence it is natural to do right, unnatural to do 
wrong, and sin is the most unnatural thing in the world. 

2 " The primary element is a simple irreducible perception of the distinc- 



BIGHT AND WRONG 111 

For evidently the notions of right and wrong imply ac- 
cord and discord with some general principle requiring all 
voluntary activity or personal conduct to conform uniformly 
to its indications. Hence every case must be subsumed 
under that principle in order to ascertain which one of the 
two qualities is predicable of it. This is a logical process. 
It is not a discernment of pure reason, but is a reasoning ; 
not conscience, but inference. 1 

The logical process concluding the moral quality in a given 
case, is very liable to error. The specific action in which 
the moral quality inheres is, as we shall immediately show, 
subjective, internal in the agent. Now, when one judges 
his own act, though it is open to his direct observation by 
introspective self-examination, still, from a lack of clear dis- 
cernment of the primary principle, or from a lack of logical 

tion between right and wrong. . . . This distinction appears among the 
necessary ideas of the human mind. It is a phenomenon in the psychology 
of the human race. It is developed, in the presence of the facts and rela- 
tions of life, as something provided for in the normal and necessary action 
of the rational self-conscious ego. It must be viewed as an intuition of the 
reason. It cannot be otherwise accounted for. In its nature it is not a 
feeling, though it gives rise to feeling. It is not a volition, for it comes 
irrespective of choice, and asserts its own rights before the will. It is not a 
mere experience, though it arises on occasion of experience. The idea 
stands for something beyond experience, experience being limited to the 
profitable, the enjoyable or the painful. We experience the useful and the 
agreeable, but the right, the ethical idea, must be perceived or rationally 
seen, as a super-sensible reality in the ideal realm of the demands of duty. 
It is not a perception of the relations themselves, but of a distinction as to 
something due in human relations and life." — Valentine, Theoretical 
Ethics, ch. iv, 4. 

Dean Stanley says that Livingstone ' ' never tired of repeating that he 
found among the native races of Africa that same feeling of right and wrong 
which he found in his own conscience ; and that it needed only to be 
developed and enlightened to make a perfect character. ' ' 

Aristotle, in Rhetoric, bk. i, ch. 13, says : "There does exist naturally a 
universal sense of right and wrong, which in a certain degree all intuitively 
apprehend." 

1 See supra, §§ 2, 3, 43. 



112 OBLIGATION 

skill in making the deduction, or from carelessness, lie often 
errs. Much more is one liable to err when judging the act 
of another person. For the subjective movement of another 
is beyond one's observation, and can be known only by his 
confessions, his professions, or by his outward perceptible 
movements, these together with circumstances being signs 
from which the internal act is inferred. This additional in- 
ference greatly increases the uncertainty of the conclusion, 
and warns against hasty judgment. 

§ 57. What is the specific action of which the moral qual- 
ity is a property ? In other words, what is the distinct and 
informing fact wherein conscience discerns obligatory moral 
quality, and whereon we pass discriminating moral judgment ? 

It is to be premised that no fact of causation has moral 
quality. Whatever is caused is necessitated by its cause to 
be just what it is. There is no alternative. Moreover, by 
the axiom of uniformity, that like causes have like effects, 
there is no variation in effects, if there be none in their 
causes. This is the realm of necessity. It is opposed to 
the realm of freedom, wherein alone moral quality finds 
place ; for freedom must be allowed as conditio sine qua non 
of moral action. Only beings having free will are morally 
responsible, and among these only such persons as are con- 
scious of moral obligation. 1 

Outward physical or muscular action, therefore, has in 
itself no moral quality, not even that outward action com- 
monly called voluntary. For the movement of the muscles 
is due to physical causes originating in the brain, and this 
brain action causing muscular motion is itself caused by ante- 
cedent mental action. Hence only to mental action can 
moral quality be immediately attributed. 

1 See Elements of Inductive Logic, §§ 18, 19. Also see supra, § 10, and 
§ 18, note. 



BIGHT AND WRONG 113 

The exercise of conscience discerning moral quality, for 
like reason, has in itself no moral quality ; it is neither right 
nor wrong. Knowledge of right and wrong, and of the dis- 
tinction between them, arises on the presentation of a per- 
sonal action, which empirical occasion is a condition precedent. 
Moreover, conscience can never have the quality imported 
into it ; for its exercise is originally and essentially involun- 
tary, the discernment intuitively necessary. The same is 
true of all pure intuitions. 

All empirical intuitions, as the sense-perceptions, are like- 
wise destitute in themselves of moral quality, since they are 
the involuntary products of our constitution in the presence 
of causative objects. 

The exercise of the logical faculty, even in case of moral 
Judgment, has no moral quality in itself, for it is an effect of 
voluntary attention. 

The like consideration sets aside, not only all presentations 
and the representations of thought, but also the representa- 
tions of mediate perception, memory and imagination, together 
with the feelings and desires that attend them. All these are 
strictly effects, and therefore destitute in themselves of moral 
quality. 

§ 58. Consequently, in our search for the activity which 
has moral quality in itself, we are shut up to the volitions. 
Volition has three constitutive elements, choice, intention, 
effort. 1 

This last, the effort, which is voluntary attention, is caused 
by the motive, the desire that prevails, without alternative. 
Hence the effort is a necessitated act, and so without moral 
quality, in itself neither right nor wrong. 

The first element, the choice, viewed simply as an act 
apart from its specific character, is also causally necessitated 

i See supra, §§7-9. 



114 OBLIGATION 

to take place or occur by the mere presentation of possible 
alternatives ; I must choose between them. Hence the simple 
act of choosing is in itself destitute of moral quality. 

But the choice of one alternative rather than the other, 
the taking this rather than that, is a fact uncaused, not neces- 
sitated, free ; for herein is the specific characteristic and the 
very essence of choice. In its resolution choice becomes 
intention, the intention to do or forbear a certain action. 
This central fact, the only fact in human nature or in nature 
at large that is not caused to be what it is, this resolution, 
this intention, purpose, design, this alone is capable of inhe- 
rent moral quality. 

An intention, though not causally determined, is rationally 
determined, is in accord with some one or more reasons. 1 
Now the moral law furnishes a reason naturally and therefore 
rightly dominating all others, and since it is the intention 
only that intelligently, impellingly, freely, preferably, con- 
forms to or disregards moral law, it follows that the intention 
properly has moral quality, is either right or wrong. 

Moreover, since the all-dominating moral law, the ultimate 
and absolute criterion of conduct, is addressed directly and 
exclusively to choice becoming intention, it follows that the 
intention is never morally indifferent, is always either right 
or wrong; right, when it intelligently, reverently and will- 
ingly conforms to the law ; wrong, when it knowingly violates 
or merely disregards the law. 

From these considerations it is manifest that the moral 
law applies, not directly to the outward, expressed, objective 
activity, but primarily and immediately to the inward, ante- 
cedent, subjective intention. 2 Hence, if we regard a trespass 

1 See supra, § 10, note. 

2 "Acts may be distinguished into external and internal By external, 
are meant corporeal acts, acts of the body ; by internal, mental acts, acts of 
the mind. Thus, to strike is an external or exterior or ' overt ' act ; to in- 



RIGHT AND WRONG 115 

as an action passing over from one person onto another, a 
realization of an intention inflicting injury, the formula of 
the moral law should be : Thou shalt not intend to do aught 
that would involve a trespass. It will be better, however, to 
regard a trespass as the total activity, including both the 
subjective antecedents and the objective consequents, the 
moral quality of this total residing in the intention. 

§ 59. That moral quality is thus a constant property of 
intention requires some further consideration, especially of 
the distinction between the intention to do an act and the 
ulterior intention with which it is done, or the purpose. 

There is a large class of offenses varying in degree from 
extreme criminality to comparatively slight culpability, such 
as murder, stealing, lying, betting, whose very essence is 
trespass. Hence the intentional doing of an action of this 
class is wrong; or, more closely, the intention to do it is 
wrong, wrong in itself, being a radical violation of the law of 
trespass. Complete, successful action is not requisite to 
constitute guilt. An attempt, an overt act, though it fail, is 
evidence of guilty intention, and therefore condemnable ; as 
in the murderous contrivance of Guy Fawkes, and in the 
villainous slander of Don John. 1 A mere intention to do 

tend to strike, an internal or interior one. ' ' — Bentham, Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, ch. vii, § 11. It is the common habit of thought and speech 
to attribute moral quality directly to the external act, and this habit is con- 
firmed by the practice of the civil courts requiring at least an overt act for 
indictment. Yet the courts seek evidence of intention as the ultimate de- 
terminant. Murder implies criminal intent ; accidental homicide is distin- 
guished from murder merely by the absence of such intent. Says the Duke, 
speaking of Angelo : 

" His act did not o'ertake his bad intent, 
And must be buried but as an intent 
That perished by the way. Thoughts are no subjects, 
Intents but merely thoughts." 

— Measure for Measure, Act v, sc. 1, 1. 445, sq. 

1 See Much Ado About Nothing. In his Institutes of the Criminal Law, 
p. 85, Professor Eosshirt, of Heidelberg, defines an attempt thus: "Eine 



116 OBLIGATION 

the deed, an intention that, perhaps for want of opportunity, 
never passes into overt action, is already a culpable violation 
of the law. Now what is essentially wrong can never become 
right, for this would be a contradiction. Hence any of this 
class of intents can never be justified by an ulterior end, 
however good, wise, benevolent this may be. No end can 
sanctify such means. We may never do evil that good may 
come. 1 

Conversely, what is essentially right can never become 
wrong. The intention to do an act that is right in itself 
alone considered cannot be vitiated by an ulterior purpose, 
however vicious this may be. Shylock did a righteous act in 
the loan of the ducats ; it was his ulterior purpose that was 
wicked. 

There is another class of intents that, in themselves alone 
considered, have no moral quality; as an intent to give 
money, to take a walk, to write a letter, and very many oth- 
ers. Such are usually spoken of as morally indifferent. But 
an intent of this sort, being properly of a means to an end, 
has the moral quality of the intended end imputed to it ; in 
other words, the proposed end sanctifies or vilifies the pro- 

Handlung, welche die Hervorbringung eines Verbrechens zum zwecke hat, 
ohne den bezweckten verbrecherisehen Thatbestand wirklich zu machen, 
ist ein Versuch." In civil law the intention (consilium, cogitalio) is recog- 
nized as crime, provided it is evidenced by an attempt or overt act. Where 
a criminal intention is evidenced by an overt act, the party is punished in 
respect of the criminal intention, commonly with less severity than if the 
deed were fully accomplished. Even confession without overt act is insuffi- 
cient to legal condemnation, for it may be due to insanity, or be invented. 
Feuerbach says : " The reference of the fact as effect to the determination of 
the will as cause, settles or fixes the legal character of the latter. In conse- 
quence of that reference, or by reason of the imputation of the fact, the 
determination of the will is held or adjudged to be guilt ; which guilt is the 
ground of the punishment applied to the party." — Institutes of Penal Law 
in Germany, p. 79. 

1 " It is not permitted to an honest man to corrupt himself for the sake 
of others." — Rousseau. See Romans, 3: 7, 8. 



EIGHT AND WRONG 117 

posed means, this becoming right or wrong according to the 
ultimate purpose, or the intention with which it is done. If 
I propose to give money, which intent in itself has no moral 
quality, with the further intent to relieve distress, the intent 
to give becomes right ; if to buy votes, it becomes wrong. 
So the intended means takes its moral color from the in- 
tended end ; for the intention in such case is to be judged 
in its totality, not in its dependent parts ; it is dyed through- 
out with a uniform hue. 1 

§ 60. The principle that moral quality is imputed to acts 
which in themselves have none, is of wider application. 

Let us recall the fundamental fact in human nature that 
a free will is the primary condition of moral activity, is the 
central essence of personality, and is most nearly identical 
with the ego, is I myself. To it alone of my powers, that is 
to me myself, the mandate of the moral law is addressed, 
since by it alone am I able to direct my powers. For the 
functional property of will is to control, according to its 
freely formed intention, by means of attention, directly or 
indirectly, all other elements of personality, as cognitions, 
feelings, desires and muscular motions, awaking or stimu- 

1 While one is bound to use a wise economy in the choice of a means, 
he is not otherwise particularly concerned about its right or wrong, unless 
so qualified in itself. When assured of a right end, he pursues it by any 
available means not wrong in itself. For instance, I am obliged to write a 
letter ; I procure pens, ink and paper, seat myself at my desk, handle my 
pen, etc., without any thought of the moral quality of these subsidiary acts. 
Again, I owe a large money debt ; in order to pay, I am diligent in business, 
prudent in expenditure, active and frugal, without thought of the moral 
quality of a multitude of details, except of their honesty, involved in the 
intermediate process. In general, it is needless and would be impracticable 
to examine and judge each of our minor actions separately. Having given 
attention to the moral quality of the end in view, we need to judge only 
that no adopted means is wrong in itself. Assured of that, we confidently 
pursue a righteous end. 

On Moral Intention, see Janet, Theory of Morals, bk. iii, chs. 1, 2. 



118 OBLIGATION 

lating or repressing their activity; and its obligation is to 
exert this control according to the supreme moral law. 

The mastery of the representative cognitions, of mediate 
perception, memory, imagination and thought, is immedi- 
diately accomplished by directing attention to this or that 
object as one may choose. They thus have moral quality 
imported into them, or imputed or attributed to them, accord- 
ing to the intention. For the effort of attention is a passing 
from the sphere of freedom into the sphere of causation or 
necessity, and what shall take place in this sphere, being 
determined by the freely formed intention, is marked by 
the moral quality of the determinant, becomes essentially 
right or wrong by imputation. I am morally obligated, for 
instance, to exert and regulate my logical faculty in search 
for truth, its proper object, especially for such truth as bears 
upon conduct, lest an error lead to trespass. The moral 
judgment, by inference from the moral principle, thus dis- 
covers reasons determining intentional conduct, and so is 
obligated, through the will, to a most patient and vigorous 
exercise, which is also, because of this obligation, a righteous 
exercise. Neglect of the obligation, or failure to fulfill it, 
renders us responsible for our avoidable errors and their con- 
sequences. 

Inasmuch as feeling is correlated with knowing, our emo- 
tions and sentiments are subject to indirect yet efficient con- 
trol by means of the direct control of the cognitions with 
which they coordinately cooperate. 1 For, since we can at 
will directly transfer attention from object to object, we are 
able thus indirectly to induce or repress the feelings that 
attend contemplation. These, therefore, have moral quality 
imputed to them, those that are normal or orderly being 
right, those that are abnormal or disorderly either in kind or 
in degree being wrong. They can and should be controlled, 
1 See Elements of Psychology, §§221, 229. 



BIGHT AND WRONG 119 

regulated, well-ordered. Because of its vast importance, let 
belief be instanced. It is the feeling of conviction, the assur- 
ance of physical or moral certainty that attends or is correla- 
tive to the recognition of truth. 1 Its opposites are the 
feelings of doubt and disbelief. Now obviously, so far as 
we are under obligation to search out attainable truth, thus 
becoming responsible for our ignorance of what we could and 
should know, just so far are we bound to believe and are 
responsible for doubt or disbelief of attainable truth ; these, 
indeed, being merely correlative statements. Hence we can 
be and are reasonably commanded to believe authentic or 
accessible truth ; the belief of it is right, the doubt or dis- 
belief is wrong. 2 

Likewise desires have imputed moral quality. Desire is 
conditioned on real or imaginary objects of cognition ; con- 

1 See Elements of Psychology, § 227. 

2 Christianity conditions salvation on belief; hence the supreme impor- 
tance of this matter. Mr. Lecky, in his History of Rationalism in Europe, 
presumes passim that no one can be held responsible for his belief. Cf his 
History of European Morals, vol. i, p. 412 sq. Mr. Bailey, in his Essays on 
the Formation of Opinions, argues to that effect, saying: "Those states of 
the understanding [?] which we term belief, doubt, and disbelief, inasmuch 
as they are not voluntary, nor the result of any exertion of the will [?], 
imply neither^ merit nor demerit in him who is the object [sic] of them. . . . 
In relation to the same subject one may believe, and another doubt, and a 
third disbelieve, and all with equal innocence." The Westminster Review 
indorses Mr. Bailey in this ; also Sir James Mackintosh, in his Progress of 
Ethical Philosophy, he insisting that in no case are we responsible for our 
opinions or beliefs, because, as he says, they are wholly independent of our 
wills. This is erroneous psychology. See a controverting article, by Albert 
T. Bledsoe, in the Southern Review for July, 1871. Austin says : " If I love 
darkness and hate the light, I refuse to examine the proofs which might 
render the truth resistless, and dwell with complacency upon every shadow 
of proof which tends to confirm my prepossession. For this reason, non- 
belief may be blameable ; when, for example, it is the result of insufficient 
examination, refusal to examine, partiality or antipathy indirectly removable, 
etc." — Lectures on Jurisprudence, § 661. 

A saying attributed to Lord Brougham, which infidelity has adopted, is : 
"It makes no difference what a man believes, if only he is sincere." This 



120 OBLIGATION 

sequently it comes and goes with their contemplation. Since 
this is under direct control, the desire can be effectively 
though indirectly regulated, and is right or wrong according 
to the volition. 1 But because desire directly solicits choice 
and becomes the motive in effectuating the intention, it re- 
ceives moral quality in a marked degree. For example, 
covetousness, which may be taken as the type of abnormal 
desire, is forbidden in the law, Thou shalt not covet ; the 
only one of the Decalogue formally subjective. Thereby I 
am commanded to suppress covetousness whenever it instinc- 
tively or spontaneously appears, much more am I forbidden to 
incite and cherish it. I am required to choose, intend and 
enforce its cessation ; for it is abnormal and evil, tending to 
objective disorder and trespass. Therefore I do wrong to 
allow it, and it becomes wrong by the allowance. Normal 
desires, which within their limits not only are right in them- 
selves, but constitute the very basis of all human rights, 2 
become abnormal and evil by degree, either when weakened 
by inattention to their objects, or when immoderate and inor- 
dinate by excess. They then become wrong, because I do 
wrong in neglecting or failing to regulate them. 

External activities, the movements of the voluntary mus- 
cles, and their proximate consequences, are, for like reason, 
right or wrong by imputation. It is only by an observation 
of his overt acts that one's mental states, thus expressed, can 
be judged by other persons. Hence we correctly speak of 
good deeds, bad habits, and the reverse, and approve or cen- 
sure them; but always with reference, though tacit, to the 
subjective intention. 

is a denial of objective truth, and of creeds. A similar denial is made of 
objective duty. But no amount of sincerity can release one from the respon- 
sibility and dreadful consequences of believing a lie. 

1 See Elements of Psychology \ §§ 255, 257. 

2 See supra, § 25. 



BIGHT AND WRONG 121 

It is a weighty and impressive truth that, not only our out- \ 
ward conduct, but our innermost thoughts, imaginings, feel- \ 
ings and desires, all at all times, are made by their intentions 
right or wrong; that we are responsible, not only for every f 
idle word, but for every idle thought or wish ; and that in 
the perfected administration of moral government, all these / 
shall be brought into judgment. Who hath ears to hear, let \ 
him hear. 

§ 61. The many deeds that are essentially trespass, wrong 
in themselves, are not known to be so intuitively, but only 
by inference from the moral principle as an ultimate major 
premise. Hence we are liable to error in judging them, 
especially in the less obvious cases. The error arises from 
an obscure or confused apprehension of the ultimate princi- 
ple or law, or from an incomplete or inaccurate knowledge of 
the particular case subsumed, or from bad logic in making 
the deduction. Hence it sometimes happens that one sin- 
cerely desiring to do right, having a motive and an ulterior 
purpose that are right, honestly judging and believing that J 
what he is doing is right, may nevertheless be doing what is 
wrong in itself, essentially, unalterably wrong. 

Also it is true that every man in all cases is morally bound 
to do what in his best judgment seems to him to be right. 
In popular phraseology, he must obey his conscience ; is 
doing right, if he acts conscientiously ; is wrong, if he vio- 
lates his conscience. Obviously it is implied that one should 
carefully exercise his best ability in judging a case, bringing 
to bear upon it all the light attainable, unobscured by predi- 
lection, repugnance or passion; then, having done this, he 
must conform his conduct to the result of his judgment. If 
circumstances require a prompt decision, without time for 
close consideration, then a habit of moral thought and a 
familiarity with moral principles greatly enhance the proba- 



122 OBLIGATION 

bility of a correct decision; but in any case it is morally 
necessary that he intend and do what his moral judgment 
approves ; otherwise he becomes a willful offender. 

Now, putting this and that together, we have the moral 
paradox, that one in doing what is wrong in itself may be 
doing right. This is an inevitable consequence of the imper- 
fections of moral judgment. Othello was bound by high 
principles of honor, as he understood them and the case, to 
commit uxoricide. The infanticide by the Hindu mother is 
an act of piety. Saul as persecutor verily thought he was 
doing God service. Conversely, one in doing what is right 
in itself may be doing wrong. A judge in granting a right- 
eous suit is doing what is right ; but if he do it merely to 
escape annoyance or censure, or to entangle the plaintiff in 
evil consequences, he is in the same act doing wrong. 1 

This moral paradox involves imperfect persons in dreadful 
responsibilities. We are answerable not only for wrong be- 
lieved to be wrong, but for wrong believed to be right, and 
for right believed to be wrong. 'Tis a strait and narrow 
way. A legal maxim holds that Ignorantia juris non excusat ; 
but, in equity, ignorance or sincerity in a moral blunder pal- 
liates, especially in a penitent, though it does not excuse, an 
offense, and so becomes a ground for mercy by a mitigation 
or a transfer of punishment. 2 Naturally we do not shudder 
at the crime of Othello, as we do at that of Macbeth. Saul 
obtained forgiveness because of ignorance. Divine mercy 
dictated the prayer : Father forgive them ; for they know 
not what they do. 

1 E.g. Shylock. Cf. Luke, 18 ; 1-6, where Avenge, *EKdtK7]<r6v, means 
Do me justice of (margin, R. V.), or Deliver me from — the justice of the 
case being presupposed. This judge was unjust, unrighteous, Kpir^s ttjs 
adidas, "because his €kUk7)<tls came of self-regard, and not from a sense of 
duty." — Alford, Com. ad. loc. 

2 See Leviticus, ch. 4; Numbers, 15: 24-29; Luke, 12: 48, and 23: 34; 
Acts, 17 i 30 ; i Timothy, 1 : 13. 



JUSTICE 123 



CHAPTER VII 

JUSTICE 

§ 62. Thus far the moral law has been considered chiefly 
as prohibiting aggressive and injurious acts or lines of action. 
The formula, Thou shalt not trespass, primarily forbids what- 
ever unwarrantably interferes in another's liberty. Its cor- 
recting effect is to put a strong positive check upon the 
hindering activities of related persons, to the end that every 
one may fully gratify his normal desires ; it restrains within 
bounds the course of each, so that all others may freely exer- 
cise their rightful license. This prohibitory sense is so obvi- 
ous and emphatic that many who are under the law conceive 
that by keeping within the prescribed bounds the demands 
of the law are satisfied, that purity and innocence, which are 
negatives, fulfill its behest, that to forbear injurious aggres- 
sion is the sum of obligation. 

But this is a very inadequate conception of the content of 
the law, a law enjoining an order of facts that ought to be ; 
enjoining in the negative sense of forbidding one class, and 
enjoining in the positive sense of requiring another class. It 
lays upon us the injunction both to refrain and to perform. 
It says, Thou shalt not transgress stated bounds ; and by 
necessary implication, it also says Thou shalt do many things 
within those bounds. This positive requisition is not less 
obligatory than the prohibition, and it is merely because of 
the imperfection of language, unfitted to express both the 
positive and negative aspects of one and the same thought 
or mandate in a single simple formula, that the one is appar- 
ently more emphatic than the other. 



124 OBLIGATION 

The necessary implication of active obligation is readily- 
explicated. Trespass is effected either by commission or by 
omission. That the one is direct, the other indirect, is not a 
difference in essence, and either may be a wrong as heinous 
and as fatal as the other. 1 In the various relations of men, 
every one has rightful claims upon the activities of others, 
and they who omit to fulfill these claims commit a wrong, a 
trespass. For, my willful omission of an act to which some 
other has a right, is a violation of his right, is to leave him 
under a restraint of his rightful liberty, which restraint I 
am bound to remove. To be merely negligent, heedless, 
thoughtless, careless of another's right to my action, is to I 
embarrass him more or less, is to interfere indirectly in his 
liberty, and thus is to trespass on him. Therefore, to him 
that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin. 

The point here brought squarely to the front has been to 
some extent anticipated in several places. 2 In what follows 
we shall give it full recognition, and allow its weight to 
establish the equilibrium between forbearing and doing, which 
equihbrium a , correct conception requires. Thus it will 
appear that the law of trespass rightly interpreted applies 
exhaustively to the relations of man to man, and is compre- 
hensive of every phase of obligation. 

§ 63. The term justice is the abstract from the concrete 
form just. 3 To be just is to concede to everyone his rights ; 
and justice is the concession of rights. This is the most 

1 " Dans une action criminelle, entre celui qui fait et celui qui laisse faire, 
celui qui laisse faire est lepire, £tant le l&che." — Victor Hugo, Quatrevingt 
Treize, p. 451. 

2 See supra, especially § 41, and § 48. 

3 Just and justice are from the Latin jus, a right, founded on nature, 
custom, or enacted law, lex. The original sense of dUrj, a right, was custom, 
usage, manner (cf. e0os, supra, § 19, note); hence dUcuos, just. According 
to Plato, justice, 5u<aio<riJi>r), is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfill- 
ment by each part of its peculiar function. Even piety, 6o-i6rijs, is justice in 



JUSTICE 125 

general sense. When a right consists in a specific claim on 
the action or inaction of some one, the concession of a just 
man implies his action or inaction in satisfaction of the claim. 
An important distinction is sometimes laid down between 
justitia interna, disposition to do right, and justitia externa, 
rectitude of conduct. 1 The opposite of justice is injustice, 
which is to refuse or to neglect the concession, and of course 
its actualization. Whoever is treated unjustly, be the injury 
great or small, is thereby restrained, more or less, in his right- 
ful liberty to gratify some normal desire, which restraint is 
essentially a trespass. 

Indeed it is quite obvious that injustice is trespass, and 
trespass injustice ; and that the law forbidding trespass is a 
law forbidding injustice. For, according to the moral princi- 
ple, every one has a right, if not trespassing, to gratify his 
normal desires ; but it is impossible to have this gratification 
in a multitude of cases except by concession of one's fel- 
lows ; hence, if they withhold the concession, they disap- 
point his desires, and nullify his claims. For example, I 
have a right to the fulfillment of all formal contracts and of 
all informal promises made to me, whether for money or ser- 

reference to the gods. See Republic, bks. i and ii. According to Aristotle, 
justice, in its general sense, is the practice of all virtue towards others, 
rrjs 8\ris apeTrjs xPV<ru npbs tLWov. It is the most perfect virtue, because 
it is the perfect exercise of all virtue. — Nic. Eth., bk. v, chs. 1, 2. Cicero 
says justice is, negatively, neminem l&dere, positively, suum cuique reddere, 
or animi afectio suum cuique tribuens. — Be Finibus, v, 23, 65. Grotius, the 
jurist, makes the notion of justice the fundamental principle of his great 
work, Be Satisfactione. 

1 This distinction is neatly marked by Horace in his sketch of the man 
who is only outwardly just. He is one — 

" Qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat, 
Quo multse magnseque secantur judice lites, 
Quo res sponsore, et quo causae teste tenentur. 
Sed videt liunc omnis domus et vicinia tota 
Introrsus turpem, speciosum pelle decora." 

— Epistles, i, 16, 41 sg. 



126 OBLIGATION 

vice, a right to the payment of all that is my due ; if the 
debtor refuse, or if any one hinder his payment, it is a tres- 
pass, an injustice. Also I have a right to acquire knowledge, 
property, social position ; and if any one hinder my effort, 
or neglect due help, he does me a wrong. Again, I have a 
rightful claim on my fellows for a fair judgment on my char- 
acter and conduct ; and to deny me the measure of honorable 
esteem to which I am entitled is a gross injury ; to slander 
me, one still more gross. Moreover, I am naturally a social 
being ; and if, without warrant, my association with compan- 
ions is prevented or disconcerted, my right is infringed, I 
suffer a wrong, a trespass, an injustice. Thus injustice, or 
its cognate, injury, is as truly committed, indirectly, by with- 
holding or perverting a right, as by directly inflicting damage. 
Also it is evident that to prohibit injustice is to command 
justice. The sole difference is in the negative and positive 
expression of the same thing. The injunction, Thou shalt 
not trespass, is identical with the injunction, Be thou just. 

§ 64. Justice taken specifically, with reference to matters 
involving gain or loss, is subdivided into corrective and dis- 
tributive justice. 

Corrective justice is fairness in exchange, or honesty in a 
general sense. It is either voluntary, as in trade, in the 
market, in commerce, in fulfilling contracts and promises, in 
payment of debts, in remuneration for service rendered ; or 
it is involuntary and rectoral, enforced by decrees of the 
courts in civil cases, as in the settlement of suits, the award 
of damages, the reparation of illegal trespass. 

Distributive justice is distinguished from corrective by not 
including the notion of exchange. It is the proper partition 
of possessions and honors among members of society. It 
corresponds to the notion of approbation or censure bestowed 
in proportion to individual merit or demerit, to the award of 



JUSTICE 127 

prizes, and of penalties in criminal cases. When a man's 
course in life entitles him to the esteem of his fellows, and 
to such outward honors as express their valuation of his 
worth, distributive justice requires that these be accorded. 
From the recipient of a benefaction it requires gratitude. It 
is violated by excessive adulation or by slander ; even by a 
secret misjudging of another's worth. In case of overt in- 
fraction of law it is satisfied rather than rectified by penalty. 1 

§ 65. Justice, in the narrow sense of legal justice, is 
administered by courts of law. The civil law, or else the 
common law, and the statute law, which these courts apply 
to cases, together with the forms by which their proceedings 
are regulated and their decrees enforced, all have their imme- 
diate ground in the authority of the State, their ultimate 
ground in human rights, and all are specific reductions of the 
one law forbidding trespass, commanding justice. Jurispru- 
dence, in general, is the science of rights as formulated and 
sanctioned by governing powers. It is the science of enacted 
law, investigating the principles common to all systems of 
law. Morality enjoins obedience to the universal, natural 
law, jus naturale, in all possible relations of men ; jurispru- 
dence enjoins and exacts obedience to that law only in so far 
as it is recognized and authorized in the enactments of the 
State. Thus Jurisprudence is a branch of Ethics. 2 

It is clear, then, that law-makers do not originate obliga- 
tions ; their office is merely to interpret and formulate the 

1 The distinction is from Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. v, chs. 3, 4. He also 
distinguishes commutative justice, or retaliation, ch. 5 ; cf. supra, § 53. 
Moreover he distinguishes political and economical justice, ch. 6 ; and sub- 
divides the former into natural and legal, ch. 7. 

2 "The design and object of laws is to ascertain what is just, honorable, 
and expedient ; and when that is discovered, it is proclaimed as a general 
ordinance, equal and impartial to all. This is the origin of law, which, for 
various reasons, all are under obligation to obey, but especially because all 



128 OBLIGATION 

obligations already existing, and to enact special sanctions. 
All laws, organic, municipal, military, international, all ordi- 
nances, canons, edicts, decrees, treaties and arbitrations, have 
the same ultimate basis, the moral law ; they must be just 
to be obligatory. Jussum quia justum est. If the law-making 
power, or, more generally, the constituted authority, depart 
from its function, and promulgate laws or ordinances at vari- 
ance with the one moral law, or for other ends than those of 
public and private justice, or in disregard of the original and 
inalienable rights of the subject, then the enforcement of such 
laws and ordinances is unjust rule, is tyranny. 1 

One qualification is needful. If an unrighteous law be 
not intolerably oppressive, and does not induce or sanction 
an immorality in the subject, then he is morally bound to 
obey it ; for, since it emanates from constituted authority, a 
refusal to obey would be a trespass on the State through its 
accredited agents. The remedy is a repeal of the law. But 
if a law be so unjust as to be intolerable, then there is appeal 
to the higher law, jus naturale, by one as by Hampden, or by 
many as by the English colonists in America. This is rebel- 
lion, resulting perhaps in revolution. 2 

The laws enacted by any human government, however 
they may be elaborated and refined in the interest of thorough 
justice, are nevertheless unavoidably inadequate and imper- 

law is the invention and gift of Heaven, the sentiment of wise men, the 
correction of every offense, and the general compact of the state ; to live in 
conformity with which is the duty of every individual in society." — Demos- 
thenes, Oration i, contra Aristogiton. 

"The law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God 
himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over 
all the globe, in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are of any 
validity, if contrary to this ; and such of them as are valid derive all their 
force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original." 
— Blackstone, Commentaries, Int. § 2, p. 41. 

1 See supra, § 37, fourth paragraph. 

2 Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, bk. i, ch. 13, refers to Antigone's defense of 



JUSTICE 129 

feet. They can effectually prohibit only the grosser forms of 
wrong doing, and secure the practice of mutual justice only 
in certain definite transactions, the vast majority of existing 
obligations, many of the weightiest, being beyond the reach 
of the courts. Moreover, in such cases as come under the 
laws, and of which the courts of law take cognizance, it is 
very often difficult and sometimes impracticable to determine 
and administer strict justice. Yet, notwithstanding these 
inherent defects, the laws and the courts of law are the tense 
woof in the texture of social organization. 

§ 66. Very early in the progress of civilization the prac- 
tice of equity arose as a complementary extension of legality. 
The ancients, in measuring building material of irregular 
surface, used a flexible leaden rule. Equity, like a leaden 
rule, bends to the specialities of each case, while the iron 
rule of enacted law is inflexible. 1 Circumstances alter cases, 

her revolt in burying Polynices as an example of appeal to natural justice. 
Turning to Act. ii, scene 5, we find that Creon, the ruler, asks : 

" And didst thou dare to disobey my law ?" 

Antigone replies : 

" I had it not from Jove, nor the just gods 
Who rule below ; nor could I ever think 
A mortal's law of power or strength enough 
To abrogate th' unwritten law divine, 
Immutable, eternal, not like these 
Of yesterday, but made ere time began." 

1 Equity, rb taov, rb iirceiKh, VS. rb bUaiov, rb vo/xuebv, is that kind of justice 
which corrects the irregularity or rigor of enacted law. "Just and equi- 
table are the same, . . . not that justice which is according to law, but 
which is the correction of the legally just. . . . It is a correction of law 
wherever it is defective owing to its universality." — Akistotle, Nic. Eth., 
bk. v, ch. 10. In the early Roman Empire, however, cequitas, jus cequum, 
was jus gentium, the law applied to subject peoples, as distinguished from 
jus prcetorium, the law Urbis Romce; later, the two were fused into jus civile, 
the Roman law. 

The leaden rule was used in the Lesbian architecture, which " appears to 
have been a kind of Cyclopean masonry, and may have remained in 



130 OBLIGATION 

and law rigidly applied may work injustice. Summum jus % 
summa injuria. Laws are expressed in general terms, and 
being framed with reference to ordinary cases, it often hap- 
pens that the actual cases involve matter beyond their scope. 
Moreover, there are many matters requiring adjudication for 
which the laws make no provision. It is the part of equity 
to supply such deficiencies by special action. Thence have 
arisen courts of equity or courts of chancery, distinguishable 
from courts of law. The decisions of a judge in equity are 
regulated, when there is no binding precedent or statute, by 
reference to the original principles of justice which give rise 
to enacted laws ; hence his decisions are a species of legisla- 
tion, judicial legislation. In the development and refinement 
of common and statute law, many of the approved decisions 
in equity have become incorporated in those systems ; and 
equity itself, being more and more determined by precedent, 
has become assimilated to the common law. Hence in many 
of our States there is a fusion of official function, the same 
court, sometimes on the same case, sitting now in law, now 
in equity. 

Casting off these limitations of its technical and juridical 
sense, the exercise of equity in the common intercourse of 
men is the doing what is equal, fair and right. 1 It is the 

Lesbos from the early Pelasgian occupiers of the island. Polygonal stones 
were used in it, which could not be measured by a straight rule. Cf. 
jHEschylus Fragments, 70 : 'AM' 6 fikv tis A4<t(3iov kv/jl kv rpcydvoLs iinrepaivtTU) 
pvdfioLs — where /cuyuameans a waved moulding." — Sir A. Grant, Aristotle's 
Ethics, bk. v, ch. 10, note. 

1 "In the most general sense we are accustomed to call that equity 
which, in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and 
right, and which properly arises ex oequo et bono. In this sense it answers 
precisely to the definition of justice or natural law, as given by Justinian in 
his Pandects: Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique 
tribuendi. And the word jus is used in the same sense in the Roman law, 
when it is declared that jus est ars boni et cequi. ' ' — Story, Comment on 
Equity, p. 1. 



JUSTICE 131 

equitable between man and man, grounded on equal subjec- 
tion to moral law or equality of rights among men, whether 
formulated in contracts, or existing in their merely natural 
relations. The distinction between equity in this general 
sense and the justice administered by the courts, that is, 
between the claims of human charity or natural justice and 
the claims of legal justice, corresponds nearly with the dis- 
tinction between imperfect and perfect rights ; a distinction, 
however, that is merely practical, not essential. 1 Equity, in 
its wide sense, and natural justice are coextensive, and both 
are synonymous with right ; etymologically, the opposite of 
justice is injury, of equity iniquity. The notion of equity 
and justice limited to jurisprudence, is a narrow and inade- 
quate view bounded by a rugged horizon ; but in their large 
and proper meaning they expand over the whole sphere of 
obligation, and are equivalent to rectitude and righteousness. 2 

§ 67. Mercy is righteous forbearance toward an offender. 
It implies kindness or gentleness, and is prompted by pity 
or compassion. These feelings, when intense, are apt to 
induce a sentimental aversion to the claims of strict justice. 

1 Wolfius says : " Justum appellatur quicquid Jit secundum jus perfectum 
alterius ; cequum vero quod secundum imperfectum." Cf. supra, § 36, note. 

2 "To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is prohibited or 
commanded by positive laws, is like saying that the radii of a circle were 
not equal till you had drawn the circumference." — Montesquieu, Spirit 
of the Laws, bk. i, ch. 1, p. 3. 

"It is equity to pardon human failings, " says Aristotle, "and to look 
to the lawgiver and not to the law ; to the spirit and not to the letter ; to the 
intention and not to the action ; to the whole and not to the part ; to the 
character of the actor in the long run and not in the present moment ; to 
remember good rather than evil, and good that one has received, rather than 
good that one has done ; to bear being injured, t6 d^xeo-flcu dducov/jievov ; to 
wish to settle a matter by words rather than by deeds; lastly, to prefer 
arbitration to judgment, for the arbitrator sees what is equitable, but the 
judge only the law, and for this an arbitrator was first appointed, in order 
that equity might flourish." — Rhetoric, bk. i, ch. 13. 



132 OBLIGATION 

Hence mercy is popularly supposed to be in opposition to 
justice, implying a disposition to overlook injury, and to mit- 
igate or even wholly remit the penalty that sanctions the 
law. Such displacement of justice is not righteous forbear- 
ance, and so is not true mercy, but a weak indulgence of 
wrong that upholds license and works injustice. True mercy 
forbears, whatever legal forms may allow, to exceed or to 
abate the claims of natural justice. 1 

Every man is necessarily a judge, not only of his own 
actions, but also of those of his fellows. Whether his judg- 
ment find utterance in words and deeds of requital or not, he 
is bound to be just. Any excess of severity is injustice to 
the subject; any abatement of righteous rigor is injustice 
to society whose welfare is involved in the right judgment of 



1 It may thereby come into conflict with rigorous legal justice adhering 
to the letter of the law. Portia's exquisite speech, Merchant of Venice, 
Act iv, sc. 1, 1. 181 sg., though familiar, cannot be omitted here. In court, 
speaking to the defendant, says — 

Portia. Do you confess the bond ? 

Antonio. I do. 

Portia. Then must the Jew be merciful. 

Shylock. On what compulsion must I ? Tell me that. 
Portia. The quality of mercy is nottstrain'd, 

It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 

Upon the place beneath ; it is twice blest ; 

It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. 

'Tis mightiest in the mightiest ; it becomes 

The throned monarch better than his crown ; 

His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, 

The attribute to awe and majesty, 

Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings ; 

But mercy is above this sceptred sway ; 

It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, 

It is an attribute to God himself ; 

And earthly power doth then show likest God's 

When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew, 

Though justice be thy plea, consider this, 

That, in the course of justice, none of us 

Should see salvation ; we do pray for mercy ; 

And that same prayer doth teach us all to render 

The deeds of mercy. I have spoke thus much 

To mitigate the justice of thy plea. 



JUSTICE 133 

its members. Mercy is shown in forbearing to do or even to 
think what is not strictly just. 1 

The judge on the bench must be just. Usually, by the 
very terms of the law which he is set to administer, he has a 
measure of discretion ; but he must not transgress its sharply 
denned bounds, and within these he is to use discretion, not 
license. The range is allowed, not for the play of pity or 3f 
resentment, but in order that he may mercifully adjust his 
decree to the peculiarities of a case. Too great severity is 
injustice to a party present; too great leniency is injustice 
to society whose interest he is empowered to guard. 2 Judicial 
mercy secures a righteous forbearance of trespass on either, 
thus not merely coexisting but coinciding with strict justice. 3 
The criminal law is merciful in holding the accused innocent 
until proved guilty, and in giving him the benefit of doubt ; 
which is but just. 4 With a chief executive or sovereign is 

1 "0 man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but 
to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God ? " — 
Micah, 6 : 8. 

2 Observe that penal justice is quite commonly miscalled justice to an 
offender. He has a right to fan- trial, that is justice to him. But con- 
demned and punished, this cannot be called justice to him ; for, he having 
forfeited certain of his rights, the penalty inflicted is not a concession to 
these, but to the rights of society, and so his just punishment is in justice 
to the community whose welfare is involved. For the ethical ground of 
punishment, see infra, § 136. 

3 " Mercy but inurthers, pardoning those that kill." 

— Romeo and Juliet, Act iii, sc. 1, 1. 212. 
" Mercy is not itself, that often looks so ; 
Pardon is still the nurse of second woe." 

— Measure for Measure, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 298. 
Isabella. " Yet show some pity. 

Angelo. I show it most of all when I show justice ; 
For then I pity those I do not know, 
Which a dismiss'd offence would after gall ; 
And do him right that, answering one foul wrong, 
Lives not to act another." 

— Idem, Act ii, sc. 2, 1. 99 sq. 
* A strict construction, a rigid adherence to the letter of the law, is re- 
quired, lest liberty in adjudication become license. Hence culprits are not 
infrequently discharged with impunity, an injustice to society for which 



134 OBLIGATION 

lodged a pardoning power. This prerogative of clemency is 
not for sentimental exercise, but for the equitable adjustment 
of penal desert and general welfare. It is mercy, but also it 
is justice. 1 

there seems no remedy ; but, indeed, it is accounted more wholesome for 
society that a culprit escape condemnation, than that the innocent suffer. 
See Genesis, 18 : 20-33. Beside this, our laws abound in mercies. See 
trial by jury secured by our Constitution, Article iii, § 2, and certain other 
merciful provisions in the Amendments, Articles iii-viii. 

1 The suffering engendered by injustice is worthy of note. Suppose two 
persons thoroughly alike in character and standing, condemned for like 
crimes to like terms of imprisonment, but the one innocent, the other 
guilty. Which would you prefer to be ? The innocent one. In Xeno- 
phon's Apology, 28, Apollodorus exclaims: "To me, Socrates, the hardest 
part is to see you suffer death without just cause." To which Socrates, 
stroking the other's hair, replies : " Would you then, dearest Apollodorus, 
prefer to see me suffer death for a just cause ? " Yet which suffers more ? 
The innocent one. For in the penalty of guilt there is the solace of requital, 
which consolation is not with the innocent sufferer. " So it is that to 
the unregenerate Prometheus Vinctus of a man," says Carlyle, "it is ever 
the bitterest aggravation of his wretchedness that he is conscious of virtue, 
that he feels himself the victim, not of suffering only, but of injustice." — 
Sartor Resartus, ch. 7. 

But, apart from penalty, which is the greater evil, to do or to suffer injus- 
tice? To do injustice. This is Plato's answer in the Gorgias and in the 
Republic; also Aristotle's in Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 11, 6 sq., where he says : 
" To injure is the worse of the two ; for to injure involves depravity, and is 
culpable." This is the ground of Plato, who says : "Assuming the three-fold 
division of the soul, must not injustice be a kind of quarrel between these 
three, a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul 
against the whole soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made 
by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural 
vassal? The confusion and error of those parts or elements is injustice. 
For the doing of justice is the working of a natural order and government 
of one another in the parts of the soul, and the doing of injustice is the 
opposite." — Republic, bk. iv, 444 Step., Jowett's trans. Trendelenburg, in 
Naturrecht, § 39, advocates this view. See Lorimer, Institutes of Law, p. 
152. So Brutus, in Julius Ccesar, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 63 sq., says: 
" Between the acting of a dreadful thing 

And the first motion, all the interim is 

Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream ; 

The Genius and the mortal instruments 

Are then in council ; and the state of man 

Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 

The nature of an insurrection." 



JUSTICE 135 

Shall not the judge of all the earth do right? Justice and 
judgment are the habitation of his throne, mercy and truth 
go before his face. He is long-suffering and of great mercy, 
forgiving iniquity and transgression, yet in no case clearing 
the guilty. Justice, no less than mercy, is an essential attri- 
bute to God. He, as absolute sovereign, decrees unbounded 
mercy to the penitent, and vindicates the claim of immutable 
justice by a vicarious sacrifice. Such is the Christian scheme ; 
such is divine mercy. 



136 OBLIGATION 



CHAPTER VIII 

DUTY AND VIRTUE. 

§ 68. The obligations, both active and passive, laid upon 
us in the moral law are duties. Duty is the name of a rela- 
tion, and so requires two terms. Every duty is because of 
something due from one person to another. It is the rela- 
tion of debtor to creditor. Honesty, honor requires the pay- 
ment of debt. The commercial meaning of dues or debts is 
merely a specific application of the essential sense inherent 
in these terms in their general application to every phase of 
human obligation. 1 

To withhold what is due another is a violation of his 
right, is an unwarranted interference in his liberty of action, 
is a trespass, and is forbidden by the moral law. But to 

1 Duty is an abstract term ; due is the concrete, meaning owed as a debt, 
from O. Fr., deu, pp. of devoir, from Lat. debere, to owe. Debt is also from 
Lat. debere, to owe, debita, a sum due. Ought is an old preterite of to owe, 
to possess (another's property), hence to be in debt. Shakespeare some- 
times plays upon this early meaning of to owe ; e.g. : 

" I owe you much, and, like a wilful youth, 
That which I owe [own] is lost." 

— Merchant of Venice, Act i, sc. 1, 1. 146. 

" Be pleased then 
To pay that duty which you truly owe 
To him that owes [owns] it." 

— King John, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 247. 

With Cicero officium means a duty performed, a service rendered, a func- 
tion fulfilled as an object of moral obligation. See Be Officiis, i, 3. He 
uses honestum in the wide sense of what is honorable, decent, virtuous. 
" Honestum aut ipsa virtus est, aut res gesta virtute; honestum a virtute diveUi 
non potest." 



DUTY AND VIRTUE 137 

forbid non-payment is to command payment. Pay thy dues. 
Owe no man anything. We must pay what we owe. We 
ought to render to every man his own, that is, what we owe 
him. These are but varied expressions of the one injunc- 
tion, Trespass not, Be thou just, Do thy duty. Ethics may 
fairly be denned as the science of duty. 1 

§69. Right and duty are coextensive, merely different 
aspects of the same notion. Eight belongs to the action, 
and is conformity to law. Duty belongs to the agent, and 
is subjection to law. Hence they imply each other. That 
whatever is duty is right, is quite evident. That whatever 
is right is duty, is readily seen. For, each case as it arises 
is subsumed under the law, or under rules, maxims of con- 
duct, deduced from the law, and a conclusion is drawn as to 
what is right, what ought to be done. Now from given 
premises, if the terms be unambiguous and the reasoning 
correct, only one conclusion can follow, certainly not two or 
more essentially different. Therefore, in every conceivable 
situation there is for the moment one and only one course 
that is right ; and this action alone being right it ought or 



1 Duty, properly, literally, is a function of persons only, they acting in 
the light of conscience. Yet a horse is said to be doing its duty when it 
willingly does its work ; and a clock when it keeps good time. Each is ful- 
filling its function, but to speak of this as duty is figurative speech. 

Brutes, since they are without conscience and personality, have no duties, 
and accordingly relative to them we have, strictly speaking, no rights, but 
merely property claims. We claim and enforce their service, and take their 
lives for food. Those that are a nuisance we drive out or kill, as weeds, by 
virtue of eminent domain. But relative to brutes, they having rights, we 
have duties ; to our domestic animals especially, food, shelter and mild 
usage are due. A pain-giving trespass is cruelty. Hunting, fishing, merely 
for -sport >. is a relic of barbarism, is cruel and wrong. Unwarranted vivisec- 
tion is a crime. See supra, § 24, note ; also, for the views of the present 
writer, an article on "The Moral Aspects of Vivisection," in The North 
American Review, for March, 1885. 



138 OBLIGATION 

owes to be done. When an action is clearly conceived to be 
right, that action and that alone is duty. 1 

It is a corollary that duty is but another name for obliga- 
tion, whose measure is found in the full application of the 
whole law to the whole life. Also it follows that duties 
never conflict. Often we are confused and in doubt as to 
the particular obligation, but of two possible acts, one being 
right, the other is wrong. There is no " divided duty." 
Moreover, it is wrong, ex vi termini, to do less than one 
ought to do ; also it is wrong to do more, this being an 
expenditure that is due elsewhere ; for example, to overpay a 

1 u Le devoir et le droit sont freres. Leur mere commune est la liberty. 
lis naissent le meme jour, ils se developpent et ils perissent ensemble. On 
pourrait meme dire que le droit et le devoir ne font qu'un, et sont le meme 
§tre envisage" de deux cotes diff erents. Qu'est-ce, en effet, que mon droit a 
votre respect, sinon le devoir que vous avez de me respecter, parce que je 
suis un etre libre ? Mais vous-m§me vous etes un etre libre, et le f ondement 
de mon droit et de votre devoir devient pour vous le f ondement d'un droit 
egal, et en moi d'un egal devoir." — Cousin, Du Vrai du Beau et du Bien, 
Douzieme Lecon, § 4. 

In Lieber's biography we find that his life "was a continual exposition of 
his favorite motto : ' No right without its duties ; no duty without its rights. ' 
Whence came it ? A letter to Judge Thayer, in 1869, gives the Genesis of 
this Deuteronomy. Lieber, bound for Greece, with his freedom-loving 
comrades, in 1822, saw at the end of the schooner's yard-arm a little flame. 
4 That's bad indeed,' said the captain, who explained that the flames (elec- 
tric lights) were called Castor and Pollux, or St. Elmo's fire. If both 
appeared, it foretold fine sailing; if only one, foul weather. 'I thought,' 
says Lieber, ' this is like right and duty ; both together, and all is well ; 
right alone, despotism ; duty alone, slavery.' " — President Gilman, in The 
Century for Sept. '83, p. 793. 

Patrick Henry, in his famous argument in the British Debt Cause, deliv- 
ered in Richmond, Va., Nov., 1791, says : " Rights and obligations are corre- 
spondent, coextensive, and inseparable ; they must exist together or not at 
all. ... If then the obligation be gone, what is become of the correspon- 
dent right ? They are mutually gone." — Wm. Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry, 
vol. iii, p. 621. 

Some writers condition rights on duties, reversing the view taken in this 
treatise. Thus Trendelenburg; also Lotze, Tract. Phil, §32. See also 
Hyslop, Ethics, ch. x. 



DUTY AND VIRTUE 139 

bill. Sometimes one ought to do all he can; he is never 
bound to do more, but frequently less. 

The essential identity of justice and right, and of injustice 
and trespass, has already been indicated. 1 Hence it suffi- 
ciently appears that, right and duty being equivalent, justice 
and duty are likewise equivalent terms. In a didactic treat- 
ment of ethics, it is far less important to mark the shades of 
distinction among these synonymous terms, a right, right, 
justice, equity, mercy, obligation, duty, than it is to show 
distinctly that, as to their essence, they are one and the same, 
and that a violation of any one is a wrong, an injustice, a 
trespass. 

§ 70. An action conforming to moral law is a virtuous 
action. This qualification implies a contrary inclination 
overcome by will. It is the doing of justice, the perform- 
ance of duty, in a particular case, wherein the agent was 
tempted to disregard obligation by an opposed desire, against 
which there was a voluntary struggle ending in its subjec- 
tion. A virtuous person is one with whom the voluntary 
suppression of wrong desire is habitual, he subjecting him- 
self uniformly to the law of duty, and thus molding his 
character anew. Under the law of habit, that our faculties 
acquire facility and strength by exercise, the righteous desires 
of the virtuous person prevail more and more uniformly, 
while their opposites, denied the nourishment of gratifica- 
tion, become weaker and suffer atrophy ; until, finally, when 
and although all conflict, all struggle, has ceased, the victor, 
because of his victory, is dubbed a perfectly virtuous person. 

The abstract name of this mark is virtue. 2 In general, 

1 See supra, § 63. For Kant's doctrine of duty, see infra, § 86. 

2 From Lat. virtus, strength, vigor, valor ; cognate with vir, man, man- 
hood ; equivalent to aper^, prowess, the Homeric notion of worth, cognate 
with "Aprjs, Mars, the god of war. Thus virtue implies opposition to be 
overcome, exertion of strength, vigor in overcoming, a struggle going on. 



140 OBLIGATION 

virtue is the conformity of will to the law discerned by prac- 
tical reason or conscience. This definition implies that all 
subjective activities are regulated, duly coordinated and sub- 
ordinated, so that each fulfills its normal function ; thus 
enabling objective activities to attain their highest efficiency. 
Primarily it indicates the subjection of the craving to the 
giving desires ; secondarily, the bringing of the members of 
each class into harmonious cooperation. Otherwise there is 
a continual strife, the lust of the flesh against the spirit and 
disorderly preferences of each, that is incompatible with per- 
fected virtue. Such entire harmony is perhaps an unattainable 
ideal, but in human nature there is a native impulse toward 
it, and an ability to approximate it. Virtue, then, is a pro- 
ficiency in willing what is conformed to practical reason, 
developed from the state of natural potentiality by practical 
action. 1 

In a certain narrowed sense virtue is synonymous with chastity. More 
properly and widely the factitive forms to chasten, to chastise, from Lat. 
castus, pure, mean to purify, to correct, by reproof or penalty. " Whom 
the Lord loveth, he chasteneth." Of. to castigate. As chastity implies 
purity, so virtue implies victory. Too often " on vante la vertu, mais on la 
laisse se morf ondre. ' ' — Gaboriau. Too often its majestic severity chills us ; 
"probitas laudatur et alget." — Juvenal. Yet, as said by Plato, "virtue is 
the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, while vice is its disease, 
weakness and deformity." — Republic, bk. iv, 444, Step. The Lady, in 
Milton's Comus, 1. 210 sq., beset by " a thousand fantasies," says : 

" These thoughts may startle well, hut not astound 
The virtuous mind, that ever walks attended 
By a strong siding champion, Conscience. 

welcome, pure-eyed Faith ; white-handed Hope, 
Thou hovering angel girt with golden wings ; 
And thou unblemished form of Chastity ! 

1 see ye visibly, and now believe 

That He, the Supreme Good, to whom all things ill 

Are but as slavish officers of vengeance, 

Would send a glistering guardian, if need were, 

To keep my life and honour unassail'd . . . 

Was 1 deceived, or did a sable cloud 

Turn forth her silver lining on the night? " 

1 This last definition is according to Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 6, 
with whom aperf is a 2£is, a habitus. Virtue has been characterized as 



DUTY AND VIRTUE 141 

§ 71. The cardinal virtues, as commonly listed, are forti- 
tude, prudence, temperance and justice. The distribution 
originated with the Greek philosophers, and still holds in 
modern literature. They are called cardinal, because the 
specific virtues hinge on them, and indeed they seem to be 
conditions rather than kinds of virtue. 1 Each may be con- 
sidered a fountain from which "virtues flow. The Pythag- 
oreans and Plato regard fortitude, prudence and temperance 
together as the source of justice, and justice as the genius of 
all duty, of all virtue, the perfection of human nature and 
of human society. With Aristotle also, justice is perfect 
virtue, yet not absolutely, but in reference to others. In 
this wide sense we have used the term justice, viewing it as 
the sum of all virtues, which are but variations upon its 
essence, and are universally prescribed in the concrete com- 
mandment, Be thou just. 

§ 72. The man who disregards moral law, or in whom the 
desire to do right is weak, passes, by frequently yielding to 

adopted when prompted by inclination or native bent of mind ; as genuine 
and ethical when prompted by principle. 

1 Socrates (according to Xenophon), Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, each pre- 
sents a varied list. Turning to the O. T. Apocrypha, in the book of Wis- 
dom, written in Greek, and ascribed by Jerome to Philo of Alexandria, we 
find, 8:7: "If a man love righteousness, her labors are virtues; for she 
teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude ; which are such 
things as men can have nothing more profitable in their life." Cf. the list 
of Christian virtues in Galatians 5 : 22, 23. 

In Nic. Mh., bk. ii, chs. 6-9, Aristotle elaborates his doctrine that 
11 every ethical virtue is a mean state between two vices, one on the side of 
excess, and the other on the side of defect." Thus courage is the mean 
between temerity and cowardice ; temperance, the mean between inordinate 
desire and stupid indifference ; liberality, the mean between prodigality and 
parsimony. Hence the familiar phrase " a golden mean." 

With reference to prudence, let it be remarked that, taken in its best 
sense, it is much the same as the wisdom that is from above ; see James 
3 : 17. Whenever it is not strictly identical with duty, it is parallel to it, 
having the same direction, and the two become one there where parallel 
lines meet. 



142 OBLIGA TION 

temptation, under the dominion of other desires. Especially 
the appetites are likely, by reckless indulgence, to acquire 
abnormal vigor, and drive the weakened will helplessly into 
gross excesses. The appetencies, in men of higher order, 
may take control, producing the refined voluptuary, the 
avaricious seeker after material wealth, the secluded scholar 
absorbed in the pursuit of " knowledge for its own sake," or 
the unscrupulous ruler ambitious of irresponsible power. 
The will, whose function it is to regulate these constitutional 
powers, restraining their exercise, and determining natural, 
which is normal and moral order, forsakes this high office, 
and becomes their servant. Thus the man is enslaved by 
his passions. His moral sense is deafened by their clamor, 
his actions are determined by their impelling energy, his 
independent self-mastery is lost, and his freedom is limited to 
a choice among contending masters and forms of obedience. 

To prevent or to escape from such degraded and deplora- 
ble condition, one must, by good-will working in the light of 
conscience, bring all his powers into subjection to moral law. 
This regulation will give play to the faculties in their natural 
relations and proportions, which is the essence of right action, 
and will determine uniformity of fit conduct, which is moral 
order, the order of facts that ought to be. Such virtuous 
rectification secures peace, harmony, and the dignity of moral 
excellence. 1 

The virtue that brings our activities into due conformity 
with moral law is usually posited as the necessary condition 
of soul-liberty, and perfected virtue is identified with per- 

1 Virtue is simply natural, vice unnatural \ man is made for virtue as a 
clock is to keep time. ^ But he finds himself disordered. Self-mastery, har- 
monizing one's faculties, directing them to the right end, may seem to be 
within our power, but uniform human experience shows that when we would 
do good evil is present with us and in us. This state of human nature is 
fully set forth in the Scriptures, and that, as we cannot unaided accom- 
plish rectification, we need regeneration. 



DUTY AND VIRTUE 143 

fected liberty. In surmounting his passions and inclinations, 
one becomes a freedman, a freeman and a master. The sage, 
said the Stoics, feels but is without passion, he is not indul- 
gent but just to himself and to others, he alone attains to 
the complete performance of duty, and thus he alone is free. 1 
This is the common doctrine of moralists at the present day, 
and we are exhorted to the exercise of morality because of 
the worth of liberty. 2 

The liberty thus acquired is independence of unrighteous, 
discordant and distracting rulers. The virtuous man is freed 
from the dominion of overweening inclinations, of unholy 
lusts and passions. It is an ideal state, exciting our admira- 
tion and emulation. 3 But this liberty is merely relative, not 
absolute. In breaking loose from subjective bondage, we 
pass under the objective bondage of law, an exchange of one 
bondage for another. All language supports this view. We 
are bound to do duty, obliged or under obligation to be just, 
forbidden to trespass, and must submit to many pains in 

1 So Epictetus the freedman, whose favorite maxim was, Bear and for- 
bear, avixov Kal air^x ov i is reported by Arrianus, in the 'TZyxdpldiov, 8, 9, as 
saying: "Freedom and slavery are but names respectively of virtue and 
vice, and both depend on the will. ... No one is a slave (SoOAos) whose 
will is free. ... Fortune is an evil bond of the body, vice of the soul ; for 
he is a slave whose body is free, but whose soul is bound ; and, on the con- 
trary, he is free whose body is bound, but whose soul is free." 

2 ' ' The only perfect conception of liberty is perfect obedience to perfect 
law." — President Seelte. 

" Intellectual freedom consists in the subjugation of the understanding to 
the truth, which delivers from errors, prejudices, and the babble of human 
opinions. Moral freedom consists in the submission of the will to duty, 
which is the practical outcome of truth. , To do as we ought is liberty ; to 
do as we like is slavery. Spiritual freedom consists in the bowing down of 
the whole man to God, who is revealed by the truth, and to serve whom is 
to be master of self and things." — Alexander McLaren. 

8 St. Paul says : "He that was called in the Lord, being a bond-servant 
(SoOXos), is the Lord's freedman (aireXe^depos) ; likewise he that was called, 
being free (iXetidepos), is Christ's bond-servant (SoOXos)." — 1 Corinthians , 7 : 22. 
For further discussion of the matter, see infra, § 92. 



144 OBLIGATION 

fulfilling the demands of an inexorable law, constant vigi- 
lance being the price of impunity. This is not liberty, but 
rigorous bondage. It is a voluntary bondage, one that ex- 
pands and ennobles our powers, satisfies the all-pervading 
and overwhelming sense of duty, and harmonizes the man 
with himself and with universal order. Still it is bond- 
age. Strict morality is strict subjection. Absolute liberty is 
incompatible with law. 



SELFISHNESS 145 



CHAPTER IX 

SELFISHNESS 

§ 73. Names of mental states with the prefix self abound 
in speech and literature. A few are, self-approbation, self- 
condemnation, self-denial, self-control, self-esteem, self-abhor- 
rence, self-love. Many of this class of expressions probably 
have their origin in the fictitious idea of an alter ego. The 
human mind subjectively distinguishes between the ego as 
conscious and the ego as represented. The former, the con- 
sciousness of self, is an element in every feeling, is essential 
to the existence of any feeling, and is itself recognized as a 
feeling. The latter, the representation of self, is a normal 
and habitual cognition, wherein the ego contemplates itself 
as an object, distinguishes itself from itself, and views this 
subjective object as though it were really another self, an 
alter ego. 1 The idea of an alter ego is strengthened by a 
conflict of desires; the opposed impulses, being a pair, are 
personified as two selves. Moreover, the mind regards the 
objectified and personified self as a possession of the wholly 

1 Spirit is capable of becoming its own object. I am I ; at once subject 
and object. " We find, on reflection, that what we call our spirit transcends, 
or is, in a sense, independent of the bodily organism on which it otherwise 
so entirely depends. Metaphysically speaking, this is seen in our self-con- 
sciousness, or power of separating one's self as subject from one's self as 
object, a thing wholly inconceivable as the result of any material process, 
and relating us at once to an order of being which we are obliged to call 
immaterial." — Illingworth, Divine Immanence. See Elements of Psy- 
chology, § 108 sq., and § 226. 



146 OBLIGA TION 

subjective self, and capable of being affected by it, which 
finds expression in such familiar phrases as one's self, control 
yourself, I hold myself responsible, and the like. The two 
are identified in the phrases I myself, he himself, we our- 
selves, they themselves. 

This distinction between the conscious ego and the repre- 
sented ego, is unreal, inasmuch as it contravenes the essential 
unity of the ego. Evidently, in thought it is a fiction, in 
speech a metaphor. Hence, although it is a natural, a normal 
mode of mind, there is need of caution lest it mislead us to 
commit the fallacy of figure of speech. 

§ 74. The name self-love is commonly used to denote that 
longing for gratification which marks the craving desires 
when their end is self. But love is essentially a desire to 
benefit some other one, and this is contrary to the benefit of 
self. It necessarily implies a relation between two ; in self 
there is really and literally but one. The compound word 
self-love is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, absurd literally, 
and can be allowed only as a metaphor derived from the fan- 
ciful idea of an alter ego. 

But self-love is merely a misnomer, for the reality of the 
thing thus absurdly named is unquestionable. It is self- 
interest, or simply interest, egoism, selfishness, the opposite 
of love. For while love is desire to impart, interest is desire 
to profit. Egoism makes self the end, seeking one's own 
enjoyment and welfare at cost of or in disregard of another's*/ 
Psychologically it is the supremacy of the craving desires, 
the appetites and appetencies, over the affections ; either dis- 
regarding these, or neglecting their call, or what is worse, a 
more intense and refined egoism, making the affections sub- 
serve self. 1 Clearly the term self-love is a euphemism, filch- 
ing the name of love to sanctify what in truth is its contrary, 

i See supra, §§ 5, 6. 



SELFISHNESS 147 

interest, egoism, selfishness. That, however disguised, it is 
to be condemned, will sufficiently appear in the sequel. 1 

Closely related to the notion of self-love, is that of duty 
to self. Can I literally owe myself anything? Can I owe 
myself a dollar ? How is it to be paid ? By passing it from 
one pocket to another ? Can I in any manner or measure be 
indebted to myself ? Is anything due me from me ? Duty 
is essentially the name of a relation between two ; I myself 
am but one. I cannot possibly be in debt except to some 
other one. Hence the phrase duty to self is, in its terms, 
self-contradictory and absurd. 2 It, too, originates in the 
fancied alter ego, to whom the ego is said to be indebted as 
to another person. Clearly it is a metaphor, and deductions 
from the generic law of duty to this as a species of duty 
commit the subtle fallacia figurce dictionis. As in the phrase 
love of self, so in the phrase duty to self, wede^tect^selfish- 
ness again masq ueradmg^nowTn^j^ the 

§ 75. But aside from terms the important question arises : 
Does not moral law command motives and actions that are 
selfish, that is, such as find in self an end ? Moralists very 
generally answer affirmatively, and recognize a wide and 
weighty class of obligations terminating in self, having re- 
spect exclusively to self, impelled by self-love, and usually 
entitled duties to self. 3 For example, they teach that every 

1 It must be acknowledged that many eminent authorities hold a contrary- 
view ; e.g., Aristotle, in Nic. Eth., bk. ix, ch. 8, "Of Self-love" ; Butler, 
Sermons, Preface, and i, xi ; et al. In "the royal law," Thou shalt love 
thy neighbor as thyself, the phrase, as thyself, evidently does not command 
self-love, nor does it approve it, but merely sets up what is in fact, as men 
are, a high mark for attainment, one beyond the reach of most of us. There 
is no Scripture that commands or approves self-love. Cf. supra, § 48, note. 

2 Let it be remarked that the term obligation is from the verb to oblige, 
meaning to bind to, to bind together. Obligation binds, and the binding is 
of at least two together. Cf. supra, § 19, note. 

8 With Kant duties to self are even the source of all other duties. See 



148 OBLIGATION 

one owes it to himself to be temperate, that moderation, as 
opposed to excess in all things, is a duty to one's self, for the 
sake of one's own personality, and in order to self-culture. 
Popular speech also quite commonly recognizes, and is dis- 
posed to emphasize, duties to self, usually holding them para- 
mount. It is heard in the every-day phrases, I owe it to my- 
self, he was bound in justice to himself so to do, and the like. 

Postponing for the present a direct argument of the ques- 
tion, we here observe merely that, if a man be morally bound 
in any case whatever to make himself an end, or in other 
words, if there be any real thing answering to the lame 
phrase duty to self, then the moral law as heretofore formu- 
lated in this treatise is quite inadequate. For trespass 
necessarily implies at least two parties, and the given inter- 
pretation of duty and of justice, though very wide, presumes 
always a relation between two. Obviously, then, our view 
of moral obligation, in its widest comprehension, does not 
include the notion of duties to self, indeed it excludes self 
as an end. 

And truly there is no duty to self. In this case the phrase 
is not merely a misnomer, for there is nothing corresponding 
to it in any admissible sense. Self is never, can never be a 
moral end, but on the contrary, all selfishness or egoism is 
violation of moral law. Duties, obligations universally relate 
to others, and selfishness is sin. 

§ 76. Let us briefly examine one or two of the duties usu- 
ally classed as duties to self, and indicate their altruistic 
interpretation. 

Grundlegung, etc., S. 56 sq.; Abbott's trans., p. 65 sq. Elsewhere he says : 
" Supposing that there are no duties of this kind, then there would be no 
duties of any kind ; for I can only think myself under obligation to others 
as far as I am under obligation to myself." Per contra, Martineau says : 
"Duties to self can be saved from contradiction only by an impossibility, 
namely, the splitting one's self in two, susceptible of reciprocal obligation." 



SELFISHNESS 149 

Temperance or the control of appetites and passions, 
bringing them into conformity with reason, subjecting them 
to moral law, is commonly cited as one of the most compre- 
hensive and prominent duties to self. Is it my duty to be 
temperate ? Certainly. It is a cardinal virtue. Is it a duty 
I owe to myself in order to the perfection of my character? 
Is it a discipline in the process of self-culture for the sake 
of my personal excellence? Assuredly, say nearly all the 
moralists, both ancient and modern, it finds in self its end. 

To be temperate is a primal duty, a weighty obligation; 
but it is strictly a duty, an obligation, to others. I owe to 
God, my maker and highest benefactor, to modulate into 
harmony the powers he has given me, that I may fulfill the 
mission on which he has sent me, and accomplish the work 
he has assigned me in the world. I ought to be temperate, 
husbanding my energies, that I may serve my family, my 
neighbor, the community, the state, mankind, as fully and 
completely as possible. Unless I be temperate, I cannot pay 
these dues. Moreover, I ought to be an example, in this 
golden mean, to my fellows, inclining them to its practice. 
Temperance is one of the highest obligations. It is the top 
round in the ladder of Christian graces. It ennobles. Still 
it is due, not to self, but to those around. 1 

1 For the graces, see Galatians, 5 : 22, 23. Closely allied to temperance is 
economy. Do I owe it to myself to be economical ? No ; yet it is a duty, 
a real duty. I am but a steward, and am bound to economize my time, my 
energy, my property, because of my relations. Man is instinctively an econ- 
omist. He naturally takes the short cut, the straight line. Also he takes 
what lies near as requiring less reach, and is, when calm, sparing even of 
unnecessary words. The habit is fostered, perhaps, by mere laziness or 
other selfish consideration ; but one ought always to prefer frugality of 
means in attaining his proper ends, because this also is due. Economy 
generally takes part as one rational determinant in choosing, and often, in 
cases of light moment, is the sole determinant. Carelessness or thought- 
lessness, excessive animal spirits, excited nerves, may neglect economy of 
effort ; but this is waste, and all waste is wrong. To be economical, frugal, 



150 OBLIGATION 

The pursuit of truth for the sake of truth is regarded as a 
refined and noble avocation. " Knowledge for its own sake " 
is a high sounding phrase; but it is merely a euphemism 
concealing the reality, which is knowledge for one's own 
sake, a refined selfishness. But the worth of knowledge is 
in its power for good, and he who possesses it in large meas- 
ure is a king among men. Every one is in duty bound to 
increase his stores, solely that he may thereby more effi- 
ciently promote the welfare of the present and the coming 
generations. 

Much the same may be said of the duty of preserving life 
and health and strength. These belong not to me save in 
trust. They belong to my relatives and friends, to mankind. 
I am a guardian and agent. So of the duty of physical, 
mental and moral culture. I am bound to account with 
usury for the talents intrusted to me. So of cleanliness, 

sparing of energy, is prudence, wisdom, duty, both private and public, per- 
sonal and political, a saving for expenditure elsewhere. "Je loue Veconome; 
c'est la richesse des pauvres, et la sagesse des riches." — Dumas. 

The earlier political economists based their science on the aphorism that 
men are governed by interest, that in affairs selfishness determines conduct. 
Hence Carlyle dubbed it " the dismal science." But viewing economy as a 
duty, this reproach disappears, and Economics, so far as it depends on will, 
becomes a branch of Practical or Applied Ethics. This, however, would 
not greatly modify its other principles. For it is remarkable that industry, 
though so largely directed by interest, works out for society about what 
would follow from a strict observance of duty. The farmer, the manufac- 
turer, the merchant, whether laboring for his own or for the common weal, 
accomplishes in the long run the same general result. ' ' To men is not given 
that God-like unselfishness that thinks only of others' good ; but in working 
for themselves they are working for us all. We are so bound together that 
no man can labor for himself alone. Each blow he strikes in his own behalf 
helps to mold the universe. Stephenson, to win a fortune, invented the 
steam engine. Shakespeare wrote his plays to keep up a comfortable home. 
The ambitious man, building a pedestal for himself, leaves a monument to 
posterity. Alexander and Caesar fought for their own ends, but, in doing 
so, they put a belt of civilization half round the earth." Such is the benefi- 
cent world-ordering of human affairs. 

J 



SELFISHNESS 151 

decency, modesty, propriety, in private as well as in public. 
So of the preservation of my personal dignity and self-respect, 
of my honor, sincerity and truthfulness. Even the indul- 
gence of innocent pleasures should be primarily for recrea- 
tion, preparing me for renewed efficiency in paying my 
dues. The supply of necessities should ever be governed 
by the same general purpose, so that whether we eat or 
drink, or whatsoever we do, let all be done for others' sake. 1 

§ 77. This doctrine is not ascetic, but altruistic. 2 It trans- 
fers the end of all right action from an exclusive self to its 
fellows. All righteous conduct is disinterested, unselfish. 
The moral law, Trespass not, or Be just, or Do duty, is 
equivalent to, Withhold no due, but bestow in due measure. 
We say in due measure, for not all giving is righteous ; a 

1 See 1 Corinthians, 10: 31. Kobert Browning, in Balaustiori 1 s Adven- 
ture, 1. 1212 sq., and 1723 sq., speaking of Herakles banqueting between his 
labors, expands the aphorism, Neque semper arcum iend.it Apollo, thus : 

He was — 

"glad to give 
Poor flesh and blood their respite and relief 
In the interval 'twixt tight and fight again — 
All for the world's sake ; 

frank and free, 

Out from the labor into the repose, 
Ere out again and over head and ears 
I' the heart of labor, all for love of men ; 
Making the most o' the minute, that the soul 
And body, strained to height a minute since, 
Might lie relaxed in joy, tbis breathing-space, 
For man's sake more than ever ; till the bow, 
Restrung o' the sudden, at first cry for help, 
Should send some unimaginable shaft 
True to the aim and shatteringly through 
The plate-mail of a monster, save man so." 

2 Altruistic, from Lat. alter, other, regardful of others. See infra, § 83, 
note. Ascetic, from Grk. Ao-icrjo-is, exercise, training. Asceticism, a dis- 
torted out-growth from early Stoicism, is the exercise of the soul in suppress- 
ing and stifling many of the normal impulses, apparently holding that 
whatever is natural is wrong. The early Stoics taught, on the contrary, 
that whatever is natural is right (see supra, § 25, notej, which is also the 
doctrine of the present treatise. Bentham, rather cynically, says : " Asceti- 



152 OBLIGATION 

lavish or a disproportionate distribution of means or of ser- 
vice is wrong, being an expenditure that is due elsewhere. 

The virtuous exercise of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, when 
clearly understood, is not the giving up of what one has a 
right to retain and enjoy, but the yielding to another his due, 
discharging his rightful claim, according to him a right of 
which he is perhaps quite ignorant. Truly it is a parting 
with what I might keep, but what I have no right to keep. 
It is free, unconstrained justice. 

While the chief, indeed the only end of life is usefulness, 
the promotion of the welfare of those to whom some one is 
related in accord with the relations, one is not thereby ex- 
cluded from participating in his benefaction. The law, by 
this doctrine, forbids his making himself alone the end, and 
requires his regard and intent to be constantly beyond him- 
self ; but it does not prohibit his sharing, as a member of a 
community of two or more, the welfare he promotes. It 
does not require self-abnegation, nor entire self-forgetfulness, 
but that the inclination, the impulse, the motive and the 
intention be altogether benevolent. 

It is a fact that in the judgment of mankind, for some rea- 
son or other, the practice of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, the 
exercise of affection, is held in high esteem, is accounted 
generous, noble, even heroic, and receives the warmest praise ; 
while, on the other hand, selfishness, exclusive or excessive 
regard for one's own, is accounted ignoble, ungenerous, mean, 
and is heartily condemned. Disinterested motives and con- 
duct are always praised ; interested motives and conduct are 

cism approves of actions in as far as they tend to diminish the agent's hap- 
piness, and disapproves of them in as far as they tend to augment it." 
— Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 2, § 3. Says Gibbon: "The 
ascetics renounced the business and the pleasures of the age, abjured the 
use of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, chastised the body, mortified [put to 
death] their affections, and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal 
happiness." — Decline and Fall, ch. 37. 



SELFISHNESS 153 

always blamed. Why is this? Is it a delusion? Is it 
merely because when my neighbor works in his own interest, 
I have less of his help in mine ? If so, then it is merely my 
selfishness that prompts me to condemn his. Is there not 
some less degrading, some better reason for the universal 
condemnation of interested action, and the universal appro- 
bation of disinterested service ? Surely there must be, for I 
judge after this manner of the conduct of the ancients, whose 
conduct cannot possibly affect me. Yet there is a school of 
moralists holding that disinterestedness is a delusion, that 
human nature is incapable of a purely disinterested action, 
that all conduct resolves, in the last analysis, into self-seek- 
ing. 1 It is undeniable that selfishness generally prevails and 
is dominant. But let us distinguish between the actual and 
the potential, and heartily deny the impossibility of disinter- 
estedness. Nay more, let us hold that purely disinterested 
conduct has sometimes been actually experienced, and also 
observed, and that it is truly the culminating perfection, the 
realization of ideal humanity. 

§ 78. The thesis is presented in the following questions : 
Why is it that the affections, the giving desires, have a right- 
ful supremacy over the appetites and appetencies, the craving 
desires ? Why is it that the moral law enjoins the practice 
of affections, impulses to benefit others, and forbids the in- 



1 So Spencer in The Data of Ethics ; and others, In the egoistic school 
of Ethics it is maintained that human nature is incapable of a strictly disin- 
terested action, that the expectation of one's own profit or reward enters 
into all cases of personal sacrifice as the fundamental, informing motive. 
But this cannot be said of extreme cases involving, under the impulse of 
duty, the sacrifice of life itself. There is often a total giving away of self, 
as in defensive warfare, with no thought of reward beyond death, in order 
that those who remain may have their rights. "We claim, in opposition to 
Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucauld, Spencer, and the rest, that purely dis- 
interested actions are not only possible, but often actual. 



154 OBLIGATION 

dulgence of impulses craving a gain for self as an end ? The 
reason lies deep in human nature. 

Let it be granted that all constitutional desires have natu- 
ral and therefore rightful aims, and should harmonize, thus 
sustaining each other in their normal functions. Also, that 
craving and giving are contraries, whence a conflict between 
appetency and affection, which two therefore do not accord 
but are in constant and inevitable discord, unless one become 
subservient to the other. That our desires should be brought 
into functional harmony, will hardly be denied. That this 
harmony can be attained only by the subservience of one to 
the other class, is evident. Which is entitled to supremacy ? 

Now suppose affection be made to subserve interest. What 
is the consequence ? The impulse to benefit another is ob- 
scured under the impulse to benefit self. I treat my friend 
with apparent and professed affection, using the manner and 
language of friendship, my real intent being to obtain for 
myself a gain. Perhaps I indulge my generous impulses in 
order to cultivate my generosity, a virtue I desire to possess 
in myself. Evidently this is egoism or selfishness doubly re- 
fined, and therefore doubly odious. I degrade my friend 
into a mere means for my own profit, and so dishonor and 
wrong him. I do it under the form, and name, and profession 
of love, when in reality it is the contrary, base, self-seeking 
hypocrisy. If there be one character the most despicable of 
all, it is the hypocrite, he whom our Lord denounces in his 
most scathing terms. 

But such procedure is something more than hypocrisy. 
It is the extinction of half of one's nature, of his affections. 
For, if I confer a benefit on my neighbor solely in order to 
benefit myself, this does not merely subject love to interest, 
since love is then no longer love, but simply interest. Love 
has ceased to be, and I am wholly, exclusively selfish. This 
is not the subordination and subservience of affection to 



SELFISHNESS 155 

appetency, but the complete suppression and extinction of 
affection. A -large part of the normal nature of the man dis- 
appears, and he stands in opposition to all his fellows. It is 
universal war ; every man's hand against every other. Surely 
this is not the way to personal excellence, to perfection of 
character. Surely this violates the law. It is amazing that 
many moralists should hold it obligatory to cultivate our 
affections to the end that we may thereby perfect our own 
personality, thus advocating a principle which would result 
in the extinction of affection, and produce a character abso- 
lutely selfish. 1 

§ 79. Suppose, on the contrary, the craving desires be 
made subject to the affections. What follows? Are they 
likewise extinguished ? Not at all. It is easy to understand 
how my appetency may, without loss, be made to subserve 
the ends of affection, craving various objects, not for my own 
sake as the end, but for the sake of those on whom I would 
bestow my energies and gains. Thus I may seek pleasure as 
a recreation, as a means of refreshing my powers for more 
efficient service. I may strive, with great earnestness and 
activity, to acquire property and increase my wealth, not 
from the miser's desire to possess, nor the voluptuary's desire 
to enjoy, but in order that I may bestow on others the bene- 
fits wealth commands, reserving for myself only such portion 
as is needful for further beneficence. I may cultivate my 
intellect, not for the sake of proficiency, but of efficiency. 
Further illustration is superfluous. But let us add, I may 
desire power in order to greater usefulness ; and I may desire 
reputation, the esteem of my neighbors, or even fame, simply 
because my influence in favor of the welfare of others is 
therein extended. Evidently the craving desires may crave 
in order to give, that is, they may become entirely subject to 
1 So Janet in The Theory of Morals ; and others. 



156 OBLIGATION 

the affections, and so far from being extinguished, they are 
thereby refined and ennobled, and their activity enlarged. 1 

We conclude that, since the subjection of the affections 
would quench them, but the subjection of the appetencies 
would advance them, the affections have rightful supremacy. 
Furthermore it follows that the right growth of character 
consists largely in this subjection of selfish propensities to 
the unselfish, and in so directing the former that they be no 
longer interested, but disinterested. 

If it be objected that there are occasions for the exercise 
■ of affection, and other occasions for self-indulgence, the 
answer is easy. The claims of near relatives, of friends, 
of neighbors, of country, of mankind, of God, upon my means 
and energies, are paramount and exhaustive. Paramount, 
because these are dues, debts, duties, to be paid before self- 
gratification ; exhaustive, since the totality of a devoted life 
fails to requite their righteous demands. Hence no hour, no 
dollar is my own to spend upon myself alone, regardless of 
my overwhelming indebtedness, of my unremitting and end-. 
less obligations. 

It must be allowed that the scheme of character and con- 
l duct here proposed, is ideal, a high ideal, unattained and 
unattainable by any man. It calls for a declaration of truce- 
^ less and internecine war upon selfishness. But selfishness so 
interpenetrates, in its many subtle forms and sacred guises, 
the human soul, interweaving its delicate fibers and gilded 
threads throughout our better nature, that to unravel and 

1 The acquisitions of my appetencies are my resources. Affection giving 
out from these does not impoverish, but only imparts so much as can and 
should be spared, economically reserving what is needed for continued effi- 
ciency. Sacrifice should rarely be total. In some cases the giving, as in the 
case of knowledge, does not diminish the store, nor does it weaken ability, 
but recuperates, refreshes, strengthens. Moreover, affection stimulates ac- 
quisition, so as to enlarge its available resources, which is the legitimate 
function of the appetencies. 



SELFISHNESS 157 

wholly displace it seems impossible. The best of men, those 
morally most refined, are still more or less influenced by 
selfish propensities, and occupied with self-seeking. But to 
approximate, as nearly as may be, the moral ideal, is the true 
struggle of a noble life. 1 

1 Even Saint Paul confessed to falling grievously short, but still kept up 
the struggle. See Philippians, 3 : 12-16. Says Carlyle : " David's life and 
history, as written for us in those psalms of his, I consider to be the truest 
emblem ever given of a man's moral progress and warfare here below. All 
earnest souls will ever discern in it the faithful struggle of an earnest human 
soul toward what is good and best. Struggle, often baffled sore, baffled 
down into entire wreck, yet a struggle never ended ; ever with tears, repen- 
tance, true, unconquerable purpose begun anew. Poor human nature ! Is 
not a man's walking in truth always that — a succession of falls ? Man can 
do no other. In this wild element of a life he has to struggle upward ; now 
fallen, now abased ; and ever with tears, repentance, and bleeding heart he 
has to rise again, struggle again, still onward. That his struggle be a faith- 
ful, unconquerable one, that is the question of questions. ' ' — Heroes and 
Hero Worship. 

In connection with duties to self Martineau says: "Without objective 
conditions, the idea of Duty involves a contradiction, and its phraseology 
passes into an unmeaning figure of speech. Nothing can be binding to us 
that is not higher than we ; and to speak of one part of self imposing obliga- 
tion on another part, — of one impulse or affection playing, as it were, the 
God to another, — is to trifle with the real significance of the sentiments that 
speak within us. Conscience does not frame the law, it simply reveals the 
law, that holds us ; and to make everything of the disclosure and nothing of 
the thing disclosed, is to affirm and to deny the revelation in the same 
breath." — Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii, p. 4. 

Again he says : "It takes two persons to make a duty ; for it is what I owe 
to another, and is not constituted by the interior egoistic relations of a single 
subject. No doubt, it makes a great difference to myself whether I do this 
or that ; but a difference which lies within the scope of Prudence, and in- 
volves no consequences but those of error. If I am a sot instead of a phi- 
losopher, you may call me a fool ; but the moment you say I am responsible 
and must answer for it, you assume the presence (society aside) of an 
authoritative Law ; that is, of a higher personality that has rights over me ; 
and such assumption lurks in every recognition by the conscience of a higher 
and a lower object of the will. Whatever, therefore, in action purely egoistic, 
may put on the aspect of something more than prudence, is duty, not towards 
ourselves, but towards God, the inspirer of conscience. " — Op. cit., vol.i, p. 231. 



158 OBLIGATION 



CHAPTER X 

SERVICE 

§ 80. The three expressions of the law already considered, 
Trespass not, Be just, Do duty, upon a liberal yet fair inter- 
pretation, taking each in both its positive and its negative 
sense, are evidently coextensive and have the same content. 
This will be allowed. But their common extension may per- 
haps be understood to be limited to the obligation to do no 
harmful injury to another, either positively by direct aggres- 
sion, or negatively by reserve of what he may justly demand. 
Practically most persons take this view, holding that, if one 
commit no hurtful trespass, pay promptly his manifest dues, 
be just in thought and deed, by this simple innocence his 
obligations are completely fulfilled. Many a man holds him- 
self acquitted before the tribunal of his own moral judgment, 
before that of his fellow men, and of his final judge, pro- 
vided he can truly say he has committed no wrong, meaning 
thereby that he has done no violence to patent rights, and 
awarded to every one his established claims. This seems to 
have been substantially the doctrine of the Stoics. It is a 
high estimate of duty, and one rarely accomplished. Never- 
theless, if the notion be thus limited, it is safe to affirm there 
are obligations higher than duty. But the indicated limita- 
tion is by no means clear, the line cannot be sharply drawn, 
and hence it is better to extend the notion of duty to include 
these higher and wider obligations. 

Recurring to the moral principle, a man has a right to 
gratify his normal desires, we observe that not merely the 



SERVICE 159 

acquiescence, but the assistance, of his fellows, is essential 
to this gratification. No man can live for himself alone. 
Apart from his natural longing for social intercourse, there 
are necessities that can be supplied only by the concurrence 
of those around, and in addition to necessities, there are many 
native and normal wants that require the cooperation of 
others. Here, then, is a just claim upon their assistance, 
upon their service. It is his right, and if withheld, he suf- 
fers trespass. The service cannot be compulsory, from lack 
of power, except in rare cases, and therefore must be free, 
willing service. Now rights are reciprocal. If some one 
have a rightful claim upon some other for free service, then 
this other has a like claim upon him ; not, however, by way 
of repayment, of compensation, but because such claim is 
original with either. Hence no man may live for himself 
alone. Every one is morally bound to render, within certain 
limits, willing service to his fellow men. It is due them; 
free, willing service is duty. 

§ 81. The obligation to render mutual service is univer- 
sally recognized among men. In all the relations of life, this 
duty, though so imperfectly fulfilled and often grossly vio- 
lated, is nevertheless judged by all to be binding on all, and 
its observance to be an essential part of righteous living. 
The prompting of instinct, antecedent to moral inference, is 
decisive in the matter. Imagine an extreme case. 1 Suppose 
yourself standing on the brink of deep water in which a 
stranger is drowning, and it needs only that you reach out 
your hand to save him. Ought not you to do it? If you 
withhold the hand, and disregarding his cries for help and 
his manifest need, allow him to drown, would not your in- 

1 Extreme cases bring an informing principle more clearly to light, and 
hence are preferable for illustration. A principle, if true, will be thoroughly 
applicable to either extreme. 



160 OBLIGATION 

action be instinctively self-condemned and condemned by all 
as inhuman ? Suppose him to be your friend, or your only 
brother ; and, further, suppose that by letting him drown you 
shall obtain the whole instead of half the inheritance ; would 
not even hesitation be intensely vile ? Ought not a man to 
help his brother, his father, his mother, his child, his neigh- 
bor, his fellow man ? There is but one answer in any candid 
mind, but one among all cultured peoples. 

Again, let us suppose the drowning man to be known as a 
worthless vagabond, or even as a dangerous criminal whose 
death would be a blessed relief to his family, and to society 
— let him drown? No. Is it to give him time to repent 
and reform ? Hardly. Suppose him, on the contrary, to be 
a godly man, afflicted with painful incurable disease, a dis- 
tressing burden to himself, and to everybody else — let him 
drown ? No. Stretch forth thy hand. Help, in the name 
of common humanity. The obligation of helpfulness has no 
other condition. It is binding in every personal relation. 
Setting aside the differences in concrete cases, there remains 
the common, imperative principle : Thou shalt serve. 1 

1 An historical case occurring in the north of Holland, early in the year 
1569, is narrated by Motley, in The Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part iii, ch. 5, 
thus : "A poor Anabaptist, guilty of no crime but his fellowship with a per- 
secuted sect, had been condemned to death. He had made his escape, 
closely pursued by an officer of justice, across a frozen lake. It was late in 
the winter, and the ice had become unsound. It trembled and cracked 
beneath his footsteps, but he reached the shore in safety. The officer was 
not so fortunate. The ice gave way beneath him, and he sank into the lake, 
uttering a cry for succor. There were none to hear him, except the fugitive 
whom he had been hunting. Dirk Willemzoon, for so was the Anabaptist 
called, instinctively obeyed the dictates of a generous nature, returned, 
crossed the quaking and dangerous ice, at the peril of his life, extended his 
hand to his enemy, and saved him from certain death. Unfortunately for 
human nature, it cannot be added that the generosity of the action was met 
by a corresponding heroism. The officer was desirous, it is true, of avoiding 
the responsibility of sacrificing the preserver of his life, but the burgomaster 
of Asperen sternly reminded him to remember his oath. He accordingly 



SERVICE 161 

We have here another form of the law, but let it be ob- 
served, not another law. The law is one. The several forms 
may be viewed as progressing in comprehension, the second 
including the first, but wider, and so on, until this last ex- 
pands to embrace the larger duty of man. That it includes 
the others is evident, for he who rightly serves will not 
trespass, and will pay his just dues. But it is preferable to 
interpret each as coextensive with the others, only presenting 
a different phase. Thus it may fairly be regarded as a tres- 
pass, as injustice, as undutiful to withhold helpful service, 
the moral law being comprised and expressed in the formula : 
Serve thy fellows. 1 

§ 82. To serve is to promote the welfare of another. He 
who does this is a servant. The term as applied to menials 
has acquired rather a bad sense, especially when the service 
is compulsory, and the cognate word servile is distinctly 
opprobrious. But no bad sense, indeed only the contrary, 
colors the notion of voluntary service, and of this we are 
speaking. To serve is to confer a benefit, and he who does 
this is a benefactor. A teacher is a servant, though we call 
him a master. He is a servant directly of his pupils, indi- 
rectly of his employers, of the public, of posterity. Poli- 

arrested the fugitive, who, on the 16th of May following, was burned to 
death under the most lingering tortures." 

1 It is worth noting that Geometry, the science of Space, arises from the 
three axioms of Non-inclosure, Straitness, and Possible parallelism ; that 
Logic, the science of Thought, arises from the three axioms of Non-contra- 
diction, Identity, and Excluded middle; and that Ethics, the science of 
Rights, arises from the three axioms of Non-trespass, Justice, and Loving 
service. If in any of these several groups we try to deduce one of the 
axioms from the other two, we find that the axiom to be inferred is neces- 
sarily presupposed in the other two. Like the sides of a triangle, each 
gives, in its own existence, the existence of the other two. They are co- 
ordinate and complementary, distinct, yet inseparable. Accordingly we 
view the ethical axioms as different phases and expressions of an essence 
that is one and the same. 



162 OBLIGATION 

ticians proclaim themselves servants of the people, which 
truly is their office, though the profession be insincere. 
Husband and wife, parent and child, mutually subserve each 
other's interests. 

A servant is a minister, and this is a title of honor. 1 Min- 
isters of religion are servants of the Church, and as such are 
justly honored and reverenced. To become a Minister of 
State is to attain the highest official rank. The Prime Min- 
ister of Great Britain holds a place of exalted dignity. The 
motto of the Prince of Wales, descending to him from the 
Black Prince, is 3£dj trim, I serve, and perhaps no heraldic 
cognizance is more widely known, or more frequently quoted. 
A king on his throne is lightly the servant of his subjects ; 
and the very King of kings pronounced himself a lowly ser- 
vant, coming not to be ministered unto but to minister, and 
because of his humble service to humanity, he has the highest 
throne. 

All service implies sacrifice. In reaching forth my hand 
to save a drowning brother, there is some expenditure of 
mental and neural energy, perhaps not measurable, but real. 
No service can be rendered without sacrifice, without giving, 
imparting what is in one's keeping. Hence the law of ser- 
vice is a law of sacrifice. Culture, in general, is preparation 
for yielding a return ; specifically, as the cultured field is capa- 
ble of yielding fruits, so the cultivated man is one prepared, 
by what he has acquired, to render services. When a sacri- 
fice is complete and directed to a noble end, we call it heroic. 
The very essence of heroism is the entire sacrifice of self for 

1 Minister, a servant, from Lat. minus, less ; cf. to administer, and ad- 
ministration. Master, from Lat. magister, from majus, more ; cf. magistrate. 
In the Virginia Bill of Eights, § 2, it was perhaps first (June, 1776) authori- 
tatively declared : ' ' That all power is vested in, and consequently derived 
from, the people ; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all 
times amenable to them." This great democratic principle is the gift of 
Christianity. See infra, § 146, note. 



SERVICE 163 

the sake of others. It is the object of unbounded admiration 
and praise. In ancient days it became distinctly a cult. 
But heroes and hero worship are not peculiar to antiquity, 
for always and everywhere the heart of humanity responds 
to the call. The heroic sacrifice of the great servant of all 
is commanding, not merely the admiration, but the adoration 
of mankind. 1 



i " Gladness be with thee, Helper of our world ! 
I think this is the authentic sign and seal 
Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad, 
And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts, 
Into a rage to suffer for mankind, 
And recommence at sorrow : drops like seed 
After the blossom, ultimate of all. 
Say, does the seed scorn the earth and seek the sun? 
Surely it has no other end and aim 
Than to drop, once more die into the ground, 
Taste cold and darkness and oblivion there : 
And thence rise, tree-like grow through pain to joy, 
More joy and most joy, — do man good again." 
—Browning, in Balaustion's Adventure, 1.1917 sq.; spoken of Herakles. 

It is fitting here to observe that standard literature, especially of history, 
biography, and prose and poetic fiction, owes its position largely, perhaps 
chiefly, to its ethical elements, thereby appealing to the profound interest 
which men universally take in questions of right and wrong. Narratives of 
mere adventure, sentiments, mysteries, intricate plots, novelties, extrava- 
gancies, though of highest rhetorical finish, command but a passing atten- 
tion, or have but an ephemeral popularity ; while such as rightly apply 
ethical principles to life, hold permanently a high place in the esteem of the 
world. A skillful account of difficult duties well done, of brave endurance 
by an innocent sufferer, of resistance to sore temptation or the fall and 
rising again of the tempted, of stern repulsion of aggression, of struggles for 
liberty, of the heroic self-sacrifice of patriots, never fails to stir the heart of 
our common humanity, and to inspire a noble emulation. Very familiar to 
us all are the sturdy manhood and piety of Crusoe, the heroism of Leonidas 
and his Spartan band, the lofty steadfastness of Luther, the warning cry of 
d'Assas, the simple truthfulness of Jeanie Deans, it being divinely impossi- 
ble for her to lie, the vacillation of Prince Hamlet, the torture of Othello, 
the unscrupulous ambition of Lady Macbeth, the wifely faithfulness of 
Imogene, the immaculate chastity of Isabella, and the filial piety of Cordelia. 
Minor incidents and characters are mere accessories. Shakespeare's most 
famous works, resolving questions of casuistry or developing the inevitable 
consequences of injustice, oppression and crime, are ethical treatises. They 



164 OBLIGATION 

§ 83. The constant service demanded by moral law is not 
to be indiscriminate. One is not to serve all others equally. 
Our obligations to our fellows vary very greatly in extent. 
To near relatives we are bound for more service than to those 
further removed ; first, because the possibilities are greater ; 
secondly, because service creates debt, and where intercourse 
is intimate the exchange of benefactions is more frequent; 
and thirdly, because in certain cases, as of husband and wife, 
the minute interdependence calls for minute reciprocation. 
The extent of obligation is to be judged by the law of tres- 
pass. My service is due to one in so far as I do not thereby 
trespass on the rightful claims of some other. I may, for 
example, distribute my fortune in alms so widely as to violate 
the rights of my children. Likewise I am bound to promote 
the general welfare of the state only in so far as I do not 
thereby trespass on the rights of individual citizens, or of 
neighboring states, either by encroachment, or by transferring 
to either the service due to the other. 

Moreover, it should be particularly observed that the alien 
service required does not preclude the agent from participat- 
ing in the benefit conferred. When a man labors for the 
welfare of his family without thinking of or caring for his 
own individual profit, still, as a member of the family, he 
shares in the beneficence. When one serves the community 
or his country, either by promoting or by defending the com- 
mon interests, it is evident that, since the interests are 
common, he thereby enlarges his own liberty, and guards his 
own well being. If he does these things selfishly, himself 
his end, then he meanly degrades his family, his country, so 
far as in his power lies, to merely useful means ; which treat- 
ment is unworthy, is a trespass, whatever be the result. But 
if, with no thought of his own interest or gain, he does those 

discuss matter of deepest and of universal interest, and constitute a hand- 
book of morals for mankind. See infra, § 133, note. 



SERVICE 165 

things unselfishly, making perhaps many painful personal 
sacrifices, still he shares in the beneficial results, is repaid 
and rewarded ; and even should his efforts fail, he neverthe- 
less enjoys the satisfaction of disinterested intent. Moral 
law does not prohibit any one from acting in a way that shall 
benefit himself, but only from thus acting in order that he 
may benefit himself. 

These modifying considerations forestall the criticism usu- 
ally and justly applied to strict altruism, that if every one 
should be constantly sacrificing his own welfare for that of 
others, there would be no permanent recipient of benefaction, 
and the perfection of morality on this basis would be not 
only a universal disregard of welfare, but also its annihila- 
tion. But according to the modified altruism of the present 
treatise, moral law does not call for such absolute self-sacri- 
fice, for the extinction of the natural and healthful desire for 
one's own welfare. 1 It forbids this only as a personal end ; 
and the gratification of the desire is provided for, in the 
economy of human nature, by the community of interests, so 
that whatever promotes the welfare of another redounds to 
the benefactor; for, although, in the existing disorder of 
society, the objective return fail entirely, still the subjective 
sanction is abundant reward. 

§ 84. In view of the right to service arises the question, 
in what manner and to what extent may one use another 
person. According to Kant, never as a means, but only as 
an end. He says : " The foundation of this principle is : 
Rational nature exists as an end in itself. . . . Accordingly 
the practical imperative will be as follows : So act as to treat 
humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, 



1 Nor does Christianity make this call, though it is often charged with 
doing. See supra, § 79, note. 



166 OBLIGATION 

in every case as an end withal, and never as a means only." l 
He argues that to make use of another person as a means 
whereby to accomplish one's end, degrades him from a person 
into a mere thing, thus violating his dignity, his worth as a 
man. Since this is to wrong him grievously, he should be 
treated only as an end in himself. 

The doctrine is striking, and with qualification it is true. 
We should never use another as a means, unless with his 
own full knowledge and free consent. If, without this, I 
myself be used as a mere tool, then, on discovering it, I am 
indignant, feeling I have been treated unworthily, degraded 
and wronged, according to the measure of the abuse. But 
with the consensus of all parties, the using each other as 
means to rightful ends is justifiable. Indeed, the greater part 
of the amenities of life, the enjoyment and benefit of social 
intercourse, kindness, politeness, could not otherwise exist. 
Such reciprocal use does not degrade, it ennobles; and by 
consenting to become an instrumental means, one becomes a 
participant in beneficence. This privilege of using others is 
limited also to rightful ends. One may never seek to use 
another even with consent in a way or to an end that is 
wrong ; for this would be inducing him to become a partner 
in wrong doing, which would be doing him a wrong. The 
point in Kant's doctrine that I should make myself in mine 
own person an end, we have previously rejected as the essence 
of egoism. On the contrary, I ought ever and actively to 
constitute myself an intelligent and willing means to the 
welfare of others, which is altruism. 

§ 85. A very important corollary from the general doc- 
trine of obligatory service is stewardship. Since unintermit- 
ting service is due from each one to others, according to his 

* From Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten, Auflage der R. and S., 
Seite 57 ; Abbott's translation, p. 67. 



SERVICE 167 

relations, it follows that his time, his energy, his ability, his 
capital, his estate, whatever he may have in possession or 
acquire, is in reality not his own, but the property of those 
others, and he himself is their steward. The transient in- 
fluence one may have on his surroundings, his daily walk and 
conversation, his health of mind and body, his life itself as 
the basis of all, these are held in trust, and are to be devoted 
to the well being of his fellow men! 1 They are the owners; 
he, their agent. All is due, all is debt, ever paying, never 
paid. Not less is comprehended in the law of service. 2 

1 Hence the deep criminality of suicide. Stoicism came short of the 
doctrine of service, and taught that the sage is lord of his life. From this 
teaching and the example of Zeno, together with the pessimism of the death- 
counseling Hegesias, resulted the horrible prevalence of suicide among the 
ancient Greeks and Eomans. On the battle field of Philippi (b.c. 42), when 
their cause was lost, Cassius, Titinius, and hundreds of the nobles of Rome, 
together with .Brutus, the noblest Roman of them all, in despair of the 
Republic, took refuge in self-slaughter. These did not see that suicide is 
the vile and wicked deed of a coward and thief. " La voix de l'honneur de 
l'homme lui cria-t-elle que se soustraire par la mort a la responsabilite' de 
ses acts est une insigne lachete\ Si irreparable que paraisse le mal qu'on a 
fait, il y a toujours areparer." — Gaboriau. "Le suicide est un vol fait 
au genre humain." — Rousseau. It is more, it is the fraud of a trustee, 
a total violation of a most sacred trust, it is robbery of both man and God ; 
a strange mixture of cowardice and rashness. With open-eyed timidity he 
flees from the passing ills of life, and with blind temerity rushes unbidden 
into the eternal presence, hurling himself against the thick bosses of Jeho- 
vah's buckler. 

2 In Measure for Measure, Act i, sc. 1, 1. 30 sq. , the Duke, a personifica- 
tion of watchful and retributive providence, says : 

" Thyself and thy belongings 
Are not thine own so proper as to waste 
Thyself upon thy virtues, they on thee. 
Heaven doth with us as we with torches do, 
Not light them for themselves ; for if our virtues 
Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike 
As if we had them not. Spirits are not finely touch'd 
But to fine issues, nor Nature never lends 
The smallest scruple of her excellence, 
But, like a thrifty goddess, she determines 
Herself the glory of a creditor, 
Both thanks and use." 



168 OBLIGATION 

We are bound, as trustees, not merely for the keeping, 
but also for the increase, the accumulation of our holdings. 
One's talents, whether of gold, silver or iron, of brain, brawn, 
bone, of intellect, sensibility, will, are all, whether great or 
small, to be put to usury, and a strict account rendered. 1 
The servant who kept his Lord's pound laid up in a napkin 
was condemned as a wicked servant. Possessions are to be 
used, and used rightly, imbursed and disbursed, as dictated 
by the law of service, which demands a continuous distribu- 
tion of our gifts. 2 

A further corollary is the obligation to guard and to de- 
fend possessions. Obviously one is bound to secure what is 
intrusted to his keeping against all comers, otherwise he can- 
not fulfill the obligation to use it in alien service. Guardian- 
ship is itself a service, since it preserves for others their 
property, which preservation is, indeed, a very necessary part 
of the general service due. Hence my rights are to be 
watchfully and zealously guarded. The property in my 
hands must be carefully protected, to prevent any trespass. 
My personal liberty must be maintained free from unwar- 
ranted interference. 3 My bodily welfare, and especially my 
life must be courageously defended against hurtful and 
deadly violence. The powerful instinct of self-preservation 
indicates the sacred duty of self-defense, and the original 

1 " Talent, a weight or sum of money, natural gift or ability, inclination. 
Fr. from Lat. from Grk. See Trench, Study of Words. We derive the 
sense of ability from the parable in Matthew xxv [cf. Luke 19 : 11-27], our 
talents being gifts of God." — Skeat. 

2 The pernicious vice of betting or gambling in any of its many forms is 
sufficiently condemned by the fact that it is a misuse of trust funds. Money 
is transferred without equivalent, and while the winner takes something for 
nothing, which is clearly akin to theft, the loser abandons his charge, 
whereby somebody other than himself, somebody to whom his service is 
due, suffers a loss, a wrong, a trespass. See supra, § 39. 

8 " Le premier des biens est la liberty Le plus saint des devoirs de 
l'homme est de la conserver." — Dumas. 



SERVICE 169 

impulse of natural affection shows the no less sacred duty of 
defending the lives intrusted to our care. Violence must be 
repelled, if need be, by counter violence. But defense 
should not be allowed to pass over, as it strongly tends to 
do, into mere vengeance. The impulse to revenge is a male- 
volent desire, and hence abnormal, and hence unjustifiable. 
Yet retaliation is sometimes the best and indeed the only 
means of effective defense, in which case it is duty. 1 

§ 86. We can imagine a life conducted throughout accord- 
ing to the principles thus far expounded. One might con- 
ceivably be governed, in general and in particular, by a 
sense of duty, duty being here taken in the limited meaning 
of outward obedience to the law of trespass, justice and ser- 
vice, inspired by respect for the law, recognized as demand- 
ing that much but no more. The whole life being one of 
innocence and beneficence, duty is said to be perfectly ful- 
filled by this external conformity to the law simply out of 
respect for the law, a profound reverence for all pervading 
moral obligation, and this alone is what should determine all 
human conduct. 2 

1 See supra, § 40 ; and infra, § 136 sq., where an application of this doc- 
trine of defense shows more fully its great importance. But let it be 
observed here that defense is the sole warrant for interference in another's 
liberty. In a profound and wide sense I am my brother's keeper, and must 
defend him from the trespass of others, which is a warrant for my interfer- 
ence in their liberty. Conversely, I am bound to defend them from him in 
case he attempts doing a wrong, and thus have a warrant for my interfer- 
ence in his liberty. See supra, § 32. 

2 Such is, the doctrine of Kant. He says : "Duty is the necessity of act- 
ing from respect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the 
effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it. . . . Now an 
action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and 
with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine 
the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this 
practical law, and consequently the maxim to follow this law even to the 
thwarting of all my inclinations." — Grundlegung, u. s. w. ; Auflage der 
R. and S., Seite 20; Abbott's trans., pp. 22, 23. The implication is that 



170 OBLIGATION 

The rigorism of this stoical doctrine is impressive and 
imposing. It is a severe and noble conception of duty, a 
high ideal. But observe, it does not merely disregard the 
affections ; it requires their suppression. If we judge a man 
to be governed in all his conduct by a sense of duty, fulfill- 
ing carefully, anxiously, assiduously his many obligations, 
living a life of sacrificial service, purely because of respect 
for the law of duty, we are filled with admiration for so lofty 
a character ; but if we judge him at the same time destitute 
of love, we admire him as we admire an iceberg. There is 
an instinctive repugnance to a person human, yet not hu- 
mane. And if we find he has laboriously extinguished the 
yearnings of natural affection in favor of an overruling and 
exclusive conception of absolute duty, we turn from him as 
from a monstrous and repulsive prodigy. 

The sense of duty, rising high but stopping with good 
works, fails to fulfill the law's demands. In the moral ideal 
of humanity, there is something higher than this rigid stoi- 
cism. 1 Were I sick and suffering, and did my friend serve 

love is not a duty ; for this conception of obligation excludes all personal 
inclination, teaching that an action determined by love alone is not a moral 
action, and that one wherein love mingles with duty is morally impure, 
being contaminated by inclination. 

1 The poets sometimes rise above the philosophers. Lowell, in The 
Vision of Sir Launfal, tells of the knight going to search for the Holy 
Grail, who, as he rode out of his castle's gate, saw a leper awaiting alms. 
Not moved with compassion (Mark, 1: 41), but with loathing, he tossed him a 
piece of gold, and without a word, rode on. 

" The leper raised not the gold from the dust ; 
• Better to me the poor man's crust, 
Better the blessing of the poor, 
Though I turn me empty from his door.' 
That is no true alms which the hand can hold ; 
He gives nothing hut worthless gold 
Who gives from a sense of duty. 

The Holy Supper is kept indeed 
In whatso we share with another's need ; 
Not what we give, hut what we share, 
For the gift without the giver is hare." 



SERVICE 171 

me merely from a sense of duty, I should be displeased, I 
would tell him to begone, I will hire a nurse. Is it suffi- 
cient for a father to guard and promote the welfare of his 
child simply out of respect for his rational obligation? Shall 
a mother tend her babe with all the wonderful, beautiful 
solicitude and ready self-sacrifice that win our adoration, 
merely because she knows she ought so to do ? No, there 
is a higher, nobler impulse, maternal love. Should a hus- 
band and wife serve each other merely from a sense of duty, 
it would be a just cause of dissatisfaction, and perhaps of 
disunion. The conception of duty, enlarged beyond inno- 
cence to include beneficence, comes short of obligation. If 
it be thus limited, then it is legality, not morality, and again 
there is something higher than duty, something nobler than 
service. We heartily reject a scheme of ethics implying 
that a man is under no obligation to love his mother or his 
country, but should purify his character by eliminating all 
such inclinations ; a scheme that clearly, distinctly enacts : 
Thou shalt not love thy neighbor. 



172 OBLIGATION 



CHAPTER XI 

CHAKITY 

§ 87. An argument already offered, having its basis in the 
general principle that the natural or constitutional powers 
of man ought to fulfill their normal functions, or, more spe- 
cifically, that every one has a right to gratify his normal 
desires, a right being a duty, concludes the appetites and 
appetencies to be auxiliary to the affections, which are thus 
normally supreme. 1 From this it was directly inferred that 
self cannot rightly be an end. With equal cogency it is 
implied that the object of affection is the normal and right- 
ful end of all endeavor. In other words, the affections, 
included under the general name love, are obligatory ; they 
ought, in due manner and measure, to be gratified. The 
moral law, found in the original and innermost nature of 
man, enjoins that he love his fellow man. 

Consider the meaning of affection, love, charity, benevo- 
lence, these terms being taken synonymously. Love is a 
desire, an impulse or inclination toward others, disposing 
one to give out from his own resources what may benefit 
them. Let it be kept clearly in mind that love is strictly a 
desire. It should not be confused with volition, though the 
synonym, benevolence, partakes, etymologically, of the voli- 
tion; for love is simply the causative antecedent of the 
volitional endeavor. 2 It is not a feeling, though attended 

i See supra, §§ 78, 79. 

2 Benevolence, from Lat. bene, well, and volens, wishing, willing. Bene- 
ficence, from bene, and faciens, doing. Endeavor, from Fr. en, in, and 



CHARITY 173 

by peculiar feelings ; being neither an emotion, though the 
name is commonly applied to its attendant emotions ; nor a 
sentiment, though the sentiments that normally accompany 
it act and react powerfully to stimulate the desire. Love is 
properly and definitely a desire, relative to a sentient object, 
whose welfare it would promote. 1 

§ 88. Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of 
high authority, Love cannot be commanded, for it is an 
affection, and not a volition which alone is subject to com- 
mand. 2 But love, benevolence, charity, pathological love, 

devoir, duty, Charity, love; from Lat. caritatem, ace. of caritas, dearness, 
from cams, dear; c/., cherish, caress. We use the beautiful word charity, 
ay airy, in this wide sense which is imbedded in our early literature, not ap- 
proving the reduction to almsgiving and like external acts, which it has suf- 
fered in common speech. The Revisers of The English New Testament 
unfortunately make the concession, and in 1 Corinthians, xiii, replace it 
by love, which term, besides marring the rhythm, is quite as ambiguous in 
usage, and as liable to be misunderstood. The words chastity and virtue 
have suffered alike reduction to a certain narrow and less delicate sense; 
see supra, § 70, note. 

1 The so-called love of complacency especially should be distinguished 
from the love of benevolence. Complacency is the quiet, pleasurable feeling 
that arises on contemplating with approbation the character or conduct of 
another. It hardly differs from the feeling of approbation, and as one may 
have self-approbation, so also he may be self-complacent. Complacency is 
strictly a feeling, a sentiment, and not a desire, and it is a misnomer to call 
it love. The love of benevolence alone is love. Hence it is quite possible 
to love one whose character and conduct are abhorrent. Jesus loved both 
Judas and John, but his love of John was mingled with and strengthened by 
complacency. 

2 " Love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for 
duty's sake ; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination, nay, 
are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practi- 
cal love [i.e. service], and not pathological [i.e. affection], a love which is 
seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense, in principles Of action, 
and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be com- 
manded. It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand 
those passages of Scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor, 
even our enemy." — Kant, Grundlegung, S. 19 ; Abbott's trans., p. 21. See 



174 OBLIGATION 

as distinguished from practical love which is not properly 
love but willing service, can be commanded ; though truly it 
is an affection, becoming active only as the subject is affected 
by an amiable object, that is, an object susceptible of wel- 
fare. For, although every command is primarily addressed 
to the will, yet the will, having, by means of voluntary atten- 
tion, indirect control of all the mental faculties, carries out 
the command, if not thwarted by passion, in impressing its 
subordinates into the required order. Otherwise the sub- 
jective springs of conduct could have no moral quality. 
Even belief, a feeling of assurance, of conviction, is com- 
manded in the presence of truth ; and the command is obeyed, 
and the feeling is induced, by giving attention, sincere heed, 
to the presented truth. 1 Love, charity, a desire for another's 
welfare, may likewise be commanded in the presence of 
amiability, and the command obeyed, the affection induced, 
by giving like heed to the amiable capacity of the object. 
Hence the love of benevolence can be commanded, since it 
can be voluntarily induced, nourished and invigorated. 

Not only can this love be commanded, but i^iscpmr- 
manded. The moral law is embedded in and arises from the 
very constitution of human nature. Desires awakened by 
objects and guided by intelligence are the motives of volun- 
tary conduct. We have seen that among these the affections 
are normally supreme, rightly subjecting all other motive 
impulses to their ends. Therefore we find that, in order to 

in Luke, 6: 27-38, where this " practical love" specifically is commanded. 
Elsewhere Kant says: " Love to God, considered as an inclination (patholo- 
gical love), is impossible, for he is not an object of the senses. The same 
affection toward men is possible no doubt, but cannot be commanded, for 
it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at command; therefore it 
is only practical love that is meant in that pith of all laws, Love God above 
everything, and thy neighbor as thyself." — Kritik der praktischen Yernunft, 
Auflage der R. und S., Seite 210; Abbott's trans., p. 250. 
i See Supra, § 60. 



CHABITY 175 

fulfill their natural functions, the affections must have not 
merely free but preeminent exercise, and that this is essen- 
tially the supreme law of humanity demanding reverent 
obedience. 

§ 89. The affections having different objects, have re- 
ceived various names ; as, conjugal, parental, filial and 
fraternal love, friendship, kindness, patriotism, philanthropy. 
In each of these the affection varies both in kind and degree. 
The differences in kind are due to differences in the rela- 
tions. The differences in degree are regulated by the pos- 
sibilities. We are not bound to love all others equally, this 
being unnatural. Many ties, many obligations. Those most 
nearly related are bound to love each other with a special 
ardor ; as, parents and children. 

The sentiment of gratitude excites love for a benefactor 
or neighbor. It enters largely along with friendship and 
kindness into the forms and substance of true politeness, 
which is love in littles, and in all its grades is essential to 
high moral culture, and is ennobling. 1 

We are bound to love those whose character and conduct 

1 Friendship is discussed by Aristotle at length in Nic. Eth. bks. viii and 
ix. On gratitude, see Elements of Psychology, § 254. The royal law, Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, suggested the reasonable question, Who 
is my neighbor ? Luke, 10 : 25 sq. The answer, in the parable, is, The 
Samaritan was neighbor to the wounded man, because he showed mercy on 
him. Hence the wounded man was bound to love the Samaritan as himself. 
This is the obligation of gratitude to a benefactor. The parable does not, as 
commonly supposed, teach philanthropy, but gratitude, and the love that 
would requite benefaction. My benefactor is my neighbor, come he from 
the far east or west, from a despised race or a hostile camp, and I am told 
to love him as myself. The added injunction, Go and do thou likewise, 
is philanthropic in tone, but it is no part of the parable, no part of the an- 
swer. There is no Scripture commanding us to love everybody as in fact we 
love ourselves. The new commandment, John, 13 : 34, is to a special class, 
and sets up a higher and purer standard. See supra, § 74, note, and § 48, 
note. 



176 OBLIGATION 

we abhor, cherishing the desire to remedy the evil in them, 
and otherwise to better them. We should love even a 
wicked and active enemy ; righteous defensive resentment 
being quite consistent with the impulse to promote, not his 
evil way, but his well-being whenever opportunity offers or 
can be found, and in so far as we do not thereby trespass on 
some other. In civilized warfare after a victory the wounded 
abandoned by the defeated are cared for humanely. This is 
love to enemies ; we feel the obligation, and call it humanity. 
We are bound to love all men of all races, those in the 
remotest regions of the globe, our very antipodes, yes, and 
even the generation yet unborn, in a due manner and meas- 
ure. This is the obligation of philanthropy. 1 

§ 90. Service fulfilling the law must be, not merely willing 
service, but loving service. We have seen that a life of 
sacrificial service, of active beneficence, determined only by 
respect for the law, fails of completeness. 2 Though I be- 
stow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it 
profiteth me nothing. It is essential to duty that love be its 
spring. The service due is loving service. Let the duplex 
form of this phrase be noted. Loving is desiring, a subjec- 
tive motive ; it is benevolence, well-wishing. Service is 
acting, an objective motion ; it is beneficence, well-doing. 
Serving is the normal outcome, the natural consequent, of 
loving ; they are psychological correlatives. Neither is com- 
plete without the other. 

For, how is it possible that one should sincerely, willingly, 
intentionally endeavor to promote another's welfare, unless 

1 "Friends, parents, neighbors, first it will embrace, 
Our country next, and next all human race. 
Wide and more wide, th' o'erflowing of the mind 
Takes every creature in of every kind. 
Earth smiles around, in boundless beauty dressed, 
And heaven reflects its image in her breast." — Pope. 

2 See supra, § 86. 



CHARITY 177 

he desire the other's welfare ? All voluntary effort is con- 
ditioned on an antecedent desire, so that the command of 
intelligent, willing service is a command of intelligent, loving 
service. One cannot sincerely strive for another's welfare 
unless he desire it, and this is love. If it be said, the desire 
is simply to obey, we reply, a desire to obey a command to 
serve, is a desire to serve as commanded. 

On the other hand, how can there be love not followed by 
service ? As faith without works is dead, so also is love 
without service. If it have any life, it is at least ready and 
watchful of opportunity to serve. For generous love impels 
to service. He who loves will serve, will render willing, 
active, self-sacrificing service. Also he who loves will be 
just, will pay all dues, will not trespass. Bear ye one 
another's burdens,' and so fulfill the law. Owe no man any- 
thing, save to love one another, this being the only debt that 
cannot be finally discharged ; for he that loveth another hath 
fulfilled the law. Love is the fulfillment of the law. 1 

All the various presentations of the moral law heretofore 
considered, we now find to be summed in the law of loving 
service, Thou shalt love and serve. And indeed we see that 
even herein is superfluity, for the whole moral law, the total 
of human obligation, is completely and comprehensively 



1 See Galatians, 6:2; Romans, 13:8, 10. Love is natural, normal; 
hate, unnatural, abnormal. "It is to the credit of human nature, that, 
except where its selfishness is brought into play, it loves more readily than 
it hates. Hatred, by a gradual and quiet process, will even be transformed 
into love, unless the change be impeded by a continually new irritation of 
the original feeling of hostility." — Hawthorne, Scarlet Letter, ch. 13. 

" Das Gesetz der Liebe soil walten, und was das Naturgesetz in den 
Dingen, das ist das Sittengesetz und das Recht im Menschen." — Auer- 
bach, Auf der Hbhe. 

" First of all was Chaos ; next in order, 
Earth with her spacious bosom ; then 
Love, who is preeminent among the Immortals." 

— Hesiod, as quoted by Aristotle in Metaphysics, bk.i, ch. 4. 



178 OBLIGATION 

summed in the single categorical imperative of one syllable, 
love. Thou shalt love, is the perfect law, the law of love. 1 

§ 91. Progress in moral culture consists in transforming 
fear into respect, and respect into love. With primitive char- 
acters, and even with many highly cultured otherwise, the fear 
of penalty is the chief, often the only, motive of obedience. 
To this may be added as one step higher, the hope of reward. 
In this is an appeal to the selfish propensities usually pre- 
dominant in crude humanity. They are not thereby ap- 
proved, but used to bring the man to at least outward 
obedience, a step toward inward culture. Thus the law is a 
pedagogue, leading men upward. 2 

A thoughtful consideration of one's relations, a clear recog- 
nition of the law in us, inspires respect for its mandate, and 
an impulse to observance. Herein is a passing away from 
the influence of threats and promises. These are lost to 

* " General benevolence is the great law of the whole moral creation." — 
Butler, Sermon viii. 

" O high imperative, how dost thou impend 
Over our guilty consciences, that know 
And yet ignore, fear yet transgress, admire 
As best, and yet pursue the way that's worse ! 
What statesman, or what scholar, or what man J 

Is there who knows not that this law, if kept, 
Would work man's perfect weal ; who doth not know 
That man was made to keep the law of love, 
And keeps it not ; that love sums all his duty, 
All his need ; and, did it once prevail, 
Love would ensure all right, include all virtue, 
Compel obedience to each lower law, 
Perfect man's being and fulfill his end ? " 

— Henry W. Bankin, The Law of Love. 

"The law ordained, Thou shalt love, and love ordained that law. Man 
could not keep it. Then love ordained the gospel, God so loved. Thus, 
Thou shalt love, is the whole of The Law; and, God so loved, is the whole 
of The Gospel. This is so clear, that it is at once Law and Gospel for chil- 
dren and for savages ; and yet it is so deep in its limpid clearness that no 
philosopher can fathom it." — Duncan, Colloquia Peripatetica. 

2 See Galatians, 3 :24, 25 ; 2 Corinthians, 5 : 11 ; and cf. supra, § 52, last 
paragraph. 



CHARITY 179 

sight, and obedience is determined simply by respect for the 
law. 1 The vast all-pervading sense of moral obligation, a 
wide comprehensive view of dnty, an obedience to the law 
for its own sake superior to its sanctions, produce nobility 
and excellence in moral character. Yet this ideal is cold, 
hard, stern, repressing as weakness the natural play of tender 
sympathy, of generous sentiment, of warm inclination toward 
others, maintaining a stoical indifference to their weal or 
woe, and giving help exclusively out of respect for the law 
of service. As a scheme of morals, this cannot be purged of 
egoism, of selfishness ; for necessarily it holds that the so- 
called duties to self are equally or even more imperative than 
duties to another, those being the basis from which all other 
duties arise. 2 

In the still higher ideal, cold respect for law is gradually, 
as culture progresses, replaced by charity, which is the bond 
of perfectness. As in the second grade the sanctions of the 
law are lost to sight, so in this highest grade the law itself 
disappears from view, and its requirements are fulfilled with- 
out reference to its mandate. It is the fruit of moral 
growth that both subjective and objective activities accord 
with the law, not because of its pressure, but because the 
order and harmony of the natural powers have been restored, 
and the man does what is right because his dominant im- 
pulses lead thereto, and his free preference finds therein his 
highest gratification. He renders loving service in due meas- 

1 " It argues a low degree of insight into the nature and dignity of man," 
says Froebel, "if the incentive of reward in a future world is supposed to 
be needed in order to insure a conduct worthy of his nature and destiny. If 
the human being is enabled at an early period to live in accordance with 
genuine humanity, he can and should at all times appreciate the dignity of 
his being ; and at all times the consciousness of having lived worthily and in 
accordance with the requirements of his being, should be his highest reward, 
needing no addition of external recompense.' ' — Education of Man, § 88. 

2 See supra, § 75, note ; and § 86. 



180 OBLIGATION 

ure to his fellow men, this having become the habit, the 
second nature of his being. He does by nature the things 
of the law, and having no law, is a law unto himself, showing 
the work of the law written in his heart. For love knows 
no law other than its own impulse. 1 

Obviously, in the economy of human nature, this progres- 
sion does not take place uniformly. A criminal at war with 
society at large may be dutiful to his family in other matters 
because of strong domestic affection, and in so far fulfill the 
law of love. The average good citizen knows little and 
cares less about the criminal code. Its enactments are not 
for him. He has not the slightest disposition to do what it 
forbids, and orders his actions without reference to it. The 
penitentiary, the jail, the gallows, have no terrors for him. 
The police, the courts, the judiciary, he recognizes as social 
machinery devised and maintained for the protection of his 
rights. They have no other meaning for him. He has risen 
above the great body of civil law, and is not, properly speak- 
ing, an obedient, but a law-abiding citizen who, without 

1 See Colossians, 3:14; 1 John, 4:18. See the progress as stated in 
2 Peter, 1: 5-7. " He who does good with inclination, and with love to his 
neighbor, stands on a higher plane than he who is doing it with a constant 
victory over himself." — Stahl, Eechts- und Staats-Lehre, i, 158. " Sympa- 
thy, fellowship in the needs of others, philanthropy, is the source from 
which flows everything that Ethics prescribes under the name of duties of 
virtue and love. It is the source of all actions which have moral value, the 
sole genuine moral motive, and the firmest and surest pledge of moral de- 
portment." — Schopenhauer, Grund-Probleme, 133. 

It is curious to note that the words of St Paul, in Romans, 2 : 14, odroi 
pSfiov fir] exovT€$ eavrois d<nv v6/jlos, these, not having a law, are a law unto 
themselves, have a counterpart in Aristotle's Ethics, bk. iv, ch. 8, §10, 6 8t] 
xapteis Kal iXevdipios 8vtu>s ?£«, olov v6/jlos &v eavrip, the refined and free-spirited 
will behave, as being a law unto himself. Again in Galatians, 5 : 23, we 
find : Kard, rCav toiovtwv oi>K tariv vdfios, against such there is no law ; and 
in Aristotle's Politico,, bk. iii, ch. 13, we have : Kara 8k twv tolo6twv oi K can 
v6/j.os - avrol ydp den ?6/aoj, against such there is no law ; for they themselves 
are a law. 



CHARITY 181 

thought of the law, governs his conduct by his own cultured 
preferences. In his intercourse with friends and acquaint- 
ances, he may still have duties that are irksome and repug- 
nant which he fulfills from a sense of duty, and therein feels 
the tense bonds of obligation. His further moral growth 
requires the enlarging and deepening of charitable sympa- 
thies, so that his conduct may be determined more and more 
by love, less and less by law ; doing always the right thing, 
not because he ought so to do, but because he wants to do 
just that thing rather than any other. 

§ 92. We have seen that so long as one acts merely from 
respect for the law, he is in bondage to the law. 1 He has 
passed perhaps with many a fierce struggle out from a de- 
grading slavery to appetites and passions and unbridled lusts, 
for of what a man is overcome of the same is he also brought 
into bondage, into a voluntary and honorable bondage. His 
conduct becomes uniform, reduced to the order of facts that 
ought to be, regulated by principles conforming to moral 
law. This is a dignified attitude, a high and rare attain- 
ment. But the man is in bonds, rigid, inexorable, though 
honorable, bound under a law that knows no concession or 
relaxation. By many moralists this is called liberty. Surely 
it is not liberty, but strict, the strictest, bondage. It is 
moral necessity. Regulus said: I must return. Luther 
cried : I can do no otherwise. Where, then, is liberty, the 
perfect liberty for which man so ardently longs ? 2 

Evidently when one does more and more as the law 
requires, not by virtue of the obligation, but by virtue of 
his own native or cultured disposition, he is passing from 

1 In § 72, supra; cf. §86. 

2 See 2 Peter, 2 :19. For the several kinds of necessity, see supra, § 44, 
note. Christians are servants, bond-servants, slaves, doOXoi. They are no 
longer their own ; they are bought with a price. See Romans, 6 : 16-22 ; 
1 Corinthians, 7: 21-23 ; Luke, 2 : 29. 



182 OBLIGATION 

under bondage into the realm of liberty. When love takes 
the place of constraining duty, the law ceases to be law. Then 
he is no longer under law, but under grace ; then, but not 
till then, is he perfectly free. The law commands, Thou 
shalt love ; and when through obedience love has become the 
dominating impulse, confirmed and established, the law as 
law has disappeared. Thus perfect love is perfect liberty. 1 
Then all doing is righteous yet free, since it is done in 
free preference to any other. Here and here only is the 
longed for liberty to be found. In our imperfection and 
struggles with self, which never cease, this highest ideal is 
never fully realized in human life. The imperfect person 
is one conscious of obligation. The perfect person is one 
conscious of holiness. Perfect persons are not under law; 
so that we may truly say the holy angels and the Deity are 
under no obligation to do what they do, but being perfect 
in love, are perfect in work, and perfect in liberty. Heaven 
knows no law. 

1 Love and liberty grow out of the same root in the reality of their 
meaning, as in the origin of the words which express it ; both arising from 
the Teutonic base Lub. 

The view presented is in accord with the true doctrine of antinomianism, 
or Christian liberty. See John, 8 : 32 ; 15 : 12-15 j Galatians, 5 : 1, 13, 14 ; 
James, 1:25. 



WELFARE 183 



CHAPTER XII 

WELFARE 

§ 93. The term welfare has been used in the foregoing 
discussion. The corresponding notion is of so great impor- 
tance in ethical theory as to require special examination. 

Many philosophers, both ancient and modern, hold that 
the total essence of well-being or welfare or happiness is 
pleasure. All activity, they say, resolves ultimately into 
seeking for pleasure and shrinking from pain, this being a 
necessary consequence of the original constitution of the 
animal man, fully explaining all his conduct, and determin- 
ing his character in its highest development. The maxi- 
mum of pleasure attained throughout life is the maximum 
of welfare. Pleasures are admitted to vary in quantity, and 
even in quality, the coarse enjoyment of brutal sensuality 
differing widely from the refined enjoyment of delicate sen- 
timent. Originally, according to the hypothesis of evolu- 
tion, all impulsion is brutally selfish ; gradually it becomes 
polished by its environment, but with no change of sub- 
stance. The doctrine is essentially egoistic. Benevolence, 
in its most generous forms, is explained by the pleasure it 
gives the benefactor, and a purely disinterested action is pro- 
nounced a psychological impossibility. 1 

1 Bentham begins his treatise on "The Principles of Morals and Legis- 
lation" as follows : "Nature has placed man under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what 
we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand 
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, 
are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 



184 OBLIGATION 

Without renewing the objections to egoism, let it be here 
observed that pleasure and pain are qualities belonging to 
feeling only. They are not elements of desire or of its grat- 
ification, though indeed they accompany both. We often 
seek to gratify a desire utterly regardless of the attendant 
pleasure or pain, and hence these are not universal ends. 1 
Moreover, pleasure and pain have in themselves no moral 
quality, they are neither right nor wrong. But if pleasure 
were the ultimate end of human endeavor, then it were 
ethical in the highest degree, and the maximum of pleasure 
attained would be the maximum of virtue; which is absurd. 2 

It is freely admitted that there is a natural and hence uni- 
versal desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, the reverse 
being psychologically impossible. But pleasure as an object 
of desire is only one among a large number of appetences, 
and it is not the chiefest or strongest or most prevailing, for 
there are others that often override it. Now it is evident 
that the gratification of one normal desire among many that 
are coordinate cannot constitute entire well-being ; for to 
this end there must be a measured, harmonized gratification 
of all native inclinations. Nor can desire for pleasure be, 
even obscurely, the constantly informing element of the 
other desires ; for very often we desire and ardently pursue, 
not pain itself, but what we know to be painful ; we take 
pains to reach a painful end, bitterly demanding satisfaction, 

all we think ; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will 
serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. The principle of utility recog- 
nizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the 
object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and 
of law." Cf. J. S. Mill's treatise on Utilitarianism. 

1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 228, 256; and supra, § 5. 

2 "The principle of private felicity," says Kant, " which some make the 
supreme principle of morality, would be expressed thus : Love thyself above 
everything, and God and thy neighbor for thine own sake." — Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft, S. 210, note. 



WELFARE 185 

and heartily accepting the poignant consequences. Hence 
pleasure, even should it be at a. continuous maximum through- 
out life, cannot of itself be accounted welfare, though indeed 
in complete welfare it is an ever-present and important factor. 1 
Of course one may define welfare as a maximum of pleas- 
ure and discuss it accordingly ; but it is very certain that 
this is not the notion of welfare that prevails among men. 
No doubt the notion includes pleasure, but it includes much 
more ; for men condemn, as lacking dignity, a life whose 
sole aim is pleasure however refined. Who enjoys more 
delightful pleasure, according to De Quincey, than the 
opium-eater? Despite his delicious dreaming, he is judged 
a most pitiful wretch. Even he who devotes himself to 
giving pleasure to others, as the professional musician, is 
held in slight esteem. So also the comedian. Men enjoy 
laughing, but the perpetually funny man is classed with the 
circus clown, a lineal descendant of the court jester, whose 
rank was low, and whose quips were regulated with whips. 
Still the pleasure giver has a calling, for pleasant recreation 

1 " The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but 
self-conservation. Such was the doctrine of Chrysippus, the Stoic. Pleasure, 
said he, is the natural result, eiri'yivvqixa' 1 of successful effort to secure what is 
in harmony with our nature. It follows upon activity, but should never be 
made the end of human endeavor." — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., §55. " If hap- 
piness means the absence of care and the inexperience of painful emotion," 
says Froude, " then the best securities for it are a hard heart and a good 
digestion." Carlyle dubbed this view of happiness "the pig philosophy," 
and also says : " Man's unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness ; it 
is because there is an Infinite iu him, which with all his cunning, he cannot 
quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers and Uphol- 
sterers and Confectioners undertake, in joint stock company, to make one 
Shoeblack Happy ? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two ; for 
the Shoeblack also has a soul quite other than his stomach ; and would 
require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, 
simply this allotment, no more, and no less : GooVs infinite universe altogether 
to himself, therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as fast as it rose." 
— Sartor Resartus, bk. ii, ch. 9. 



186 OBLIGATION 

is needful to our welfare. But the mere pleasure seeker, 
studying his own enjoyment, not occasionally as a recreation 
but as the end of living, the devotee of social amenities, the 
professional sportsman, the dissipated spendthrift, the disso- 
lute libertine, each of these is even more justly reprobated, 
hardly for lack of wisdom in his way, rather for total lack of 
wisdom's way. A life of pleasure, whether generous or self- 
ish, even one of simple playful gayety apart from vice, is 
accounted a wasted life, and wise men take infinite pains to 
secure, through much self-denial, a regulated and sober 
welfare. 

§ 94. We are, then, in great need to know, clearly and 
distinctly, the meaning of welfare. In accord with the fun- 
damental doctrine of this treatise, the following definition is 
proposed: Welfare is the gratification of normal desire. 
From this it follows that continuous welfare is the constant 
gratification of normal desires throughout a complete life. 
Its attainment calls for self-control, for a measured adjust- 
ment of incompatible gratifications, in order to harmony, and 
to the maximum gratification of those desires that are natu- 
ral, normal and in accord with moral law. The primary 
principle is, a man has a right to gratify his normal desires, 
if he do not trespass. Hence he has a right to welfare ; but 
whether he will attain it or not depends on the intelligent 
regulation of his desires, together with the possibility of 
their gratification within the given limits. 

It has been pointed out that, taken concretely, virtuous 
conduct is conduct conformed to practical reason or con- 
science, and, taken abstractly, virtue is action in conformity 
with moral law. Also it was observed that virtue implies a 
struggle against obstacles. 1 Now, besides the subjective dif- 
ficulties of virtuous endeavor, the judging, choosing and 

i See supra, § 70. 



WELFARE 187 

striving for right life, there are practically numerous and 
great objective difficulties, external obstacles in circum- 
stances, that oppose one at every turn, preventing the com- 
plete gratification of virtuous longings. If the subjective 
intention and effort be accomplished, then, even though the 
objective result fail, the chief condition of welfare is ful- 
filled, and its principal element provided. But to complete 
welfare, there must be an external realization of the subjec- 
tive virtuous intent. So it is that, in the actual warfare of 
life, though it chastens and strengthens, there is rarely, if 
ever, a complete realization of thorough-going welfare. 1 

Since we have defined welfare as the gratification of nor- 
mal desires, and have characterized virtue as being the effort 
to realize this gratification in loving service, it appears that 
one's welfare comes from seeking disinterestedly to promote 
the welfare of others, and that an earnest constant striving 
to reach this end comprises the sum total of obligation. It 
is attained on two parallels. First, as a prime condition, 
one should seek, directly and indirectly, by precept, by exam- 
ple, and by whatever influence he may rightly use, to culti- 
vate in his fellows a virtuous disposition, inducing generous 
impulses, and impressing the mandate, Go, and do thou 
likewise. Such education is due especially from parents to 
children, from teachers to pupils, from the enlightened civ- 
ilizer to the benighted barbarian. Secondly, he should 
strive to remove, in so far as practicable, the external obsta- 
cles to their welfare lying in the way of his fellows, espe- 
cially of those more nearly related to him ; and also to fur- 
nish out of his own resources all reasonable facilities for 
these others to do likewise, thus helping them to modify and 
arrange their circumstances favorably to their own righteous 

1 Semita certe 
Tranquillse per virtutem patet unica vitae." 

— Juvenal, lib. iv, sat. 10. 



188 OBLIGATION 

ends. So doing, he shall himself, without thought of him- 
self, experience the working of that great natural law of 
human activity, It is more blessed to give than to receive. 1 

§ 95. It is now needful to inquire concerning happiness, 
of which nothing has heretofore been said. The term is 
very indefinite, and though in common use, there is difficulty 
in fixing its meaning. 2 Sometimes we hear that happiness 
is continuous pleasure. If this be allowed, then happiness 
cannot be identified with welfare ; for, as we have seen, wel- 
fare is something more than pleasure. But, while pleasure 
is a large, and perhaps an essential ingredient in happiness, 
this also seems to have other elements. 3 Then shall not 
happiness and welfare be identified? Not strictly; for, 
though surely there is an intimate connection between them, 
a distinction remains. It is the distinction of antecedent 
and consequent in causal relation. Welfare consists in the 
constant gratification of right desires. Now, like as pleas- 
ure is the reflex or correlate of spontaneous and unimpeded 

1 "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he himself said: 
MaKa.pi.bv £<ttiv fxaXkov 8id6vcu 1) \ap.fiaveiv.' 1 '' — Acts, 20: 35. Words not found 
elsewhere. 

2 Happy, from hap, a word of Scandinavian origin, meaning fortune, 
chance, accident ; seen in hap-hazard, hapless, haply, happen, perhaps, and 
mishap ; cf. Ger. Gliick, luck, and Gliickselig, blissful ; Ft. bonheur, from 
bon, and heur, luck ; Lat. felix, from which, felicity ; Grk. evrvxta, good-hap, 
and ev5a.iiu.ovLa, a good dai/iav, genius, fate, destiny, fortune, providence. 
" Happiness," says Coleridge, "is not, I think, the most appropriate term 
for a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap, that 
is, chance." — Aids to Beflection, i, p. 31. 

3 "We can only have the highest happiness," says George Eliot, in her 
epilogue to Romola, " by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest 
of the world as well as for ourselves ; and this sort of happiness often brings 
so much pain with it that we can tell it from pain only by its being what we 
would choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good." 
"We think," says Aristotle, "that pleasure should be mixed up, Trapafie/xlxdai, 
with happiness." — Nic. Eth., x, 7, 3. Yet it hath been said, Blessed are 
they that mourn. 



WELFARE 189 

energy exerted in any special case, so, in the general course 
of living, happiness is the reflex or correlate of virtuous and 
successful conduct. Thus welfare is antecedent, well-being 
consequent; the one is dynamic, the other static ; the one, 
prosperity, the other, happiness. 1 

There can be no doubt that happiness is universally re- 
garded as desirable in the highest degree. Whence it may 
be presumed that the desire for happiness is a subjective 
necessity, an established uniformity, a natural law in human- 
ity. Also it may be allowed that no man can forecast the 
particular circumstances that would make him happy. 2 Yet 
it seems not impossible for practical ethics to lay down rules 
of conduct in accord with fundamental principles, which, if 

1 " Oil happiness ! our being's end and aim, 

Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, what'er thy name, 

That something still which prompts the eternal sigh, 

For which we bear to live, or dare to die ; 

Which, still so near us, yet beyond us lies, 

O'erlooked, seen double, by the fool and wise ; 

Plant of celestial seed, if dropped below, 

Say in what mortal soil thou deign'st to grow. 

Where grows ? Where grows it not? Jf vam our toil ; 

We ought to blame the culture, not the soil. 

Ask of the learn' d the way ? The learn' d are blind ; 

This bids to serve, and that to shun mankind ; 

Some place the bliss in action, some in ease, 

Those call it pleasure, and contentment these ; 

Some, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end in pain, 

Some, swelled to gods, confess e'en virtue vain; 

Or indolent, to each extreme they fall, 

To trust in everything, or doubt of all." 

— Pope, Essay on Man. 

2 " There is one end," says Kant, "which may be assumed to be actually 
such to all rational beings, and therefore one purpose which they not merely 
may have, but which we may with certainty assume that they all actually 
have by a natural necessity, and this is happiness. To be happy is a pur- 
pose which we may presuppose with certainty and b, priori in every man, 
because it belongs to his being. . . . The notion of happiness is so indefi- 
nite that although every man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say defi- 
nitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills. He is 
unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him 
truly happy, because to do so he would have need to be omniscient." — 
Excerpts from Grundlegung, u. s. w., S. 39-43; Abbott's trans, p. 46 sq. 



190 OBLIGATION 

favored by environment and followed intelligently and per 
sistently, should conduce to happiness. But only a brief 
theoretical consideration is herein admissible. 

It appears, then, there are in general two necessary condi- 
tions of welfare and its consequent happiness, subjective 
observance of moral law, and objective environment favor- 
ing realization. The former is necessary, but insufficient. 
The inward satisfaction arising from a full discharge of obli- 
gation, is an essential and the chief element of happiness ; 
but untoward circumstances may so mar the felicity of a 
righteous worker that we deem him stricken, smitten of 
God, and afflicted. The most perfect man was a man of 
sorrows, suffering the contradiction of sinners against him- 
self. On the other hand, the full possession of health, 
wealth and honors does not in itself constitute welfare. 
Outward success only, like that of Alexander, what doth 
it profit a man ? There must be prosperity both within and 
without in order to welfare, and to its reflex, happiness. 

Also we observe that no one can hopefully make happi- 
ness, however much he may desire it, his immediate object. 
It is altogether out of direct reach. The only possible way 
to it is through its condition, welfare. Hence wisdom dis- 
regards happiness as an end, not looking beyond welfare, 
but seeking this as the end of all endeavor. This attained, 
happiness results by a benign law of human nature ; well- 
being, the sanction of well-doing. A poet has said : Happi- 
ness is a wayside flower ; plucked, it withers in the hand ; 
passed by, it is fragrance to the spirit. 

Moreover, let it be especially observed that, still less can 
any one hopefully make his own personal happiness his end. 
It has been sufficiently shown that, one's own welfare de- 
pends on his seeking the welfare of others. Hence one's 
own happiness is found only in thus promoting that of 
others. Outward duty done for the jsake of inward satisfac- 



WELFARE 191 

tion, fails as duty and as satisfaction. The mother, who 
with much self-denial waits upon her sick babe merely be- 
cause, should the babe die from neglect, she could never for- 
give herself and would suffer the pangs of remorse, that 
mother is an egoist, and not the mother we adore. She may 
escape the pain, yet is unhappy, for this is not the outcome 
of maternal love. Self-seeking in any form is foredoomed to 
failure, for it lacks the perfect virtue which, forgetful of 
self, strives for the welfare of others. Living for one's own 
happiness is living for one's self ; and -living for one's self is 
sure to be a failure. Living for loving service is living for 
others ; and living for others is the sure and only road to 
welfare, both theirs and ours, that welfare whose correlate / 
is happiness, both theirs and ours. 1 

1 Aristotle's eudemonistic theory makes happiness, eidai/iovta, the highest 
good and ultimate end of human endeavor. He holds that happiness de- 
pends on the rational or virtuous activity of the soul continuously exercised, 
defining it to be the energy of the soul according to the best virtue in a com- 
plete life, and saying that with normal activity pleasure is joined as its 
blossom and natural culmination. Yet he hardly distinguishes happiness 
from virtue, saying, in the Politico,, vi, 9, 3, that it consists in an active 
exertion and perfected habit of virtue, dperrjs ev<!pyeia ical xPVfk tis riXeios. 
Nowhere does he seem to have a conception of the higher demand of moral 
law, that dutiful service must be loving service. See Grote, Aristotle (Second 
Edition, 1880), ch. xiii, Ethica, for a critical examination of the doctrine. 

The Stoics did not surpass the Stagirite. They taught that the end of 
man is to live agreeably to the natural constitution of man, tAos ehai rb ffip 
aicoXoijdws 7-77 rod avdpwirov KaTcuncevy . Self-conservation is virtue, and virtue 
is sufficient for happiness ; not that it renders one insensible to pain, but 
because by it one rises superior to pain. — Seneca, Epistola, 9. See Ueber- 
weg, Hist. Phil. , § 55. The doctrine of these cultured but heathen Greeks, 
which for many centuries exerted a powerful influence upon the European 
thought, has not a breath of the charity that suffereth long and is kind, and 
that never f aileth. 

Spinoza, with a like view of virtue, and no thought of charity, taught 
identity, saying, Virtue is happiness. His dictum is, Beatitudo non est vir- 
tutis prcemium, sed ipsa virtus. 

Kant teaches that ' ' All the elements which belong to the notion of hap- 
piness are altogether empirical" ( — trans, p. 49), and the hope to attain it 



192 OBLIGATION 

§ 96. Involved in the notion of welfare is the notion of 
good, a term so very ambiguous that its use has thus far 
been avoided. Good things are relatively or absolutely good. 
The relatively good are those not good in themselves, but 
only as a means to something beyond ; as, riches. We seek 
them in order to attain those absolutely good, that is, such 
as are good in themselves, and not good for aught else ; as, 
luxuries. What is good for something else has value ; what 
is good in itself has worth. An end good in itself is an 
absolute end. 1 

Absolute ends are altogether subjective, found only in 
certain mental states of sentient beings, more especially of 
persons, who habitually seek some one end, and only occa- 
sionally others, as desirable. Ends vary in degrees of excel- 
lence, as good, better, best. The best, the highest aim of 
human activity, is termed the summum bonurn. 

The determination of the absolute, the ultimate good, the 
summum bonum, as the end of all moral endeavor, was the 
primal problem of ancient ethics. 2 The Hedonists found it 
in pleasure, the highest enjoyment of the present passing 
moment. The Epicureans also found it in pleasure, but 
posited the maximum 01 enjoyment extending throughout 
life, and called this happiness. /Plato solved the problem 
grandly by declaring that the highest ultimate good is not 

in any measure depends on our following the dictates, precepts or counsels, 
consilia, of prudence, the hypothetical imperative, quite distinct from the 
intuitive categorical imperative or moral law. See supra, § 44, note. 
This sets happiness entirely apart from morality. His fundamental doctrine 
that " Eespect for the moral law is the only and undoubted moral motive " 
( — trans, p. 243), is fatally defective in this exclusion of all sanction, as 
well as in ignoring the very essence of duty, the love that perfects service, 
that at once consummates and dissolves obligation. 

1 See supra, § 40, note. Also Plato, Republic, bk. ii, p. 357. — Step. 

2 This method of procedure is criticised by Kant in the Analytic of Pure 
Practical Reason; see Abbott's trans., p. 219 sq. See also Sidgwick's 
Methods of Ethics, bk. i, ch. 9, and bk. iii, ch. 14. 



WELFARE 193 

pleasure, nor wealth, nor knowledge, nor power, but is the 
greatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good. 
He taught that happiness depends on the possession of this 
moral beauty and goodness. 1 Aristotle's ultimatum is happi- 
ness, but with a definition, already noted, that distinguishes 
it from pleasure, and is hardly exceptionable. The Stoics, 
taught that the supreme end of life, the ultimate good, is 
virtue, that is, a life conformed to nature^the agreement of 
conduct with the all- regulating law of nature, the human 
with the divine will, whereby the sage combines in himself 
all the essential perfections of deity. We remark that each 
of these several doctrines is egoistic, finding the summum 
bonum, the ultimatum of moral endeavor, to be an attainment 
of the moral agent for and within himself. 2 

§ 97. In modern ethics investigation of the summum 
bonum is less prominent, and various and conflicting views 
are entertained. 3 The utilitarians teach the right aim and 
end to be happiness, whiclPis variously and hazily defined. 
This doctrine divides into egoism and altruism, according as 
the agent regards his own happiness as the end of his 
endeavor, or makes that of related persons its object. If the 
good of a particular person, himself or some other or others, 
be the aim, it is called individualism ; if the good of a com- 
munity at large be the aim, it is called universalism, which 
has as many forms as there are kinds of community ; for 
instance, social, national, or humanistic universalism. In 

1 See Symposium, pp. 202 e, 240 e ; and Gorgias, p. 508 b, Step. Cf. Mat- 
thew, 5 : 48. 

2 See Cicero, Be Finibus Bonorum et Malorum; and Augustine, Be 
Summo Bono. Also supra, § 25, note. 

3 On the matter of this section, which is necessarily very brief, see Mar- 
tineau's Types of Ethical Theory, Sidgwick's History of Ethics, Kulpe's 
Introduction to Philosophy, §§ 27-30, Janet's Theory of Morals, bk. i, chs. 
3, 4, and Wundt's Ethical Systems. 



194 OBLIGATION 

seeking the good of a community the aim should be the 
greatest good of the greatest number. 1 

The dominant form of philosophical ethics at the present 
day seems to be evolutionism, which affirms that develop- 
ment, progress, prosperity, is the end of moral endeavor. 
According to Spencer, that is good, in the widest sense, 
which serves to accomplish some purpose ; and the ultimate 

1 Bacon struck the keynote of utilitarianism when he made the common 
weal the end of moral endeavor. He was followed by Hobbes, Cumberland, 
Locke and Paley, and later by Bentham, Comte and J. S. Mill. Hutche- 
son, in his Inquiry (1725) p. 177, says : " That action is best which produces 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number; and that worst which in like 
manner occasions misery." The phrase here italicized has become famous, 
and is still the recognized principle of the utilitarians and humanitarians. 
Hutcheson anticipated Bentham, to whom the phrase is usually attributed, 
by at least three-fourths of a century. To it other schools object that hap- 
piness is indeterminable, and that what actions would reach the greatest 
number is even more indeterminable. 

By utility is meant that property in any object whereby it tends to pro- 
duce happiness, and the doctrine in morals is that an action which produces 
utility is a right action because utility produces happiness. See Bentham' s 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 1, and J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism. 
To this it is objected that useful action can be known to be such only from 
observation extending over a vast range of facts through a vast period of 
time, which renders it impossible for any except the learned and wise to 
judge what is right, especially in any new combination of circumstances. 
See Wayland's Moral Science, p. 38 sq. ; Grote's Utilitarianism; Lecky's 
History of European Morals, ch. 1. 

Furthermore we object that an action proving useful does not make it 
right, which reverses the order of production, but can only logically show 
it to be right. The utility is causa cognoscendi, not causa essendi, of Tight- 
ness. An action that conforms to the law, is right, regardless of conse- 
quences. When the application of the law to a case is obscure, we may 
forecast from experience the consequences, and if we regard these as tending 
to welfare, we may infer the action to be morally right ; since we have 
already judged that all right action, and it only, has this tendency. Thus 
its consequences help us to know what action is right, but do not make it 
right. Let it be remarked that in the proposition, an action is right be- 
cause it is useful, the word because is ambiguous and misleading. It may 
mean either efficiently producing cause, or logically informing cause, ie., a 
reason. The utility of an action is the latter only. 



WELFARE 195 

conscious purpose of all vital activity is the production or 
retention of pleasure, or the avoidance or removal of pain. 
According to Wundt there is a series of ethical ends, begin- 
ning with self -contentment and self -improvement, rising to 
social ends in public well-being and general progress, and 
terminating in humanistic ends, chiefly intellectual, which 
consist in the continuous improvement of mankind. 1 

In opposition to the foregoing empirical doctrines, is the 
extreme intuitionism of the Kantians, who make the absolute 
ethical end to lie in obedience, pure and simple, to the objec- 
tive moral law. 2 Less extreme are the perfectionists, who 
make the supreme good to lie in excellence of moral charac- 
ter, which excellence they fail to define clearly, but hold 
that it is attained by the active exercise of the intellectual 
and sensitive nature under the presidency of reason. 3 

The present treatise teaches that the aim and end of life 
is the harmonious and complete development of humanity, 
individually, socially, politically and religiously, each one 

1 See Spencer's Data of Ethics, and Wundt 1 s The Facts of the Moral 
Life. Also Williams's A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the 
Theory of Evolution, and Darwin's Descent of Man, ch. 3. See also supra, 
§ 6 note ; § 20 ; and § 21, note. 

2 According to Kant, " Virtue is not the entire, complete good as an ob- 
ject of desire to reasonable, finite beings; for, to have this character it 
should be accompanied by happiness, not as it appears to the interested 
eyes of our personality, which we conceive as an end of itself, but accord- 
ing to the impartial judgment of reason, which considers virtue in general, 
in the world, as an end in itself. Happiness and virtue, then, together con- 
stitute the possession of the sovereign good in an individual, but with this 
condition, that the happiness should be exactly proportioned to the morality, 
this constituting the value of the individual, and rendering him worthy of 
happiness. The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, repre- 
sents the entire or complete good, but virtue must be considered as the 
supreme good, because there can be no condition higher than virtue ; whilst 
happiness, which is unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not 
of itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition, a morally good con- 
duct." — From Fleming's Vocabulary, ad verb., p. 68. 

3 See Janet's Theory of Morals, particularly bk. i, ch. 3. 



196 OBLIGATION 

devoting his constant and total activity to the welfare of his 
fellows in loving service, thus obeying the perfect law of 
love and liberty, and thus promoting, as an unsought conse- 
quence, both his own and their happiness. The ideal of an 
ultimate and absolute good is that of a complete organism 
whose members cooperate in entire harmony ; which implies 
the fulfilling by every organ of its normal functions, and 
hence the perfect wholeness of the organism. It denotes, 
negatively, the absence of all discord, of all impurity; posi- 
tively, the perfection of functional activity. 1 In the moral 
sphere, each rational being is himself an organized whole, 
and also an organized member of wider organisms. Now, 
since in every organic whole each member is at once means 
and end to every other, the law of an intelligent organism 
requires that each member become voluntarily an active 
imparting means, as well as a passive receptive end. Herein 
is the ideal of welfare, and the sphere of the moral law, 
which commands every man to seek, not his own, but 
another's weal. 2 Its observance regards that wholeness 
which is the summum honum. 

The correlative concomitant of wholeness or holiness is 
beatitude or blessedness. This is more than happiness, as 
holiness is more than virtue. 3 Virtue implies a struggle, 
and a virtuous being is still under and continuously endeav- 
oring to conform to the law. But in holy beings there is no 
struggle, they are not under the law, but dwell in a realm of 
perfect love, liberty and bliss. 

1 See supra, §§ 15, 16. 

2 See 1 Corinthians, 10 : 24, 33, and Galatians, 6 : 2. 

8 Carlyle, in Sartor Resartus, bk. ii, ch. 9, notes a difference between 
happiness and blessedness. Hesiod and Homer, in speaking of the gods, 
call them, in an absolute sense, /id/capes, blessed ones. 



DEITY 197 



CHAPTER XIII 

DEITY 

§ 98. The existence of God is a postulate of Ethics. 1 A 
speculative system may be evolved from the mere conception 
of a deity, a conception such as is found, with many modifi- 
cations and varying in degree from obscure to clear, in every 
human mind. But a true ethical theory, thoroughly estab- 
lished as a correct representation of its matter, to be complete 
and fully rounded out in accord with the demands of philo- 
sophical system, must posit as essential, not merely the con- 
ception, but the reality of Deity. We might adopt, relative 
to ethical system, the saying of Voltaire that " if God did 
not exist, it would be necessary to invent him ; but all nature 
cries out to us that he does exist." 

In modern times the attempt has been made, especially by 
the Comteists, to devise a system of humanitarian ethics, 
shutting out even the thought of God. To give such scheme 
philosophic unity and completeness, its authors have been 
necessitated to find a common end for all lines of moral activ- 
ity, and they propose the general welfare of Humanity. 
This Humanity is personified, and set up as an object of rev- 
erence, and even of worship. 2 Or the deity recognized in 
the affairs of the world is " the Stream of Tendency that 

1 See supra, § 13. 

2 See Frederic Harrison's Apologia pro nostra Fide, in Fortnightly Be- 
view f or Nov. , 1888. In a work by H. Gruber, Der Positivimas, u. s. iv., 
1891, may be seen an account of the ceremonies of the orthodox positivists 
of France and England. They have their liturgy, prayers, sacraments, pil- 
grimages, everything but God ; a solar system without a Sun. 



198 OBLIGATION 

makes for righteousness," which is " the Eternal, not our- 
selves." 1 A modified view substitutes " the Unknowable," 
which, notwithstanding the negation, is defined to be " forma- 
tive force, working according to its inner necessity." 2 But 
it is very certain that a generalized abstraction, rhetorically 
personified by a capital letter, will never satisfy the minds 
and hearts of men, nor even meet the demands of a godless 
philosophy. Such proposed end of human endeavor is at 
most either a logical generalization, gathering up in an ab- 
stract formula the moral causes manifest in secular history, 
or an enfeebled pantheism. True ethical theory, however, 
arises, not from impersonal generalities, but from individual 
men and combinations of rational beings in their actual rela- 
tions; not from intellectual abstractions, but from concrete 
realities the most vivid and stern. 3 

1 Matthew Arnold. 

2 Herbert Spencer. 

8 " If, as is the case," wrote Cardinal Newman, "we feel responsibility, 
are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voice of conscience, this 
implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are 
ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If in doing wrong we feel the 
same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a 
mother ; if on doing right we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind which 
follows on receiving praise from a father — we certainly have within us the 
image of some Person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose 
smiles we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct 
our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feel- 
ings within us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent 
being." 

" Man is not mere understanding," says Professor Paulsen, " he is above 
everything else a willing and feeling being. Feelings of humility, reverence, 
yearnings after perfection, with which his heart is inspired by the contem- 
plation of nature and history, determine his attitude to reality more imme- 
diately and profoundly than the concepts and formulae of science. Out of 
these feelings arises the trust that the world is not a meaningless play of 
blind forces, but the revelation of a great and good being whom he may 
acknowledge as akin to his own innermost essence." 

"Our human consciousness," says Professor Findlay, "being without a 
counterpart or explanation in the world of nature, reaches out to some over- 



DEITY 199 

One point may be particularly noticed. Ethical schemes 
that do not recognize a personal sovereign Deity are unable 
to provide for the perfect administration of justice ; they find 
no court of appeal beyond the consensus of men. Now, 
from the patriarchal day of Job until this late and enlight- 
ened day of ours, it has been and still is the common convic- 
tion of thoughtful observers that the distribution of rewards 
and punishments, the avenging of wrongs, the adjustment of 
claims, in the historical life of our race, fail of righteousness. 
But such is the profound faith of mankind in the ultimate 
triumph of the principle of universal justice that this further 
conviction prevails: There must of necessity be a supreme 
court of appeal which shall, in an after life, administer retri- 
bution, vindicate justice, and establish righteousness. Unless 
there be such provision, there is no ground for faith in the 
unity and supremacy of moral law. 1 

§ 99. The ethical theory herein proposed posits as essen- 
tial the real existence of a personal Deity. The one eternal 
God, from everlasting to everlasting, the almighty maker of 
the world, himself a spirit and the father of our spirit, the 
founder and center of all truth, the supreme ruler and final 
judge, unfailing in strict justice while abounding in tender 
mercy, a perfect person conscious of holiness and ruling in 
love — he it is on whom an intelligent faith rests as the 

consciousness, some personal God in whom it may rest and find its element. 
The finite spirit demands the infinite, as each atom of matter the boundless 
space." See supra, § 50, note. 

1 " In the corrupted currents of this world 

Offence's gilded hand may shove hy justice, 
And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself 
Buys out the law ; but 'tis not so above : 
There is no shuffling, there the action lies 
In his true nature, and we ourselves compell'd 
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults 
To give in evidence." 

— Hamlet, Act iii, sc. 3, 1. 67 sq. 



200 OBLIGATION 

original source of authority, and who as legislator, judge and 
executor in one, shall finally perfect all righteousness. 

To those objecting to the anthropomorphic character of 
this conception, a sufficient reply is that no other kind of 
notion is possible to the human mind. For us God is thus, 
or he is not. Holding this to be the true conception does 
not degrade the Deity to the human rank, but lifts the 
human to the divine. He has made us in his image, a little 
lower than divinity, that in his likeness we may become par- 
takers in his glory. 1 

Should it be objected that the introduction of a supernatu- 
ral element into an explanation of natural phenomena is 
unscientific, we admit this to be true of physical science, 
which is concerned with second causes only, having no re- 
course to a first cause. Bacon in his Organum, and Newton 
in his Principia, make frequent and devout reference to the 
Deity, though not as a factor in their systems ; but Laplace, 
it is said, when asked by Napoleon why he made no reference 
to God in his Mechanique Celeste, replied : Sire, I had no 
need of that hypothesis. So the physics of to-day very prop- 

1 Nothing less than personality in the Deity will satisfy humanity. Pan- 
theism freely uses the name of God, and Spinoza, perhaps the most famous 
of pantheists, was surnamed "the God-intoxicated." But this God is not 
our God. The God of the pantheist is Nature, impersonal, unconscious, 
necessitated. See infra, § 142. Pantheism can never be a religion, meeting 
the demand of the soul for a sympathizing person as an object of adoration, 
petition, worship. "If we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all 
religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, 
to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God. Whether 
the etymology which the ancients gave of the Greek word dvdpwiros, man, be 
true or not (they derived it from 6 &vo> adpuv, he who looks upward) ; certain 
it is that what makes man to be man, is that he alone can turn his face to 
heaven ; certain it is that he alone yearns for something that neither sense 
nor reason can supply." — Max Muller, Science of Religion, Lee. 1. 
" Pronaque cum spectent animalia coetera terram, 

Os homini sublime dedit, coelumque tueri 

Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere valtus." 

— Ovid, Metamorphoseon, i, 2. 



DEITY 201 

erly makes no mention of the Deity. But in metaphysics 
the chief problem is the existence of God. Ethics, which 
also is not a science of material nature, but of human nature, 
of man on his spiritual side, in like manner transcends 
physics. It treats exclusively of mental states and acts, of 
phenomena of the soul or spirit. The facts on which its 
theory is based are subjective facts of direct observation by 
introspection, which are combined with inferences from them 
and from observed external activities. Here we are wholly 
within the spiritual sphere. 1 A clear distinction may be 
made, by a difference in degree, between the human and the 
superhuman, but who shall draw the line between the natu- 
ral and the supernatural ? 2 To posit in the spiritual sphere 
a supreme personal spirit, so far from being unscientific, is 
simply to complete the content of the sphere with a substance 
and its attributes, with the conscious personality of a rational 
being, in kind like to that which gives rise to the theory ; 
and therefore this complementing of the scheme is strictly 
scientific. 3 

1 See supra, § 18, note. 

2 Professor F. Godet, in his Defence of the Christian Faith, Lee. 4, p. 
148, Lyltleton's translation, seeks to do so. He defines the supernatural 
as "any modification of being in nature which is not the effect of the forces 
with which it is endowed, or of the laws under whose command those forces 
act." Of such modifications he finds two cases, "the one existing in nature 
itself, man; the other, above nature, God," both characterized as super- 
natural beings by freedom. Passing by the errors of viewing laws as causes, 
and natural laws as mandatory, we remark that to say the freedom of man, 
a being within nature, "is not the effect of the forces with which it [nature] 
is endowed," is inept, unless "nature" be restricted by definition to a 
meaning more narrow than that commonly understood in scientific discus- 
sion. Freedom is not something superadded to man's nature ; it is the very 
law of his being, and essential also in the nature of a personal Deity. See 
Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, ch. 2. 

3 Should anyone flippantly say that the introduction of the Deity into 
ethical theory renews the Deus ex machina of the ancient drama, a god let 
down at last, from the machinery overhead, to disentangle the imbroglio on 
the stage, the answer is easy. Theism posits God as the only explanation 



202 OBLIGATION 

§ 100. The ground from which the doctrine of this treatise 
has thus far been developed, is the natural constitution of 
man. His several powers of intellect and will, his emotional 
capacity, and the impulse to activity in his motive desires, 
have each a normal and cooperative function. Herein is dis- 
cerned the principle that it is right to gratify normal desire, 
together with the supreme law of humanity commanding the 
constant order of facts that ought to be, the single impera- 
tive of trespass, duty, justice or loving service. Now, it may 
reasonably be asked whether the common constitution . of 
human beings is to be regarded as an ultimate ground, an 
original source of obligation, beyond which there is no 
determinant. 

Positivism answers affirmatively, which consists with its 
rigid empiricism. But we have tried to show that there is 
for us something more than experience. Evolutionism finds 
an antecedent determinant in the environment, a combina- 
tion of second causes, under whose influence the human con- 
stitution has been developed. But when we consider the 
great variety of environment to which the several races of 
mankind have been subjected, we should expect, on this 
view, to find a corresponding variety of constitution, and 
consequent varieties of moral law ; whereas, however great 
the variations in degree especially of intelligence, and the 
variety of constructions built upon the law, still, throughout 
history and everywhere, mankind is one, and the law is one. 1 

of cosmic order, as both establishing and maintaining. If from the drama 
of human life his part be left out, then indeed it were a comedy to those who 
think, a tragedy to those who feel. But on recognizing him as its author 
director, and principal personage, present throughout, combining, regulating, 
overruling the great lines of action amid a free play of characters, the whole 
becomes intelligible, the obscure clear, and the ultimate solution foreseen. 

1 The pessimism of Pascal led him to say, in Pensees, that justice on one 
side of the Pyrenees is a different thing from justice on the other side. But 
even Hobbes found place to say : " The laws of Nature [meaning of Human 



DEITY 203 

This essentially permanent uniformity points distinctly 
to an origin for the human constitution in a cause beyond 
itself and its environment, and, on the principle of like effect 
like cause, to a common cause, to a unity in the originating 
cause. 1 The existence of an omnipotent and consistent 
maker and ruler, is the only satisfactory explanation of these 
significant facts that has been or can be offered, and this 
explanation alone fulfills the demand of ethical theory. 

§ 101. Many theistic moralists hold that the will of God 
is the original and ultimate ground of obligation. He has 
made us as it hath pleased him, revealing his will in us, and 
in our relations to each other and to himself. A reverent 
interpretation of nature and of history enables us to under- 
stand his will more clearly, and to these he has added a 
distinct revelation of it in the holy scriptures. Had it 
pleased him to make us and our surroundings otherwise, or 
merely to issue different, even contrary, commandments, our 
obligations would have been different from what they are, 
since his express will is their sole, sufficient and final 
ground. 

That the will of God, however revealed, defines our obliga- 
tions is unquestionable. But we cannot regard his authority 
as decisive, if it be merely arbitrary ; for this view implies 
the possibility of contradictions that are revolting. Should 
he capriciously command lying, murder, theft, all heaven 
and earth would rebel. The doctrine unwittingly represents 
him as a tyrant ruling by fear, liable to transient whims 
inverting right and wrong, disordering order, compounding 
felony, falsifying truth, thereby divesting his intelligent 

Nature ; see supra, § 18, note] are immutable and eternal. What they 
forbid can never be lawful ; what they command can never be unlawful." 
— Be Cive, vol. ii, p. 46. 

1 See Elements of Inductive Logic, § 21 ; and Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, p. 384 of Meiklejohn's translation. 



204 OBLIGATION 

subjects of all reliable knowledge of himself and of his crea- 
tions. Such notion is psychologically, philosophically and 
logically absurd. 1 

We must look beyond the will of God for the ultimate 
determinant of obligation, into that which determines his 
will, into his original, eternal, essential nature. Necessarily 
and rightly we conceive of him as a spirit, having harmoni- 
ous attributes constituting his nature, in which is no vari- 
ableness nor shadow of turning. Being in himself the 
embodiment of truth, it is impossible for him to lie ; being 
essentially just, he can never justify crime ; such self-contra- 
diction would dethrone him, would be the suicide of God. 
His omnipotence is not absolute, but limited to what accords 
with his nature, and his every action is confined to the strait 
and narrow way of righteousness. The macrocosm, the 
world, " answering his fair idea," conforms in the fixed 
material laws to his unchanging essence, and the uniformity 
of nature is the faithfulness of God. The microcosm, man, 
the express image of his person, is formed to conform in the 
fixed moral law to the same unchanging essence, and the 
oneness of justice is the righteousness of God. It is not 
the will, but the nature of the Deity that is the original and 
ultimate ground of obligation, 2 

1 "Amongst the rational principles of morality," says Kant, "the onto- 
logical conception of perfection, notwithstanding its defects, is better than 
the theological conception which derives morality from an absolutely perfect 
divine will." If we avoid a gross circle tacitly presupposing the morality 
which it is to explain, " the only conception of the divine will remaining to 
us is a conception made up of the attributes of desire for glory and dominion, 
combined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance ; and any 
system of morals erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to 
morality." — Grundlegung, etc., Abbott's trans., p. 89. 

2 " Here is the Ground of Right ; the nature and character of God, the 
great designer and creator of all things ; and my nature and character so far 
as I am the expression of this creator and his design. I am right when 
energizing and controlling myself in accordance with these ; my rights are 



DEITY 205 

§ 102. The final problem in our obligation to each other 
is now readily solved. The prior examination of human 
nature found it constituted for a free and harmonious play 
of its powers in the exercise of loving service, and this was 
recognized as the sum of obligation. Further examination 
has disclosed that human nature is derived from and akin to 
the divine nature, so that in promoting the welfare of each 
other, men are conforming to the divine will arising from 
the divine nature. ^'The maker and ruler has given to every 
man more or less ability to promote the common welfare, and 
holds him accountable for its exercise. Whoever unwar- 
rantably interferes with this service trespasses both on the 
servant and on the served, and thereby violates the divine 
will and nature. Much has been said about the divine 
right of kings. Every man's right is a divine right ; both 
because of its origin, and because it involves the right of the 
Deity himself. Hence the sacredness of human rights, and 
the paramount obligation to respect them. Arising from the 
very nature of God, they are invariable, inalienable, irrevo- 
cable, grounded in eternal justice and truth, and he who 
would violate them is at war with the inflexible Almighty. 

Along with our obligation to each other is our obligation 

whatever may be necessary to my so doing. By knowing and doing the 
right, I attain to excellence ; excellence brings enjoyment ; and in the two 
combined I find blessedness." — A. T. Bledsoe in Southern Beview for Oct., 
1875, p. 436. 

The theistic moralist may learn much from heathen philosophy. " This 
then, as it appears to me," says Cicero, "has been the decision of the wisest 
men, that law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor estab- 
lished by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle which 
governs the entire universe, wisely commanding and forbidding. Therefore 
they called that primal and supreme law the mind of God enjoining or for- 
bidding each separate thing in accordance with reason. On which account 
it is that this law, which the gods have given to the human race, is so justly 
praised. For it is the reason and mind of a wise Being equally able to urge 
us to good, and to deter us from evil." — Laws, i, 4. 



206 OBLIGA TION 

to God. To him is due, in the most comprehensive sense, 
loving service. We are bound to love God for his own sake, 
and all others for God's sake. 1 The recognition of him as 
our personal creator and ruler, and of our obligation to him 
as his creatures and subjects, leading to adoration, is religion, 
the binding of man to God. 2 Thus ethics expands over reli- 
gion by comprehending the author of our being, the father 
of our spirit, the eternal One from whom all our obligations 
arise, and in whom all our obligations end. He desires all 
that is disorderly to become orderly, and calls upon his 
rational free creatures to gratify, so far as in them lies, this 
desire ; hence it is hardly too much to say that our conduct 
affects the welfare and happiness of Our Father. 3 To serve 
rightly our fellows for his sake, is to serve him ; and a tres- 
pass upon a fellow man is a trespass upon him. Moreover, 
he has a supreme right to our reverential worship, and omit- 
ting or neglecting it is using our freedom, which having 
given he will not revoke, to restrict his liberty in gathering 
up his due. 

Contemplating, inversely, the relation of God to man, we 
observe that the obligation is not properly reciprocal. We 

1 Which brings the peace of God that passeth understanding. 

" D'un coeur qui t'aime, 
Mon Dieu, qui peut troubler la paix ? 
H cherche en tout ta volonte' supreme, 

Et ne se cherche jamais. 
Sur la terre, dans le ciel meme, 
Est-il d' autre bonheur que la tranquille paix 
D'un cceur qui t'aime?" 

— Kacine, Athalie, close of Act iii. 

2 Religion, from Lat. religio ; etymology doubtful. " Allied to religens, 
fearing the gods, pious ; and therefore not derived from religare, to bind, as 
often supposed." — Skeat. Lactantius of the third century, followed by 
Augustine of the fifth, and many others, held that it is from re-ligare, to 
bind back or anew. This, however, seems to refer to the Tall, which is 
hardly allowable to an ante-classical word. 

8 " To do good and to communicate forget not ; for with such sacrifices 
God is well pleased." — Hebrews, 13 : 16. 



DEITY 207 

cannot think of the Deity as under any obligation, under 
aoy law, under anything ; for this contradicts his essentially 
absolute supremacy and sovereignty. But while it cannot 
correctly be said that he is bound to be steadfast in purpose, 
and faithful in promise, it is very certain that he will be 
thus, and all that is righteous, because of his ultimate 
nature. 1 Now, as the universality of physical, psychical and 
ethical law indicates his unity, so does the total content of 
ethical law, loving service, indicate his benevolence. He 
seeks the welfare and consequent happiness of his sentient 
creatures in his own constant loving service of them, both 
by direct providence, and by the obligation laid upon them 
to serve each other. Hence are we confident of his inexor- 
able and perfected justice, essential to entire welfare, in 
which justice every life shall eventually be complete ; also 
of his tender mercy to the erring, he having opened a way, 
through infinite self-sacrifice, whereby to be just and yet 
justify the penitent, and secure to him eternal welfare and 
blessedness. Our God is no egoist, but an altruist. He did 
not make us, nor does he rule us, for his own glory, but for 
our own beatitude. God is love. 



1 We speak of his justice and holiness, but never of his duty or virtue. 
"No imperatives hold for the divine will, or in general for a holy will; 
ought is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily 
in unison with the law." — Kant, Grundlegung, u. s. w. § 43. 

Bacon, in his treatise Of the Advancement of Learning, bk. vii, quotes 
Aristotle as saying: "As beasts cannot be said to have vice or virtue, so 
neither can the gods ; for as the condition of the latter is something more 
elevated than virtue, so that of the former is something different from vice." 



Ilav to crai/xa crvvapfioXoyovfxevov /cat o-v/A/?i/?a£o/x€vov Sta Traces 
a^5 tt/s c7ri^op>;ytas, /car' cvepyetav ev /act/ow evo? eKaorov [tcpovs, 
r-qv av£r)cnv tov crw/xaros 7roieiTai ets oiKoBofxrjv kavrov ev ayd7rr]. 



ETHICS 



SECOND PAKT-OKGANIZATION 
TRANSITION 

§ 103. A glance over the course thus far pursued will 
prepare for further advance. The purpose of Ethics is to 
bring our ordinary moral judgments, so far as they tally with 
enlightened conscience, into a coherent system, discovering 
in them a principle which shall give it philosophic unity, 
and also furnish, if we would not have a mere castle in the 
air, a foundation on which to build. Beginning with the 
common notion of a right, its condition is at once seen to be 
a reciprocal relation between persons, each having orderly 
claims upon the other, which claims compose his rights. 
These rights are grounded in the very constitution of human 
nature, which, moved by its normal desires, seeks their grati- 
fication. The fundamental right is a right to liberty in this 
pursuit. This is the primary principle of Ethics. An inten- 
tional violation of a right, an interference in one's proper 
liberty, is a wrong, a trespass, which being a subversion of 
constituted order, is forbidden. This is the moral law, dis- 
cerned by conscience, and supported by subjective and objec- 
tive sanctions. 

Obligation takes several forms whose essence is one. Pri- 
marily its law forbids aggressive trespass, then equally it 
forbids retentive and neglective trespass. From these emerge 

209 



210 ORGANIZATION 

the comprehensive forms of justice, duty, virtue, service and 
love, the last pair being the choice expression simply because 
it brings more clearly forward the common essence. For, in 
examining the springs of action, the affections are seen to be 
naturally paramount, all other desires ancillary and disinter- 
ested. They are inconsistent with interested motives whose 
ends, lying within the agent himself, are selfishly opposed 
to loving service. The ideal man expends his energies in 
serving the interests of his fellows without thought of his 
own as separate and independent, but only as involved in 
the common welfare. 

It should be observed that there are three principal notions 
pervading the discussion, which grow out from the funda- 
mental notion of rights. These are: 

1st. Trespass, in its direct and indirect sense, which as 
forbidden expresses the whole of obligation. 

2d. Trust, in the active sense of mutual confidence that 
the law of trespass will be observed; and in the passive 
sense of stewardship, of being a trustee of all possessions, 
including life itself. 

3d. Defense, meaning the right and duty to guard trusts 
by resisting encroachment on them ; which is the only prem- 
ise that can warrant an interference in another's liberty. 

A strict and generous conformity to law results in common 
welfare. Welfare consists of liberty and continuous success 
in the exercise of benevolence and beneficence. The correl- 
ative criterion and natural consequence of welfare is happi- 
ness, which involves the special pleasure arising from a 
consciousness of disinterested conduct, and in general that 
arising from the satisfaction of enlarged and harmoniously 
regulated desires. But it is the essential dignity of benevo- 
lence rather than the resultant happiness that makes common 
welfare the proper aim and end of endeavor. 

Finally, the general constitution or nature of mankind is 



TRANSITION 211 

not the ultimate ground of obligation. A practical ethics 
may be built upon it, but complete theory needs to look 
beyond, into the nature of the Maker, which is the ultimate 
determinant of all nature, and more especially of the native 
obligation which binds his rational creatures to each other 
and to himself. 1 

§ 104. We are to pass now from the consideration of obli- 
gation, a binding together, to that of organization, a working 
together. Heretofore the simple reciprocal relation of man 
to man, with occasional anticipations of other relations, has 
been the basis of our explanation. This view has proved 
sufficient for the development of certain ethical principles, 
and their application to the case supposed. But human 
relations are mostly complex, consisting largely of relations 
of the individual man to societies, and of societies to their 
individual members, and also of societies to each other. In 
considering hereafter these complex relations, it will be 
found that the same principles without addition are applica- 
ble to solve the obligations involved. The right aim of 
society, in its various organic forms, is likewise the common 
welfare, to be sought under the impulse of love. Every 
moral agent is a member of some system in whose welfare 
his own is bound up, and thus sharing his own beneficence, 
he finds his welfare, not in opposition to or deprivation of 
others or in any self-seeking, but in union with his kind. 

1 The doctrine that the moral law is discoverable in the constitution of 
human nature brings to light the profound ethical significance of the motto 
inscribed over the portal of the temple at Delphi : Know thyself. See in 
Elements of Psychology, opposite p. 1, Plato's comment as found in 
Charmides, 164d, Step. 

Perhaps the first who declared the unity and divinity of the law was 
Herakleitos of Ephesus (circa 500 b.c.) who, in Fragment 91, says: "All 
human laws are nourished by (or fed by, and so get their strength from) 
One, the divine (or of God) ; for it has power (strength, force) so much as 
he wills, and it has enough for all, and more than enough." See his words 
on the title-page of this volume, and cf. his koiv6$ (£w6s) \6yos in Fr. 92. 



212 



KJJX KxjO.HJ.L,^ II UJS 



The advantage of organized effort is familiar in the notion 
of help, the combination of several energies to accomplish a 
single purpose, one will directing many forces to the same 
end. ' The will may be that of one man, as a Caesar, a Loy- 
ola, a Richelieu, a Napoleon, a Bismarck, overmastering and 
bringing to unity the wills of a multitude ; or, turning from 
autocracy to democracy, the unity of many wills may be the 
result of a free consensus, as in a republic, and in voluntary 
associations of all kinds. In this oneness of will the divided 
becomes an individual, a Briareus. What is subjectively 
plural is objectively single. The individuality is complete 
in its solidarity, and the combination is to be judged as an 
undivided whole, whether it be a family, a mercantile firm, a 
society, an army, or a nation. 

Likewise let it be observed that conscience is catholic, and 
the law it reveals universal. Now a combination of men for 
a common purpose or purposes must be duly regulated by 
the common conscience. An organized association is respon- 
sible for its official actions. Even a nation may do right or 
wrong, and accordingly is honored or censured and perhaps 
punished. As a common will makes it an individual, so a 
common conscience makes it a person ; for as a body it is 
conscious of obligation, and thus is a person. This organic 
personality, though not wholly independent of, yet is to be 
distinguished from, the private and persistent personality of 
the members taken severally, for it implies a mass of super- 
added obligations dominating the whole. Thus an organism, 
or that wherein all parts and the whole are mutually means 
and end, is recognized, when it consists of men, as an indi- 
vidual person ah ty, subject in all functional activity, both 
internal and external, to the moral law. 1 

1 Eelative to this general topic, see especially supra, §§ 14-16. 



THE 213 



CHAPTER I 

THE MAN 

§ 105. It will be well, as introductory to the subsequent 
matter and for the sake of its clear treatment, to examine 
here the organic character of the human constitution. 

Each individual man is a completely organized being. 
Primarily he consists of a body and a mind or spirit. He is 
essentially a duality. A human body without a mind is not 
a man ; it is merely a corpse. A mind without a body is — 
science knows not what. The disembodied human spirit 
may furnish matter for revelation, but since it presents no 
phenomena for our observation, it is beyond the reach of 
science. The man we study is a body and mind. These 
are coordinate. Both being essential, we cannot say which 
has priority in efficiency, any more than we can say which 
blade of a pair of shears does the more work. They cooper- 
ate, and neither can perform its functions apart from the 
other. Thus the body is for the mind, and the mind is for 
the body. Each is a means serving the other as an end, so 
that together they constitute a duplex organic whole. 1 

1 For definition of organism, see supra, § 15. Ever since Plato declared 
the end of philosophy to be unity, science has constantly been seeking the 
reduction of the many to one ; and in the history of philosophy we find a 
doctrine of the absolute. But does not the ultimate constitution of the uni- 
verse of things seem rather to be essentially duplex ; essential, since each 
thing depends for its actuality upon some other ; ultimate, since analysis of 
what is essentially a pair is annihilation ? God and the world ; creator and 
creature ; the spiritual and the corporeal spheres ; mind and matter ; subject 
and object ; means and end ; time and space ; attraction and repulsion ; 
love and hate ; heaven and hell ; good and evil ; and so on indefinitely. 



214 ORGANIZATION 

Evidently the body is itself an organism. The limbs are 
for the sustenance of the trunk, and the trunk is for the 
sustenance of the limbs. If the body suffer mutilation, the 
loss may in a measure be compensated by an increased or a 
specialized activity of other organs, yet it is a defect. The 
heart supplies the brain with blood, the brain supplies the 
heart with energy. Moreover, each subsidiary organ is itself 
an organism. The visual organ, the eye, serving as a guide 
to the movements of the whole, is composed of various 
organs, as the cornea, the lens, the retinal screen, each of 
which is a means to every other as an end. Thus the whole 
body is an organism composed of many organisms, to each of 
which every other and the whole brings its contribution. 1 

§ 106. The mind is a complement of faculties, an assem- 
blage of functions. 2 Its several generic powers, knowing and 

That contraries are first principles of entities is a Pythagorean doctrine (see 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, bk. i, ch. 5). Necessarily we conceive things by 
virtue of their oppositions (see Elements of Psychology, § 56 sq.), and if the 
realities correspond with our conceptions, the universe is a system of coun- 
terparts in couples polarized. See supra, § 14 sq. 

Philosophic materialism on the one hand, and idealism on the other, 
teach monism, the unity of the human being, of self ; but the prevailing 
doctrine in philosophy is dualism, and such is the common notion of man- 
kind. This dualism of mind and body is usually thought of as limited to 
mankind, or at most extended to animals ; but, in the very dawn of philoso- 
phy, two centuries before Plato, the Ionians taught hylozoism, d\r}, matter, 
and fay, life, that all matter is endowed with life, or, as Thales expressed it, 
all things to be full of gods, iravra irXriprj deQv ehai. — Aristotle, DeAnima, 
i, 5. This doctrine, with some modification, has in our day been revived 
under the title panpsychism or the universal subconsciousness of matter. 
See Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, bk. i, ch. 1, § 5. 

1 " In the physical constitution of an organized being," says Kant, "we 
assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be 
found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose." — 
Grundlegung, etc., Abbott's trans, p. 13. What follows on pp. 14-16 will 
repay thoughtful reading. 

2 See supra, § 1, and note ; also § 16. 



THE MAN 215 

feeling, desiring and willing, are reciprocally related. Each 
class is a means to the others as ends, enabling them to fulfill 
their normal functions. Were there no intelligence, there 
could be no emotion or sentiment ; were there no intelligence 
and feeling, there could be no desire ; were there no desire, 
there could be no volition ; and were there no motived voli- 
tion, there could be no intelligence higher than mere brutal 
receptivity. Each serves the other and the whole. 

We must be on our guard lest we transfer to this spiritual 
sphere our notions of corporeal organs. These organs are 
distinct entities standing apart in space ; whereas the mental 
faculties and capacities are simply properties or functions of 
one and the same entity whose substance has no relation to 
space, except through the incorporating body. 1 It is never- 
theless evident that these generic properties are mutually 
related as means and end. Hence they are organized as to 
their functions, and the mind, by virtue of this constitution, 
is a spiritual organism. 

Furthermore, the specific powers are organically related, 
each special faculty being supported in the exercise of its 
functions by each and all the rest of its class. It will be 
best to exemplify this by the desires, with which, as motives 
of the will, we are here particularly concerned. 

The desires are primarily divided into the craving desires, 
or appetites and appetencies, whose function impels to 
acquire, and the giving desires, or affections, whose func- 
tion impels to impart. 2 This opposition is merely logical, 
for actually, in their naturally constituted order, they coop- 
erate, the former seeking to acquire in order that the latter 
may be prepared to impart. The suppression or hinderance 
of either would be a mutilation, worse than the amputation 
of a leg or arm. As already pointed out, the exercise of the 

1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 77, 78, 149, 154. 

2 See supra, §§ 5, 6. 



216 ORGANIZATION 

craving desires in disregard of the affections, is abnormal, 
leading to a distraction of the affections from their proper 
objects, and to a subversion of their functions; also the 
exercise of the affections in disregard of the appetites and 
appetencies, is abnormal, leading to inefficiency from lack of 
resources supplying what affection would bestow; but, if 
both classes be exercised according to their constitutional 
relations, each with regard to the other, then the offices they 
are naturally fitted to fulfill are performed, their several and 
combined efficiency is attained, and their exercise is normal. 1 
Each is for the other. 

The same principle is applicable to all the various mental 
powers both in particular and in general, thus showing the 
mind as a whole to be an organism consisting of minor or 
subsidiary organisms so delicately adjusted that an excess or 
deficiency or distortion in the action of any one disorders 
every other and the whole. 

§ 107. Let us try for a moment to imagine what a man 
might be and become if he were somehow so separated from 
all objects of affection that it could have no play. We need 
not suppose him incapable of affection, but only that it be 
wholly dormant from lack of call. Allow that this solita^ can 
provide the necessaries of life, and even many of its luxuries, 
and that he can successfully engage in self-culture. Pru- 
dently caring for his body, he is temperate, and enjoys phys- 
ical health and strength. Under the impulse of craving 
propensities, he acquires a wealth of means to further enjoy- 
ment, and his cultured intellect gathers and delights in treas- 
ures of knowledge. 

1 See supra, §§ 78, 79. It should be observed that the term affection is 
used here and heretofore in its popular sense of benevolence. In its wider 
generic and scientific sense affection is of two kinds, benevolent and malevo- 
lent. See Elements of Psychology, §§ 262, 263. In general the benevolent 
affections are normal, the malevolent abnormal. 



THE MAN 217 

Now we point out that, in this imaginary case, there is 
strictly nothing moral or immoral; for, it is the relation 
to rational beings, including Deity, or at least to sentient 
beings, and not merely the possession of a rational nature, 
that determines the existence of rights and obligation. No 
trespass is possible, in case of an absolute solitary, for there 
are no rights or counter rights. No duty is done, for there 
is no one to whom a debt is due. There is no virtue or 
vice, for there is no law demanding conformity. There is 
no justice or injustice, for there is no claimant. Nor can 
there be loving service. Indeed, this isolated man is desti- 
tute of actual conscience, for no occasion would bring the 
potential to an actual discernment of moral law. He has no 
responsibility, is not a moral being, not human, not a man, 
unus homo, nullus homo, not a person, since he has no con- 
sciousness of obligation. With him nothing is either right 
or wrong ; even suicide would not be a crime. 1 Truly it is 
not good that the man should be alone. Pleasures we allow 
he may have, even the intellectual; otherwise they are less 
than brutal, for the brute enjoys at least instinctive affec- 
tion. But the solitary can never be happy, certainly not 
with that happiness which ripens into blessedness. 2 

It appears, then, that man is essentially a moral being, 
and therefore essentially a social being. So let us change 
our supposition from one solitary to one in society, whose 
affections, however, are wholly dormant because of his entire 
selfishness. Guided by the counsels of prudence, 3 negatively 
in avoiding harm, positively in securing personal benefit, he 
may accomplish the correct functioning of his physical or- 
gans, and maintain his body in wholesome condition. Also 
he may wisely discipline his intellectual powers, and regulate 
his passions and emotions, and so attain a high grade of effi- 
ciency. Moreover, by observing certain rules of art, using 

1 See supra, § 85, note. 2 See supra, § 97. 3 See supra, § 44. 



218 OB GANIZA TION 

his fellows as means to secure his own ends, 1 he may accu- 
mulate wealth, power, and fame. Such seem to have been the 
character and aims of the more refined peoples of antiquity, 
especially of the Greeks. Their self-culture, looking solely 
to the beautiful development of the individual man, was 
very sensitive to the aesthetic elements essential to excel- 
lence, while the ethical elements were more lightly esteemed 
and often disregarded. The tendency was strongly egoistic, 
seeking the enjoyment of a fair personality, and its secure 
tenure against infringement. And in modern times such 
self -culture is widely and highly approved, many moralists 
making it the basis of their systems. 

The supposition of a cultured man in society without nat- 
ural affection is monstrous. Unlike the solitary, he is a 
morally responsible person, for conscience in him is actual, 
the law is upon him, and in his disregard of all save his own 
interests, he is a law-breaker, thoroughly immoral. Yet, 
strange to say, he may be a good neighbor and citizen ; for, 
if one selfishly serve his own interest with far-sighted pru- 
dence and wide-reaching wisdom, this works out for society 
very much the same result as if his energies were wholly 
devoted to thoroughly unselfish, disinterested, loving ser- 
vice. Such is the economical ordering of human affairs. 2 
But it does not so work for the man himself. Though far 
from criminal or even disorderly, though he do not sin with 
his lips, and though he practice, for his own ends, a large 
beneficence, yet, without benevolence, he is a whited sepul- 
cher, a hypocrite, a moral monster. More likely, however, 
the inward corruption breaks forth, poisoning the air and 
multiplying ills. This has usually been the historical result. 3 
These considerations illustrate the fact that men are social 

1 See supra, § 84. 2 See supra, § 76, note. 

3 See the catalogues in Bomans, 1 : 28-32, and 2 Timothy, 3 : 1-5. Cf. 
Colossians, 3 : 5-8. 



TBE MAN 219 

beings in the sense of interdependence, not merely for the 
common needs of pleasurable living, but also for moral devel- 
opment by the exercise of mutual affection, through which 
alone the dignity of complete manhood is attainable. 

§ 108. But in real human life there is not and cannot be 
thorough seclusion. A solitary is a mere negation, a meta- 
physical abstraction, a logical ghost. We find ourselves in 
a world of fellow beings from whom it is impossible to be 
completely absolved. Even a Selkirk on his desert isle not 
only remembers his former associations, but contemplates 
the possibility of a return to the world, and hence is bound 
to comport himself with reference to it, to care for and culti- 
vate his powers as far as may be in view of that possibility. 
But should he reasonably despair of a return among men, 
still he may not neglect his personal dignity, or ever, even 
under the greatest suffering, take his own life ; for he can- 
not know his future here, and one relation, the chiefest of 
all, persists. He is bound by indissoluble obligations to his 
maker, law-giver and judge, whose claims are never released, 
and whose honor is involved. 

Also let it be remarked that the individual owes his exis- 
tence, as well as the possibility of its continuance and of all 
moral culture, so much to the human society in which he is 
ordinarily included, that it is rare to find one so totally de- 
praved as to be entirely destitute of all natural affection. 
A mother gives birth to her child; therein and thereafter 
the moral tie binds. No distance of place or time can atten- 
uate it to nothingness, no violence can sever it, even death 
spares a bond in dutiful memories rendered more precious 
and sacred by loss. Can a woman forget her sucking child, 
that she should not have compassion on the son of her 
womb ? Hardly is it possible. Can a son forget the mother 
who bore him, that he should not have compassion for her 



220 OR GANIZA TION 

pains, her nurture, her watchings, her tender caresses? 
Hardly, yet perhaps less rare. Shall he not, even in mature 
years, honor his father and mother with kindly watch-care 
and grateful memories ? Surely, even amid a godless civili- 
zation, or even amid a barbarous heathenism, Nature will 
enforce in some measure her claims for loving service. 1 

* § 109. If we view each man, then, as an organism of orga- 
nized organs, these standing to each other and to the whole 
in a relation of interdependence, and if we observe that he 
has the power of self-direction and control, it is clear that it 
is within him to conserve and cultivate his natural powers 
by regulating their organic relations, and that the bringing 
of all the corporeal and spiritual powers with which he is 
endowed by nature into full activity and harmonious coop- 
eration, is the discharge of obligation and the perfection of 
manhood. But also it is clear that the constitution of the 
man, apart from his affections, furnishes no ethical element, 
no basis for an ethical system. His subsidiary powers of 
body and mind are not persons, and there is no moral ele- 
ment that does not involve a personal relation. 2 

1 ' ' We could not live in society unless we had some of the qualities of 
the moral character. We should be what Hobbes supposed us to be, mere 
brutes with intelligence enough to see that it is best to give up something in 
order to attain a greater good. Honesty then were honesty only because it 
is the best policy." 

2 "The trifling of comparing society with a living organism, that is to 
say, that of a man or an animal, and of making the functions of the latter 
the pattern for its regulation, is altogether fruitless. The essential differ- 
ence is overlooked, that every such living organism serves a single individual 
soul with very many wholly impersonal parts ; while in society many indi- 
vidual persons unite themselves into a community which does not exist 
apart from them as a distinct being.' 1 — Lotze, Practical Philosophy, § 49. 
Plato committed this " trifling " in taking the organization of the individual 
man as the pattern for the constitution of his ideal republic. Also Freder- 
ick II : "As men are born and live for a certain period, and at last die of 
age or infirmity, so also States are constituted ; they flourish for some cen- 
turies and then at last cease to exist." — Antimacchiavelli, ch. 9. So also 



THE MAN 221 

Such relation is necessarily implied in the existence and 
exercise of affection. There must be a sentient object, one 
capable of benefit, to whom there is conscious obligation. 
Herein, and herein only, personality appears ; herein, and 
herein only, moral character has its root and growth. The 
affections being psychologically and ethically essential to 
integral manhood, it follows that a man cannot be truly 
and rightly a man apart from his fellows, and in his 
relations to them his conscience discerns the moral law de- 
manding the exercise of righteous affections, and claiming 
recognition as the supreme law of humanity. 

There is no need to consider further the individual man. 
We have noted him as a typical organism, pointing out that, 
apart from his relations to others, that is, in him alone, there 
is no ethical element. In the prior part of this treatise the 
reciprocal relations of man to man, in their ethical aspect, 
have been discussed at length.* True the mere coexistence 
of two persons may correctly be construed as an organism, 
each being for the other and both for the pair; especially 
exemplified by partners in business, they being formally uni- 
fied. But to view the simple relation of man to man as an 
organism would lead to no conclusions other than those 
already attained, and hence we may now dismiss this simple 
case also, and proceed to consider more intricate relations. 

Herbert Spencer : " We find not only that the analogy between society and 
a living creature is borne out, but that the same definition of life applies to 
both." — Social Statics, p. 490. Elisha Mulford says : "The logical fallacy 
of defining an ethical by a physical organism, and limiting the one to the 
conception of the other, appears in Draper's Civil Polity. . . . But nations 
do not exist in history in this limitation in a physical sequence ; they ap- 
pear under the conditions of a moral life, and their growth or decay is 
traced, not in necessary, but in moral causes." — The Nation, p. 18, note. 
And von Mohl says : ' ' These conceptions of the State and its correspon- 
dences based on physical science appear from time to time, partly through 
an altogether sickly tendency of thought, and partly through a mystical and 
fanciful conceit.' 1 — Encyklopadie der Staatswissenschaften, p. 84. 



222 ORGANIZATION 



CHAPTER II 

THE FAMILY 

§ 110. A study of the simple relation of man to man has 
enabled us to discover the principles of obligation, with their 
application in equivalent intercourse. This exposition, how- 
ever, though fundamental and widely comprehensive, is not 
exhaustive, and not adequate to the demands of right living. 
For, in actual life, the relations subsisting among men exhibit 
many varieties in kind, and those of the same kind many 
differences in degree ; also these relations are subject to 
many and extreme changes, often amounting to reversal, due 
to growth, activity, and the ceaseless mutations of inter- 
course. Now, since all obligations originate in and corre- 
spond to present relations, it follows that the special duty of 
a man to some one on his right hand is rarely quite similar 
to what is due to some one on his left ; also that his duty to 
either is often quite unlike the duty of that other to him ; 
and further, that his duty to any one to-day frequently 
differs greatly from what is due to the same one to-morrow. 
It is needful, therefore, to consider the kinds of relations in 
which men stand to each other, and their variations, in order 
to determine the corresponding obligations. 

The relations that obtain among men exhibit many varie- 
ties chiefly because of differences in social organization ; 
under which general title, therefore, human relations and 
consequent obligations may be distributed and discussed. 
The procedure involves the principle that the perfection of 
natural order, its harmony and stability, require that each 
member fulfill its office in the several organisms to which it 



THE FAMILY 223 

belongs. This is a natural principle, physical and psychical 
and ethical, being applicable to the universe considered as 
an organic whole, as well as to each of its organized mem- 
bers, and specially, as we have just seen, to the microcosm, 
man. In society at large each one is morally bound to fulfill 
his functions as a member of the whole, and also as a mem- 
ber of each of those subordinate and constitutive organisms 
in which he is integrant. A study, then, of the chief con- 
stituents of society will bring into view the various kinds 
and degrees of duty corresponding to these functional rela- 
tions, whose variations determine the variations of personal 
obligation under the sole but universal law of loving service. 
To this study we now proceed. 

§ 111. Nature presents in both animals and plants a fun- 
damental fact in sex. This is a primary, inerasable distinc- 
tion that cuts all higher forms of animated beings, and 
especially the total of humanity together with every subordi- 
nate class of mankind, into two portions, delicately marked 
by anatomical and physiological variations which extend 
throughout the body, being discoverable even in the brain. 
The physical differences are normally attended by mental and 
moral differences which though less definite are not less deep, 
permanent and universal. In these differences originate an 
appetite and an affection which often become passionate, 
tending on the one hand toward the deepest degradation, and 
on the other to the highest exaltation. Hence it comes that 
the relation of the sexes is perhaps the most powerful social 
factor in every community, both savage and civilized. 

Herein the pointing of nature is distinctly to marriage and 
offspring. It sets apart a pair, a male and female, for each 
other, their exclusive union being spontaneously guarded by 
hygienic barriers, and by a prompt jealousy, fierce and fatal. 
Offspring brings into play strong parental instincts, prompt- 



224 OR GANIZA TION 

ing protection, provision and nurture until maturity. Thus 
the family is preeminently a natural institution, which in 
some important respects takes precedence of all others, and 
is fundamental in the constitution of society. 1 

§ 112. The ideal family in modern society consists of a 
mature man and woman, not differing greatly in age, who of 
their own free will, have entered with civil and ecclesiastical 
forms, into the marriage bond, are living together as husband 
and wife, and providing for their yet unemancipated chil- 
dren. Their children are first a son, then a daughter, again 
a son, then another daughter. The parents, beside each 
other, have both a son and a daughter, and each child has 
both a brother and a sister. These exhaust the family rela- 
tions. To complete this ideal, add a home, giving common 
shelter, furnishing conveniences, and serving as a local habi- 
tation and center of union. 

What support this ideal receives from ethical principles 
will be more clearly seen after a detailed consideration of 
the several relations involved. But we make at once the 
obvious remark that it is not often fully realized, because of 
failure or irregularity in births, intervention of death, or ex- 
treme poverty. Still, even in such incomplete families, the 
relations are generally sufficient for the unfolding of the 
domestic virtues, the building of character, and the enjoy- 
ment of home life. 2 

1 It is noteworthy that the zoologist and the anthropologist, in their logi- 
cal distribution of the animal kingdom into genera, species and sub-species, 
never recognize, even in the most insignificant varieties, sex as marking a 
class. This indicates that scientifically a male and female together consti- 
tute one individual of a kind. So in the story of Eden this essential oneness 
is singularly emphasized ; see Genesis, 1 : 27 ; and 5:1, 2. 

2 "Home, its perfect trust and truth, its simple holiness, its ex- 
quisite happiness, is to the world what conscience is to the human mind." 

— BULWER. 



THE FAMILY 225 

§ 113. It is evident that a family is an organic union of 
several persons, as indicated in their common surname, and 
in the correlative terms husband and wife, parent and child, 
father or mother and son or daughter, brother and sister; 
each of these implying the existence of the other. Ethically 
each member is related to every other, and to the whole, as 
at once means and end. The existence of relations among 
these persons determines that there be corresponding obliga- 
tions, and the variety of relations determines a variety in 
the obligations. The particular kind and degree of the obli- 
gation of each member, is determined by the special function 
belonging to that member in maintaining the orderly unity 
of the organism. Just this much is the duty of each, and 
no more. 

If, however, there be, as there often is, disorder, distrac- 
tion or failure on the part of some one member, requiring addi- 
tional and special efforts on the part of the others to restore 
and maintain order and efficiency, then their duty is enlarged 
to meet the requisition. An excellent analogy is seen in the 
physical organism of the individual man. Each of the organs 
of his body contributes to the healthful action of every other, 
and all the others contribute to sustain each one. Moreover, 
when any one is disordered, there is a disturbance more or 
less general, a sympathetic suffering of all allied organs, and 
a feverish effort of nature to restore the normal condition. 

§ H4. In the actual case of a man and a woman obeying 
the beck of nature, and entering into the marriage relation, 
let the distinct personality of each, and their entire moral 
equivalence, be granted ; then several important truths are 
logically consequent. 

First. In consenting to this union, both parties are to 
exercise their unbiased free will. Any unwarranted inter- 
ference, objective or subjective, in the liberty of either is a 



226 ORGANIZATION 

trespass the more grievous because of its far reaching conse- 
quences. It is true that circumstances often warrant or even 
require a hindering interference, extending perhaps to pro- 
hibition, on the part of parents especially, or of friends, or of 
the State ; but it is obvious that, in a matter so extremely 
delicate, and of such vast importance to those immediately 
concerned, the warrant should be very clear. Compulsory 
marriage, on the other hand, is never warrantable, and is one 
of the grossest forms of trespass. 

Secondly. Actual marriage, or the yielding of each to the 
other of what is peculiar to the distinct personality, works no 
detriment to the honor of either party, provided it be accom- 
panied by an entirely voluntary, mutual and unreserved sur- 
render of all the interests of life into the common keeping 
of both. 1 Thereby the pair, without losing the distinct 
personality, become a single individual personality. In this 
fusion, their honor, social standing, property and prospects 
are rightly held in common by each for the other, by each 
for both, by both for each. The two are one. Their joint 
welfare and happiness is an inseparable compound. 

Thirdly. In the pair thus unified there should be but one 
will. A constant endeavor to harmonize opinions, senti- 
ments and desires, wherein a firm adherence to principle is 
combined with a yielding even in matters of importance, 
results in a singleness of will that is essential to the perfec- 
tion of the union. A tie so sacred should never be loosened 
by willful discord. Custom has established on firm and suf- 
ficient grounds that, generally speaking, the control in detail 
of interests outside the home shall be in the hand of the hus- 
band, and those within the home shall be subject to the man- 
agement of the wife. But, while the decisions of each 
should be as far as possible in accord with the views 
and wishes of the other, yet, in case of a permanent differ- 
1 See Lotze, Practical Philosophy, § 35. 



THE FAMILY 227 

ence, the final decision should be left to the one in whose 
province the matter in question belongs. 1 

Fourthly. The union may not be enlarged by the addi- 
tion of another partner. Polyandry or polygamy, common 
among brutes, is inadmissible among persons, it being incon- 
sistent with the moral equivalence of the sexes. If more 
than one of either sex be bound to one of the other, the plu- 
rality is severally deprived of the rank of equal fellowship, 
and degraded to a thing useful merely as a means. 

Fifthly. While it may be doubted whether there be physi- 
ological reasons why the marriage of persons of near consan- 
guinity should not be permitted, the ethical reasons are 

I We quote from Victor Hugo's " Quatrevingt-Treize,'''' p. 492, part of a 
dialogue : 

" Gauvain reprit : 

— Et la femme ? qu'en faites-vous ? 
Cirnourdain repondit : 

— Ce qu'elle est. La servante de Phomme. 

— Oui. A une condition. 

— Laquelle ? 

— C'est que Phomme sera le serviteur de la femme. 

— Y penses-tu ? s'e'cria Cirnourdain, Phomme serviteur! jamais. 
L'homme est maitre. Je n'admets qu'une royaute\ celle du foyer. 
L'homme chez lui est roi. 

— Oui. A une condition. 

— Laquelle ? 

— C'est que la femme y sera reine. 

— C'est-a-dire que tu veux pour Phomme et pour la femme. . . . 

— L'egalite. 

— L'egalite" ! y songes-tu ? les deux etres sont divers. 

— J'ai dit Pegalite\ Je n'ai pas dit P identity. 

II y eut encore une pose, comme une sorte de tr§ve entre ces deux esprits 
^changeant des Eclairs. Cirnourdain la rompit. 

— Et Penfant ! a qui le donnes-tu? 

— D'abord au pere qui Pengendre, puis a la mere qui Penfante, puis au 
maitre qui P 61 eve, puis & la cite qui le virilise, puis a la patrie qui est la 
mere supreme, puis a P humanity qui est la grande aieule. 

— Tu ne paries pas de Dieu. 

— Chacun de ces degree, pere, mere, maitre, cite", patrie, humanity, est 
un des Echelons de Pechelle qui monte a Dieu." 



228 ORGANIZATION 

clearly good and sufficient. The marriage of members of 
the same family would bring about such an admixture of 
moral relations as to confuse the functions of its members, 
rendering them perplexing and distracting, and so disorder- 
ing the harmony of its system. Hence the State, in the 
interest of the family, and of general society whose moral 
health is involved with that of the family, prohibits such 
marriage as incestuous, tending to disturb the normal opera- 
tion of the family organism, and to check the unfolding of 
its peculiar beauty and worth. 1 

§ 115. Marriage is indissoluble, except by death or crime. 
If death sever the bonds, a new marriage of the survivor 
cannot be prohibited by the State, for civil law is properly 
concerned with temporal relations only, and so the question 
of second marriage must be left to the religious convictions 
of the parties. A formal dissolution of marriage is justified 
specially by the crime of conjugal infidelity, this being a vio- 
lation of its peculiar significance and manifest purpose, and 
itself an actual breaking of the vow. 

Legal questions concerning divorce, with permit of new 
marriage, present many difficulties, especially on plea of 
cruelty or desertion. But it is clear that a wished-for disso- 
lution cannot rightly be decreed merely because of disease, 
poverty, misfortune, disappointed expectation, "incompati- 
bility," whatever this may mean, or the dissatisfaction of one 
or both parties, or even because of wickedness and crime 
that does not victimize home. None of these can be allowed 
as sufficient ground for entire divorce, if society would pre- 
serve its moral health, so largely dependent on the sanctity 

1 For like reason it forbids the marriage of certain collateral relatives. 
English statute forbids even the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's 
sister, for which certainly no physiological, and perhaps no sufficient reason 
can be given, other than the liability of intermixing moral relations. 



THE FAMILY 229 

of marriage. Relief may be had in extreme cases by a legal 
recognition of actual separation, without a severance of the 
moral bond that forbids a new relation. 1 

1 Among heathen peoples, ancient and modern, the marriage tie has 
always been loose, and divorce facile. In Christendom the reverse is gen- 
erally true, influenced by the law of marriage gathered from Genesis, 2 : 24 ; 
Matthew, 19 : 9 ; Mark, 10 : 2-12 ; Luke, 16 : 18 ; and 20 : 27-36 ; Romans, 
7 : 2, 3 ; 1 Corinthians, 7 : 10-14. The principle informing these precepts 
was incorporated in the Canons of the Church at an early date, and in 1562, 
the Council of Trent decreed marriage indissoluble from any cause. Soon, 
however, under the influence of the Reformation, the distinction was made 
between separation a vinculo matrimonii, or complete divorce, and separa- 
tion a mensa et toro, which latter, in extreme cases, the Canons allowed. 

Constantine prohibited, circa 315, by special edict, divorce on simple 
consent of the parties ; and the States of Europe have ever since recognized 
marriage as a civil contract, and, with fluctuating severity and laxity, have 
restricted divorce, on grounds of civil polity. 

In England, until of late, marriage was, by the Canon Law, indissoluble ; 
but, after the Reformation, separation a mensa et toro was allowed, by de- 
cree of Ecclesiastical Court, neither party being permitted to marry again ; 
while complete divorce with this privilege could be granted only by special 
act of Parliament. Late statutes, 20, 21 Vic. c. 85, et al., have made great 
changes. Jurisdiction in divorce casSs is transferred to a special Civil Court, 
in which either spouse may obtain a decree of complete divorce on ground 
of adultery ; and judicial separation from board and couch may be secured 
on ground of cruelty or desertion, in which case the woman thereby becomes 
femme sole in regard of property. 

In America the practice varies in different States. " In several of them 
no divorce is granted but by special act of the legislature, and in others the 
legislature itself is restricted from granting them, but it may confer the 
power on courts of justice. So strict and scrupulous has been the policy of 
South Carolina, that there is no instance in that State since the Revolution 
of a divorce of any kind, either by sentence of a court of justice or by act 
of the legislature. In all other States divorce a vinculo may be granted by 
courts of justice for adultery. In New York the jurisdiction of the courts 
as to absolute divorce for causes subsequent to marriage is confined to the 
single case of adultery ; but in most of the other States, in addition to 
adultery, intolerable ill-usage, or willful desertion, or unheard-of absence, or 
habitual drunkenness, or some of them, will authorize a decree for divorce 
a vinculo under different modifications and restrictions." — Kent, Commen- 
taries, iv, 105. The laws relating to divorce have undergone many changes 
since the publication of these Commentaries in 1830. 



230 ORGANIZATION 

§ 116. Persons of full age, and emancipated from parental 
authority, often do not marry for some years, or perhaps 
never marry. The social status of such persons is more or 
less abnormal according as they are more or less absolved 
from family connection. For the family is the basis of social 
organization, and since these are now but external appen- 
dages to some one, they cannot be accounted more than 
fractional members of society at large. 1 

Such persons are unhappily at great disadvantage in respect 
of moral culture. For the conditions of complete develop- 
ment are lacking to those destitute of the familiar objects 
around which the strongest and best affections of the human 
soul gather and grow, and whose lack it is not possible fully 
to compensate by other lines of moral activity. In these 
other lines, however, exceptional attainments are often made, 
commanding high respect, and rounding out a useful life. 

§ 117. When the family circle is completed by the birth 
of children, a new and wide field is opened for the cultiva- 
tion of ethical graces. Moral possibilities, which otherwise 
are forever latent, become patent. The potential becomes 
actual, and nature has not planted in vain. No man is ever 
wholly a man until he is a husband and a father ; and, more 
emphatically, no woman is wholly a woman until she is a 
wife and mother. A babe is a pledge of love, an additional 
and powerful tie, a sacred trust, calling out and taxing the 
moral energies, and making an unlimited demand on loving 
service. All that is beautiful in human nature blooms under 
the influence of this fertilizing relation. It is easy to adore 
the Madonna. 2 

1 It is at least curious to note that a prerequisite to membership in the 
ancient Jewish Sanhedrin was that one should be a husband and a father ; 
perhaps because this would qualify him to be a wiser and more compassion- 
ate judge. See Bunsen, Hippolytus, ii, 344. 

2 It is a famous saying of Froebel : " Kommt, lasst uns unsern Kindern 



THE FAMILY 231 

The familiar care and provident rearing of children con- 
stantly exercises the domestic virtues, tending directly to the 
perfection of manhood and womanhood. The responsibility 
and difficulty are of the gravest. The culture should be 
dominated by the view that, in the order of nature, the child 
is destined to moral independence, and to membership in 
society. In being prepared for this, it has many and very 
sacred rights. Its parents are bound, as their function in 
the family organism, to provide for its healthful maintenance 
suitable to their rank in society, for its education, intellec- 
tual, moral and religious, and, in general, for its present and 
prospective welfare. Great laxity of restraint is likely to be 
ruinous; but, on the other hand, severe restrictions, a rigid 
molding of character, opinions, and religious creed, is hardly 
less to be deprecated as an injurious trespass on the right of 
the child to generous culture, and the free growth of its 
individuality. 1 

The office of brothers and sisters in this organic relation 
is affectionate sympathy, and mutual helpfulness, which 
should extend throughout life. As sons and daughters they 
are bound to honor father and mother by a willing and 
pleased obedience to their rightful authority, and by a 
prompt readiness to promote their welfare. Also they are 
bound to guard sedulously the honor of the family name, 
and to seek actively the advancement of the common interest. 

leben. Come, let us live for, with and in our children. Then will the life 
of our children bring us peace and joy, then shall we begin to grow wise, to 
be wise." — Education of Man, § 42. 

1 "The feeling of community, first uniting a child with its mother, father, 
brothers and sisters, and resting on a higher spiritual unity, to which later 
is added the unmistakable discovery that father, mother, brothers, sisters, 
human beings in general, feel and know themselves to be in community and 
unity with a higher principle, with humanity, with God — this feeling of 
community is the very first germ, the very first beginning of all true reli- 
gious spirit, of all genuine yearning for unhindered unification with the 
Eternal, with God."— Idem, 8 21. 



232 OR GANIZA TION 

§ 118. This human institution, the family, is preeminently 
natural, being physically determined. Those born into it 
are involuntarily and inseparably its members. By its pri- 
macy it stands as the unit of society and of the State, with- 
out derogation from the distinct personality, moral status 
and obligation of its individual members. Yet it is a whole. 
Even when some part or parts are lacking, it is still a unit. 
It is not a logical whole, a genus, for its parts are not 
species or kinds of family. It is an integral whole ; not col- 
lective, as a cluster of grapes, but organic, as a flower whose 
central organs, stamen and pistil, yield germ and seed, within 
a corolla. It is an individual, indivisible in itself, and sepa- 
rate from every other. 

Less clear perhaps, but not less true, is it that a family is 
a single personality. The definition of a person is a being 
conscious of obligation. Now there is a consciousness com- 
mon to all members of a family, an intelligent apprehension 
of moral law which is the same in each, a judgment which, 
under the influence of common interest, is assimilated into 
one, a pervading sentiment, a united impulse to effectuate a 
single will. The obligation of some one family as an organic 
whole to some one man as its benefactor, or to some other 
family, or to general society, is matter of familiar speech and 
acknowledgment, and the common consciousness of such 
obligation constitutes its unique personality, quite distin- 
guishable from the peculiar personality of its several mem- 
bers. To this conception of its distinct personality may be 
added the possession of family traits in features, manners, 
customs, habits, and in general, of character, often sharply 
marked. Moreover, what wounds one member, wounds all ; 
the honor, dignity and welfare of the whole, is in common 
keeping. 1 

1 This moral solidarity is not a product of refined civilization. In rude, 
primitive ages it found abundant recognition ; for example, in the infliction 



TEE FAMILY 233 

§ 119. The individual personality of a family as an organ- 
ized unit, distinct from the personality of its members, is 
manifest in the significant fact that it claims a life beyond 
the present generation. Its ancestry extending back for 
ages is its pride, and its posterity in an indefinite future is 
its hope. What it has been confers titles of honor, and what 
it may become excites anxious solicitude. The death of a 
member breaks in upon its present entirety, but does not 
interrupt its continuity. Only by sterility and death com-, 
bined is it extinguished, and this is accounted a special loss 
to society, a public and private misfortune. 1 

A family of the present generation, inheriting the honor 
and wealth of the same family in preceding generations, rec- 
ognizes its moral obligation to maintain and rightly use the 
trust, thus discharging a sacred debt due the dead. Also it 
recognizes its moral obligation to the coming generation in 
provision for its welfare, thus discharging a sacred debt due 
descendants, including those yet unborn. That one is thus 
bound to pay debts due the deceased and the unborn, is not 
fanciful sentiment, nor figurative speech, but real, literal 
ethics. Current expressions and approved literature recog- 
nize in many ways the obligation as especially incumbent on 

of punishment due to the offense of a single member upon the whole of his 
family ; the guilt of one, it was held, making all alike guilty. This lingers 
with us in the social ostracism of an innocent member of a dishonored or 
disreputable family. Put merit for guilt, gratitude and love for vengeance, 
and we have a law of the moral order holding good for all time, for the high- 
est civilization, for the most refined moral consciousness. 

1 Witness the deification and worship of ancestry, so common among 
heathen peoples, ancient and modern. The law of primogeniture in Eng- 
land, and in most of the States of Europe, by which, the father dying intes- 
tate, his eldest son inherits the real estate, i.e. lands and buildings, in pref- 
erence to and in exclusion of all other members of the family, clearly intends 
to confirm its continuity. So also the practice of entail. The preference in 
inheritance of males to females, found in ancient Jewish, Athenian (but not 
in Koman) law, and in the laws of some modern States, e.g. the Salic law, 
likewise was apparently intended to perpetuate more distinctly the family. 



234 OB GANIZA TION 

the family, whose individuality and personality extend 
through generations that come and go, yet perpetuate its 
organic unity. 

§ 120. The foregoing considerations enable us to under- 
stand more clearly the ethical principles that regulate the 
holding and disposing of property. 1 

Property owned by either party at time of marriage, and 
that acquired afterward, is, by virtue of the marriage, the 
common property of the family. That either husband or 
wife should have property at disposal apart from and inde- 
pendently of the other, though often it is so arranged, con- 
tradicts the unity of the relation, drawing a line of separation 
and making a distinction that ought never to exist. Such 
an arrangement is inconsistent with that entire surrender of 
all the interests of life into the common keeping which the 
marriage bond requires; and in so far the marriage is but 
partial. The reserve implies a distrust that is chilling, and 
likely to produce a discord that is fatal. It is a withholding 
trespass. 

Evidently, then, the family property should not be largely 
ventured in trade, or otherwise disposed of, without the free 
consent of all members, including the children, in whom also 
property rights are vested by birth, when they become suffi- 
ciently mature to appreciate and rightly judge the interests 
involved. Yet, be it remembered, that each and all should 
seek, by a reasonable yielding, to assimilate their views and 
wishes, thereby attaining a unity of will which thus becomes 
the will of the family. 

Also it is evident that the management of the family prop- 
erty in detail must be left to some one member. This seems 
naturally to devolve upon the husband and father who, 
according to the usual and approved order, takes charge of 
1 See supra, § 38. 



THE FAMILY 235 

the family interests outside of home, and hence is best 
acquainted with public affairs. Because property is held 
and ordinary business transacted in his name, he is apt to 
regard himself as exclusive and irresponsible owner. This 
error, pervading society, stands greatly in need of correction. 1 

§ 121. Distribution by testament of the property of a 
family is, for like reasons, by the hand and in the name of 
its ostensible head ; also for the reason that, preparatory to 
his decease, when the house band is loosed, and the family 
disintegrated, there is need of a special and provisory adjust- 
ment of property rights by the one to whom their care has 
been chiefly committed. In any such adjustment the united 
consensus of all members should be had, so that together 
with the avoidance of any actual trespass, complaint of wrong 
may also be forestalled. 

Testamentary distribution gives rise to many difficult 
questions which largely occupy the courts. The funda- 
mental principles involved are, however, sufficiently clear. 
A producer has a right to use and dispose of his products at 
will, and this will must be effective beyond his decease, else 
a great incentive to industry and accumulation would be lost, 
projects for the benefit of the coming generation would not 
be devised and driven, and social progress would be hindered, 
inasmuch as each generation would have to make a new be- 
ginning. But let it be observed that the home management 
and industry, its provision for rest and refreshment, its cheer- 
ing influence, its trifling comforts even, are very important 
elements in the efficiency of the producer, and thereby enter 

1 In the United States, when the head of a family dies intestate, distri- 
bution to the survivors, is made of the property according to civil statute, 
and guardians of minors are appointed. There are differences, but the ex- 
istence in any form of such statutes is a distinct recognition by the State 
that property rights in what was an undivided possession inhere in each 
member of a disrupted family. 



236 ORGANIZATION 

into his product ; so that all members of the home circle, but 
especially the husband and wife, are partners in business, 
and since they share in the producing, are entitled to share 
in the production, both in consuming and in disbursing. 
Beside this, it should be distinctly recognized that all posses- 
sions are held and managed as trusts, and their agreed testa- 
mentary distribution should be regulated accordingly. The 
testator is bound to provide suitably for the family, thus dis- 
charging his primary obligation as its trustee. A surplus 
may rightly become matter of bequest to collaterals, to friends, 
or to the general public, in the founding or endowing hospi- 
tals, schools, libraries, and such like benefactions, according 
to the best judgment of the trustee representing the family in 
this discharge of its alien obligations. 



THE COMMUNITY 237 



CHAPTER III 

THE COMMUNITY 

§ 122. Human beings manifest a strong disposition to 
gather into groups more or less permanent. In some of these 
population is massed, as in cities ; in others it is more sparse, 
as in villages, hamlets, neighborhoods. Hence in any inhab- 
ited region, it is easy to point out centers of population, 
though the circumference be quite indefinite. Besides the 
gregarious instinct of the human animal, there are many 
rational determinants of this tendency, both economical and 
ethical. Every one owes his existence to progenitors and 
also is indebted for its continuance, for all physical means, 
conveniences and comforts of living, for all intellectual and 
moral culture, so entirely to association, more or less intimate, 
with his fellows, that all the interests of life, his whole wel- 
fare, is bound up with them. Strict independence is a prac- 
tical impossibility. 1 

1 "La nature de l'homme le porte a vivre en soci£te\ Quelle qu'en soit 
la cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout ou Ton a rencontre* 
des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en corps de nation. Peut- 
6tre est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur surety commune ; peut-gtre afin 
de pourvoir plus aisement a leur besoins ; toujours il est vrai qu'il est dans 
la nature de Phomme de se reunir en soci&6, comme font les abeilles et 
plusieurs especes d'animaux ; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes 
ces reunions d'hommes, en quelque parti du mondequ'ils habitent." — Say, 
Cours d'Econ. Polit. 

" The impulse which leads to combination lies in the necessity of supple- 
menting the force of the individual by that of others, without which the 
aims of life are not completely attainable. Here belong not merely the con- 
ceivable advantages which one receives from another, but above all the 
social intercourse itself, without which a really human development is incon- 
ceivable." — Lotze, Trad. Phil, § 56. 



238 ORGANIZATION 

A group of people thus specially related by living in prox- 
imity is a community. 1 This is not merely a collection but a 
body of people ; for the necessities of its members which draw 
them together determine at once an organic constitution. 2 
Each member contributes more or less directly to the welfare 
of every other, and to the welfare of the whole, in which 
welfare he participates. The variations of function are deter- 
mined by the pressure of various needs, and by the fitness of 
various abilities to meet them. There is a tacit consensus in 
the distribution of these functions ; but since there is no 
formal and definite enactment of a constitution, the com- 
munity is often spoken of as unorganized society ; whereas, 
though not formally, yet it is essentially an organism, neces- 
sitated by the interdependence of its members. 3 

1 " Common = public, general, usual, vulgar; Fr. from Lat. com-, for 
cum, with, and munis, complaisant, obliging, binding by obligation." — 
Skeat. Community, from Lat. communitas, fellowship, from cum, together 
with, mutually, and munis, ready to serve. 

2 " Quam fluctus diversi, quam mare conjuncti." 

3 " A quoi bon la sociele" ? Restez dans la nature. Soyez les sauvages. 
Otai'ti est un paradis. Seulement, dans ce paradis on ne pense pas. Mieux 
vaudrait encore un enfer intelligent qu'un paradis bete. Mais non, point 
d'enfer. Soyons la sociCte" humaine. Plus grande que nature ? Oui. Si 
vous n'ajoutez rien a la nature, pourquoi sortir de la nature ? Alors, con- 
tentez-vous du travail comme la fourmi, et du miel comme l'abeille. Restez 
la bete ouvriere au lieu d'etre rintelligence reine. Si vous ajoutez quelque 
chose a la nature, vous serez nCcessairement plus grand qu'elle ; aj outer, 
c'est augmenter, c'est grandir. La sociCte', c'est la nature sublimed. Je 
veux tout ce qui manque aux ruches, tout ce qui manque aux f ourmilieres, 
les monuments, les arts, la poe'sie, les he'ros, les genies. Porter des fardeaux 
kernels, ce n'est pas la loi de Thomme. Non, non, non, plus de parias, plus 
d'esclaves plus de formats, plus de damned ! je veux que chacun des attri- 
buts de l'homme soit un symbole de civilisation et un patron de progres ; 
je veux la liberte devant 1' esprit, l'egalite" devant le cceur, la fraternite" 
devant Tame. Non ! plus de joug ! l'homme est fait, non pour trainer des 
chaines, mais pour ouvrir des ailes. Plus d'homme reptile. Je veux la 
transfiguration de la larve en lepidoptere, je veux que le ver de terre se 
vivante, change en fleur et s'envole." — Victor Hugo, Quatrevingt-Treize, 
p. 495. 



THE COMMUNITY 239 

§ 123. Recur to the primary ethical principle that every 
one has a right to gratify his normal desires, and to this, be- 
side, that it is his obligation not merely passively to allow 
their impulse, but actively to seek their gratification, and it 
is manifest that the fulfillment of obligation is impracticable 
apart from society. 1 For, no class of normal desires can 
properly be gratified without reference to associates ; but 
especially the affections, which are conditioned on the presen- 
tation of sentient objects, can have no exercise in solitary life. 
In such life the chiefest, indeed the sole function of humanity 
is perverted and comes to naught. Mankind is a brother- 
hood, and it is only by close fraternization, only by being a 
man among men, that it is possible to be wholly a man. 
Whoever lives his life in its natural and rightful fullness is a 
constant recipient from his fellows of the necessary means, 
for which he is dependent on them, and therefore is constantly 
incurring an indebtedness which requires a constant reciprocal 
activity to repay. 

These considerations forbid an ascetic life, which, under 
the guise of righteous self-denial, renounces invigorating en- 
joyment, and thus leads to such an impoverishment of spirit- 
ual power that its dues go unpaid. 2 Nor can the life of a 
recluse be approved, which seeks self-sufficiency in solitude 
and retired contemplation, or an escape from thronging ills 
by a timid retreat into privacy, idle ease, and indifference to 
the common welfare. Likewise we must condemn the life 
of a reserved student who, enamored of truth, withdraws 
from familiar intercourse, and in the scholarly seclusion of 
his library seeks to accumulate knowledge with no intent or 
thought of sharing it, and thereby promoting the well-being 
even of his compeers. 3 These several forms of social seques- 

1 See supra, §§ 25, 35. 2 See supra, § 77. 

3 " We are right in being enthusiastic for science only on account of the 
fact, partly that we discern the usefulness of its impulse for the sum-total of 



240 ORGANIZATION 

tration can be approved only when they are temporary, and 
for the purpose of recuperation and preparation for better 
service in subsequent life. Thus only can they be acquitted 
of selfishness, and accepted as transient phases of that active 
life of practical benevolence which alone develops the moral 
dignity of true manhood. 1 

§ 124. The reciprocal obligations of the members of a com- 
munity are recognized in a code of social intercourse, an 
unwritten common law, which prevails throughout and regu- 
lates communication. This law, like the unwritten Common 
Law of the courts, is a detail of rights and duties. Both sys- 
tems originated in the exigencies of popular intercourse, and 

human life so well as to renounce all claim to see a special application for 
every individual (einzelne) truth, and partly that the general character of 
truth, its consistency, and the manifoldness of the consequences that follow 
with certainty from a few principles, places before our eyes an actualization 
( Verwirklichung) of what we ought to attain in the moral world by our own 
conduct." — Lotze, Pract. Phil, § 30. 

1 Moral isolation is not in being retired, but in being selfish. One may 
be "Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife," yet in a communion 
that braces and strengthens ; and amid the turmoil of the throng, he may 
be apart, alone. 

" To sit on rocks, to muse o'er flood and fell, 
To slowly trace the forest's shady scene, 
Where things that own not man's dominion dwell, 
And mortal foot hath ne'er, or rarely heen ; 
To climb the trackless mountain all unseen, 
With the wild flock that never needs a fold ; 
Alone o'er steeps and foaming falls to lean ; 
This is not solitude ; 'tis but to hold 
Converse with nature's charms, and view her stores unrolled. 

But 'midst the crowd, the hum, the shock of men, 
To hear, to see, to feel, and to possess, 
And roam along, the world's tired denizen, 
With none who bless us, none whom we can bless J 
Minions of splendour shrinking from distress ! 
None that, with kindred consciousness endued, 
If we were not, would seem to smile the less 
Of all that flatter'd, follow'd, sought and sued ; 
This is to be alone ; this, this is solitude." 

— Bybon, Childe Harold, Canto ii, 25, 26. 



THE COMMUNITY 241 

by degrees have been fully developed : and both are but va- 
riations, explications and applications of the law of trespass. 
The conventions of society are known as the rules of good 
breeding and good manners. They require comity, a proper 
consideration and respect for the minor rights of each other, 
a delicate regard for one another's wishes, feelings and pe- 
culiarities, a prompt attention to wants, their serviceable 
anticipation, a complaisant readiness in assistance ; this is 
politeness. In the denser portions of a community there 
is constant call for its exercise, so that people, even those of 
otherwise indifferent culture, become by attrition polished, 
that is, polite ; they are civil, and the higher ranks are cour- 
teous or courtly in address. To this must be added the spe- 
cial code of social etiquette observed in refined circles, which 
descends to minutiaa, and is so rigid in its required decorum 
that an infraction of it is sometimes less readily condoned 
than vice. All such conventionalities arise from the union 
or consolidation of interests and responsibilities, and betoken 
the solidarity of the community. 1 

§ 125. A prime condition of the wholesomeness of a com- 
munity is the truthfulness of its members. The obligation 
to be truthful in both word and deed is clear. Every one 
has a right to certain services from his fellow-man, and a 
usually just and sometimes very important claim is for an 
opinion, judgment, information, direction, advice, sympathy. 
If these be reserved when due, it is a trespass, a restriction 
of a rightful liberty to use and profit by them. Still greater 

1 " Nicht die Sittlichkeit regiert die Welt, sondern erne verhartete Form 
derselben : die Sitte. Wie die Welt nun einmal geworden ist, verzeiht sie 
eher eine Verletzung der Sittlichkeit als eine Verletzung der Sitte. Wohl 
den Zeiten und den Volkern, in denen Sitte und Sittlichkeit noch Eins ist. 
Aller Kampf dreht sich darum, den Widerspruch dieser Beiden aufzuheben 
und die erstarrte Form der Sitte wiederum fur die innere Sittlichkeit flussig 
zu machen." — Auerbach. 



242 OB GANIZA TION 

is the trespass, if they be misstated, thereby misinforming 
and misleading the recipient, for then his trust is violated, 
his confidence outraged. If the claim be allowed, the expres- 
sion by word or deed must be true to the thought. 1 

But the claim is not always just, not always to be allowed. 
We are not always bound to speak; often it is right and 
wise to" be silent. Nor, if we speak, are we always bound to 
tell the whole truth ; in which case the extent of the reserve 
is matter for conscientious judgment, having care not to mis- 
lead by the partial statement. This right of private reserve 
is superseded by the courts in the interest of society at large, 
and the witness required to tell the whole truth without 
reserve. 

Whether deceit in any form is ever justifiable is a ques- 
tion that has been discussed for centuries, and is still unset- 
tled. On the one hand it is affirmed that deceit is in its 
very nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of right 
and justice ; and on the other hand it is asserted that certain 
emergencies may justify a departure from ordinary rules of 
conduct, and render deceit not only justifiable but obligatory. 
This question of the ages is not to be answered in a few 
words. We must be content here with saying : first, that a 
lie is never justifiable ; secondly, that not every deception is 
to be accounted a lie, e.g., the myth of Santa Claus ; and 
thirdly, if the definition of a deception be allowed wider 
scope than the definition of a lie, yet is a deception so rarely 
right and duty that every one should practice habitual truth- 
fulness, deviating from it with great hesitation, and only 
when the justification is beyond all question. 2 

1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 218, 251. In north China, a request for 
information is usually introduced by the polite phrase : ' ' May 1 borrow 
your light ? " 

2 See Trumbull's^. Lie Never Justifiable; especially ch. vi, which cites 
many authorities ancient and modern, heathen and Christian, pro and contra. 
To these add Kant, who, in a tractate tiber ein vermeintes Becht aus Men- 



THE COMMUNITY 243 

§ 126. The general obligation to be truthful takes a num- 
ber of specific forms. Beside this duty in the commonplace 
talking of familiar intercourse, we place the formal tie of a 
promise, written, oral, or indirectly implied in mere behavior. 
The obligation in such case is strengthened by the fact that 
the promisee, in reliance on the faithfulness of the promiser, 
may in his life-conduct order important matters with refer- 
ence to the promise, and suffer injury or even disaster should 
it fail. A promise given under an essential misunderstand- 
ing, or, since we cannot accurately forecast the future, in 
case the duty of its observance is superseded by some higher 
unforeseen duty with which it is radically inconsistent, is 
null. This does not endorse the loose aphorism that a bad 
promise is better broken than kept ; for, if its badness work 
merely the private personal injury of the promiser, unless 
ruinous in an intolerable extreme, he is not thereby dis- 
charged of the obligation. We commend him that sweareth 
to his own hurt, and changeth not. A promise made under 
compulsion cannot be claimed by the promisee, yet it meas- 
urably binds the promiser because of respect for his word. 
In no case, however, is a promise obligatory if the fulfillment 
be criminal, for it can never be duty to commit crime. 

A contract or covenant differs from a simple promise in 
that it implies an exchange of services, and reciprocal obliga- 
tion. 1 It is usually under the protection of special statute, 
an outcome of the moral element, of that mutual trust which 
is the basis of social order. Contracts are of endless variety, 

schenliebe zu liigen (Auflage R. und S. vii, S. 295) pronounces strongly for 
the negative. A translation of this tractate is appended to Abbott's KanVs 
Theory of Ethics, p. 431 sq. Cf. Lotze, Grundziige, § 45. 

1 "A contract is an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or 
not to do a particular thing." — Blackstone, Commentaries, etc., bk. ii, 
p. 442. The Constitution of the United States, Article i, Section 10, forbids 
any State to enact a " law impairing the obligation of contracts," which 
clause has given rise to a vast deal of litigation. 



244 ORGANIZATION 

and affect nearly every detail of private and public life ; and 
if their binding character were not fully recognized there 
would be no security in affairs. A deception practiced by 
either party in making a contract invalidates it; but both 
parties must abide the consequences of carelessness, thought- 
lessness, or stupidity. 

Common honesty in trade, and in business dealings gener- 
ally, is another form of truthfulness. Exchange of services, 
of goods, and of other forms of property, has the advantage 
of being estimated numerically in the medium of exchange, 
money, which gives exactness to the mutual obligation, ana 
sharply expresses its violation. The interests involved in 
such transactions are so widely interlaced that fraud excites 
general indignation and reprobation. There is hardly any 
form of trespass that incurs such deep and lasting disgrace 
as dishonesty. 1 

§ 127. The membership of an organized community does 
not consist in merely so many men, women and children, 
standing singly as discrete elements coalescing into a con- 
crete body. A strong tendency to such individualism has 
marked the nineteenth century, in France, in England, and 
even more positively in the United States. It cries out for 

1 It is worth noting that honor and honesty are, etymologically, the same 
word. Cf. Cicero's usage of honeslas. "The advantage to mankind," says 
Mill, " of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and 
cranny of human life ; the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet 
even this is incalculable." — Polit. Econ., bk. i, ch. 7, § 5. Says Professor 
James : "A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it 
is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the 
other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is 
achieved by the cooperation of many independent persons, its existence as 
a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those 
immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a 
ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which 
not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is ever attempted. ' ' — The WUl to 
Believe, p. 2^ 



TEE COMMUNITY 245 

liberty, equality, fraternity, and demands that creed, race, and 
even sex shall be ignored on the forum, at the polls, and in 
the schools. Now, while each individual man and woman is 
a distinguishable member of society, it should be observed, 
in opposition to individualism, that each is primarily a mem- 
ber of a family whereby he or she is socialized, that the 
family is properly the organized and organizing unit of so- 
ciety, and that a community consists fundamentally of asso- 
ciated families. This incidentally appears in the fact that 
the social standing of the individual is in general determined 
by that of his family, above which it is difficult to rise, and 
below which one rarely falls. The question, What is he? 
asks after his vocation ; but, Who is he ? asks after his 
family. 

A variety of minor organizations are usually formed by 
voluntary association, which also are integrant members ; as, 
social or literary clubs, and benevolent societies. Beside 
these are business firms of two or more members, stock com- 
panies, cooperative associations, and guilds or trade-unions. 
Such combinations for more effective achievement are often 
legally incorporated, and usually have a contract or articles 
of agreement, or a written organic law or constitution, stating 
the ends they seek and the means, and defining the functions 
of members and officers as duties ; the variations in duty 
arising from a specializing of functions so as to constitute 
an efficient cooperative whole. A special class of subordi- 
nate organisms is seen in the schools, which also usually 
have a formal constitution and laws defining the duties of 
members, official and unofficial. They are instituted specially 
to meet the debt due the next generation, are essential to the 
perpetuity rather than to the maintenance of society, and 
form a bond, a historical enchainment, between its present 
and its future. 

Each of the foregoing minor organizations is itself a mem- 



246 ORGANIZATION 

ber of the community, having, as already said of the family, 
an individual personality distinguishable from the individual 
personality of its components. 1 Moreover, although the 
bounds of any single community be ill denned, still commu- 
nities are recognized as more or less distinct from one 
another. Now each of these as an organic whole has not 
only obligations to its various members, but also to neighbor- 
ing communities with which it is in communication. Thus 
the community as a whole is an individual, a personality, 
with a conscience, and a moral judgment in the consensus of 
its members, which passes upon its own character and con- 
duct, upon that of its several members, and upon that of 
affiliated communities. 

§ 128. The organic nature of a community distributing 
various functions or offices and consequent duties among its 
members, is clearly seen in its division of labor. The neces- 
sities of life necessitate labor, but no one by his own labor 
alone can surely supply even these, much less can he produce 
the many requisites to comfortable living. The civilized man 
has many desires or wants that have become so habitual as to 
be classed as necessaries. 2 For the full gratification of these 
he is dependent on the productive labor of his fellows. 
Hence the pressure of such wants molds the community 
into an organism, in which each works for every other, and 
they for him ; also he labors for the welfare of the whole, and 
the end of the whole is the welfare of each. Thus a simple 
community will comprise a shoemaker, a tailor, a carpenter, 
a blacksmith, a shopkeeper, a printer, a doctor, a lawyer, a 
schoolmaster, and a curate. These exchange services or 

1 See supra, § 118. 

2 Said Voltaire: "Le superflu, c'est le vrai ndcessaire. " This paradox 
was revived by Charles Boyle, saying : " Only give me the luxuries of life, 
and I will dispense with the necessaries." 



THE COMMUNITY 247 

products, and a variety of duties is a consequence of the 
organization. 

A discussion of division of labor is not proper to a treatise 
on Ethics, but belongs rather to the theory of Economics. 1 
It is appropriate, however, to observe that, in addition to its 
economical advantage, it has the moral advantage of giving 
rise to the common virtues of honesty, industry, and respect 
for order, and to a sense of personal responsibility, the re- 
sponsibility of each worker to his fellows and to the commu- 
nity at large. Besides, it originates the conception of a 
vocation, a calling, and establishes each worker in a position, 
changed from a mere man into a member, whereby he is no 
longer just like all others, but assumes a place and mark 
specially his own. 2 Extreme division of labor, however, de- 
presses the intellectual status of the laborer, narrows his 
spiritual horizon, and assimilates his activity to that of an 
automatic mechanism. 

The distribution of functions brings about social classifica- 
tion. Mere laborers are distinguished from farmers and 
mechanics, and these from skilled artisans, and these again 
from artists and the professional class whose work is mostly 
intellectual. Greater honor always attaches to the finer, and 
less to the coarser kinds of labor. This has the wholesome 
effect of inducing effort to rise into what is accounted a 
higher social rank, and is thus a powerful stimulus to civil- 
ization. But here also an abatement must be made. Classes 
strongly marked tend to become castes, in which form their 

1 See supra, § 76, note. 

2 The familiar word vocation implies Providential superintendence and 
appointment to special service. The reality of this is perhaps not commonly 
recognized. Still " die sittliche Weihe des Berufs, 1 ' or the moral consecra- 
tion of a calling, has great influence in the regulation of society. It acts like 
" the expulsive power of a new affection," ejecting all that is inconsistent 
and unworthy, and assimilating all that is concordant and befitting in a new 
consecration. 



248 ORGANIZATION 

wholesome effect disappears, ambitious effort is paralyzed, 
improvement discouraged, and civilization restrained. 

§ 129. In a prosperous community, one whose wealth in 
general is increasing, capital or the wealth destined to repro- 
ductive consumption tends to accumulate in the hands of 
those more intelligently industrious, and thereby a special 
class is formed, the capitalists. These are marked off from 
the wage-earners whom they employ in their large and 
enlarging industrial enterprises. Now the economical advan- 
tages of large capital engaged in extensive and systematic 
industry are obvious, yet just because of the greater uni- 
formity, abundance and cheapness of its products, the ability 
of the sma]l free crafts to subsist is curtailed, which reduces 
the larger portion of the community to the position of wage- 
earners under the mastership of the capitalists, on whom 
their livelihood depends. The evils of this division of soci- 
ety, and of this enforced relation, have become familiar in 
what are known as labor troubles. The grasping selfishness 
of moneyed power induces oppression; and the sense of 
injustice, and the dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution 
of the amenities of life, induce violent revolt. 

Certain remedial schemes, under the generic name of 
socialism, have attained notoriety and many advocates. They 
propose a reorganization of society, giving it a more definite 
and compact solidarity. In general, they would abolish com- 
petition in labor, wages, and particular or private ownership 
of property, especially of land ; substituting work under the 
stimulus of public spirit, an equal distribution of products, 
and a common ownership and disposition of all fixed property 
by closely organized society. A still more radical scheme of 
reorganization, called communism, proposes to abolish also 
the family, substituting for domestic relations and the gov- 
ernment of parental authority, temporary unions, and a com- 



THE COMMUNITY 249 

ruunistic care for the nurture and education of offspring. 
Attempts to maintain such schemes in practical operation 
have hitherto failed. 

A discussion of socialism as to its economical value, and 
even as to its ethical worth, must be passed by with the gen- 
eral remark that the evils of society as actually constituted 
arise, not from contrived injustice, but from a lack of moral 
equipoise. In the ideal community, which moral culture 
seeks to attain, there would be no tolerated trespass upon 
the rights of even the humblest member ; and in the absence 
of just cause of revolt, all would be content in the station 
determined by merit, by the relative value of services. Until 
this Utopia be realized, a more intelligent apprehension of the 
inseparable interests of capital and labor would conduce to 
greater harmony, to mutual respect, and to a wider recogni- 
tion of reciprocal rights. 1 Meantime, remedy against oppres- 
sion by either party should be sought, not in turbulence and 
disorder, but in appeal to that which is set for the guardian- 
ship of rights, to the strong arm of the State. 

1 " Voici une sage et belle devise : Prendre pour point de depart et pour 
point d'appui de tout progres le devoir du rich plutCt que le droit des 
pauvres ; de sort que 1' accord dut pu se faire entre les deux adversaires, a 
l'aide de quelque concessions, en somme assez peu douloureuses. ' ' — Revue 
des deux Mondes, 1883, p. 725. 



250 ORGANIZATION 



CHAPTER IV 

THE STATE 

§ 130. It is essential to any widely associated life of men 
that there should be definite and effective provision for the 
protection of rights. For in every community evil-doers, or 
at least doers disposed to trespass, are so many, active and 
strong, that its several members are not competent, without 
combination, to maintain intact their rightful liberties. 
Moreover, certain important interests of the total community 
are best served by concerted action, indeed many cannot 
otherwise be served. To attain these two general ends, the 
safeguard of rights and the advancement of the common weal, 
the one protecting, the other promoting, is the purpose of 
the State. 1 

1 "The society of many families, instituted for mutual and lasting advan- 
tage, is called a village, Kiijmj. . . . When many villages join themselves 
perfectly together into one society, that society is a State, 7r6\ts, and con- 
tains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence. It is first 
founded that men may live, and continued that they may live happily [i.e., 
in the perfect practice of virtuous energies. — bk. vii, ch. 8]. For which 
reason every State is the work of nature, since the first social ties are such ; 
for to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by 
its tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is 
the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house. Besides, 
its own final cause and its end must be the perfection of any thing ; but a 
government complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best. 
Hence it is evident, that a State is one of the works of nature, and that man 
is naturally a political animal, -rroXiTiicbp&ov, and that whosoever is natu- 
rally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, &tto\is, must be either inferior 
or superior to man ; just as the person reviled in Homer : * No tribe, nor 
State, nor home hath he.' For he whose nature is such as this, must needs 
be a lover of strife, and as solitary as a bird of prey. ' ' — Aristotle, 
Politico,, bk. i, ch. 2. 



THE STATE 251 

The established State occupies a definite territory. It em- 
braces several, perhaps many distinguishable communities 
usually of one race and language, having common manners, 
customs and traditions. It consists primarily of the whole 
body of people, the body politic, including all officers of gov- 
ernment; but the term is often, secondarily, limited to the 
official class, the sovereign body having supreme power held 
in trust for the common weal, which class, however, is more 
properly termed the government. 1 

It is not within the scope of this treatise to discuss the 
relative merits of different forms of state government, nor to 
trace the historical evolution of the State through the abuses, 
turmoils, and civil wars which, because of the imperfect or 
erroneous views and the selfish ambition of statesmen and 
rulers, have embarrassed its development. We shall attempt 
no more than to sketch the essential features of its constitu- 
tion, and to indicate its exclusively ethical basis, its thor- 
ough-going ethical character, and the varieties of moral 
obligation imposed on its members by its specific and peculiar 
organization. 

§ 131. Governments are distinguished as monarchic, aris- 
tocratic or republican, and democratic. Some combine ele- 
ments of each of these principal forms ; as, Great Britain. 
No exclusive preference can be given to any one form. That 
is best which best accords with the historical traditions and 
habits of its subjects, is suitable to their grade of intellectual 
and ethical culture, and is administered in the interest of the 
public rather than of the rulers. 2 

1 When a number of States, whose people as a body come of a common 
stock, natus, are confederated under a general government, this is properly 
a Nation ; as, the German Nation, especially prior to the unification in 1870, 
and the nameless Nation formed by the United States. When a number of 
States of distinct nationality are united under a common government, this is 
properly an Empire ; as, the Roman Empire, and the British Empire. 

2 The very best form of government, according to Aristotle, is the aris- 



252 ORGANIZATION 

Every well-ordered State, whatever be its form of govern- 
ment, has essentially a Constitution, unwritten or written, 
positively decreed, and loyally observed by its officials and 
citizens. 1 The Constitution is the fundamental organic law, 
organizing the body politic. It has three essential features 

tocracy of intellectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities 
be found, in their highest development, in a few persons, or only in one. 

The Virginia Bill of Eights, § 3, says : "Of all the various modes and 
forms of government, that is best, which is capable of producing the great- 
est degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against 
the danger of mal-administration." 

"A government is to be judged," says Mill, "by its action upon men, 
and by its action upon things ; by what it makes the citizens, and what it 
does for them ; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, 
and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by 
means of them." — Representative Government, p. 43. 

1 England has no formally enacted and written Constitution. The gov- 
ernment, originally an absolute monarchy, has been reduced to a limited 
monarchy by Magna Charta and numerous subsequent Acts of Parliament, 
which stand in lieu of a formal Constitution, and insure to the people re- 
publican liberty. 

The Constitution of the United States is a written and formally enacted 
document. Its preamble is : " We the People of the United States, in 
order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tran- 
quillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Thus 
is declared the multiple end, essentially a duplicate, to protect and to pro- 
mote welfare. The articles which follow enact the specific means for attain- 
ing the end, reciting the functions or duties, with limitations, of the various 
officers of the government. 

In a republican government, whose legitimate procedures are determined 
ultimately by the will of the majority, the Constitution is an aegis for the 
minority, shielding it from the caprice of popular whims. In general, it is 
protective of citizens from the tyranny of magistrates. " The powers must 
be administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger 
than the social feelings. And hence, the powers vested in them to prevent 
injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by 
them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community. 
That by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant 
by constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to govern- 
ment." — Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, p. 7. 



THE STATE 253 

arising from the very nature of the State, the legislative, the 
judicial, the executive. The functions of the three are some- 
times embodied in one person ; as, an absolute monarch. In 
many cases they are irregularly distributed to a number of 
persons ; but the historical trend is clearly to separate them 
as distinct departments intrusted to a distinct personnel ; as, 
in each of the States of our Union, and in the Federal whole. 

The function of the Legislature is to enact statutory laws 
within the limits and in pursuance of the organic law, the 
Constitution. As a necessary corollary it has authority to 
affix penalties to these laws to insure their observance, and 
power to lay and collect taxes for the support of the govern- 
ment, and for the execution of its measures. 1 

The function of the Judiciary is to sit in judgment on the 
constitutionality of the legislated statutes, to interpret their 
application, to sanction and decree the penalty for violation. 
When not otherwise directed by statute, the inferior courts 
proceed in accord either with the Roman or Civil Law, as in 
the States of continental Europe, or with the English Com- 
mon Law, which has been adopted as the basis of jural rights 
in the United States. 2 

1 Legislation for the general welfare is to be distinguished from legisla- 
tion for the welfare of individuals, which is favoritism, or to benefit some 
distinct social group, which is class legislation. These are illegitimate. 

2 Except in Louisiana, where the Napoleonic Code, a modification of the 
Justinian, is recognized. For Koman or Civil Law, see supra, § 47, note. 
The English or Common Law, lex non scripta, derives its authority from 
long usage or established custom, and has been immemorially received and 
recognized by the English tribunals. The historical source of this system 
cannot be traced. The origin of the Common Law, says Lord Hale, is as 
undiscoverable as the head of the Nile ; which is true historically, but phil- 
osophically its origin in human rights is easily discerned. Its settled rules 
and principles have not been authoritatively codified ; they are found only 
in the records of courts, and reports of juridical decisions. Statute Law, 
lex scripta, is a body of laws or rules of action prescribed or enacted by the 
legislative power, providing for specific and exceptive cases, and promul- 
gated and recorded in writing. 



254 ORGANIZATION 

The function of the Executive is to enforce the laws and 
carry out the measures enacted by the Legislature. The 
execution of laws respecting crime, and of those respecting 
property rights, is intrusted to the inferior courts with their 
police and prison auxiliaries, backed by the superior courts, 
and by the chief executive, be he governor, or president, or 
king. Measures for the public weal, as the coinage of money, 
the care and disbursement of the public funds, the system of 
public education, the postal system, the improvement of har- 
bors and waterways, the making of treaties, and many others, 
are carried into effect by this branch of the government. 
Also the chief executive is commander in chief of the army 
and navy, wherewith to insure domestic tranquillity, and the 
common defense against foreign aggression, invasion, or other 
form of trespass. 1 

§ 132. Now be it observed that the State is a complete, 
authoritative and powerful organization. Its foundation is 
on human rights, its superstructure is a fortress against tres- 
pass, a lodgment of justice, an abode of public duty and 
patriotic service. The structure is not new ; for the human 
race, so long as it has existed, has been busied in building, 
remodeling, repairing, improving, and maintaining in differ- 
ent forms, through all the vicissitudes of history, this emi- 
nently ethical institution. 

1 " What constitutes a State? 
Not high-raised battlement or labored mound, 

Thick wall or moated gate ; 
Not cities proud with spires and turrets crowned ; 

Not bays and broad-armed ports, 
Where, laughing at the storm, rich navies ride ; 

Nor starred and spangled courts, 
Where low-browed baseness wafts perfume to pride. 

No ; men, high-minded men, 
With powers as far above dull brutes endued 

In forest, brake, or den, 
As brutes excel cold rocks and brambles rude ; 

Men, who their duties know, 
And know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain." 

— Sib William Jones. 



THE STATE 255 

Recalling the definition of an organism, that each member 
is at once means and end for every other, and the whole for 
each and each for the whole, we observe : first, that each 
citizen in his action as such, as in voting, or paying a tax, or 
serving on a jury or in the army, and likewise each officer of 
any department in exercising his special function, is thereby 
expending energy as a means for the profit, directly or re- 
motely, of every other individual member of the State ; sec- 
ondly, that in so far as each member is profited thereby, he is 
an end ; thirdly, that the whole as a systematized means finds 
its end in guarding and promoting the liberty, privileges, 
rights and property of each individual member separately 
taken; and fourthly, that it is the function of each officer 
and citizen to become a means whereby to maintain the integ- 
rity and efficiency of the State in all its departments as an 
end. In ancient times this last relation was emphasized, the 
people are for the State ; as in the Roman Constitution, and 
in the Spartan Constitution so greatly admired by Aristotle. 
In modern times the reverse relation is emphasized, the State 
is for the people ; as in the Virginia Bill of Rights, which 
has been generally accepted as their Magna Charta by the 
United States. 1 The right relation, however, between the 
governing and the governed is one of constant reciprocity. 
The mutual obligations are dissimilar, but in delicate and 
admirable equipoise. 2 

Moreover, in observing that the ends in every view are 
the preventing of trespass and the promoting of welfare, it 
is evident that the raison d'etre of the organization and its 
informing elements are strictly ethical. It would be easy to 



1 See supra, § 82, note ; and infra, § 146, note. 

2 A mere allusion may be permitted to the famous old Roman fable of 
"The Belly and the Members," as told by Menenius Agrippa in the early 
days of the city. Livy, ii, 32. The analogy illustrates a profound truth. 
See 1 Corinthians, 12 : 14-26. Also supra, § 109, note. 



256 ORGANIZATION . 

treat in detail of the duties of citizens to the State, and of 
the duties of the State, to citizens, showing them to be 
strictly and exclusively moral obligations of high order, all 
coming under the law of trespass as prohibitions or as 
requisitions ; and it is well worth repeating that all laws of 
civil government are amplifications and specifications of the 
law of trespass. 1 The Legislature originates no law abso- 
lutely. Having discovered certain rights unguarded or in 
abeyance, it is obligated to enact specific laws to meet the 
specific cases; and these laws derive their authority ulti- 
mately, not from the enacting body, nor from the whole 
people whom it represents, but from the fundamental impera- 
tive principle of right and justice, the moral law. 2 

§ 133. Mention has already been made of the strong 
tendency in recent days to individualism, of the disposition 
to lay stress upon the individual personality of each man 
and woman, slighting the unity of society in favor of its 
disparate plurality. 3 It is evidently a reaction against the 
centralizing tendency of former times, which regarded the 
State as comprised in one man, 4 or in one set of men, and all 
others as fused to a mass whose sole relation to the state 
was subservience. Both views are exaggerations, between 

1 See supra, § 65. 

2 " For even Tarquin had the light of reason deduced from the nature 
of things, which incites to good actions and dissuades from evil ones ; and 
which does not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in 
writing, but from the first moment that it exists ; and its existence is coeval 
with the divine mind. Therefore the true and supreme law, whose com- 
mands and prohibitions are equally authoritative, is the right reason of the 
sovereign Deity." — Cicero, Laws, bk. ii, ch. 4. 

"Law in general," says Montesquieu, "is human reason, inasmuch as it 
governs all the inhabitants of the earth ; the political and civil laws of each 
nation ought to be the particular cases in which human reason is applied." 
— I? Esprit des Lois, Tome ii, ch. 3. 

8 See supra, § 127. 

* Said Louis XIV : " L'&at ! C'est moi." 



THE STATE 257 

which lies the truth. Both violate the organic character of 
the State, the latter excessively integrating, the former dis- 
integrating. 

Against individualism we point out that the State is not 
an aggregate of men and women, nor are individual men 
and women its originating units. The unit of the State is 
the family. 1 As a city is composed of houses, so is a State 
of homes. The representative head of a family judges and 
acts for it in uniting with others to organize, or in the far 
more usual case, to conduct the affairs of the already organ- 
ized State. To him alone is properly committed the right of 
suffrage, as the one best capable of guarding and promoting 
all interests outside the domestic sphere. 2 It has been wisely 
said that the two pillars upon which the whole structure of 
the State reposes, are the sanctity of the marriage relation 
and that of the judicial oath. 3 Should a blind Samson bow 

1 " It is clear," says Aristotle, " that a State is not a mere society, having 
a common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of 
exchange. These are conditions without which a State cannot exist ; but 
all of them together do not constitute a State, which is a community of 
well-being in families and in aggregations of families called villages or com- 
munes, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. ' ' — Politico,, bk. hi, 
ch. 9. He distributes society as follows : oTkos, a house, home, or family ; 
Kd)/A7) , a village, neighborhood, or community ; ir6\ts, a city, municipality, 
or State. — Idem, bk. i, ch. 2. 

2 That bachelors of twenty-one or more years of age, notwithstanding 
their incomplete social status, are admitted to citizenship, is a concession to 
the prospect of their becoming heads of families, and to their usefulness in 
public affairs ; e.g., in the army. A sharp line of franchise is necessary ; 
it is best furnished primarily by sex and age. See supra, §§ 114 (3), 116. 
Wisdom from experience dictates there should be also educational and prop- 
erty qualifications for franchise. Its extension to ignorant paupers, espe- 
cially to those of other races and nationalities, has always proved disastrous. 
The presence in the State of a proletariat incapable of a voice in its affairs, 
should be recognized as unavoidable ; so that it is not the total people, but 
only a selected portion that rules, the portion which most contributes to the 
consistence of society, and therefore is privileged to represent it. 

3 For 'oath' we would substitute the more general 'truth,' inspiring 
trust ; see supra, § 125. Aristotle, in Politica, teaches that human society 



258 ORGANIZATION 

himself on these, the whole edifice would fall with disaster 
to ruins. 1 

The State is thus constituted primarily of a congeries of 
families organized into the larger whole. But beside these 
are many other organizations holding membership in the 
State, to whom protection is due ; as, business firms, stock 
companies, and corporations generally, including incorporated 
towns and cities. These are endowed by the State with 
large powers, and thus become subordinate municipalities, 
each imperium in imperio? Also each department of the 
State, and each of its subdivisions, as a court, an army, is 
itself a subsidiary organism. 

can be resolved into the two ultimate elements, sexual relation and private 
property. Upon these the State is founded. The first is necessary for its 
continuance, and both for its welfare. His recognition of private property 
as a twin pillar, rather than merely a buttress, of civic organization, is 
more likely to be apprehended and approved in modern times. 

i "In Troilus and Cressida, Shakespeare has indicated the deep moral 
relation of the family and the nation, and its significance in the story of 
Troy. The war had its origin in the violation of the purity of marriage 
life, and it was this which involved the city in destruction. The doom 
which overtakes Troilus and Cressida is the reflex borne on through the 
years, and on to the close of the city, of the moral judgment upon Paris 
and Helen. There is an expression not only in the catastrophe, but through 
the whole drama, of the organic and moral relation of the family and the 

State." Muxford, The Nation, p. 282. See supra, §82, note. Thus 

it teaches that the natural and moral consequence of the disrupted family 
is the disrupted State. What the wise Ulysses therein says of the State, 
may be applied to the drama itself : 

" The providence that's in a watchful State 

Knows almost every grain of Plutus' gold, 

Finds bottom in th' nncomprehensive deeps, 

Keeps pace with thought, and almost, like the gods, 

Does thoughts unveil in their dumb cradles. 

There is a mystery — with whom relation 

Durst never meddle — in the soul of State, 

Which hath an operation more divine 

Than breath, or pen, can give expressure to." 

— Act iii, sc. 3, 1. 196 sq. 

2 On' the social and moral effects of the affranchisement of the cities, see 
Guizot, History of Civilization, vol. i, Lee. 7. 



THE STATE 259 

§ 134. The State as an organized whole, while distin- 
guished by special characteristics, has features resembling 
those of its elementary and subsidiary members. It is logi- 
cally indivisible in itself, an individual. Its subdivisions are 
not kinds, but departments, into which it is logically severed. 
As a self-subsisting individual, it has a life whose beginning 
is sometimes out of sight in remote antiquity, as that of 
Greece ; and whose continuity does not depend on that of 
its several members. We are born into it, we live within it, 
we die out from it ; we are but its transient accidents. A 
man looks forward to his end, and makes provision for it by 
testament ; a State, looking forward with expectation of in- 
definite continuity, makes no provision for cessation, which, 
indeed, as with Poland, rarely occurs. 1 

Moreover, a State is a personality. It has an intelligence 
and a culture of its own, and it has a will of its own. Also 
it has a conscience of its own. 2 Often it incurs debt, and 
with unconstrained honesty meets its obligation. If it fail, 
it is dishonored and disgraced before the world, and causes 

1 ' ' Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut seterna sit. ' ' — Cicero, Be 
Republica, bk. iii, ch. 23, § 34. " It is not composed of its present occu- 
pants alone, but it embraces those who are, and have been, and shall be. 
There is in it the continuity of the generations, it reaches backward to the 
fathers and onward to the children, and its relation is manifest in its rever- 
ence for the one and its hope for the other. . . . The work of the individ- 
ual is brief, and in its isolation would be almost vain, but in the continuity 
of the nation it is inwrought in the longer social development. Thus, also, 
a single generation, in its furthest advance, achieves but little in comparison 
with the long line of the generations in the nation, and if there is laid on 
any the necessity of battle, still the holiest triumph is that in which the life 
of the nation in its continuity is maintained. ' ' — Mulford, The Nation, 
pp. 6, 9. 

2 " The conception of the magistracy is significant to a certain extent of 
the common conscience of the people, which is made thereby to confront 
the changeable will of the individuals, precisely as within the spirit of the 
individual the consciousness of moral laws that are universally binding 
confronts the momentary frames of mind. 1 ' — Lotze, Practical Philosophy, 
§63. 



260 ORGANIZATION 

guilty shame in every citizen, though he himself be blame- 
less. 1 Sometimes States commit crime as States, and are 
punished by other States, or by ordinary providence. Usu- 
ally they are very jealous of national honor, and an offense 
arouses national indignation. 2 

i One generation in a State incurs debts to be paid by subsequent gener- 
ations, and these accept the burden without question ; as, war debts, bonds 
issued for improvements, and the like. The historical enchainment is also 
seen in the provision by law for general public instruction, which recognizes 
a debt due the coming generation. This obligation of the State is felt to be 
so weighty that not only in many modern but in some ancient States, as in 
early Greece, compulsory education has been adopted ; see Plato, Crito, 
50d, and 51c, e, Step. ; cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. x, ch. 9, §§ 7, 13, 14, 
who in this last place says : " It would be best that the State should pay 
attention to education, and on right principles, and that it should have 
power to enforce it ; but if neglected as a public measure, it would seem to 
be the duty of every individual to contribute to the virtue of his children 
and friends, or at least to make this his deliberate purpose." 

"The State," says Burke, " ought not to be considered as nothing better 
than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper, and coffee, calico or 
tobacco, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved 
by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, 
because it is not a partnership in things subservient to the gross animal 
existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all 
science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all per- 
fection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many « 
generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, 
but between those who are living and those who are dead and those who 
are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is a clause in the 
great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher 
natures, connecting the visible and the invisible world according to a fixed 
compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all 
moral natures each in their appropriate place." — Reflexions on the Revo- 
lution in France, Select Works edited by Payne, Clarendon Press, vol. ii, 
pp. 113, 114. 

2 "The State is bound," says the Bishop of Peterborough, Eng., "by 
precisely the same morality that binds the individual ; for morality is not a 
duty of positive, but of natural obligation, and is binding therefore on all 
men under all possible circumstances. The State may not, any more than 
the individual may, act immorally in the discharge of its trust. As he may 
not lie or steal for his wards, so neither may the State. It may not, for 
instance, in the interests of its citizens, plunder the property of other States, 



? 



THE STATE 261 

Also this distinct individual personality is manifest in the 
familiar recognition of national calamities, national pros- 
perity, national blessing, and national thanksgiving ; all these 
being clearly distinguished from what befalls this and that 
man, or this and that family. Withal there is a national 
character, as seen by contrast of the English, French, and 
Spanish peoples, more or less common to the individual 
citizens, but attributed to the nationality rather than to the 
man. It is only in a clear recognition of the distinct and 
unique personality of the State that a full and correct con- 
ception can be had of civic interest, of common welfare, and 
of public obligation. 1 

§ 135. Let us here give a passing glance at the great vari- 
ety of duties devolving upon a man because of his member- 
ship in a variety of organizations, each involving a special 
class or series of obligations. First as a member of a family, 
whose name he bears, he has peculiar obligations to each of 

or lie to them, or take unfair advantage of them in any way. Similarly in 
all its dealings with its own subjects it must be scrupulously and equally 
just. But this is a natural and not a distinctively Christian obligation. 
Morality and justice were not created, nor even revealed, by Christ ; they 
existed, and were known to exist, before the giving of the Sermon on the 
Mount, and would have continued to exist had that discourse never been 
spoken, or had He who spoke it never appeared among men." — Govern- 
ment and the Sermon on the Mount. 

1 Much that is here said of the State may be, indeed has been already, 
said of the family ; supra, §§ 118, 119 ; cf. § 127. It was perhaps the inti- 
mate relation of the family and the State that gave rise to the paternal 
theory : As is a father to his children, so is a ruler to his subject. In his- 
tory, since the patriarchs, we find paternalism affected by kings and magis- 
trates generally. But this is not the doctrine of modern civics. The State 
is an organization sui generis, not patterned after the family, or any other 
organized body. See supra, § 109, note. 

Furthermore, the theory, promulgated by Bousseau in his famous Du 
Contrat social, ou Principes du Droit politique, which attributes the origin 
of the State to a social contract binding in perpetuity, has not survived the 
French Bevolution. 



262 OBGANIZATION 

the other members and to the whole. Then as a member of 
polite society, as a business man in the market, on change or 
in professional relations, as one of a club, or company, or as- 
sociation, or church, he enters into many varied relations ; 
and, since obligation is founded on relation, these many varied 
relations determine, not only a multiplication but also a diver- 
sity, in kind and degree, of obligations. No man compre- 
hends life until he is made to see by how many organic fila- 
ments he is bound to his fellows ; how utterly impossible it 
is for him to separate his interests and his fortunes from 
theirs; in how many ways the welfare of those who are 
round about him depends upon the working, in due manner 
and measure, of that part of the organism which he occupies. 
With membership in the State, whether as a citizen sim- 
ply or as an official also, arises another distinct series of obli- 
gations, often of a very exacting and absorbing character. 1 
Upon the sincere discharge of these by rulers and subjects 
depend the health and strength, the wholesome welfare, of 
the body politic. No merely perfunctory conduct, no dis- 
play of avowed patriotism, can replace genuine civic virtue. 2 

1 The relations and consequent obligations in the family and in the State 
are alike in this, that they are both involuntary and indissoluble. A man 
becomes a member by birth, and finds himself already under bonds. Con- 
sent is not asked. There is an important sense in which it is true that 
States " derive their just powers from the consent of the governed " (Decla- 
ration of Independence, postulate), and that " all power is vested in, and 
consequently derived from the people " (Virginia Bill of Bights, § 2) ; but 
this does not apply to the individual man. If dissatisfied, he may transfer 
his allegiance, removing himself and his effects, but this is merely an ex- 
change, and not a dissolution of bonds. 

2 It was Doctor Johnson, I believe, who said : ' ' Patriotism ! the last 
refuge of a scoundrel." 

Oliver Cromwell said to the men of England : "You glory in the ditch 
which guards your shores, but I tell you that your ditch will not save you, 
if you do not reform yourselves. ' ' 

Says the Virginia Bill of Bights, § 15: "No free government, or the 
blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence 



THE STATE 263 

It is sorrowful to observe that public duties are ordinarily 
performed from dread of penalty or hope of reward, or per- 
haps from the higher motive of respect for the law. But in 
extraordinary junctures, in crises, in war, the service ren- 
dered, even when enforced, is often loving service, the com- 
pulsory is lost in the voluntary, and the dormant good-will 
of the people arouses to free and devoted exercise. This 
loving service of the State is the noble affection of true 
patriotism. 

§ 136. What is the justification of legal punishment? 
What is the ground on which rests the acknowledged right 
of society organized as a State to deprive a member offend- 
ing against its laws of his property, his liberty, his life? 
What is the warrant? This grave question has been vari- 
ously answered. It is the right of the stronger, the com- 
bined force of many against one, the right of might, say 
some. It is the right of vengeance, of revenge for injury, 
transferred from the sufferer to the more capable and effect- 
ive State, say others. Yet others say, in lofty words, the 
dignity and authority of the law must be vindicated; the 
broken law must have its integrity restored, must be made 
whole again, rendered holy, sanctified, reconsecrated in the 
eyes of all before whom it has been violated, and this is the 
end of penalty. Let us seek firmer ground, some more 
rational justification. 1 

to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by a frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles." 

1 That might gives right, that whatever a man can he may rightly do, 
take, hold, enforce, is the "brutal maxim of barbarians. There is a sense, 
however, in which might confers right. What one cannot do is not duty ; 
but, the condition of ability supplied, many things, within the limit of tres- 
pass, thereby become duties with their correlative rights. Noblesse oblige. 

In unorganized society, says Lotze, each man avenges his wrongs with all 
his might ; but this is inadequate, either as insufficient or excessive. Hence 
organized society takes from him the right of private vengeance, undertaking 



264 ORGANIZATION 

At the beginning of this treatise it was pointed out as a 
familiar fact in history that men are exceedingly tenacious of 
their rights, defending their claims with great pertinacity. 
This is obviously the ultimate explanation of most quarrels 
between individual men, of suits and prosecutions before the 
courts, of contests between states or nations leading to inter- 
necine wars. Evidently by the common judgment of men 
every one has a right to defend a right. 

This judgment is clearly correct For, if we once more 
fix discriminating attention on the primary, necessary, and 
universal notion of a right, we discern, implied in its exclu- 
sive ownership, this addendum to the original conception, a 
right to defend a right. Whatever possession is truly my 
own, I may retain and use, I may protect it from all damage, 
especially from trespass, I have a right, indeed am bound, to 
defend it against all comers. Evidently the right and obli- 
gation to defend my right is an essential implication in the 
demand for maintenance of moral order. Again, of my pos- 
sessions I am steward and guardian, they are trusts. A 
neglect to conserve and defend, within limits, a trust, is an 
indirect trespass upon all who have a claim upon me for its 
keeping and using. An attempted or threatened trespass 
upon my life, liberty or property, is to be resisted, else I my- 
self become a trespasser. Thus defense is not a mere con- 
tingent privilege, but a necessary obligation. 1 

Further, the obligation to defend a right implies a recipro- 
cal loss of right in the aggressor. By becoming a trespasser 
he forfeits in some corresponding degree his right to liberty, 
in extreme cases even to life. One attempting assassination, 

to avenge him in due measure. This is legal punishment. See Tract. Phil, 
§ 52; cf. § 13 (3). Also cf. Butler, Sermons viii and ix. But revenge is 
essentially wrong. Can such wrong become right by transference ? Civil 
law nowhere recognizes that its penalties are retributive. Whatever is 
righteous in vengeance is reserved to a higher tribunal. 
1 See supra, § 85. 



THE STATE 265 

or arson, or burglary, is killed, if this be the only preventive 
means, by his intended victim, with regret, with sorrow in- 
deed, but without compunction. In the right of defense lies 
the warrant for interference in the liberty of a trespasser, 
which interference is not, therefore, itself a trespass. 

§ 137. In an unrestrained intercourse of men, with their 
various abilities physical and mental, and with the varied 
opportunities afforded by wealth and station, the stronger 
trespass upon the weaker. An oppressor may perhaps con- 
sole himself with the brute maxim that might makes right, 
but the oppressed is not thereby relieved and quieted. Be- 
sides, impelled by selfish interests, men combine in couples, 
or squads, or large bands, and thus accumulate force to over- 
come the weaker. To inhibit such predicament society is 
organized into a State, constituted by a combining majority ; 
which organization is not oppressive but rather protective of 
the minority, the organic law becoming its shield, a defensive 
weapon, against popular caprice. The body politic employs 
agents, empowered by general consensus, to frame, apply and 
enforce particular laws in accord with the general purpose. 1 

To accomplish the chief end of its existence, the protec- 
tion of its subjects in their rightful liberty, the government 
must, as far as practicable, defend, both at large and in de- 
tail, the original and acquired rights of individual men, of 
trade firms, of legalized corporations, of all subordinate com- 

1 The historical origin of States has rarely perhaps been just thus. Yet 
many a clan, or tribe, or people has organized, on a patriarchal or on a 
military basis, for defense of common and private rights from aggression of 
similar bodies, as well as for conquest. More often, it may be, States have 
arisen from the skillful and selfish handling of the strong, seeking to enlarge 
and perpetuate their power. While the progress of civilization has failed 
to enlighten many, others have been gradually modified to approximate at 
least the form and intent indicated. Our discussion, however, is not con- 
cerning historical origin, but of the ground on which the ideal State, the 
State as it ought to be, is justified in exercising punitive powers. 



266 ORGANIZATION 

binations of its citizens for legitimate purposes ; the right of 
private defense being transferred, except in emergency, to 
the more potent and equable agency. In order to fulfill this 
great trust, the government must defend itself. Its officers 
must be protected in the discharge of their legitimate func- 
tions against violence or intimidation. It must prevent the 
high crimes of regicide and treason, must resist the insurrec- 
tion of a disaffected minority, or the aggression of a foreign 
power. As an individual personality it is bound to preserve 
its integrity and efficiency by vigorous self-defense. It is 
clear that a State, as a faithful trustee, is bound, first, to 
preserve its own existence, and secondly, to restrain, to 
resist, and, if need be, to destroy whatsoever and whosoever 
assails its authority or attacks the interests committed to its 
charge. Self-preservation, and the preservation of all that 
is intrusted to it, are moral obligations of every State. 

§ 138. Therein is the ultimate ground that justifies legal 
punishment. It is discovered in the obligation to exert pro- 
tective defense of rights. All legal penalties are set for the 
defense of rights. They inflict pain on the law-breaker, are 
a painful interference in his liberty, warranted by the prin- 
ciple of defense. They deter him from repetition of the 
offense, and they deter observers from like misconduct, thus 
defending the rights involved. Practically imperfect as it is, 
no other means is known by which to effect defense against 
offense, except this of inflicting pain on offenders in propor- 
tion to the gravity of their misdeeds. The punishment, as to 
kind and degree, is determined by what is past and cannot 
be reinstated ; its purpose is to determine what is future, and 
is deterrent, preventive of further or like trespass. Thus the 
sufficient, rational, and only righteous ground of legal penalty 
is the protective defense of rights. 

The principle applies to the divine government of the 



THE STATE 267 

world. The natural sanctions of universal moral law are the 
typical antecedents of the artificial sanctions of civil law, 
and go far in an explanation of the righteousness of pain. 1 
The sovereign Deity has rights on which men trespass as 
well as on the rights of his subjects. He defends these and 
his authority by the appointed natural pains attending dis- 
order, and by special penalties affixed to special offenses. 
Sin is essentially trespass on Deity, and the punishment of 
sin is self-defense, and the defense of all under his protec- 
tion. To have any other gods before him is high treason. 2 

Deterrent defense is disciplinary. This gives title to 
houses of correction or reformatories set especially for re- 
claiming youthful offenders, and to penitentiaries where felons 
do penance, rendering them penitent, leading to reformation. 
So imprisonment generally, and also fines are disciplinary, 
not only of the offender, but of the observer, and even capi- 
tal punishment has this salutary effect on society. Thus the 
law is a schoolmaster, a pedagogue, leading to higher life. 
But this, with the State, is not its original, nor its avowed, 
nor indeed its ultimate purpose, but is an accessory. The 
State is not an educational, but a protective institution, and 
reformation is not the end, but a means of preventing tres- 
pass. Its enacted sanctions, among which are no rewards, 
are not incentive, but deterrent. Indeed, in the last analysis, 
any and every warranted interference in liberty is a defense 
against trespass, or, no interference in a person's liberty has 

1 See supra, § 54. 

2 That the purpose of civil punishment is deterrent, is the common doc- 
trine of jurists. It is here carried one step further back to the ultimate 
ground of a right and duty in defense of trust. The Church has always 
very generally held that the only legitimate end of civil punishment is the 
prevention of crime. The doctrine merges justice into benevolence. It is 
because God has a view to the welfare of his rational creatures, that he 
visits sin and moral disorder with punishment. Leibnitz defines justice to 
be benevolence guided by wisdom ; and Tertullian says : " Omne hoc justi- 
tise opus procuratio bonitatis est." 



268 ORGANIZATION 

ever a warrant save in defense against trespass. In the 
domestic sphere parents punish to chasten. Chastisement is 
punishment intended to benefit the sufferer. It is often and 
rightly inflicted with no wider or further view ; but this whip 
of love means more, and the chastening has its only complete 
justification in forestalling the trespasses of perhaps a remote 
future. Our Father, in the abundance of his love, chastens 
his children, not only that the erring may turn and live, but 
more largely that all who might suffer from the persisting 
error may be spared the harm, and loss, and sorrow. 

§ 139. The right of a government to suppress mob turbu- 
lence or riots of any kind, is obviously the right and duty to 
defend domestic tranquillity; and to quell an insurrection 
against magisterial authority, is clearly to exercise the right 
and duty of self-defense. The inverse right of revolution 
has the same basis. The ends of the State being the defense 
of rights and the promotion of the common welfare, " when 
any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to 
these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu- 
bitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or 
abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive 
to the public weal." 1 Evidently, if a government be con- 
tinuously oppressive to the body of the people, their original 
and sacred right of self-defense justifies them in subverting 
it, and substituting one that promises better things. 2 

1 Virginia Bill of Rights, § 3. Cf. American Declaration of Indepen- 
dence. Unjust laws, such as are not intolerably oppressive, of which exam- 
ples continually abound, ought, until repealed, to be obeyed by all concerned, 
from respect for the dignity and integrity of the State. In such case it is 
duty patiently to suffer injustice. 

2 In usage of the terms, the distinction between revolution and rebellion 
is not always clear. Generally, if a revolt succeed, it is called respectfully 
a revolution ; if it fail, it is stigmatized as a rebellion ; the justice of the 
cause being disregarded in favor of the historical result. Treason or rebel- 
lion against righteous civil authority, is rankest offense. " Whoever lays 



THE STATE 269 

War has no other justification. A war of conquest is 
plainly the crimes of murder, arson, robbery, and the rest of 
the foul catalogue, many times multiplied. On the other 
hand, a defensive war, provided all other honorable means of 
rectification have failed, is thoroughly righteous. That a 
State repel vi et armis the encroachment, the aggression, the 
trespass of another, is a moral obligation of highest order. 
A brave and conscientious people, possessing civic rights 
inherited to be fostered and transmitted, maintains them, 
even against overwhelming numbers and resources, and does 
not surrender, but dies in defending its trusts, warring until 
resistance becomes madness. Defense may fire the first gun, 
may invade the enemy's territory, may sweep his commerce 
from the sea, thus to conquer immunity and peace ; but, to 
be justified, all proceedings must originally and continuously 
be intentional and essential defense. This is so clearly recog- 
nized by civilized States in modern times that, whenever war 
between them occurs, each party loudly claims to be acting 
on the defensive, thus seeking to justify its action in its own 
eyes, and in the eyes of the rest of mankind. 

§ 140. Geographic, climatic, and other conditions deter- 
mine that there shall be many States. Differences of race, 
language, religion, tradition, the genius and general culture 
of the people, further determine different forms of govern- 
ment, as monarchies, republics, democracies. These, the 
world over, have both common and conflicting interests, and 
are otherwise more or less intimately related. Their relations 
are adjusted by resident ambassadors and consuls, and by 
occasional diplomatic correspondence, forming and perform- 
ing treaties of commerce, and of alliance, fixing boundaries, 

violent hands upon the State, assails the conditions of all moral life, and 
therefore the crime is regarded as the greatest." — Trendelenburg, quoted 
by Mulf ord, The Nation, p. 16. 



270 OR GANIZA TION 

and regulating minor matters. The trend of civilization has 
long been towards a brotherhood of peoples, and the enter- 
prise of the nineteenth century has so vastly increased the 
facilities of intercommunication, by multiplying roads of 
rapid transit, by tunneling Alpine barriers, by devising a 
swift and safe crossing of seas, by weaving over the globe 
a network of electric wires and submarine cables, that civic 
isolation has now almost entirely disappeared, and the na- 
tions are fusing and welding together. This intimate inter- 
course and manifold relation is subject to the one universal 
moral law of trespass not. There is no other obligation in 
all the comity of nations. 1 

1 In the foregoing- discussion it sufficiently appears that {.he sole purpose 
of the State is the welfare of its constituents. It is in no sense a philan- 
thropic institution. The United States, for example, and the several States, 
in their manifold functions, are for the benefit of their own people, and not 
for the good of France, or Spain, or Mexico, or Canada, or any country or 
people not within their territorial limits. No government has a right to do 
charity outside its own jurisdiction, or to legislate for or to govern an 
alien people. A man may charitably give away money which is his own, 
but governments, federal, state, municipal, have no money except that ob- 
tained by taxation. Its possession and disbursement is a trust of the people 
whose agents they are, to be exercised only within sharply defined constitu- 
tional limitations which make no provision for philanthropy. To use it 
for other purposes than the welfare of the taxpayers, to use it to relieve 
oppressions or sufferings of remote or adjacent peoples, is illegitimate, a 
departure from right and duty, and liable to the grossest abuses. 

It is sometimes alleged that it is the right and duty of our government so 
to intervene in foreign affairs as to extend the area of civil liberty, to save 
others from misgovernment, to prevent persecution, and to establish the 
true religion. But what is liberty, right government, true religion ? We 
may determine these questions for ourselves, but we are not required nor 
authorized to determine them for others. No State is bound to incur cost 
or danger in the interest of others, this being detrimental to its own interest 
and that of its subjects, but rather therefore is it bound to abstain rigorously 
from all unnecessary interference in foreign affairs. The exercise of wide 
philanthropy, and the propagation of our high civilization, of our free insti- 
tutions, of our cherished religion, belong exclusively to voluntary associa- 
tions organized for the purpose, and more especially to the Christian Church. 



THE STATE 271 

The increasing intimacy of these civic relations brings 
clearly into view the organic unity of mankind, and suggests 
the conception of a universal State, whose mighty function 
shall be to secure international justice without war. This 
ideal is becoming in a measure realized. " Its realization," 
says Dr. Seelye, "does not require, indeed, in the actual 
condition of men, would not permit that all particular States 
should lose their individuality of government or institutions, 
and be merged in what might be deemed the visible embodi- 
ment of the one universal State. The universal State has no 
visible embodiment. Yet it is not thereby without reality or 
power. In our modern world nothing has shown itself more 
real or potent. What we call international law, or the law 
of nations, unknown except in the vaguest, faintest way in 
ancient times, is recognized in our day as a sovereignty in 
human affairs, equally majestic and mighty. It has no visible 
throne ; it does not utter itself through the voice of a mon- 
arch, or the votes of a legislature or people ; it has no courts 
to expound, nor any fleets or armies to enforce its dictates ; 
but it guides kings, and legislatures, and peoples, and courts, 
and fleets, and armies in our times, with an authority whose 
manifestation of power is steadily increasing. There is 
nothing so characteristic of modern politics as the sway which 
international law, a development of the one moral law, is 
continually gaining among existing nations. There is no 
other point in which the politics of the present day are 
so clearly distinct from those of the ancient world. But 
international law is nothing other than the voice of the one 
universal State. It is the State in the highest exhibition of 
it yet given in history." The State thus organizing is a 
whole, is one and indivisible, uniting through itself more and 
more manifestly its constituent organizations, without effa- 
cing their distinct individuality, and presenting to the vision 
of political philosophy a world of united States. 



272 ORGANIZATION 



CHAPTER V 

THE CHURCH 

§ 141. Religion, in its widest sense, viewed subjectively, 
is belief in presiding, superhuman, spiritual power, earnest 
enough to influence moral character and conduct; viewed 
objectively it is a body of doctrine relative to such power, 
instructing and regulating its votaries. Religion is of two 
kinds, natural and revealed ; the former relying for its be- 
lief and doctrine on reason alone ; the latter claiming to 
have in addition information communicated by the higher 
power. 

The negative member of this dichotomy is natural reli- 
gion. Under scientific treatment it is entitled natural theol- 
ogy. It proceeds independently of historical, racial and 
local influences, discarding the dogmas of tradition, author- 
ity and custom, and upon rational grounds investigates the 
evidence furnished by nature of the reality and character of 
a higher power. More particularly, it seeks proof of the 
existence of God, his unity and personality, the kind and 
degree of his attributes, his will concerning us, the distinc- 
tion between right and wrong, good and evil, our relation 
and obligation to him, and our destiny both here and here- 
after. 

Revealed religions, which Diderot calls the heresies of 
natural religion, seek in general to impose their systems far 
less by reason than by persuasion with appeal to emotion 
and passion. Historically they have been largely character- 
ized by superstition or extreme reverence and fear of what is 
unknown or mysterious, and by fanaticism or ignorant, irra- 



THE CEUECE 273 

tional worship of deities, with excessive rigor in opinions 
and practice. Witness the prevailing Asiatic and African 
cults. Christianity, however, is a revealed religion claiming 
to be in entire accord with natural religion, to be at its basis 
strictly rational, and to demand no more of its adherents 
than conformable faith in its transcendent doctrine. 1 

1 It is an old saying that man is a religious animal. This differentiates, 
distinguishes him. His very nature determines that he shall look upward 
and worship. Among Aryan races, even the name which is above every 
name, in which every knee shall bow, is one, and tells of filial adoration. 
"In exploring the ancient archives of language," says Max Muller, "we 
find that the highest god received the same name in the ancient mythology 
of India, Greece, Italy, and Germany, and retained that name whether wor- 
shipped on the Himalayan mountains, or among the oaks of Dodona, on the 
Capitol, or in the forests of Germany. His name was Dyaus in Sanskrit, 
Zeus in Greek, Jovis in Latin, Tiu in German. These names are not mere 
words. They bring before us the ancestors of the whole Aryan race, thou- 
sands of years it may be before Homer and the Veda, worshipping an unseen 
Being, under the selfsame name, the best, the most exalted name they could 
find in their vocabulary, under the name of Light and Sky. . . . We have 
in the Veda the invocation Dyaus pitar, the Greek Zed 7rdrep, the Latin 
Jupiter; and that means in all the three languages what it meant before 
these three languages were torn asunder ; it means Heaven-Father. . . . 
Thousands of years have passed since the Aryan nations separated to travel 
to the North and the South, the West and the East ; they have each formed 
their languages, they have each founded empires and philosophies, they 
have each built temples and razed them to the ground ; they have all grown 
older, and it may be wiser and better ; but when they search for a name for 
what is most exalted and yet most dear to every one of us, when they wish 
to express both awe and love, the infinite and the finite, they can but do 
what their old fathers did when gazing up to the eternal sky, and feeling 
the presence of a Being as far as far, and as near as near can be ; they can 
but combine the selfsame words, and utter once more the primeval Aryan 
prayer, Heaven-Father, in that form which will endure forever, Our Father 
which art in heaven. ' ' — The Science of Beligion, Lee. iii. 

" Im Innern ist ein TTniversurn auch, 
Daber der Volker loblicber Gebrauch, 
Dass jeglicber das Beste was er kennt, 
Er Gott, ja seinen Gott bqnennt, 
Ihm Himmel und Erden ubergiebt, 
Thn fiircbtet und womoglicb liebt." 

— Goethe. 



274 ORGANIZATION 

§ 142. It has already been pointed out that a theory of 
Ethics to be complete as to its system must include the rec- 
ognition of a personal God, and of man's relation to him, and 
consequent obligation to render him loving service. This 
does not mean that there may not be practical morality even 
of very high grade in the various relations among men, with- 
out religion, without any acknowledgment of God; but it 
means that a scheme of morality without God is necessarily 
incomplete, has no ultimate support, no philosophic unity, 
and cannot be expanded into a scientifically systematized 
theory. Herein it appears that natural religion is the cap- 
stone, or rather the key-stone, of Ethics. 

Oriental scholars testify that Confucianism is simply and 
solely a body of inconsistent, ill assorted and often erroneous 
ethical doctrines, that Buddhism, the confession of one-third 
of the human race, is little else, and that both are distinctly 
atheistic. 1 Hinduism is pantheism, and pantheism, whether 
taught by the Brahman or by the god-intoxicated Spinoza, or 
by the haughty Hegelian, is merely a refined and enlarged, a 
generalized feticism. It denies the intelligence and freedom, 
the personality of its god. Now, since ethics with its com- 
plement religion is grounded in and arises from relations 
among persons, an impersonal being can have no part therein. 
Man cannot trespass on the world of nature, on the moun- 
tains, the continents, the ocean, or the stars, but only on 
him who intelligently and freely produced them, and to 
whom therefore they belong. The impersonal, so-called god 
of the pantheist is not at all the God of the ethical and reli- 
gious philosopher. Pantheism is essentially atheism. 2 

The mythical polytheistic cult of the ancient Greeks, in 

1 "Buddhism is no religion at all, and certainly no theology, but rather 
a system of duty, morality and benevolence, without any real deity, prayer 
or priest." — Monier Williams, Hinduism, p. 74. 

2 See supra, § 99, note. 



THE CHTJBCH 275 

form adopted by the skeptical Romans, and by them diffused 
over the Empire, was doubtless originally a deified personifi- 
cation of natural objects and forces, and an apotheosis of 
heroes. It was replaced in the philosophic thought of An- 
axagoras and of his successors by a strict monotheism, shin- 
ing forth clearly in the famous hymn of Cieanthes. 1 Thus 
unaided philosophy early reached and taught esoterically a 
remarkably pure natural religion, which, though it seems not 
to have taken practical form, nevertheless gave to the ethics 
of the Stoics a coherence, a consistency, an ultimatum and 
completeness that secured its permanence and general accep- 
tance even to this day. 2 

All religions, and even atheistic cults, come within the 
scope of Ethics. We have already seen that a man is re- 
sponsible for his beliefs. 3 Every belief relating to conduct, 
be its matter true or false, carries with it obligations, duties ; 
for every one is bound, whatever be its error, to conform his 
conduct to the result of his moral judgment, or, as it is com- 
monly expressed, is bound to obey his conscience. In reli- 

1 The text of the Hymn may be seen in Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, 
§ 54 ; and a translation in Mayor's Ancient Philosophy, p. 177. A metrical 
rendering of the opening lines is as follows : — 

" Thou, who amid the Immortals art throned the highest in glory, 
Giver and Lord of life, who by law disposest of all things, 
Known by many a name, yet One Almighty forever, 
Hail, O Zeus ! for to Thee should each mortal voice be uplifted ; 
Offspring are we too of thine, we and all that is mortal around us." 

2 See supra, § 100. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel says: "The 
idea of God constitutes the general foundation of a people. Whatever is 
the form of a religion, the same is the form of a State and its constitution ; 
it springs from religion, so much so that the Athenian and the Roman States 
were possible only with the peculiar heathendom of those peoples, and even 
now a Roman Catholic State has a different genius and a different constitu- 
tion from a Protestant State. The genius of a people is a definite individual 
genius, which becomes conscious of its individuality in different spheres ; in 
the character of its moral life, its political constitution, its art, religion and 
science." 

8 See supra, § 60, note. 



276 ORGANIZATION 

gion it is not otherwise. Ethical principles prevail within 
the shrine. They are immutable and all pervading. They 
are the ground not only from which natural religion arises, 
but on which revealed religion descending must take its 
stand to find a firm support. 

Shall an exception be made in favor of Christianity ? Not 
at all. Christianity is preeminently ethical. Indeed in a 
philosophic view its great strength lies in the exact conform- 
ity of its teaching to the universal and eternal ethical princi- 
ples which it enlightens, widens, exalts and refines. It came 
not to destroy but to fulfill the law more enduring than 
heaven and earth. The Sermon on the Mount speaks of the 
Kingdom of heaven and of the fatherhood of God, but it con- 
tains no distinctively Christian doctrine, and is occupied 
otherwise with applications of purely ethical principles. It 
might fairly be entitled a Lecture on Practical Ethics. 
These principles determine what is due in domestic, in social, 
and in civic order, and are likewise fundamental in religious 
order. Hence it is that so much is discovered to be common 
to all those religions, both natural and revealed, that have 
attained to the dignity of a system. 1 

1 Bishop Bigandet of Ava, in his Life and Legend of Gaudama, p. 494, 
says: "The Christian system and the Buddhistic, though differing from 
each other in their respective objects and ends as much as truth from error, 
have, it must be confessed, many striking features of an astonishing resem- 
blance. There are many moral precepts equally commanded and enforced 
in common by both creeds. It will not be rash to assert that most of the 
moral truths prescribed by the gospel are to be met with in the Buddhistic 
scriptures. " 

Mozoomdar, one of the leaders in a new religious movement in India, 
belonging to the high caste of his people, and reputed as learned in almost 
all the wisdom of certain kinds in England and America as well as in India, 
says : " Every great religion of which I have any knowledge has worshipped 
God either through the forces of nature, or in the form of heroes and great 
men, or through their own spiritual instincts. No religion, however idola- 
trous, has been able to shake off this threefold medium. The Vedas wor- 
shipped God through the forces of nature. David and Elias also saw the 



THE CHURCH 277 

§ 143. In general it is true that wherever cults develop, 
even those full of superstition, there arises a priesthood pro- 
fessing the function of mediator to propitiate the super- 
human power. The priesthood becomes organized, and 
unites with the State, seeking its protection, using its au- 
thority, and lending in turn its potent influence to strengthen 
the secular government. So it has been with the Christian 
Church, an organization that prevails to-day throughout 
Europe and America. To it we will now give special 
attention. 

In the Christian Church we find a purified and exalted 
ethical doctrine, including natural religion supplemented and 
complemented by revelation. Christianity is differentiated 
from other religions by the teaching that Jesus of Nazareth 
is the Christ, the incarnate Son of God, making atonement- by 
the cross, and ever living as Savior and King. 1 It is this 
differentia only that Christian polemics has to defend against 
infidelity. Its expansion constitutes Christology. With 
this a treatise on Ethics has nothing to do ; it is concerned 
only with the generic features which are common. 

manifestations of God's power and wisdom in natural objects so glorious that 
no argument, no logic, no sophistry, could overcome the simplicity of their 
natural religion. Behold, also, God's attributes in the different deities wor- 
shipped in the Hindu Pantheon ! We cannot escape the conclusion that the 
processes of religious development have been universal. . . . Every nation 
has had its different surrounding circumstances. Its climate is different ; 
its geography, its bodily constitution, its mental temperament, its history, 
all different. That these differences should have deeply affected religious 
development is not at all wonderful. But the sense of trust, love, and holi- 
ness in all religions is the same or similar, only the forms disagree. . . . 
Yet I declare that even in the midst of all this variety there is so much in 
common that the student is wonder-struck at the fact of unity. In the 
midst of all the controversies and conflicts that afflict the religious world, 
we come across fundamental truths which are so similar that we are struck 
by the thought that they must have a common soul, a common impulse, a 
common origin, and a common aim." 

1 For the best possible definition of Christianity, see John 3 : 16. 



278 ORGANIZATION 

For, all the great virtues that stand out as cardinal have 
had existence among all peoples from the beginning. The 
decalogue, excepting perhaps the sabbath-day law, contains 
nothing new. All moral obligations binding men to God 
and to each other originate, not in legislation, but in the 
nature which God gave to man, and are determined in detail 
by the variations in his complex relations. The virtues have 
been developing through all the ages among all peoples, and 
are developing to-day under a better understanding, a fuller 
comprehension, a more subservient recognition of personal 
relations and their consequent obligations. No doubt Chris- 
tianity has been and still is powerfully influential in their 
higher development, giving brighter light over a widening 
horizon; but Christianity did not originate them, it merely 
found them, enlarged them, enlightened them. Manifestly, 
the all-informing, all-embracing, fundamental law of Chris- 
tian activity, is the ethical, altruistic law of loving service. 1 

§ 144. Historically the Christian Church emerged from 
Judaism very weak in numbers, and in social influence. Its 
organization, comparable to a shepherd with his flock, was 

1 "It is sufficiently evident," says Guizot, " that morality may exist in- 
dependently of religious ideas ; that the distinction between moral good and 
evil, and the obligation to avoid evil and to cleave to that which is good, are 
laws as much acknowledged by man, in his proper nature, as the laws of Logic, 
springing likewise from a principle within him, and finding likewise their 
application in his life. Granting all this, and yielding up to morality its 
independence, the question naturally arises : Whence cometh morality, and 
whither doth it lead ? This obligation to do good, is it a fact standing by 
itself, without author, without aim ? Doth it not conceal, or rather doth it 
not reveal an origin, a destiny reaching beyond the world ? By this ques- 
tion, which arises spontaneously and inevitably, morality leads man to the 
porch of religion, and opens to him a sphere whence it was not borrowed." — 
History of Civilization, Lecture V. " The real novelty of Christian Ethics," 
says Dr. Broadus, " lies in the fact that Christianity offers not only instruc- 
tion in moral duty, but spiritual help in acting accordingly." — Commentary 
on Matthew, p. 161. 



THE CHURCH 279 

extremely simple and apparently feeble. But its native 
strength was soon manifested. The original hundred and 
twenty speedily became as many thousands. Local churches 
were multiplied. The ' heresy ' was propagated with an 
activity, energy and devoted zeal that knew no bounds. It 
spread into Asia Minor, it invaded Europe, and entered 
Rome. The vast power of the State, then mistress of the 
civilized world, was put forth to suppress the rising ' super- 
stition,' and in the course of three centuries ten fierce and 
bloody persecutions, extending throughout the Empire, and 
waged with all the implacable might of the Roman power, 
sought to crush it, and failed. Gathering new and greater 
strength from adversity, it successfully resisted the oppressor, 
conquered the conqueror, and shared the throne of the 
Caesars. 1 

1 " We can be at no loss to discover the cause of this triumph. No other 
religion, under such circumstances, had ever combined so many distinct ele- 
ments of power and attraction. Unlike the Jewish religion, it was bound 
by no local ties, and was equally adapted for every nation and for every 
class. Unlike Stoicism, it appealed in the strongest manner to the affections, 
and offered all the charms of a sympathetic worship. Unlike the Egyptian 
religions, it united with its distinctive teaching a pure and noble system of 
ethics, and proved itself capable of realizing it in action. It proclaimed, 
amid a vast movement of social and national amalgamation, the universal 
brotherhood of mankind. Amid the softening influence of philosophy and 
civilization, it taught the supreme sanctity of love. To the slave, it was the 
religion of the suffering and the oppressed. To the philosopher it was at 
once an echo of the highest ethics of the later Stoics, and the expansion of 
the best teaching of the school of Plato. ... To a world, grown very 
weary of gazing on the cold and passionless grandeur which Cato realized 
and Lucan sung, it presented an ideal of compassion and of love, an ideal 
destined for centuries to draw around it all that was greatest, as well as all 
that was noblest on earth, a Teacher who could weep by the sepulchre of his 
friend, who was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. ... It was 
because Christianity was true of the moral sentiments of the age, because it 
represented faithfully the supreme type of excellence to which men were 
then tending, because it corresponded with their religious wants, aims, and 
emotions, because the whole spiritual being could then expand and expatiate 
under its influence, that it planted its roots so deeply in the hearts of men." 
— Lecky, History of European Morals, ch. iii, p. 387 sq. 



280 ORGANIZATION 

This affiliation of the Church with the State, in the middle 
of the fourth century, together with an increasing complexity 
and solidarity of organization, gave even greater efficiency to 
its propagandism. Apparently weakened by the schism into 
East and West, into Greek and Latin, it nevertheless with- 
stood the floods of barbarians that overwhelmed and over- 
threw the Empire, converted and subdued them, saved 
Christianity for Europe, and ruled the continent throughout 
the mediseval centuries. 1 In modern times, beginning with 
the sixteenth century, a further division of the Western 
Church into Catholic and Protestant, with many subdivi- 
sions, has occurred, which seems to have stimulated rather 
than impaired its zealous activity. Thus during two millen- 
niums, amid the rise and fall of States and Empires, the 
Church has maintained its growing power, and to-day Chris- 
tendom embraces Europe and America, and is pressing its 
jurisdiction into Asia, Africa, and the isles of the sea. 2 

1 Strikingly similar is the historical spread of Buddhism, propagated 
from India over eastern Asia and Japan, by its lofty ethics, and the promise 
of Karma and Nirvana ; and of Mohammedanism, propagated from Arabia 
over western Asia and northern Africa, by the sword and the Koran, with 
its promise to the faithful of a paradise of houris. Mohammedanism swept 
Christianity out of Asia and Africa, excepting the feeble remnants in Arme- 
nia and Abyssinia ; and Christianity in southern Europe was threatened 
with a like fate from the invasions of the northern barbarians overthrowing 
the Roman Empire. " Humanly speaking, it is not too much to aver," 
says Guizot, "that in the fourth and fifth centuries, it was the organized 
Christian Church that saved Christianity ; the Church with its institutions, 
its magistrates, its authority, which struggled so vigorously to prevent the 
internal dissolution of the Empire, which struggled against the barbarian, 
and in fact overcame the barbarian, it was this Church that became the 
great connecting link, the principle of civilization, between the Roman and 
the barbarian worlds. ' ' — Hist. Civ. , Lee. ii. Cf. Lectures V, and VI, on 
The Christian Church. 

2 " Christianity enjoyed no privileges and claimed no immunities when it 
boldly confronted and confounded the most ancient and most powerful reli- 
gions of the world. Even at the present day it craves no mercy, and it 
receives no mercy. Unless our religion has ceased to be what it was, its 



THE CHURCH 281 

§ 145. What therein determines this unique persistence 
and expanding potency is not far to seek. First, there is an 
exalted, purified and extended morality, approving itself to 
the heart and conscience of humanity as in accord with its 
ideal constitution and the natural order of life among men, 
which morality is taught in precept and urged in practice. 
Secondly, there is an enlarged and enlightened view of our 
relation and obligation to God as Our Father, giving to 
natural religion a clearness and cogency never attained in 
the schools of philosophy. Thirdly, there is a well settled 
claim of a divine origin, of a divine founder in the person of 
Jesus of Nazareth, of a divine revelation promising redemp- 
tion to the faithful and eternal blessedness to the righteous. 
We would not ignore but heartily approve the further claim 
of the Church that it is multiplied, upheld and impelled by 
the immanent Spirit of God ; but, from a historic and philo- 
sophic point of view the aforementioned principles go far 
toward explaining the phenomenal strength and growth of 
this the most durable and comprehensive of all human 
organizations. 

Moreover, consider the ends for which the Church pro- 
poses itself as the means. It claims to have solved the 
problem of life, to interpret its meaning, and to offer sure 
guidance to the faithful. Maintaining that our terrestrial 
life is teleologically justified only by the fact that it is related 
to a higher life, to a life beyond, and therefore has import, 
not as an end in itself, but as a period of preparation and 
probation for eternal life, it proclaims to restless humanity : 

defenders should not shrink from any trial of strength." — Max Mullek, 
Science of Religion, Lee. i. Let me, the writer of this treatise, reverently 
add, that a religion which cannot abide the most searching investigation of 
philosophy and of physical science, a Bible which cannot pass unscathed the 
fire of adverse criticism, of skeptical, hostile criticism, that religion, that 
Bible are not for me. Let research go freely on, free from all check save 
fact and logic ; the result, we need not fear. 



282 ORGANIZATION 

Come unto me, and find your promised rest. " We may con- 
cede that the teleology of history has never reached a system 
formally more complete than the philosophy of the Church. 
Heaven and eternal happiness the goal of historical life, the 
earth its temporal scene of action, its central point the incar- 
nation of God and the foundation of the Kingdom of heaven 
on earth, all past ages leading up to this culmination which 
shall determine the entire future, the whole course of history 
bounded by the day of creation on the one hand and the day 
of judgment on the other, these indeed constitute such a 
grand philosophy of history that Hegel's or Comte's barren 
abstractions are mere nothing when compared with the fruit- 
ful, concrete conception." 1 Under the shield of this massive 
doctrine, and by right of its divine ordination, the Church is 
claiming ownership and actively seeking possession of the 
whole world in the name of its living King. 

§ 146. In the fourth century the Church was incorporated 
with the State. It is generally admitted by ecclesiastical his- 
torians that, from and after the time of Constantine, the ori- 
ginal constitution of the Church was overlaid by a vast body 
of human additions, particularly by the hierarchy, assimilating 
the magistracy by a long gradation of ecclesiastical dignities 
or powers, rising upward from the primitive pastor or curate 
to the bishop, to the pope or patriarch ; and that by these 
and other results of the alliance of the Church with the 
Empire, its simplicity was lost, its purity corrupted, and the 
prior relations of the clergy and laity injuriously affected. 2 

1 Translated, with some verbal adaptation, from Paulsen's Einleitung in 
die Philosophie, Berlin, 2d ed., 1893 ; bk. I, ch. ii, § 3 (p. 178). 

2 "If it be assumed that Platonism was among the causes which led to 
the development of the mediaeval hierarchy, its influence must be conceived 
as mainly indirect and exerted through the doctrines of Philo, the Neo- 
Platonists, and the Church Fathers, all of whom had been especially attracted 
and influenced by the Platonic doctrine of the ultra-phenomenal world. But 



THE CHURCH 283 

Yet " it was of immense advantage to European civilization 
that a moral influence, a moral power, a power resting entirely 
upon moral convictions, upon moral opinions and sentiments, 
should have established itself in society, just at the period 
when it seemed on the point of being crushed by an over- 
whelming physical force. Had not the thoroughly organized 
Church at this time existed, the whole world must have 
fallen a prey to mere brute power. It alone possessed a 
moral power; it maintained and promulgated the idea of 
a precept, of a law superior to all human authority ; it pro- 
claimed that great truth which forms the only foundation of 
our hope for humanity, namely, that there exists a law above 
all human law, which, by whatever name it be called, whether 
reason, or the law of God, or what not, is, at all times and in 
all places, eternally one and the same." 2 

In the course of the centuries, however, the alliance of the 
Church with the State proved unwholesome. An arrogant 
and ambitious clergy endeavored to render its rule entirely 
independent of the people, to bring them under authority, to 
take possession of their mind and life without the conviction 
of their reason or the consent of their will. Claiming to be 
in possession of the keys, it exercised a spiritual lordship of 
almost unbounded power. It endeavored with all its might 
to establish a theocracy, to usurp the temporal authority of 
the State, to establish universal dominion. The struggle for 
supremacy between the Church and the State, always at the 
expense of the liberties of the people, often resulted in the 
subjugation and subservience of the latter ; and the former, 
asserting its catholicity, was for centuries the dominant power 

whatever judgment may be passed on the question of historic dependence, 
and setting aside many specific differences, the general character of the Pla- 
tonic State and that of the Christian hierarchy of the Middle Ages are 
essentially the same." — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., § 43, note, 
1 Guizot, Hist. Civ., Lee. ii. 



2 84 OR GANIZA TION 

over Europe. Ecclesiastical dissension and division, in some 
States, broke this dominion, but the ill-starred communion of 
the two organizations has persisted, an unholy alliance, con- 
fusing the sacred with the secular to the prejudice of both. 1 

The end, the ultimate purpose for which the State exists, 
and that for winch the Church exists, are quite distinct, and 
their rightful means of attaining their ends have little in 
common. The proper function of the State is concerned with 
the material prosperity, the external wealth of its citizens ; 
the proper function of the Church is concerned with the 
spiritual prosperity, the internal weal of its clergy and laity. 
The one seeks to protect and promote the health and wealth 
of the body politic ; the other to edify and multiply its adhe- 
rents. Membership in the one is quite involuntary ; in the 
other it is essentially voluntary. The one upholds its au- 
thority by physical force ; the other by moral force alone, 
having no penalties beyond censure and excommunication. 
The State has sharply marked geographical limits which it 
may not transgress ; the Church, expanding its realm, freely 
invades all other realms. The former is in no sense a propa- 
gandist ; the latter is essentially a missionary. In their union 
the lines of demarcation become obscured, and each under- 
takes more or less the office of the other, leading to a strug- 
gle for mastery and a consequent hinderance of efficiency. 
Christendom has greatly suffered, and is still suffering from 

1 Still, Mr. Gladstone, an eminent Statesman, in one of his later Essays, 
strongly advocates the maintenance of the union ; but, on the other hand, 
the Bishop of Peterborough, a high Ecclesiastic of the established Church 
of England, in a recent Essay, says : "The Church is not and cannot become 
the State. These words stand for two wholly distinct and different societies, 
having different aims, different laws, and different methods of Government. 
The State exists for the preservation of men's bodies ; the Church for the 
salvation of their souls. The aim of the State, even put at its highest, is 
the welfare of its citizens in this world ; the aim of the Church is their holi- 
ness here in order to their welfare hereafter. The duty of the Church is to 
eradicate sin; the duty of the State is to punish and prevent crime." 



THE CHURCH 285 

this error. And not without warning. For, at the very 
origin of the Church, their prospective divorce, their separate 
functions, their distinct work and harmonious adjustment, 
were declared in the profoundly wise prescription of its 
founder : Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and 
unto God the things that are God's. 1 

1 According to Plato, the chief end of the State is the training of its citi- 
zens to virtue. " Our object," says he, " in founding the State is that, not 
a class, but that all may be made as happy as possible." — Republic, iv, 
420 b. Elsewhere he teaches that happiness depends on culture and justice, 
or the possession of moral beauty and goodness. — Gorgias, 470 e. Accord- 
ing to Aristotle, the State originated for the protection of life, but ought to 
exist for the promotion of morally upright living, its principal function being 
the development of moral capacity in all its citizens, but especially in the 
young by education. The end is of higher order than the causes which brought 
it into being ; 17 tt6\ls -yivo^vt] yJkv odv rod ^rjv %v€kcl, od<ra dt rod e& {t}v. — ■ 
Politica, i, 2. The end is good living, ed fijp, that is, the morality of the 
citizens and their happiness as founded on virtue. Id. vii, 8. These eminent 
authorities seem hardly to have distinguished the political from the religious 
institutions, and there can be no doubt that their views greatly influenced 
those of statesmen and ecclesiastics of the Roman and mediseval periods. 

Only in quite modern times, and particularly in America, has a complete 
separation been made between Church and State. An entering wedge was 
driven by Lord Baltimore in 1634, and another by Roger Williams in 1685, 
who as pioneers founded colonies with a guaranty, the one of religious tol- 
eration, the other of religious liberty. But it was reserved for the State of 
Virginia, in its reorganization as an independent commonwealth, formally 
to enact the divorce as an integral part of its organic law. The Virginia 
Bill of Rights, adopted June 12th, 1776, closes with § 16, as follows: "That 
religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of dis- 
charging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence ; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience ; and that it is the mutual 
duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each 
other." The Bill of Rights was incorporated with the State Constitution, 
enacted June 29th, 1776 ; and, in pursuance of its provision, the famous 
Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, drawn by Thomas Jefferson, was 
enacted December 16th, 1785. See Code of 1849, ch. 76. Other States in- 
cluded the same principle in their several Constitutions, and at the instance 
of Virginia, it was incorporated in the Constitution of the United States, as 
a part of Amendment First, thus : " Congress shall make no law respecting 



286 ORGANIZATION 

§ 147. A local church politically free, and constituted 
simply of a pastor, deacons and lay members, is strictly and 
distinctly an organism. Very generally, local churches come 
into organic union with each other, constituting synods, con- 
ferences, councils. These again organize into yet more com- 
prehensive ecclesise or general assemblies, officered by a 
hierarchy of priests, bishops, and other clergy, whose consti- 
tutional functions are formally defined. All the various 
groups of church organization, of various denomination, not- 
withstanding their differences and dissensions, are furthermore 
in reality organized into a holy Church universal, one truly 
catholic, by their common acceptance of the New Testament 
as organic and ultimate law, interpreted, and in some cases 
modified, as in the Church of Rome, by ecclesiastical au- 
thority. In the universal and intensely active Christian 
Church, with its many subsidiary organizations, their officers 
and members, we discover the most extensive, complete and 
powerful organism ever known, and one which is rapidly 
realizing the ancient dream of universal empire in an organic 
unification of mankind. 

From the varied relations obtaining in this Christian body, 
wherein all are members one of another, arises a multiplicity 
of special obligations and active duties calling for a never 
flagging constancy and devotion, and heartily recognized as 
displacing by superior claim all conflicting calls. Each mem- 
ber confesses that he belongs to the Church, and does not 
hesitate to name this servitude as a sufficient reason for his 
special conduct. On the other hand, the Church belongs to 
him, serving to edify his spiritual worth. Moreover, it is a 
common brotherhood, a communion, a fellowship one with 
another, and with the divine head, all working together for 

an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." In 
the United States there is, therefore, at last a severance of Church and 
State, and each pursues its end without let or hinderance from the other. 



THE CHURCH 287 

nearness and likeness to God. These obligations ramify 
throughout every other class of duties, intensify and sanctify 
them. The Christian man among men, the Christian father, 
mother, son and daughter, the Christian member of the com- 
munity where his lot is cast, the Christian man of affairs, the 
Christian citizen and statesman, is more closely bound in 
each and all of these relations by virtue of his Christian con- 
fession, and finds therein new and higher, the highest motives 
for ordering all his conduct on the principles inculcated by 
the Christian Church. Thus this spiritual organism enters 
into, and exerts a dominant influence over, all the relations 
and obligations of our temporal life, while looking and pre- 
paring for the eternal life beyond. 1 

It has been pointed out that natural religion in its origin 
and perfection is ethics, also that the Christian religion is 
ethics extended, confirmed, refined. The revelation of God 
in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, expands obliga- 

1 u To one who admits the organic unity of the human race," says Dr. 
Gladden, " the notion that Christ's law is ultra-rational is absurd. It is and 
must he the law of the organism. It is the simple scientific expression of 
the relation of the members to the body. The bond that unites us to our 
fellows is, therefore, one that we cannot sunder. To sever ourselves from 
our kind is self -mutilation. This is not some counsel of perfection for 
saints ; it is the fundamental fact of life. All our industry, all our social 
organization, must conform to it. No man liveth unto himself. Our daily 
work is a social function. Wealth is valueless and impossible apart from 
human fellowship. Not to keep this steadily before us in our administra- 
tion of all our affairs is to be false to the primary human obligation. To set 
up natural law in the social world or the business world, as distinct from 
and contrary to the Christian law, is not only unmoral, it is unscientific. 
Love is the fulfilling of all law. And not only do these ideas make our life 
sacred and love our daily regimen, they ought to fill us also with confidence 
and courage. The kingdom that we pray for and fight for is not a mere 
hope, it is a solid reality. When we say that we are working together with 
God, we know what we mean. We can discern his working, and can be 
confident that we are helping in the fulfilment of his great designs. The 
signs of his presence and power are everywhere." —Ruling Ideas of the 
Present Age, ch. x. 



288 ORGANIZATION 

tion heavenward, and widens its horizon to embrace all man- 
kind. The ethics of every day life, which is not itself 
distinctively Christian, finds its complement in the doctrines 
of the Church. The teachings of the Teacher have enlight- 
ened human reason, cleared the moral judgment, exalted the 
moral sentiments, purified motives, and subdued the will. 
The realm is enlarged, but it is the realm of ethics still, 
involving conscience, obligation, duty, gratitude, love. We 
found the moral law to be Thou shalt not trespass either by 
invasion of rights or by evasion of dues, having an equivalent 
in Be thou just, and in Thou shalt love and serve. Chris- 
tianity lays no other mandate. The loving service of God, 
and of his Christ, and of his creatures, a fellowship in mutual 
self-sacrifice, is its very essence ; and clear definitions of 
duty, pressing incentives to activity, and divinely ordained 
means of efficiency, are supplied by its organized Church. 



FINIS. 



index 



The number refers to the page. For general topics, see Table of Contents. 



Alford, on the unjust judge, 122 n, 
Alter ego, 145, 146, 147. 
Altruism of the doctrine, 151. 

— etymology of, 151 n. 
Argument for existence of God, 20, 
Aristotle, cited on motive, 9 n. 

— on deliberation, 11 n. 

— on condition of choice, 15 n. 

— on definition of pure reason, 16 n. 

— on definition of Nature, 25 n. 

— on etymology of ethics, 36 n. 

— on principle, 46 n. 

— on the basis of ethics, 48 n. 

— on liberty, 51 n. 

— on customary laws, 66 n. 

— on prohibition of law, 92 n. 

— on the golden rule, 93 n. 

— on Ethics and Politics, 103 n. 

— on pleasure and pain, 104. 

— on retribution, 103 n. 

— on intuition of right, 111 n. 

— on meaning of justice, 125 n. 

— on Antigone's defense, 128 n. 

— on equity, 129 n., 131 n. 

— on doing injustice, 134 n. 

— on definition of virtue, 140, 207. 

— on the golden mean, 141 n. 

— on self-love, 147 n. 

— on love, from Hesiod, 177 n. 

— and Paul, certain words of, 180 n. 

— on happiness, 191 n. 

— on hylozoism, 214 n. 

— on the state, 250 n. 

— on best form of the state, 251 n. 

— on purpose of the state, 257 n, 285 n. 

— elements of society, 258 n. 

— on compulsory education, 260 n. 
Arnold, Matthew, cited on deity, 197. 
Arthur, on physical and moral law, 28 n. 
Auerbach, on law of love, 177 n. 

— on custom vs. morals, 241 n. 
Augustine, on summum bonum, 193 n. 



Austin, definition of law, 32 n. 

— on liberty and right, 50 n. 

— on distribution of rights, 62 n. 

— on ambiguity of civil, 90 n. 

— on effect of sanction, 96 n. 

— on legal right, 109 n. 

— on responsibility for belief, 119 n. 
Axioms, the three, 161 n. 

Bacon, cited on providence, 22 n. 

— on meaning of ethics, 36 n. 

— on limit of man's power, 54 n. 

— on utility, 194 n. 

Bailey, on belief and disbelief, 119 n. 
Basis of ethics, 38, 47, 48 n., 60. 
Belief, responsibility for, 119. 
Bentham, his use of deontology, 36 n. 

— on overt action, 114 n. 

— on asceticism, 151 n. 

— on utility, 183 n., 194 n. 

Bishop of Ava. on Buddhism, 276 n. 
Bishop of Peterborough, on state, 260 n. 

— on church and state, 284 n. 
Black, on definition of law, 32 n. 
Blackstone, definition of law, 32 n. 

— on civil law, 90 n. 

— on superiority of moral law, 128 n. 

— on definition of contract, 243 n. 
Bledsoe, on ground of right, 204 n. 
Broadus, on Christian Ethics, 278 n. 
Brougham, on sincerity in belief, 119 n. 
Browne, cited on Aristotle's ethics, 48 n. 
Browning, on recreation, 151 n. 

— on self-sacrifice, 163 n. 
Brutes, rights of, 45 n., 137 n. 
Bulwer, on home, 224 n. 

Burke, the state a partnership, 260 n. 
Butler, on methods in ethics, 39 n. 

— on anger, 72 n. 

— on definition of conscience, 78 n. 

— on supremacy of conscience, 82 n. 

— on self-love, 147 n. 



289 



290 



INDEX 



Butler, on law of love, 178 n. 
Byron, on solitude, 240 n. 

Calderwood, definition of conscience, 78 n. 

— on authority of conscience, 82 n. 

— on the law, its formula, 90 n. 
Calhoun, on a constitution, 252 n. 
Carlyle, on suffering injustice, 134 n. 

— on moral progress, 157 n. 

— on happiness, 185 n., 196 n. 
Categorical imperative, 81, 91 n. 
Charity, etymology of, 173 n. 
Choice, its conditions and issue, 11. 

— reality of, 14. 

Christians, bond-servants, 143 n., 181 n. 
Christianity, differentia of, 277. 
Church and state, separation of, 285 n. 
Cicero, on definition of ethics, 40 n. 

— on principle, 46 n. 

— on meaning of justice, 125 n. 

— his officium and honestum, 136 n. 

— on highest good, 193 n. 

— on origin of law, 205 n. 

— on supreme law, 256 n. 

— on continuity of the state, 259 n. 
Civil law, taken generically, 90. 
Cleanthes, hymn of, 275. 

Coker, on unusual punishment, 104 n. 
Common law, anticipated, 66 n. 

— its origin, 253 n. 
Complacency, love of, 173 n. 
Comteists, their doctrine, 197. 
Condition, its kinds, 6 n. 
Conflict of desires, its regulation, 6. 
Conscience, definition of, 3, 77, 78 n. 

— a postulate of ethics, 18. 

— supremacy of, 82 n., 97 n. 
Constitution, English, 252 n. 
Constitution, U. S., on punishment, 104 n. 

— on validity of contracts, 243 n. 

— preamble of, 252 n. 

— on church and state, 285 n. 
Contract, Rousseau's social, 261 n. 
Cousin, formula of the law, 91 n. 

— on right and duty, 138 n. 

Cook, definition of conscience, 78 n. 
Cosmological argument modified, 20. 
Cown, cited on evolution, 21 n. 
Creation, absolute, 23 n. 
Cromwell, to men of England, 262 n. 
Cruelty, definition of, 137 n. 

Decalogue examined, 87, 88 n. 
Defense of possessions, 168. 

— personal and national, 72, 266. 



Definition of mind, 1. 

— of pure intuition or reason, 3, 16 n. 

— of conscience, 3, 77, 78 n. 

— of desire, 5, 15 n. 

— of volition or will, 8. 

— of philosophy, 13 n. 

— of person, perfect and imperfect, 19. 

— of individual, 24 n. 

— of nature, 25 n. 

— of organism, 27, 212 

— of law, 31, 32 n. 

— of science, 35. 

— of deontology, 36 n. 

— of ethics, 36, 38 n., 40 n. 

— of virtue, 36 n., 140. 

— of moral, 40 n. 

— of principle, 46 n., 64. 

— of normal, 46 n. 

— of duress, 58 n. 

— of pleasure and pain, 104. 

— of attempt, 115. 

— of justice, 124, 131 n., 267 n. 

— of cruelty, 137 n. 

— of duty, Kant's, 169 n. 

— of welfare, 186. 

— of supernatural, 201 n. 

— of contract, 243 n. 

— of religion, 272. 
Deity, existence of, 20. 
Deliberation, prior to choice, 11, 15 n. 
Demosthenes, on moral principle, 47 n 

— on origin of law, 127 n. 
Deontology, etymology of, 36 n. 
Desire, defined and divided, 5, 6, 45. 
Determination, causal, rational, 15 n. 
Divorce, history of, sketched, 229 n. 

— of church and state, 285. 
Duality of the universe, 213 n. 
Dueling a crime, 73 n. 

Dumas, on defense of liberty, 168 n. 
Duncan, on law of love, 178 n. 
Duress, legal definition of, 58 n. 
Duty, etymology of, 136 n. 

— definition of, Kant's, 169 n. 

— to self, 147. 

Earth, a cosmic unity, 28. 
Economy, duty of, 149 n. 
Edersheim, on number of laws, 89 n. 
Effort, its issue in attention, 12. 
Epictetus, on liberty, 55 n., 143 n. 
Ethics, etymology of, 36 n. 

— of standard literature, 163 n. 
Etymology of person, 18 n. 

— of ethics, 36 n. 



INDEX 



291 



Etymology of obligation, 36 n. 

— of right, 36 n., 107 n. 

— of deontology, 36 n. 

— of moral, 40 n. 

— of principle, 46 n. 

— of conduct, 49 n. 

— of trespass, 64 n. 

— of conscience, 77 n. 

— of pain, 105 n. 

— of wrong, 107 n. 

— of just, 124 n. 

— of duty, 136 n. 

— of virtue, 139 n. 

— of altruism, 151 n. 

— of minister, 162 n. 

— of talent, 168 n. 

— of endeavor, 172 n. 

— of benevolence, 172 n. 

— of charity, 173 n. 

— of Greek for man, 200 n. 

— of religion, 206 n. 

— of common, 238 n. 

Evolution of the moral impulse, 7 n. 

— hypothesis of, 37, 41 n. 

— of ethics, 194, 202. 

Farrar, on the commandments, 88 n. 
Feuerbach, on legal guilt, 116 n. 
Fichte, on theory of rights, 63 n. 

— on formula of the law, 91 n. 
Findlay, on methods in ethics, 39 n. 

— on moral power, 80 n. 

— on supremacy of conscience, 97 n. 

— on personality of deity, 198 n. 
First cause, existence of, 20. 
Fleming, on rectitude, 107 n. 
Freedom, the essence of choice, 11. 

— a postulate of Ethics, 15. 

— and liberty discriminated, 55. 
Froebel, on future reward, 179 n. 

— on our children, 230 n., 231 n. 
Froude, on happiness, 185 n. 

Gaboriau, on suicide, 167 n. 
Gambling a vice, 73 n. 

— a trespass, 168 n. 
Gibbon, on asceticism, 152 n. 
Gladden, on Christian law, 287 n. 
God, existence of, 20. 

Godet, definition of supernatural, 201 n. 
Goethe, on part for whole, 28 n. 

— on love of God universal, 273 n. 
Golden rule, 93 n. 

Golden mean, 141 n. 
Good, kinds of, 192. 



Grant, on the Lesbian rule, 129 n. 
Gratitude as commanded, 175. 
Grote, cited on Aristotle, 191 n. 
Grotius, on justice, 125 n. 
Guizot, on cities, 258 n. 

— on morality and religion, 278 n. 

— on Christianity saved, 280 n. 

— on church and civilization, 283. 

Haggard, on immortality of acts, 96 n. 
Hamilton, definition of science, 35. 

— on Kant's peroration, 86 n. 
Happiness the reflex of welfare, 188. 
Harrison, Frederic, cited, 197 n. 
Hawthorne, on repair of guilt, 96 n. 

— on love and hate, 177 n. 
Hegel, formula of the law, 91 n. 

— on the idea of God, 275 n. 

Henry, Patrick, on rights and duties, 138 n, 
Herakleitos, on unity of the law, 211 n. 
Hickok, formula of the law, 90 n. 
Hillel, the golden rule, 94 n. 
Hobbes, on right reason, 79 n. 

— on the effect of sanction, 96 n. 

— on law of human nature, 202 n. 
Hooker, on appetite and will, 10 n. 

— on definition of law, 32 n. 

— on rectitude, 107 n. 
Honor, personal, 71. 
Horace, on the past, 11 n. 

— on the outwardly just, 125 n. 

Hugo, Victor, on criminal neglect, 124 n. 

— on moral parity of sexes, 227 n. 

— on excellence of society, 238 n. 
Humanity personified, 197. 
Hutcheson, on utility, 194 n. 
Huxley, on evolution of morals, 37 n. 
Hyslop, on rights, 62 n. 

Illingworth, on mind as object, 145 n. 
Intuition, pure, defined, 3, 16 n. 

— of the ethical principle, 40, 43, 47. 

— of the notion of a right, 60. 

— of the moral law, 76. 

— of right vs. wrong, 110. 

James, on mutual trust, 244 n. 
Janet, definition of conscience, 79 n. 

— on Kantian good will, 84 n. 

— on personal excellence, 155 n. 
Jefferson, on religious freedom, 285 n. 
Jones, Sir Wm., on the state, 254 n. 
Judgment, the moral, distinguished, 3. 
Justice, definitions of, 124, 267 n. 
Juvenal, on virtue, 140 n., 187 n. 



292 



INDEX 



Kant, on philosophy, 13 n. 

— on definition of desire, 15 n. 

— on will as causality, 16 n. 

— on freedom and the law, 16 n. 

— on definition of pure reason, 16 n. 

— on postulates of Ethics, 20 n. 

— on proof of existence of God, 20 n. 

— on theses of philosophy, 23 n. 

— on kingdom of ends, 26 n. 

— on value and dignity, 71 n. 

— on definition of conscience, 78 n. 

— on imperatives, 82 n. 

— on good will, 84. 

— on excellence of moral law, 86 n. 

— on formula of the law, 91 n. 

— on duties to self, 147 n. 

— on using other persons, 165. 

— on duty, 169 n. 

— on love as commanded, 173 n. 

— on private felicity, 184 n. 

— on happiness, 189 n., 191 n., 195 n. 

— on method, 192 n. 

— on perfection as principle, 204 n. 

— on imperatives for divine will, 207 n. 

— on organism, 214 n. 

— on deception, 242 n. 
Kent, on municipal law, 90 n. 

— on divorce, 229 n. 
Kingdom of ends, 26, 33 n. 
Kiilpe, on philosophy, 13 n. 

— on theories of morals, 41 n. 

Law of relativity, 17. 

— its ultimate ground, 30. 

— its definition and kinds, 31, 32. 

— the moral, 76, 86 n., 123, 161, 177. 

— the royal, 93 n. 

— civil and moral, 32 n., 90, 102 n. 

— of love, 176. 

Lecky, on varieties of judgment, 79 n. 

— on responsibility for belief, 119 n. 

— on triumph of Christianity, 279 n. 
Leibnitz, on the two realms, 26 n., 29 n. 

— on definition of justice, 267 n. 
Lesbian rule, 129 n. 

Lex talionis, 103. 

Liberty and right, 49, 50 n. 

— and freedom discriminated, 55. 

— and law, 143. 

— in perfect love only, 181. 
Lieber, on right and duty, 138 n. 
Limit of man's power, 52. 
Literature, standard, ethics of, 163 n. 
Livingstone, on right and wrong, 111 n. 
Locke, definition of conscience, 78 n. 



Lotze, on divisions of metaphysics, 13 n. 

— on reality of relations, 25 n. 

— on right to freedom, 47 n. 

— on possession, 49 n. 

— on ground of property, 68 n. 

— on retribution for injury, 73 n. 

— on definition of conscience, 78 n. 

— on natural rights, 61 n. 

— on non-interference, 91 n. 

— on society unlike man, 220 n. 

— on enthusiasm for science, 239 n. 

— on common conscience, 259 n. 

— on ground of punishment, 263 n. 
Lowell, on the gift and the giver, 170 n. 
Love as commanded, 173. 

— as law, 176. 

— and liberty, etymology of, 182 n. 

Mansel, definition of individual, 24 n. 
Martensen, cited on freedom, 16 n. 
Martineau, on duties to self, 148 n. 
McCosh, definition of conscience, 78 n. 
McLaren, Alex., on freedom, 143 n. 
Metaphysics, divisions of, 13 n. 
Michelet, on prohibition of law, 92 n. 
Mill, cited on evolution, 21 n. 

— on limit of man's power, 54 n. 

— on the ultimate sanction, 96 n. 

— on utilitarianism, 184 n., 194 n. 

— on mutual trust, 244 n. 

— on government, how judged, 252 n. 
Milton, cited on conscience, 98 n. 

— on chastity, 140 n. 
Mind, its own object, 145 n. 
Minister, etymology of, 162 n. 
Minor, definition of law, 32 n. 
Montesquieu, definition of law, 32 n. 

— on just and unjust, 131 n. 

— on law in general, 256 n. 
Motive, the desire that prevails, 9 n. 
Motley, on helping an enemy, 160 n. 
Mozoomdar, on universal religion, 276 n. 
Moore, Henry, the golden rule, 93 n. 
Moral judgment distinguished, 3. 

— sentiment examined, 4, 5. 

— impulse, its function, 7. 
Morality and revelation, 261 n. 
Morals, definition of, 40 n. 

— theories of, distributed, 40 n. 
Mulford, on ethical vs. physical, 221 n. 

— on Shakespeare's the state, 258 n. 

— on continuity of the state, 259 n. 
Muller, on man looking upward, 200 n. 

— on the universal prayer, 273 n. 

— on Christianity persistent, 280 n. 



INDEX 



293 



Necessity, kinds of, 81 n. 
Neighbor, who is my, 175 n. 
New Psychology, a criticism, 2 n. 

— its method, 43 n. 

Newman, on personality of deity, 198 n. 
Normal defined, 46 n. 

Obligation, etymology of, 36 n. 
Organism, definition of, 27, 212. 
Ought, its origin and meaning, 136 n. 
Ovid, on man looking upward, 200 n. 

Pain and pleasure, Bentham on, 183 n. 

— as punishment, 105. 
Pantheism, 274. 

Paternoster, use of terms in, 64 n, 89 n. 
Paternal theory of the state, 261 n. 
Paulsen, cited on philosophy, 13 n. 

— from von Baer, on nature, 28 n. 

— on problem of ethics, 39 n. 

— on basis of ethics, 48 n. 

— on definition of conscience, 78 n. 

— on conscience and reality, 83 n. 

— on personality of deity, 198 n. 

— on philosophy of the church, 282. 
Perfect and imperfect rights, 65 n. 
Person, etymology of, 18 n. 

— definition of, 19. 

Philosophy, various definitions of, 13 n. 
Plato, cited on existence of God, 20 n. 

— on definition of ethics, 36 n. 

— on doing injustice, 134 n. 

— on virtue and vice, 140 n. 

— on highest good, 193 n. 

— on know thyself, 211 n. 

— on the state, its pattern, 220 n. 

— on compulsory education, 260 n. 

— on end of the state, 285 n. 
Pleasure and pain defined, 104. 
Pope, on philanthropy, 176 n. 

— on happiness, 189 n. 
Positivists, their ritual, 197 n. 
Powers of mind distributed, 2, 45. 
Principle defined, 46 n. 

— the moral, 46, 47. 
Property, ground of, 68. 

Pure intuition or reason, 3, 16 n, 76. 
Pythagorean definition of virtue, 36 n. 

— the decad, 88 n. 

Racine, on peace of God, 206 n. 
Rankin, on law of love, 178 n. 
Realms of kingdom of ends. 33 n. 
Reason, or pure intuition, 3, 16 n, 76. 
Reasons not causes, 57. 



Relations, philosophy of, 24. 
Religion, etymology of, 206 n. 

— definition of, 272. 
Renan, on philosophy, 13 n. 
Responsibility, condition of, 16. 
Revolution and rebellion, 268 n. 
Right, etymology of, 36 n, 107 n. 

— and a right coextensive, 108. 
Rights, basis of, 45, 47, 60. 

— distribution of, in Civil Law, 62 n. 

— moral and legal, 109. 

— Virginia Bill of, 49 n., 162 n., 252 n. 

262 n., 268, 285 n. 
Robinson, on scripture incentives, 102 n. 
Roman law, rights distributed, 62 n. 
Rousseau, on liberty, 55 n. 

— on altruistic limit, 116 n. 

— on suicide, 167 n. 

— on contract social, 261 n. 

Sanction, its meaning, 96 n. 
Say, on society natural to man, 237 n. 
Schleiermacher, formula of the law, 91 n. 
Schopenhauer, on duty of love, 180 n. 
Seeley, on perfect liberty, 143 n. 

— on a universal state, 271. 
Seneca, the golden rule, 94 n. 

— on happiness, 191 n. 
Sentiments, the moral, examined, 4, 5. 
Servants, Christians, 143 n., 181 n. 
Sidgwick, cited on method, 192 n. 
Shakespeare, cited on moralize, 40 n. 

— on self-condemnation, 99 n. 

— on intent and act, 115 n. 

— on justice and mercy, 132 n., 133 n. 

— on intending injustice, 134 n. 

— on owe and own, 136 n. 

— on talents as trusts, 167 n. 

— on final justice, 199 n. 

— on the state, 258 n. 

Sin defined, a trespass, 75. 
Sophocles, Antigone's defense, 128 n. 
South on condition of volition, 10 n. 
Spencer, on knowledge, 13 n. 

— on interested action, 153 n. 

— on the Unknowable, 198. 

— on society like man, 221 n. 
Spinoza, on happiness, 191 n. 
Stahl, on loving service, 180 n. 
State not philanthropic, 270 n. 
Stewart, on definition of virtue, 36 n. 
Stewardship, 166. 

Stoics, their ethical basis, 48 n. 

— their doctrine of pleasure, 185 n. 

— their doctrine of happiness, 191 n. 



3 4 



iH-2/'3 



294 



INDEX 




Story, on equity, 130 n. 
Suicide, 167 n. 
Sumruum bonum, 192. 

Talents as trusts, 168. 

Teleology, 26, 

Theories of morals distributed, 40 n. 

Trendelenburg, on treason, 268 n. 

Trespass, etymology of, 64 n. 

Trumbull, on lying, 242 n. 

Ueberweg, cited on philosophy, 13 n. 

— on principle, 46 n. 

— on doctrine of Stoics, 48 n., 185 n. 

— on Aristotle on liberty, 51 n. 

— on Platonism and Christianity, 282 n. 
Utilitarianism, 193. 

Valentine, on intuition of rights, 110 n. 
Vice a trespass, 70. 
Virginia Bill of Rights, see Eights. 
Virtue, etymology of, 139 n. 
Voltaire, on existence of God, 197. 



Voltaire, on luxuries, 246 n. 
Volition or will defined, 8. 

— its relations and exercise, 9, 10. 
Vocation, its meaning, 247 n. 

War, its sole justification, 269. 
Wayland, definition of conscience, 78 n. 
Welfare, definition of, 186. 
Whewell, on deontology, 36 n. 

— on Plato and Butler, 48 n. 

— on supreme law, 83 n. 

-»- on right and a right, 108 n. 
Will or volition defined, 8. 

— its relations and exercise, 9, 10. 
Williams, Monier, on Buddhism, 274 n. 
Wolfius, definition of justice, 131 n. 
Wrong, etymology of, 107 n. 

Wundt, on mental faculties, 2 n. 

— on philosophy, 13 n. 

Xenophon, on summary of the law, 89 n. 

— on suffering injustice, 134 n. 



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